JUDGMENT : Rampal Singh, J .- 1. The appellant has preferred this Second Civil Appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Gwalior on 17/1/1974, in Civil Appeal No. 7-A of 1969. 2 The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit against the defendant-respondent for possession, perpetual injunction and mesne profits, on 2-11-1963 in the Court of First Civil Judge, Class I, Gwalior. According to the facts enumerated in the plaint, plaintiff's father, Shanker Rao Mohite, died on 26/1/1956, leaving the plaintiff as his heir. Agricultural lands Survey Nos. 13, 122, 123, 124,125,126,127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 161, 166 & 167, total area 22 Bighas of village Jaganpura belonged to his father and after his death, the plaintiff became the owner. Before coming into force of Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act and Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, his rights were governed by the provision of Kanoon Mal of the erstwhile State of Gwalior. The suit lands have been in possession of the defendant since Samvat 2007 (l950-51) or Samvat 2008 (1951-52). In the year 1953-54, the defendant knocked the door of Tahsil Court for conferring upon him the pacca tenancy rights on the ground that he was the Subtenant of Shankarrao Mohite and the litigation in Revenue Court continued. Plaintiff further averred in the plaint that the suit lands were cultivated by some persons on behalf of his father, but the yields were poor, hence in Samvat 2008, the fields were entrusted to the defendant on assurance of better yield. thenceforth, the defendant started cultivation of the suit lands, as the agent of his father and subsequently, the defendant filed the aforesaid application for recording him as a pacca tenant under section 38 of M. B. Zamindari Abolition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act). Since then defendant started his claims adverse to the interest of the true owner. Plaintiff further proceeds to say that on the death of Shankarrao Mohite, the agency came to an end and defendant's possession since then became unlawful. Hence the plaintiff claimed, in the suit, possession upon the suit lands with mesne profits for the last three years and also prayed for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. 3. Plaintiff further proceeds to say that on the death of Shankarrao Mohite, the agency came to an end and defendant's possession since then became unlawful. Hence the plaintiff claimed, in the suit, possession upon the suit lands with mesne profits for the last three years and also prayed for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. 3. The defendant denied the contents of the plaint and claimed that on 9/6/1950, plaintiff's father, Shankar Rao Mohite, executed an agreement to sell (Ex. D/1) the suit land, in writing for a consideration of Rs. 3000/-, out of which a sum of Rs. 1000/-, was paid as advance & on 9/6/1950, he was placed in actual possession on the suit land. Defendant further averred that according to the said agreement, he was to remain in possession as a sub tenant and pay rent till full consideration was paid. According to the claim of the defendant, he entered into the possession of the suit land on 9/6/1950 as purchaser as sub-tenant. He claims to have done improvements at a total cost of Rs. 9000/-. Defendant pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. The trial Court in its judgment concluded that the defendant was not proved to be an agent or a sub tenant of the plaintiff's father and agreement Ex. D-1 was not proved. But according to the trial Court the defendant's possession was as a trespasser for more than 12 years preceding the date of the institution of the suit. Hence the trial Court dismissed the suit as barred by limitation, without assessing the mesne profits. 5. Aggrieved by this decree and judgment of the trial Court, the appellant preferred an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Gwalior. The District Judge in the impugned judgment discussed entire evidence of the parties, minutely examined the contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses and concluded that: - (1) There is absolutely no evidence to show that the defendant entered into the possession of the suit lands in Samvat 2008 as an agent of the plaintiff. (2) Ex. D-1 dated 9/6/1960 was executed by the father of the plaintiff Shanker Rao Mohite in favour of the defendant because it has been so proved by Abasaheb (D. W. 2) and defendant (D. W. 3). (2) Ex. D-1 dated 9/6/1960 was executed by the father of the plaintiff Shanker Rao Mohite in favour of the defendant because it has been so proved by Abasaheb (D. W. 2) and defendant (D. W. 3). Subsequent to this the name of defendant has been consistently recorded in revenue papers as sub-tenant since 1950-51 i. e., Samvat 2007. (3) The alleged admission of the defendant in Ex. P. 13-A is not conclusive and hence it does not constitute an estoppel against him. Defendant is at liberty to prove that it was erroneous, mistaken and untrue. (4) The witnesses of the plaintiff, Prayag Narayan (P. W. 1) Dhani Ram (P. W. 2) and plaintiff (P. W. 4) are not reliable and hence their theory that the defendant entered into the possession in Samvat 2008 is false. (5) On 9/2/1950 the plaintiff's father, Shanker Rao Mohite, entered, into a written agreement (Ex D-1) to sell the suit lands to