JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, A C.J. 1. As a puisne Judge, I had directed that the papers of this case be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Bench to decide the same. By a quirk of fortune it has now come to me as the Acting Chief Justice of this Court to refer the case for hearing to this Bench of which I also happen to be a member. 2. The salient facts giving rise to this writ petition are that the petitioner filed a suit for eviction of Gyan Chand, respondent No. 1, on the ground of default in payment of rent, subletting and renunciation of his character as tenant. The suit was decreed by the Judge, Small Causes Court on 2271965. The tenantrespondent preferred SCC Revision No. 81 of 1975 which was dismissed by the revisional court on 1981976 and the decree for eviction and arrears passed by the trial court was upheld. The tenant, thereafter, went in revision to the High Court and the impugned order was quashed on 1271978 and the case was remanded for fresh consideration of the question as to whether the tenant was entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). 3. The central points of controversy between the parties were : the date of the construction of the premises in dispute and also the date when it came within the purview of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The High Court in its judgment held that the premises would be deemed to have been constructed on 141966, and, thereafter, the aforesaid Act would be applicable to it ten years thereafter. Accordingly, the High Court directed the lower court to decide as to whether the amount due and required under Section 39 of the Act was deposited by the tenant by 3131976. After remand made by the High Court, the revision was decided by the IInd Additional District Judge, Muzaffarnagar by his order dated 29111978, which is impugned in the present writ petition. The effect of the decision was that the tenant's revision stood allowed and the decree passed by the trial court was modified in this respect that the suit for ejectment was dismissed and a decree only for recovery of rent etc. was passed. 4. The effect of the decision was that the tenant's revision stood allowed and the decree passed by the trial court was modified in this respect that the suit for ejectment was dismissed and a decree only for recovery of rent etc. was passed. 4. Thus, the sole point arising in the case is as to whether the tenantrespondent had complied with the provisions of Sec. 39 of the Act i.e., whether the requisite deposit had been made by him on or before 3131976. Before we refer to other relevant facts and findings recorded by the court below in its impugned judgment it is necessary to advert to one important circumstance. It appears that during the pendency of the suit for ejectment the petitioner (Plaintiff) sought permission to file some papers but her application for such additional evidence was rejected by the IInd Additional Munsif by his order dated 2331971. Againstthis order the plaintiff filed Revision No. 9 of 1971. This revision was allowed with costs on 881972. The formal order prepared thereafter showed that the plaintiffrevisionist was awarded Rs. 132.10 as costs. It was urged on behalf of the present petitioner that when making a deposit under Section 39 of the Act it was the duty of the tenant to deposit the amount of Rs. 132.10 also before the relevant date and since this was not done, the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act. Sri A. K. Yog, appearing for the respondenttenant, placed strong reliance on a single Judge decision of this Court in Kamta Prasad v. Behari Lal, AIR 1977 Allahabad 109 in which it was held that a deposit had to be made in the revisional court only when a revision against the final order was pending and not where revision against some interlocutory order was pending. It was observed in that case : If an appeal or revision is directed against an ancillary or supplemental proceeding which does not entitle the appellate or revisional court to get into the merits of the case or to touch a decree for eviction, if any, which has already been passed in the suit, there will be no occasion for it to consider the question whether a decree for eviction should be passed, much less will there arise an occasion for the appellate or the revisional court to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to Subsection (1) or in clauses (b) to (g) of subsection (2) of Section 20. 5. It was, therefore, contended that assuming that the costs awarded in the revision arising out of an interlocutory order were not deposited, that could not be considered as a case of absence of deposit in accordance with Section 40. In the instant case, Revision No. 9 of 1971 was decided on 881972 and costs were awarded. Curiously enough, on the same date i.e., 881972, the respondenttenant has deposited rent, costs of the suit and interest etc. but according to the petitioner the costs awarded in Revision No. 9 of 1971 were not deposited. On the other hand, it was pointed out on behalf of the respondenttenant that these costs were not included in the decree passed in the suit. The Court asked for a report in this case from the District Judge, Muzaffarnagar, who submitted a reply stating that the costs awarded in Revision No. 9 of 1971 were not shown in the decree of SCC Suit No. 913 of 1969 Smt. Phoolwati v. Gyan Chand. Two contentions were raised on behalf of the respondenttenant. Firstly, it was submitted that according to the ratio of Kamta Prasad's case (supra) such costs of the revision could not be legally included in the deposit contemplated by Section 40 of the Act. Secondly, on facts also, according to the respondenttenant the position was that the amount deposited by the respondenttenant on 881972 actually covered the costs of Revision No. 9 of 1971 as well. 6. Secondly, on facts also, according to the respondenttenant the position was that the amount deposited by the respondenttenant on 881972 actually covered the costs of Revision No. 9 of 1971 as well. 6. So far as the second contention is concerned, namely, that the amount of costs pertaining to Revision No. 9 of 1971 was not deposited within time, we are of the opinion that this is a question of fact on which the finding recorded by the court below is conclusive. It has been found as a fact that the respondent (tenant) failed to deposit the amount of Rs. 132.10. Hence, this matter cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage and this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction would be reluctant to go behind that finding. However, the first point raised on behalf of the respondenttenant merits serious consideration. On behalf of the petitioner it was strenuously contended that there was legal obligation on the respondent to deposit the amount of costs referred to above while making a deposit under Section 40 of the Act. