JUDGMENT B. N. Katju, J. 1. This is a petition praying that the opposite parties be punished under Sections 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. Opposite party No. 3 Pooran Chandra Mao is the producer of the film 'Andha Qanoon'. Dr.Rahi Masoom Raza opposite party No. 2 is the writer of the dialogues of the said film. T.Rama Rao opposite party No. 4 is the director of the said film and Amitabh Bachchan opposite party No. 1 is an actor in the said film. It is alleged in the petition that the speech made by Amitabh Bachchan in the film 'Andha Qanoon', a copy of which is attached as annexure 1 to the petition, the song sung by Amitabh Bachchan in the said film, a copy of which is attached as annexure 2 to the petition and also the film as a whole scandalised or tended to scandalise the courts of this country in general, which amounts to criminal contempt under section 2 (c) of the Act and is punishable under Section 12 of the Act. 3. In the counter-affidavit filed by Pooran Chandra Rao opposite party No. 3 it has been stated that the Board of Censors had issued certificate 'A' under Section 5-A of the Cinematograph Act 1952 certifying that the film was fit for being exhibited to adults only and not to persons below the age of 18 years,. The opposite parties were, therefore, justified by law in exhibiting the film. They cannot thus be convicted under Section 12 of the Act in view of Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 79 IPC runs as follows :- "Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it" Section 40 IPC runs as follows :- "Except in the Chapters and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section, the word "offence" denotes a thing made punishable by this Code. In Chapter IV, Chapter V A and in the following sections, namely, sections 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 187, 194, 195,202, 211,213, 214, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 347, 348, 388, 389 and 445, the word "offence" denotes a thing punishable under this Code, or under any special or local law as hereinafter defined." Section 41 IPC runs as follows :- "A "special law" is a law applicable to particular subject." 4. In view of Sections 40 and 41 IPC the word 'offence' in Section 79 IPC does not only denote a thing made punishable under the Indian Penal Code but also denotes a thing made punishable under 'special laws' as it is contained in Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code. The Act is obviously a 'special law' as it relates to a particular subject, namely, contampt of court. Thus if contempt of court is made punishable under the Act it will be an offence within the meaning of Section 79 IPC but if it is punishable under the inherent powers of this Court as a court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution and not under the Act it will not be so. This is, therefore, the first question that requires determination. The High Courts were established under Article 214 of the Constitution and Article 215 of the Constitution lays down that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. In State v. Padma Kant Malviya, AIR 1954 Alld. 523 it was observed :-- "What the Constitution (Art. 215) and the Contempt of Courts Acts of 1926 and 1952 have done is simply to recognise that contempts are punishable, and punishable by High Courts under their inherent and supervisory powers, and to regulate these powers. It was expressly stated in the preamble of the Act of 1926 that it was enacted to define and limit the powers exercisable by High Courts in punishing contempts. In the face of this statement in the preamble it cannot be argued that the Act was enacted to create the powers on that contempt is made punishable under a law since 1926. In the face of this statement in the preamble it cannot be argued that the Act was enacted to create the powers on that contempt is made punishable under a law since 1926. The Act of 1926 not only did not define contempt of court but also did not contain any provision making it punishable. "Contempt" was not defined in the Act, not because it was difficult, or not necessary, to define it but because the legislature had no power to define it, a court of record having the exclusive power to define and determine what amounts to contempt. Section 3 by itself did not make contempt punishable ; it assumed that it was punishable and only fixed limits to the punishment that could be imposed...... contempt was not defined in the Act because the Act did not purport to make contempt punishable" and it was held that contempt of court was not an offence within the meaning of Section 5 (2) CrPC. It was further held that offence has been defined in the General Clauses Act in exactly the same language as is used in Section 4 (1) (O) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The General Clauses Act applies for the interpretation of the Constitution by Article 367 of the Constitution As contempt of court has not been found to be an offence within the meaning of the Code it cannot be an offence within the meaning of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. 5. It was held in R. L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 858 :- "Article 215 declares that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Whether Article 215 declares the power of the High Court already existing in it by reason of its being a court of record, or whether the Article confers the power as inherent in a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special one, not arising or derived from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure.... In any case, so far as contempt Of the High Court itself is concerned, as distinguished from that of a court subordinate to it, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, and so no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority. No doubt Section 5 of the Act states that a High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into and try a contempt of itself or of a court subordinate to it whether the alleged contempt is committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction and whether the contemner is within or outside such limits. The effect of Section 5 is only to widen the scope of the existing jurisdiction of a special kind and not conferring a new jurisdiction. IT is true that under section 4 of the Act the maximum sentence and fine which can be imposed is respectively simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 2000, or both. But that again is a restriction on an existing jurisdiction and not conferment of a new jurisdiction. That being the position, Section 25 in the General Clauses Act, 1897 cannot apply. The result is that Section 70 of the Penal Code is no impediment by way of limitation in the way of the recovery of the fine. 6. It was thus settled law that contempt of court was not punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act. 1926 and 1952. Contempt of court was not defined in those Acts and the offence of contempt of court was not created by them. Those Acts only limited the punishment that could be awarded by the High Court for contempt of court. Contempt of court was punishable under the inherent powers of the High Court as a court of record. This was a special jurisdiction, to which neither the Indian Penal Code nor the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable. Now we shall consider whether contempt of court has been made punishable under the Act and is thus an offence under Act, or it is still punishable under the inherent powers of the High Court as a court of record. Contempt of court has been defined in Section 2 (a) of the Act and means civil or criminal contempt. Now we shall consider whether contempt of court has been made punishable under the Act and is thus an offence under Act, or it is still punishable under the inherent powers of the High Court as a court of record. Contempt of court has been defined in Section 2 (a) of the Act and means civil or criminal contempt. Civil contempt has been defined in Section 2 (2) and criminal contempt has been defined in Section 2 (2) of the Act. Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Act mention acts which would not constitute contempt'.3 Section 9 of the Act lays down that nothing contained in the Act shall be construed as implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is punishable as contempt which would not be so punishable apart from the Act; Section 12 of the Act provides the punishment for contempt of court. Section: 13 of the Act mentions that no court shall impose a sentence under the Act for contempt of court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. It is thus evident that contempt of court has been defined) for the first time in the Act. The Act also provides the punishment for contempt of court. Thus both the definition of contempt and the punishment for contempt is provided in the Act. This is similar to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, which defines offences and provide punishment for them. It, therefore, follows that contempt of court has now been made punishable under the Act and is, therefore, an offence under the Act. The Act does not take away the power conferred by Article 215 of the Constitution on the High Court as a court of record to punish for contempt of itself by making it an offence under the Act. That power has been kept in tact by the Act. It is only regulated by the Act. It was held in S. K. Sarkar v.. Vinay Chandra Misra, AIR 1981 SC 723 ;- "Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court, respectively, as a Court of Record which include the power to punish the contempt of itself. As pointed out by this Court in Mohd. It was held in S. K. Sarkar v.. Vinay Chandra Misra, AIR 1981 SC 723 ;- "Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court, respectively, as a Court of Record which include the power to punish the contempt of itself. As pointed out by this Court in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. The State of U. P., AIR 1964 SC 1625 , there are no curbs on the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. Articles 129 and 215 do not define as to what constitutes contempt of court. Parliament has, by virtue of the aforesaid Entries in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule, power to define and limit the powers of the courts in punishing contempt of court and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. In deed, this is what is stated in the preamble of the Act of 1971." It must, therefore, be held that contempt of court is made punishable under the Act and is thus an offence within the meaning of Section 79 IPC. 7. The next question that requires determination is whether the opposite parties were justified by law in producing the film ' Andha Qanoon' and in exhibiting it. Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution gives a right to all citizens to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The right to make films and exhibit them is thus guaranteed by the Constitution. This right is restricted by the Cinematograph Act, 1952. Under Section 4 of the said Act a person desiring to exhibit any film is required to make an application to the Board of Film Certification in the prescribed manner for a certificate in respect thereof. Under Section 4-A of the said Act every film in respect of which an application has been made under Section 4 of the said Act is required to be examined in the presented manner by the Examining Committee. The Examining Committee is required to observe the guidelines provided in Section 5-B of the said Act while making its recommendations to the Board. The Examining Committee is required to observe the guidelines provided in Section 5-B of the said Act while making its recommendations to the Board. Section 5-B of the said Act mentions that a film shall not be certified under the Act if in the opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is against the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or involves defamation or contempt of court or is likely to incite the commission of any offence. The Board of Film Certification is required under Section 4-A (3) of the said Act to consider the recommendations of the Examining Committee and after making further examination of the film, if it deems necessary, sanction the film for unrestricted public exhibition, or public exhibition restricted to adults, or direct the applicant to carry out such excisions or modifications in the film as it thinks necessary before sanctioning the film far unrestricted public exhibition or for public exhibition restricted to adults, or refuse to sanction the film for public exhibition. A certificate granted in respect of any film is required to be published in the Gazette of India under Section 5-A (2) of the said Act. Section 5-A (3) of the said Act provides that a certificate granted under the said Act shall be valid throughout India for a period of ten years. It is thus evident that after obtaining a certificate under the said Act, the producer, director, actors and all others involved in the making of the film are justified by law in exhibiting it. The opposite parties were thus justified by law in making the film 'Andha Qanoon' and in exhibiting it after obtaining a certificate under the said Act. Thus no offence under the Act was committed by the opposite parties in producing the film and in exhibiting it in view of Section 79 IPC. 8. In is noteworthy that in Raj Kapoor v. Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605 the prosecution of the appellant under Section 292 IPC was quashed and it was held :- "The position that emerges is this. 8. In is noteworthy that in Raj Kapoor v. Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605 the prosecution of the appellant under Section 292 IPC was quashed and it was held :- "The position that emerges is this. Jurisprudentially viewed, an act may be an offence, definitionally speaking ; but a forbidden act may not spell inevitable guilt if the law itself declares that in certain special circumstances it is not to be regarded as an offence. The chapter on General Exceptions operates in this province. Section 79 makes an offence a non offence. When ? Only when the offending act is actually justified by law or is bona fide believed by mistake of fact to be so justified. If, as here,, the Board of Censors, acting within their jurisdiction and on an application made and pursued in the good faith, sanctions the public exhibition, the producer and connected agencies do enter the statutory harbour and are protected because Section 79 exonerates them at least in view of their bona fide belief that the certificate is justificatory. Thus the trial court when it hears the case may be appropriately apprised of the certificate under the Act and, in the light of our observations, it fills the bill under Section 79 it is right for the court to discharge the accused as the charge is groundless. In the present case, the prosecution is unsustainable because Section 79 is exculpatory when read with Section 5-A of the Act and the certificate issued thereunder." The result, therefore, is that the opposite parties cannot be convicted under Section 12 of the Act. 9. This application is accordingly dismissed and the notice issued to the opposite parties is discharged. Application dismissed.