defendant for a consideration of Rs. 3, 000/- out of which the plal1ltiff received Rs. 1,000/- as advance and placed the defendant in possession. (6) Defendant was placed in possession of the suit land on 9/6/1950, not as a sub-tenant but in part performance of the sale-agreement Ex. D-l dated 9/6/1950. So suit for possession could be brought against the defendant under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908, within 12 years from 9/6/l950 and as the present suit was instituted after the lapse of the period it would be barred by time. (7) The defendant is entitled to protect his possession under the Transfer or Property Act. 6. Both the Courts below on the findings of fact are unanimous that the defendant entered into the possession on 9/6/1950. This suit was filed on 2/11/1963, i. e., after 12 years. In the impugned judgment the District Judge has relied upon the evidence of the defendant and upheld his plea. when the entire evidence of the plaintiff has been disbelieved, the starting point of limitation, according to the appellant cannot be accepted. At the bar, Shri Sapre, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that his case is governed by the provisions of Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 because according to his case, the starting point is 2008. At the bar, Shri Sapre, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that his case is governed by the provisions of Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908 because according to his case, the starting point is 2008. I have gone through the entire evidence, on persuation of Shri Sapre, but find myself in complete agreement with the reasonings given in the impugned judgment. Question of limitation is always mixed with the facts of the case and it is the fi'1ding of fact which determines the starting point. When the facts alleged by the appellant and his entire evidence has been rejected by the District Judge, this contention of Shri Sapre that both the Courts below have applied wrong provision of the Limitation Act, cannot be accepted, He has cited at the bar, several decisions but they do not apply to the facts of the case. 7. Next submission of Shri Sapre is that in Ex. P-13-A which is the certified copy of the defendant's previous statement dated 13/2/1959, recorded in the Tahsil Court, is an admission of the fact that he did not enter into the contract with Shankar Rao Mohite and the lower Court has erred in disregarding it. Defendant was confronted with this previous statement and he has given an explanation which was accepted as satisfactory by the District Judge. Unless the statement is clear and unambiguous, the principle "what a party himself admits, admits to be true, may reasonably be presumed so" cannot be invoked. An admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matter stated therein. It is only a piece of evidence the weight to be attacl1ed to which must depend on the circumstances under which it is made. It cannot be shown to be erroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it was made, has not acted upon it to his determent, when it might become conclusive by way of estoppel. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reiterated this view in the case of Kishorilal v. Chatibai [1] in the following words :- "Admissions are not conclusive and unless they constitute estoppel, the maker is at liberty to prove that they were mistaken or were untrue." The alleged statement of the defendant that there was no agreement to sale of the fields between him and Shankar Rao Mohite. does not constitute estoppel in the present Case. does not constitute estoppel in the present Case. So the defendant was at liberty to prove that it was erroneous, mistaken or untrue. Furthermore, they are contradictory in nature. 8. The theory of the supremacy of the title in the agricultural lands has changed its colour and shape since the agrarian land reforms commenced in this province. The accent has now gone to the possession rather than the title. By virtue of section 38 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 the defendant continued to be the sub-tenant till 2nd October, 1959, when Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code came into force. Section 185 (1)(ii) (d) of the Code provides that every person who at the coming into force of the Code holds, in Madhya Bharat region, 'any land of a proprietor as defined in Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, as a sub-tenant or as a sub tenant of a tenant, shall be called occupancy tenant and shall have all the rights and he subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon an occupancy tenant by or under this Code. The defendant, on coming into force of the said Code, acquired occupancy rights on the suit lands and by virtue of the provisions of section 158 (b) of the Code, became a Bhumiswami. The plaintiff failed to apply for resumption of the suit lands under section 189 of the Code. Therefore, under section 190 (1) of the Code the rights of Bhumiswami accrued to the defendant. Once the Bhumiswami rights are acquired by him by operation of law, the defendant could not be dislodged in the present litigation. 9. Consequently, to conclude, this appeal has no force and is therefore dismissed. The respondent shall receive all the costs throughout and counsel's fee of this appeal Rs. 250/-, if certified. 1. AIR 1959 SC 504