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondenttenant has argued that according to Kamta Prasad's case (supra) such costs were alien to the deposit required to be made under Section 40, because the expression full cost of the suit used in Section 39, which mutatis mutandis applied to a case under Section 40 also, would include only the costs of a revision or appeal arising out of the final decree or order passed in the suit and not the costs of a revision or appeal arising out of any interlocutory order. This proposition of law which has been laid down in Kamta Prasad's case (supra), however, appears to us to be of doubtful correctness. In the case of R. D. Ram Nath Co. This proposition of law which has been laid down in Kamta Prasad's case (supra), however, appears to us to be of doubtful correctness. In the case of R. D. Ram Nath Co. and another v. Girdhari Lal and another, 1975 ALJ 1, Division Bench of this Court while referring to the deposit required to be made in the case of an appeal or revision observed, in paragraph 23 of the Reports, as under : In case of a first appeal or revision filed against a decree or order of the Trial Court it will represent the costs awarded to the landlord in the decree or order together with the amount paid as court fee on the memorandum of appeal or revision and other documents and other taxable expenses incurred in the first appellate or revisional Court including the Advocate's fee and the fee of his clerk which are to be computed in the manner stated above. The words other taxable expenses incurred mentioned in the above extract are significant. They indicate that where expenses have been incurred in a revision, they are legally taxable. They have to be included in the deposit irrespective of the fact whether they are actually shown in the decree or formal order etc, prepared in the case. It is noteworthy that Section 39 of the Act speaks of the landlord's full cost of the suit and not to cost awarded to the plaintiff in the suit. The Legislature has also eschewed the use of such words as costs of the decree for eviction which could restrict the meaning to those proceedings only which directly resulted in eviction. In our opinion, the plain meaning of ''full cost of the suit is not only cost of the decree for eviction and the revision or appeal arising out of it but also the cost of such other incidental proceedings as are directly triggered off by the suit for eviction. Such revision is, without doubt, an offshoot of' the suit itself. The rationale of this interpretation is that such proceedings also arise out of the suit for eviction and before the landlord is eventually denied the fruits of his suit for eviction, he must atleast be assured repayment of all the expenses legitimately incurred by him in such litigation. Such revision is, without doubt, an offshoot of' the suit itself. The rationale of this interpretation is that such proceedings also arise out of the suit for eviction and before the landlord is eventually denied the fruits of his suit for eviction, he must atleast be assured repayment of all the expenses legitimately incurred by him in such litigation. The conditions are twofold, firstly, such proceedings must have directly arisen out of the suit and secondly, such costs must be taxable according to law. The fact as to whether they are shown in the decree or not, would not make any difference. 7. Therefore, in the instant case even though the costs incurred by the revision directed against any interlocutory order may not have been incorporated in the decree of the suit, the respondenttenant was not absolved of the obligation of depositing the amount in order to save himself from eviction. Besides, the provisions of Sections 39 and 40 of the Act appear to have been made with the object of imposing a brake on the tenants and preventing them from unnecessarily protracting the proceeding on frivolous grounds or instituting multiplicity of proceedings with a view to harassing the landlord claiming eviction. In order to confer on the tenant the supreme privilege of immunity from eviction, the provisions relating to the deposit must be strictly construed. It is a right which must be assiduously earned and not a benefit to be surreptitiously stolen. If a contrary view is taken, it will be easy for a scheming tenant to drag on the proceedings in the suit and precipitate other collateral litigation and thereby subject the landlord to incalculable hardship and monetary kiss, without the defendant being the worse for it. That is why the expression plaintiff's costs of suit or similar phraseology has not been employed. The object of the Legislature appears to have been to discourage delaying and embarrassing tactics on the part of cantankerous tenants. This would not be achieved unless the tenant is conscious that he would be saddled with the liability of compensating the landlord for all the extraneous expenses also which are forced upon him on account of such other collateral proceedings, apart from the main suit, as have to be resorted to. This would not be achieved unless the tenant is conscious that he would be saddled with the liability of compensating the landlord for all the extraneous expenses also which are forced upon him on account of such other collateral proceedings, apart from the main suit, as have to be resorted to. This justifies a strict construction of the nature and quantum of deposit required in compliance with the provisions of Sections 39 and 40 of the Act. According to our assessment of the authorities on the subject, we think that this interpretation would be in conformity with the observations made in ft. D. Ram Nath Co.'s case (supra). We are in agreement with the view expressed by N. N. Mithal, J. in Benarsi Lal v. Smt. Sagiran Begum, 1983 (1) ARC 417 (Paragraph 9 of the Reports) : Mutatis Mutandis' in the context of Section 