S. K. DHAON, J. ( 1 ) THIS Criminal Misc. Application (No. 2629 of 1984) and the accompanying Criminal Misc. Application (No. 8575 of 1983) under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) arise out of the same proceedings under section 145 of the Code. Therefore, they can be conveniently disposed of by a common order. ( 2 ) THE police, at the instance of the applicant, who is a pradhan of a Gaon Sabha, submitted a report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. On the basis of the report the Magistrate passed on order purporting to be under section 145 (1) of the Code. During the course of the proceedings an application purporting to be under section 145 (5) of the Code was made by and on behalf of the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 12 stating, inter alia, that no dispute existed. This application was allowed and the proceedings under section 145 were dropped. Feeling aggrieved, the applicant preferred a revision which was dismissed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, hence this application. In the accompanying petition filed by the opposite-parties the prayer, inter alia, is that the preliminary order passed under section 145 (J) of the Code may be quashed. This petition has not been admitted so far. ( 3 ) DURING the course of hearing of the Criminal Misc. Application No. 2629 of 1984 learned counsel for the opposite parties, apart from defending the order passed under section 145 (5) made a virulent attack on the preliminary order passed under section 145 (1 ). He desired that the material supplied by the opposite-parties in the Criminal Misc. Application No, 8575 of 1983 should be taken into consideration while deciding this application. Learned counsel for the applicant rightly objected to this course being adopted as Criminal Misc. Application No. 8575 of 1983 had not even been admitted. Since the opposite-parties could support the impugned order on other grounds including the ground that the preliminary order itself was in accordance with law, I called for the record of the case. ( 4 ) THE dispute between the parties centres round a temple of Johara Devi. The parties are at variance about the precise nature of the dispute. Since the opposite-parties could support the impugned order on other grounds including the ground that the preliminary order itself was in accordance with law, I called for the record of the case. ( 4 ) THE dispute between the parties centres round a temple of Johara Devi. The parties are at variance about the precise nature of the dispute. According to the applicant, the dispute relates to the possession and the management of the said temple, while according to the opposite-parties the dispute is confined only to the offerings made to Johra Devi by her devotees. The case set up by the opposite-parties is that there was neither any dispute of possession nor management as they were admittedly in possession and they were admittedly managing the same all along. According to them, the applicant, the Pradhan all of a sudden raked up the trouble that instead of them (the opposite-parties) the Gaon Sabha concerned should pocket the offerings made at ,the temple. ( 5 ) ON 14th September, 1983 the police made a report that there existed a dispute between the parties regarding the temple. I shall advert to exact contents of the police report a little latter. On the same day the Magistrate concerned passed a preliminary order under section 145 (1) and also passed an order of attachment under section 146 (1 ). In the order passed under section 145 (1) the Magistrate fixed 28th September, 1983 for the filing of their respective written statements by the parties. An application purporting to be under section 145 (5) of the Code was made by and no behalf of the opposite-parties before the Magistrate on 19th September, 1983. The Magistrate directed the same to be placed before him on the next day, that is, 20th September, 1983. On 20th September, 1983 the Magistrate passed an order concerning many matters. So far the controversy in this Court is concerned, the relevant orders were that the opposite-parties were directed to hand over a copy of the application dated 19th September, 1983, to the applicant,, and the parties were directed to produce their oral and documentary evidence on 28th September, 1983. Oil 28th September, 1983, certain documents were filed by and on behalf of the opposite parties before the learned Magistrate and on the same date the Magistrate fixed 1st October, 1983 for the delivery of his judgment and. Oil 28th September, 1983, certain documents were filed by and on behalf of the opposite parties before the learned Magistrate and on the same date the Magistrate fixed 1st October, 1983 for the delivery of his judgment and. on 1st October, 1983, the impugned order was passed. The record shows and the learned counsel for the parties are agreed that before the learned Magistrate none of the parties filed their respective written statements. None of them produced any oral evidence either. It also transpires that no proceeding under section 145 (4) of the Code took place on 28th September, 1983. It appears that on 28th September 1984, the learned Magistrate confined his attention to the application dated 19th September, 1983, purporting to have been made by and on behalf of the opposite parties under section 145 (5 ). ( 6 ) BEFORE the Magistrate an affidavit was filed on behalf of the opposite-parties. To that affidavit, it appears, certain papers were annexed. The first paper was a true copy of an order passed by the Tehsildar Chibramau that the Mela round about the shrine of Johara Devi was being held on a land which was Banjar. The Tehsildar directed that as a result of the abolition of the zamindari the panchayat concerned would manage the Mela which was held on the said Banjar land and would deposit the offerings made at the temple in the Treasury at Chibramau. The other paper was a true copy of the memorandum of a Writ Petition No. 730 of 1953 presented in this Court by the opposite-parties. In this petition, the Land Reforms Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, the Land Reforms Officer, the panchayat Raj Officer, Fatehgarh, district Farrukhabad and the State of Uttar Pradesh were arrived as opposite-parties Nos. 1 to 4 respectively. The prayer made in the petition, inter alia, was that the aforementioned order made by the Tehsildar may be quashed, a writ of mandamus or prohibition or any other suitable writ, order or direction may be issued to the opposite parties not to take over the management of the Mela held at the Sthan of Deviji and not to interfere with the rights of the opposite-parties over the same and the building, well and area of land appurtenant thereto. The third paper is a true copy of a judgment dated 18th December. The third paper is a true copy of a judgment dated 18th December. 