Saikto, J.:- The writ petitioner herein impugns the Notification No. 13/3/76 LSG dated 3rd May, 1976, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Manipur in exercise of the power purported to be under Rule 125 (2) (K) of the Defeace and Internal Security Rules, 1975, empowering the District Magis­trate, Manipur Central District, Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Manipur East and West Sub-division to summarily evict the roadside encroachments. The petitioner states that he bag been occupying a plot of land measuring .01 acre in C. S. Dag No. 1661 under the Imphul Municipality and acquired title in the said land by adverse possession having been in passessios thereof since 1942 and that his residential house stands beyond 150' away from the centre of the Itnphal-Ukhrul road. Earlks eviction proceeding was drown up against him and 48 others by issuing notice on 4.5.1973 under Rule 18(1) and (2) of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules, 1961 and his appeal therefrom was dismissed on 19.5.1973, whereafter the eviction order was sought to be executed by demolishing as of destroying his houses. It is further stated that the petitioner, however, reconstructed his structures and has been living there and that he was a petitioner in Civil Rule No. 6 of 1974, Wherein the impugned order of eviction was stayed and later the Civil Rule allowed by judgment dated 29.6.1976. The peti­tioner, thereafter, issued a notice on the Government of Manipur section 83 C.P.C. and filed T.S. No. 1 of 1977 on 6.1.1977. But, during the pendency of that suit the Superintendent of Police on 6.1.1977 with armed forces started demolishing his house along with those of few others without any notice or warning and the Police Officer conducting the eviction informed the petitioner that the State Government issued the impugned order empowering the District Magistrate of Manipur Central District to summarily evict the encroachment upon the road­side lands within the Imphal Municipal area, under certain provision of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971, and he was shown a copy of the said notification. 2. The petitioner contends that clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 125 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, does not empower to issue notification under the said provision, and the same therefore being beyond jurisdiction, is liable to be quashed. 2. The petitioner contends that clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 125 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, does not empower to issue notification under the said provision, and the same therefore being beyond jurisdiction, is liable to be quashed. He further contends that in Civil Rule 6 of 1974 it was held that an enquiry under sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act was appropriate and the Government of Manipur had no right to evict the petitioner, without holding such an enquiry, with the help of the impugned order. 3. Mr. R. K. Manisana Singh, the learned Advocate General Manipur, submits that the impugned order in a sense bas become infructuous in view of the fact that Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971, itself remained in force during the period of proclamation of the emergency issued on the 4td day of December, 1971 and for a period of six months thereafter. The emergency having ended and after six months thereof, the Act itself ceased to be in force. The Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, could not therefore remain ia force thereafter. We are inclined to accept this submissson. 4. The Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971, shortly, 'The Rules' had been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971, Shortly, 'the Act' and all other powers enabling the Central Government in that behalf. Under Rule 1A of the Rules as from the commencement of the Defence and Internal Security of India (Amendement Rules, 1975), the pro­visions of the rules, so far as might be applied for the purpose of internal Security as they applied for the other purposes of the Act accordingly those provisions should be construed, where­ver necessarily, as including also a reference to Internal Secu­rity. The petitioner has challenged the vires of the Notification (Annexare A). Before deciding that question, it would be more appropriate to decide whether the Rules whereunder the impug­ned notification was issued and for that matter, the notificat­ion itself are still inforce. The petitioner has challenged the vires of the Notification (Annexare A). Before deciding that question, it would be more appropriate to decide whether the Rules whereunder the impug­ned notification was issued and for that matter, the notificat­ion itself are still inforce. It h settled law as stated in Max­well that Rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation. The Rules have therefore, to be treated as if those were contained in the Act itself. It is also settled that the Rules framed under an Act must be consistent with the Act and not in derogation of it, as was ruled in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Babu Ram, AIR 1961 SC 151. As the Rules were framed under the Act, these could not, unless otherwise provided, survive the Act itself. 5. Clause (k) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 125 of the Rules, empowered the State Government by General or special order to make such other provisions in relation to road transport as appeared to that Government to be necessary or expedient foe securing the Defence of India and Civil Defence, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient conduct of mili­tary operations, or for Maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. The impugned order is purported to have been passed under this provision. 6. The impugned order is purported to have been passed under this provision. 