39 and 40, would, therefore, mean that similar provisions as are to be found in Section 39 would also apply in a case of an appeal or a revision arising out of a suit of eviction of the same nature as contemplated under Section 39 of the Act. In other respects, provisions of Section 39 must prevail. From this it follows that even though cost may or may not have been awarded by the court below, if the tenant wants to seek the benefit against his eviction in view of Section 39 of the Act, he can so do only after complying with the conditions as are laid down in that section. Section 39 does not lay down that if costs have not been awarded by the court, the same are not to be paid. According to the General Rules (Civil) in every case a decreesheet has to be prepared in accordance with the decision of the court showing the cost which a party may be entitled in the litigation or taxed therein in accordance with the Rules laid down. If the court is of the view that in the circumstances of a particular case, the plaintiffrespondent should be denied the right to recover the cost from other party, it does not mean that BO costs have been incurred by the landlord. If the court is of the view that in the circumstances of a particular case, the plaintiffrespondent should be denied the right to recover the cost from other party, it does not mean that BO costs have been incurred by the landlord. The words 'landlord's full costs of the suit' is not the same thing as the costs awarded to the plaintiff in a suit', and it appears to me that the word 'landlord has been used here purposely in order to distinguish it from the plaintiff of the suit. As a plaintiff, a person may or may not be entitled to recover any costs under the decision of the court, yet as a landlord he may have incurred certain costs in fighting out the suit. Therefore, when in the case of R.D. Ram Nath & Co. (supra) the Division Bench had used the expression, 'cost awarded', what the court really meant was the ''taxable cost incurred by the landlord. In that case, since the cost had already been awarded to the plaintiff by the trial court this question was not before it in this light and, therefore, this distinction could not be kept in mind by the Bench. I must, however, say that the entire reasoning on which decision rested in that suit does go to show that when whatever amount is supposed to be deposited by the tenant under the head landlords' full cost of the suit in Section 39 really meant all those taxable costs which were capable of being ascertained on the date of the deposit, with reference to the material on the record and in pursuance of the Rules framed by the Court in that behalf. In paragraph 22 of the said decision this reasoning has been elaborated and it leaves no room for doubt that only so much of the amount as has been actually awarded by the court below need be deposited by the tenant in order to get the benefit under Section 40 does not appear to be correct. The tenant must, in order to get the benefit of these provisions., deposit all ascertainable costs liable to be taxed in favour of the landlord whether or not such had been awarded tinder the decree against which an appeal or revision was actually pending on 15.7.1972. 8. The tenant must, in order to get the benefit of these provisions., deposit all ascertainable costs liable to be taxed in favour of the landlord whether or not such had been awarded tinder the decree against which an appeal or revision was actually pending on 15.7.1972. 8. Admittedly, in the instant case, costs of Revision No. 9 of 1971 were not deposited by the respondenttenant who was at pains to content that in law no such deposit was required. Sri Yog submitted that the respondenttenant had made deposit of an amount which was in excess and which covered the costs awarded to the petitioner in Civil Revision No. 9 of 1971. The contention is unacceptable. In the application dated 881972 made by the respondenttenant before the trial court, for permission to make deposit and also in the tender of the same date vide papers 44C/49C the specification made by him of the sum of Rs. 3,280 which he deposited was as under : (i) Rent from December 1, 1968 to August 31, 1972 Rs. 2,475 (ii) Interest Rs. 436 (iii) Costs of the suit Rs. 369 Rs. 3,280 9. The respondenttenant having, thus, himself made the specification and in force of the breakup that he gave, it did not remain open to the court to allocate any sum out of this to another head or to assume that this be deemed, nonetheless, to be inclusive of Rs. 132.10 awarded towards the costs to the petitioner in the aforementioned revision. It was not a deposit of a lump sum without specification. Sri K.B. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner, also points out that in the decree passed by the trial court on 2271975 while deciding the suit, the proportionate costs awarded to the petitioner were Rs. 330.50 but the deposit made by the respondenttenant towards this item was of a sum of Rs. 369 only. There is no indication from his side that this does not represent the costs incurred by the petitioner, even though not awarded to her under the decree. Even otherwise, the extra amount would, at best, be a sum of Rs. 38.50 only and that too does not meet the costs awarded to the petitioner in the concerned revision. 369 only. There is no indication from his side that this does not represent the costs incurred by the petitioner, even though not awarded to her under the decree. Even otherwise, the extra amount would, at best, be a sum of Rs. 38.50 only and that too does not meet the costs awarded to the petitioner in the concerned revision. 10 Therefore, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the respondenttenant had failed to make the requisitedeposit under the law and was, thus, not entitled to the benefit of Section 39 of the Act. It follows that the respondenttenant made himself liable for ejectment and the impugned order dated 29111978 passed by the IInd Addl. Distt. Judge, Muzaffarnagar was plainly erroneous and contrary to law in so far as it dismissed the suit for eviction. 11. For these reasons this writ petition is allowed with costs and the impugned order is modified to this extent that the petitioner's suit for ejectment of the respondenttenant is also decreed, besides the decree for rent etc. passed by the court below, which is affirmed. (Petition allowed)