1955, given by this Court in the said Writ Petition No. 730 of 1953. The opposite-parties to the writ petition neither cared to put in appearance nor contested the same. This Court allowed the writ petition and passed the following order: The notice issued by the Tehsildar in pursuant to the order of the Land Reforms Commissioner. U. P. and the order referred to in that notice are set aside and it is further ordered that a writ of Mandamus be issued to the opposite-parties directing them not to take over the management of the Mela which is held on As han Deviji-village Rohli Tehsil Chhibramau, district Farrukhabad not to interfere with the rights of the petitioner over the same and the building well and area of the land appurtenant thereto. The fourth paper was an order passed by the lind Additional District and Sessions Judge. Farrukhabad on 21st February, 1979, in Misc. Appeal No. 165 of 1978 preferred by the Gaon Sabha or-village Rohili against the opposite parties. It appears that the Gaon Sabha had instituted a suit and in that suit they had made an application for the grant of an interim injunction. They had also made an application for the appointment of a Receiver in respect of the property which was the subject matter of the suit It appears that the learned Munsif rejected the application for interim injunction and also vacated the order appointing a Receiver. It also appears that the suit was with respect to the said Banjar land and the injunction prayed for was that the opposite parties should not interfere with the right of the Gaon Sabha to hold the Mela etc. The learned and Additional District and Sessions Judge recorded a finding that the opposite parties were in possession and were managing the Mela on the land which was the subject matter of the suit. He held that, prima facie, the Gaon Sabha bad no case and there was no justification to either issue an ad-interim injunction or to appoint any Receiver. The learned Judge. therefore, dismissed the appeal. He held that, prima facie, the Gaon Sabha bad no case and there was no justification to either issue an ad-interim injunction or to appoint any Receiver. The learned Judge. therefore, dismissed the appeal. ( 7 ) A perusal of the impugned order dated 1st October, 1983, indicates that on the basis of the aforementioned order passed by this Court, the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the opposite-parties were fully authorized to manage the temple of Johra Devi and also to manage the Mela held round it and, therefore, no further proceedings under section 145 of the Code were required to be taken. He, therefore, dropped the proceedings under section 145 of the Code. He, thereafter, passed the consequential order releasing the property from attachment. It may be stated that the Magistrate noted that on the record before him there were the other aforementioned papers as well. ( 8 ) HAVING read the impugned order more than one, I have come to the conclusion that it is liable to be quashed for more than one reason. First, it will be immediately seen that it does not conform to the requirements of 5. 145 (5) of the Code at all. The Magistrate as to be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists concerning any land or water. The preservation of peace and public tranquillity or the prevention of the breach of peace are the sheet-anchor round which the entire machinery under section 145 of the Code rotates. The condition precedent for initiating a proceeding under section 145 (1) is the satisfaction of the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists. This satisfaction of the Magistrate is an ex-parte one. It pervades throughout the proceedings under section 145 unless set aside in proceedings under section 145 (5 ). Indeed, it is not the requirement of the law that while passing the final order in proceedings under section 145 the Magistrate concerned should again record a finding that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists. In proceedings under section 145 (5) it is open to the party opposing the initiation of the proceedings to demonstrate that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace ever existed or exists. Merely showing that no dispute exists will not suffice. In proceedings under section 145 (5) it is open to the party opposing the initiation of the proceedings to demonstrate that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace ever existed or exists. Merely showing that no dispute exists will not suffice. It has also to be proved before the Magistrate that there is no apprehension or likelihood of any breach of peace. Likewise, the Magistrate, while dropping the proceedings, has to record a categorical finding that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed or exists. In the instant case, even the finding that no dispute exists bas not been recorded by the Magistrate in clear and unequivocal terms. As mentioned already, the Magistrate took the view that in view of the decision of this Court of 1955, the opposite-parties had absolute right to manage the temple as well as the Mela. Assuming, that in such a finding the finding that no dispute existed or exists is implied, even then the order falls short of the legal requirements. That