JUDGMENT S. D. Agarwala, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of the proceedings under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner is the tenant of a portion of the first floor of premises no. 8/18, Arya Nagar, Kanpur. Mrs. Radha Devi, respondent No. 2, is the landlady of the said premises. The landlady filed an application for release under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The application was contested by the petitioner and, ultimately, by a detailed order dated 15th September, 1982, the application for release was dismissed by the Ist Civil Judge, Kanpur against the order dated 15th September, 1982, the landlady filed an appeal. The appeal was allowed on 28th February, 1984, by the 16th Additional District Judge, Kanpur, and, consequently, the application for release was also allowed by the Court. Aggrieved by the order dated 28th February, 1984, the present petition has been filed in this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the lower appellate court has completely ignored to consider the most material facts relevant for the purpose of the decision as to whether the need of the landlady was bonafide or not and, as such, the finding recorded by the lower appellate court, that the need of the landlady is genuine and bona fide, is vitiated in law. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 4. The release application was filed by the landlady on the ground that considering the number of the members of her family and the accommodation available to her, she needed additional accommodation and, as such, the portion occupied by the petitioner be released in her favour so that her need be satisfied. These allegations were denied by the petitioner tenant. In para 12 of the release application, it has been stated by the landlady that on 28th April, 1981, the ground floor of premises no. 8/18, Arya Nagar, Kanpur, fell vacant and since it was not possible for her to shift from the first floor residence to the ground floor, as such, it was let out to Sri Mam on 9th June, 1981. Immediately thereafter on 13th June, 1981, the application for release was filed. 8/18, Arya Nagar, Kanpur, fell vacant and since it was not possible for her to shift from the first floor residence to the ground floor, as such, it was let out to Sri Mam on 9th June, 1981. Immediately thereafter on 13th June, 1981, the application for release was filed. During the pendency of the release application, the release application was amended and in paragraph 13 of the release application as it stands today, it has been further stated that another portion of the ground floor in the house in dispute facing on the back side, was vacated by another tenant Mr. Agrawal on 27th December, 1981. In this accommodation too, the landlady did not shift, as, according to her, the accommodation did not fulfil her needs. This accommodation consisted of two rooms, kitchen, verandah, court-yard, latrine and bath In Annexure 'RA-3' filed to the rejoinder affidavit, in para 2, which is the counter affidavit of Jai Shanker Tandon, who is the husband of the landlady, it has been further stated that in house no. 8/17, which is the house adjacent to the house occupied by the landlady, the ground floor accommodation fell vacant. This, according to the landlady, was also not required by her and, as such, it was let out to Dr. Usha Rani Tandon after allotment. One accommodation, mentioned above, was vacated only four days prior to the filing of the release application. Two accommodations were vacated after the filing of the release application during its pendency. These are facts which have been stated by the landlady herself. 5. The main case of the landlady is that she requires additional accommodation only on the first floor and not on the ground floor. In order to find out the bonafide need of the landlady and as to whether only the first floor accommodation will meet her requirement, it was necessary for the appellate court to have considered these facts before recording a finding in favour of the landlady that her need was bonafide. The fact, that three accommodations fell vacant immediately prior to the filing of the release application and during the pendency of the release application, were very material facts, which were necessary to be considered before the finding in regard to bonafide need was recorded. The fact, that three accommodations fell vacant immediately prior to the filing of the release application and during the pendency of the release application, were very material facts, which were necessary to be considered before the finding in regard to bonafide need was recorded. Since these relevant facts have not been considered by the appellate court, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is well founded and the finding in regard to bonafide need recorded by the lower appellate court is, consequently, vitiated in law. 6. Learned counsel for the landlady has vehemently urged that the accommodation on the ground floor could not be used by the landlady due to reasons that there are vibrations on the ground floor and she is a patient of heart trouble. These are all facts which require proper consideration by the appellate court on the basis of the evidence on the record. I am not going into these facts in order that none of the parties in this litigation may be prejudiced by any observation in this judgment either way. In the appellate order, the appellate court has recorded a finding in the following words :- "From the evidence given by the appellant it is proved that the accommodation in ground floor in possession of the appellant's husband is not suitable for residence for appellant because there is severe jerks caused in the said accommodation due to the Plastic Factory run in flat no. 8/19, ground floor. There is no believable evidence that there is severs jerks and vibration in the disputed premises." 