JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J.- The following pedigree is necessary to appreciate the facts and the points involved in the case: 2. The contesting opposite party Surya Bux Singh in the present writ petition is transferee of Payag in the above pedigree. In the basic year the disputed khata No. 141 stood in the name of the contesting opposite party Surya Bux Singh. The petitioners had claimed co-tenancy rights in the disputed khata. Their claim has been negatived by all the consolidation authorities. Aggrieved by their judgments the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that in the second settlement over a large number of plots the name of Gajadhar was recorded. In the third settlement the name of Data Din was recorded in representative capacity and thereafter payag also figured in representative capacity, but he has sold the disputed khata to opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition therefore, the opposite party no. 1 would have only share in the disputed khata no. 141. 4. The claim of the petitioner was contested by the transferee of Payag on the allegations that the disputed property belongs to Payag and he had acquired valid title to the disputed khata and that his name was correctly recorded over the same in the basic year. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has demonstrated before me that a large number of plots stood in the name of Gajadhar in the second settlement therefore, on those plots the names of Data Din and Payag were only in representative capacity. According to him all the consolidation authorities have patently erred in negativing the claim of the petitioners at least in the plots which stood in the name of Gajadhar in second settlement. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that all the consolidation authorities have taken correct view in the circumstances of the present case. The petitioners have failed to prove the identity of the land coming down from the time of common ancestor Gajadhar. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that all the consolidation authorities have taken correct view in the circumstances of the present case. The petitioners have failed to prove the identity of the land coming down from the time of common ancestor Gajadhar. He has cited the rulings reported in 1965 A.L.J. page 68 (Rev) (1) 1975 R.D. page 196, Ram Narain v. Buddhu, and 1979 R.D. 125, Balwanti v. Bhaiya Ram, and has emphasised that as the identity of the ancestral land coming down in the same form has not been established, hence the petitioner's claim has rightly been negatived. He has also emphasised that the admission contained in the mutation case will not help the petitioner in view of the ruling reported in 1973 A.W.R. 277, Smt. Chandra Wati v. Kallu, and others. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that in a grove the petitioners have got their due share and the other plots were also such as were governed by the personal law, yet the petitioners' claim has been wrongly, Goberi v. Smt. Uretha, negatived by the consolidation authorities. 8. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties and I have also examined the revenue record. I find that the revisional court has maintained the claim of the contesting opposite party only on the ground that there was a big difference between the old holding and the present holding, but it has not examined the effect of the decision between the parties regarding grove wherein the claim of the petitioners has been accepted and also there are a number of plots which are really coming down from the time of Gajadhar and there is no cogent reason as to how the interest of the descendant of Gajadhar became extinguished in those plots. Since the revisional court has not examined an important aspect involved in the case. I think that in the ends of justice the judgment of the revisional court should be quashed and the revisional court be directed to re-examine the claims of the parties, and it should indicate the effect of the decision between the parties regarding the grove plots. Since the revisional court has not examined an important aspect involved in the case. I think that in the ends of justice the judgment of the revisional court should be quashed and the revisional court be directed to re-examine the claims of the parties, and it should indicate the effect of the decision between the parties regarding the grove plots. It should also indicate that in the circumstances of the present case how the interest of the petitioners became extinguished over the plots standing in the name of Gajadhar in the second settlement. The reasons given by the consolidation authorities that the petitioners did not pay rent or their names did not appear on those plots afterwards are not material circumstances to negative the claim of the petitioners. It is for the parties claiming exclusive right in those plots to indicate as to how the claim of the other descendants of Gajadhar became extinguished. 9. It is noteworthy that grove was also governed by the personal law of the parties and the area of the grove shown in the second settlement also was in third settlement, yet the claim of the petitioners has been recognised qua grove therefore, its impact upon the claims of the parties regarding other plots involved in the present writ petition should be carefully examined by the revisional court. The judgment of the revisional court appears somewhat contradictory in the circumstances of the present case. 10. In the result the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the revisional court dated 19.3.1974 is hereby quashed and the revisional court is directed to re-examine the claim of the petitioners in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.