being, that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed or exists. In Gajraj and others v. Collector Singh1 this Court has taken the view that if in proceedings under section 145 (5) the Magistrate decides that the likelihood of the breach of the peace had existed or exists, his jurisdiction derived at the stage of Section 145 (1) shall continue and he might decide the question of possession. If on the other hand he finds that the likelihood had never existed or does not exist, his jurisdiction to decide the question of possession himself will come to an end. It, therefore, follows that in the absence of the finding by the Magistrate that the likelihood of the breach of the peace neither existed nor exists, the impugned order dropping the proceedings under section 145 of the Code cannot be allowed to stand. Secondly, the finding of the Magistrate, on the material relied upon by him that no dispute existed or exists too is not sustain, able. The determination of title or legal right is foreign to proceedings under section 145. The farthest end of the material relied upon by the Magistrate is an order dated 21st February, 1979 passed by the lind Additional District and Sessions Judge. In this order it is undoubtedly mentioned that the opposite parties were in possession. The determination of title or legal right is foreign to proceedings under section 145. The farthest end of the material relied upon by the Magistrate is an order dated 21st February, 1979 passed by the lind Additional District and Sessions Judge. In this order it is undoubtedly mentioned that the opposite parties were in possession. I have already extracted the operative portion of the order passed by this Court in the aforementioned writ petition as far back as 18th December, 1955. The decision of this Court says that the building including the temple therein and the area of the land appurtenant thereto vested in the opposite- parties. Obviously, this part of the order of this Court is based upon the provisions of Section 9 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The order of this Court, as extracted above, further indicates that the opposite-parties to the writ petition were directed not to take over the management of the Mela which was held on the Asthan of Deviji, not to interfere with the rights of the opposite-parties over the same and not to interfere with the rights of the opposite-parties over the building. well and the area of land appurtenant thereto. Despite the order of this court and the order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge referred to above, the Gaon Sabha could raise the dispute of possession relating to the Banjar Land, the building over it, including the temple, and in this dispute there could be a likelihood of the breach of the peace. The propriety or the legality of the action of a particular party has no relevance in proceedings under section 145. At best, on the basis of the aforementioned papers, the Magistrate could come to a conclusion that the Gaon Slbha concerned was acting recklessly, irresponsibly and in a high-handed manner in raising a controversy which stood settled. The Magistrate, in the instant case, really abdicated his function as assigned under section 145 (5) by merely relying upon the judgments, particularly, the judgment of this Court. It appears that the Magistrate was somewhat obsessed by the judgment of this Court, and he considered that nothing further was required to be done except to give effect to the same. The Magistrate, in the instant case, really abdicated his function as assigned under section 145 (5) by merely relying upon the judgments, particularly, the judgment of this Court. It appears that the Magistrate was somewhat obsessed by the judgment of this Court, and he considered that nothing further was required to be done except to give effect to the same. We may appreciate the attitude of the Magistrate in showing respect to this Court, but that will not absolve him of the responsibility of exercising his jurisdiction in accordance with law. Instant is a case, where it can be said that the Magistrate bas failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. In Kalap Din and others v. State2 in paragraph 40 a Division Bench of this Court observed: Therefore, on a consideration of the language contained in Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code and the case law produced before us, we held that the decision of a civil court does not dust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code nor such a decision is binding on the Magistrate. It is not open to the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or to pass an order on the basis of the decision of the civil or revenue court without himself making an enquiry in accordance with sub-section (4) of section 145, Criminal Procedure Code and without applying his mind to the evidence in the case. In other words, it is necessary for the Magistrate to conclude the proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code in accordance with the procedure contained therein. The judgment of the civil or revenue court. if produced before the Magistrate, should be considered by him only as evidence in the case. The impugned order of the Magistrate, therefore, stands vitiated. ( 9 ) WE may now advert to the additional submissions made on behalf of the opposite parties to sustain the impugned order. The argument put forward in the forefront is that not dispute with respect to any land was either raised by the applicant nor did it exist either on the date of the passing of the preliminary order or on the date when the impugned order was passed, the dispute was confined to the offerings made at the temple. The argument put forward in the forefront is that not dispute with respect to any land was either raised by the applicant nor did it exist either on the date of the passing of the preliminary order or on the date when the impugned order was passed, the dispute was confined to the offerings made at the temple. The argument is that as the condition