7. Prior to recording this finding, the Court has neither discussed any evidence as to how it has come to the conclusion that the ground floor residence is not suitable because of severe jerks. It is not only one accommodation, but there are three accommodations which fell vacant on the ground floor. The Court has only recorded the ultimate finding. In my opinion, this does not satisfy the requirement of law. The appellate court should consider the material evidence and then only record a finding either way in regard to the bonafide and genuine need. The argument of the learned counsel for the landlady is that this finding is valid in law and since it is a finding of fact and is not vitiated in any manner, should be accepted. The appellate court should consider the material evidence and then only record a finding either way in regard to the bonafide and genuine need. The argument of the learned counsel for the landlady is that this finding is valid in law and since it is a finding of fact and is not vitiated in any manner, should be accepted. In support of her contention she has relied upon three cases. The first case is M/s. Beopar Sahayak Pvt. Ltd. v. Vishwa Nath, 1977 AWC 607. In this case, the release application was made in the year 1975. The back portion of the ground floor in the building was let out to the tenants about two years before the filing of the release application. This court observed that if the accommodation on the ground floor was not available to the landlord in 1975, because it was occupied by another tenant, it could not be assumed that the landlord had been in use of the same accommodation. The choice is with the landlord as to which accommodation will suit her for vacation of one or more portions. So far as the proposition of law is concerned, as laid down in this case, I agree with the same. It is always open to a landlord to choose any one of the accommodation which suits his purpose and he can file a release application in respect of that accommodation. The omission by the Court in that case to consider the accommodation on the ground floor was justified on the ground that the accommodation was not at all available when the release application was filed. In the instant case, the facts are to the contrary. Here, only few days before the filing of the release application, a portion of the ground floor fell vacant and, thereafter, two more portions on the ground floor fell vacant and, as such, the omission, in my opinion, was a serious omission on the part of the appellate court as when an accommodation is available then the appellate Court should have considered whether the accommodation is available to suffice the need of the landlady or not. If it sufficed, it was not necessary to throw away the tenant from the premises in dispute. In the circumstances, so far as this case is concerned, this does not, in any manner, advance the argument made on behalf of the respondent. 8. If it sufficed, it was not necessary to throw away the tenant from the premises in dispute. In the circumstances, so far as this case is concerned, this does not, in any manner, advance the argument made on behalf of the respondent. 8. The second case relied upon is J. N. Bhatia v. District Judge, Shahjahanpur, 1979 ARC 269. In this case, this Court laid down that an error cannot be said to be an error of law apparent on the face of the record, and this Court cannot interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been further laid down that errors in appreciation of documentary evidence or affidavits or errors in drawing inferences or omission to draw inference or in other words, errors which a court sitting as a Court of appeal only, could be examined, is not a ground for intereference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has not been laid down in this case where a finding has been recorded after omitting to consider the most material facts on the record then too this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If a question of appreciation of evidence is considered, it is correct that this Court cannot set aside a finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court which has been arrived at on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. But if a finding is recorded omitting to consider most material evidence on the record then, in my opinion, it would be a fit case where Article 226 should be invoked to set aside such findings So far as the proposition of law is concerned, as laid down in the case of J. N. Bhatia v. District Judge Shahjahanpur (Supra), there is no dispute. The third case relied upon is Sharda Prasad v. Smt. Sampati Devi, 1983 ARC 378. Hon. M. N. Shukla, J. (as he then was) had opined as under : "I have already observed that there is no prescribed language or formula in which a finding with regard to the landlord's bonafide need must be recorded. The third case relied upon is Sharda Prasad v. Smt. Sampati Devi, 1983 ARC 378. Hon. M. N. Shukla, J. (as he then was) had opined as under : "I have already observed that there is no prescribed language or formula in which a finding with regard to the landlord's bonafide need must be recorded. If the order read as a whole does substantially contain the inference that the authority was convinced that the need of the landlord was bonafide that would satisfy the requirement of the substantive law contained in Clause (1) of subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act." 9. I have gone through the entire order passed by the lower appellate court. In my opinion, on reading the order as a whole, it is apparent that the lower appellate court has only recorded a finding that the need is bonafide, but it has omitted to consider the material evidence which had a strong bearing on the question as to whether the need of the landlady was bonafide or not. In the circumstances, so far as this case is concerned, in my opinion, it is distinguishable and no assistance can be drawn -from this authority. 10. In view of the above, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. I, accordingly, allow the petition, quash the judgment of the lower appellate court dated 28th February, 1984, and remand the case to the lower appellate court for decision afresh in accordance with law after considering all the material evidence on the record. The lower appellate court is directed to dispose of the appeal very expeditously, as far possible, within a period of six months from today. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.