precedent to the passing of the preliminary order was not in existence the same hand been passed without any jurisdiction and consequently the entire proceedings fall to the ground. In the preliminary order it is recited that the police report dated 12th September 1983 indicates that a dispute regarding the possession and management of the temple of Johara Devi existed and on account of this dispute there was likelihood of a breach of the peace in the near future. We have, therefore, to find out as to what were the contents of the police report. This report has been read over to me by the learned counsel for the opposite parties more than once. This report is rather a long-one and in it the facts are narrated. Details of the offerings made to the deity (Deviji) are mentioned. The report is in Hindi, the relevant portion of which is being extracted hereunder in Roman: Eh ki Gram Samaj Ka Pradhan Apni Gram Sabha ki Sampatti, Mandir wa Uski Banjar Bhumi Hatata Hai Aur Parti No. 2 Surendra Singh Aadi Apna Mandir wa Banjar Bhumi Batati hai. Is prakar Pradhan Gram Sabha Sri Ghasi Ram Gram Robili was parti No. 2 Surendra Singh Aadi men vivad hai. Aur Kabje ko Jekar Dispute hai. Jiski wajah se koyee bhee San gin Ghatna ghat sakti hai, The portion of the report extracted above clearly shows that there was a dispute between the parties with respect to the temple and the Banjar Land and this dispute was in respect of the possession of the said properties and there was a likelihood of the breach of the peace in the near future. From a combined reading of the report aforequoted and the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate, the conclusion is inevitable that before the Magistrate there was a dispute regarding possession of the land and the Magistrate was satisfied about the existence of such a dispute. From a combined reading of the report aforequoted and the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate, the conclusion is inevitable that before the Magistrate there was a dispute regarding possession of the land and the Magistrate was satisfied about the existence of such a dispute. That being the position, I am unable to agree with the learned counsel that before the Magistrate the dispute was confined to the offerings made to the deity. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel next contended that the preliminary order suffers from yet another legal infirmity, namely, in it the Magistrate had failed to state the grounds of his satisfaction. A close reading of the preliminary order, in my opinion, indicates that this. not so. The ground of satisfaction given by the Magistrate clearly is that according to the police report, a dispute regarding the possession of land existed between the parties. It is true that further details are lacking in the preliminary order, but those are to be found in the police report and the material on which the satisfaction is based is the police report. Assuming, the preliminary order does not conform strictly to the procedural requirement as contained in Section 145 (1), will that shortcoming vitiate the order or is such a defect curable under Section 465 of the Code? The opposite-parties have not been able to demonstrate that they have been prejudiced in any manner on account of this procedural defect. The object or the purpose for stating the grounds of satisfaction obviously is that the satisfaction of the Magistrate may be subjected to a judicial scrutiny in proceedings under Section 145 (5 ). The opposite-parties have failed to show that they were in any manner handicapped in proceedings undert Section 145 (5) on account of the nonobservance of the particular procedural requirement under discussion. This Court will be loath to interfere in proceedings under Section 482 on account of the mere procedural irregularity and not illegality. The opposite-parties have failed to show that they were in any manner handicapped in proceedings undert Section 145 (5) on account of the nonobservance of the particular procedural requirement under discussion. This Court will be loath to interfere in proceedings under Section 482 on account of the mere procedural irregularity and not illegality. A matter of this kind engaged the attention of a Full Bench of this Court in Kapoor Chand v. Suraj Prasad3, wherein this Court took the following view We see that if the Magistrate is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, he is seized of jurisdiction to take action and he is empowered by the Code to act in a particular way. If this view is correct, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate arises from the fact he has received certain information and that he is satisfied as to the truth of that information. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate does not depend on how the proceeds. There are two things; one is the authority conferred on him to act and the other is how he to act. If he has jurisdiction, he is not deprived of jurisdiction merely because his procedure is erroneous or defective. If this view be right, the omission on the part of the Magistrate to follow certain directions contained in the Code although some of these directions may be more important than others, cannot be said to deprive him of jurisdiction. . The object of procedure is to enable the Court to do justice, but if in spite of even total disregard of the rules of procedure, justice has been done, there would exist no necessity for setting aside the final order which is just and correct simply because the procedure adopted was wrong. This submission too, therefore, fails. . The object of procedure is to enable the Court to do justice, but if in spite of even total disregard of the rules of procedure, justice has been done, there would exist no necessity for setting aside the final order which is just and correct simply because the procedure adopted was wrong. This submission too, therefore, fails. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel next contended that having regard to the fact that even prior to the abolition of the zamindari and even thereafter the opposite-parties continued to manage the temple of Deviji and conduct the Mela at the shrine and having regard to the fact that this Court had recognised their right to do so, the so-called dispute raised by the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha on 9th September, 1983, for the first time, when he made an application to the district authorities, was not a real or bona fide dispute. He contends that Section 145 comprehends a bona fide or a real dispute and not a controversy merely for setting the machinery of Section 145 in motion. ( 12 ) THE word dispute has not been defined in the Code. It has been used in its ordinary sense. Therefore, the dictionary meaning is to be given to that word. The ordinary meaning of this word is disagreement, struggle, scramble or quarrel. ( 13 ) IN Mst. Mosnaki and other v. State through Sheo Baran Rai4, a Division Bench of this Court held: For a Magistrate to have jurisdiction to proceed under Section 145 there must exist a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. He is only concerned with the existence of a dispute; he is not concerned at all with the questions how it arose, which party is on the aggressive or unreasonable, whether the dispute had been decided remotely or even recently by a Court of competent jurisdiction or whether an alternative remedy is open to the party that seeks his assistance. Same view has been taken by another Division Bench of this Court in Kalap Dins case (supra) We have seen that in the instant case the last order passed in favour of the opposite parties was on 21st February, 1979 by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge. Therefore, it cannot be said that and dispute so as to entitle the Magistrate to assume jurisdiction under Section 145 (1) existed. Therefore, it cannot be said that and dispute so as to entitle the Magistrate to assume jurisdiction under Section 145 (1) existed. ( 14 ) LASTLY, it was submitted on behalf of the opposite-parties that in view of the conduct of the applicant in disregarding the decision of this Court as well as of the lind Additional District and Sessions Judge referred to above this Court should decline to interfere. The emphasis is that the conduct of the applicant disentitled him to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code. The Gaon Sabha was not a party to the proceedings in the writ petition. Under Section 4 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act land which was recorded Banjar on the date of vesting (1st July 1952) vested in the State. By virtue of Section 117 of the said Act this land vested in the Gaon Sabha. This Court in the writ petition took the view that the building of which the temple in dispute forms part together with the land appurtenant thereto continued to be the property of the opposite parties. It is true that the State Government was arrayed as one of the respondents in the writ petition, but bad the Gaon Sabba concerned been given a right to contest the writ petition probably the decision of the case may have been different. It is to be noted that none of the respondents to the writ petition inducing the State Government put in appearance in this Court. Moreover, it is to be remembered that orders under Section 145 of the Code are police orders and the sole purpose of initiating the proceedings is to prevent the breach of the peace. I have found that there is no illegality in the satisfaction recorded by the Magistrate that there is a dispute between the parties with respect to the possession of land and on account of that dispute there is an apprehension of the breach of peace. I have also held that the impugned order passed by the Magistrate in proceedings under Section 145 (5) of the Code is absolutely illegal. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that no prejudice has been caused to the applicant by the impugned order. It cannot also be said that by the impugned order of the Magistrate substantial justice bad been done between the parties. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that no prejudice has been caused to the applicant by the impugned order. It cannot also be said that by the impugned order of the Magistrate substantial justice bad been done between the parties. To put it differently, I am not satisfied that the ends of justice will be met by not interfering with the impugned order. ( 15 ) THIS application, Criminal Misc. Application No. 2629 of 1984 (Ghasi Ram Pradhan v. Surendra Singh and others), succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 1st October, 1983, passed by the learned Magistrate in quashed. . The order dated 21st March, 1984 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also quashed. The learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of the application made by the opposite parties under Section 145 (5) of the Code afresh, on merits and in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. He shall give reasonable opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. The learned Magistrate shall dispose of the matter within one month from the date of the production of a certified copy of the order of this Court before him by either party. If the learned Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the application of the opposite parties made under Section 145 (5) of the Code should be dismissed. be shall dispose of the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code within a period of two months from the date of his decision on the application under Section 145 (5 ). If the learned Magistrate accepts the application under Section 145 (5) that will be the end of the matter. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Magistrate on 28th September, 1984, either personally or through their respective counsel. On that day the learned Magistrate will fix a date for proceeding with the application under Section 145 (5 ). ( 16 ) THE accompanying Criminal Misc. Application No. 8575 of 1981-Surendra Singh and others v. State of U. P. and others, is dismissed summarily.