6. In sub section (3) of section 1 of the Act, the expiry of the Act shall act affect : (a) the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule, or (b) any Tight, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule, or (c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence under this Act or any contravention of any rule made under this Act or of any order made under any such rule, or (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted,, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not expired. The question therefore, is, whether the provision made by the Governor of Manipur that the District Magistrate of Manipur Central District Sub-divisional Magistrates of Imphal East and West shall have power to summarily evict the aforesaid encroachers and remove the encroachments by adopting the mechanical means of knock­ing down the structures with the help of bull-dozers and to consfiscate the materials of the structures to the Government, shall continue to be in force after the expiry of the period of operation of the Act and for that matter of the Rules ? No specific order passed by virtue of this notification is being chall­enged. What is challenged is the vires of the notification itself. Would this notification be covered under clause (a) above, namely. "any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule", or under clause (b), namely, "any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule" ? To decide this question, we have to ascertain the true nature of the notification. From the appa­rent tenor of the notification, it appears that the notification only empowers the District Magistrate, Manipur and Sub-divisional Magistrates, Manipur, to summarily evict the encroachers as stated therein. To decide this question, we have to ascertain the true nature of the notification. From the appa­rent tenor of the notification, it appears that the notification only empowers the District Magistrate, Manipur and Sub-divisional Magistrates, Manipur, to summarily evict the encroachers as stated therein. It does not amount to a rule made under the Act or any order made under any such rule and as such it would not be covered by the above clauses (a) and (b). This empowerment, in our opinion, must naturally some to an end as soon as the Rules ceased to be in force, upon the Act itself ceasing to be in force. In other words, this empowerment could not survive the Act and the Rules. It did not amount to an order directly affecting any citizen, being only an enabling order and it must necessarily have spent its force with the expiry of the Rules and the Act. This being the legal position, there is nothing left to be quashed by this Court. No action can, therefore, be taken pursuant thereto after it ceased to be in force. 7. There is no doubt that the Act is a temporary one. If an Act contains a proviso that it is to continue in force only for a certain specified time, it is called a temporary Act. As a general rule, and unless it contained some special provi­sion to the contrary and if that temporary Act has expired, no proceeding can be taken upon it after it ceased to have any further effect. Therefore, offence committed against tempor­ary Act must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expire. As soon as the Act expires, any proceedings, which are being taken against the person will ipso facto terminate. The duration of a statute, as has been stated by Halsbury, is prima facie perpetual; it endures until it is repealed either expressly or by implication, by a subsequent statute, or in exercise of a power conferred by a statute, and does not lapse through non-user. A statute or a particular provision thereof, may, however, be merely temporary, that is to say be expressed to continue in force for a limited period only, in which case it will expire automatically at the end of that period unless earlier repealed. A statute or a particular provision thereof, may, however, be merely temporary, that is to say be expressed to continue in force for a limited period only, in which case it will expire automatically at the end of that period unless earlier repealed. A temporary statute or provision may be continued in force for a further period by subsequent statute, or under powers conferred by statute. A temporary statute or provision may also be made permanent by subsequent legislation. The effect of the expiry of a temporary statute is in each case a matter of con­struction. There is no presumption that the statute is to be treated on expiry as dead for all purposes. As has been observed by Bhagwati, J., delivering the judgment of the Court in Hansraj Moolji vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 497 , every statute for which no time is limited is called a Perpet­ual Act, and its duration is prima facie perpetual. It continues in force until it is repealed. If an Act contains a proviso that it is to continue in force only for a certain specified time, it is called a Temporary Act. This result would follow not only from the terms of the Act itself but also from the fact that it was intended only as a temporary measure. This ratio has also been applied to emergency measures which continue during the subsistence of the emergency but lapse with the cessation thereof. In the instant case nothing has been shown to us by way of extension or rivival of the Act and the Rules. There is, therefore, no doubt that no fresh action can be taken under the impugned notification after the Act and the Rules ceased to be in force. 8. While taking the above view of the impugned notifica­tion, we should not be understood to have held that the Dist­rict Magistrate, Manipur and Sub-Divisional Magistrates referred to therein would not have power to carry out eviction of encroachers if they are otherwise empowered under any provisions of law. Whether or not there is such a provision in force is entirely a different matter. 9. As regards the rights claimed by the petitioner on the land stated to have been under his occupation, the reasons given in our judgment just delivered in Civil Rule No. 51/77/2/77 will be applicable to the petitioner. 10. Whether or not there is such a provision in force is entirely a different matter. 9. As regards the rights claimed by the petitioner on the land stated to have been under his occupation, the reasons given in our judgment just delivered in Civil Rule No. 51/77/2/77 will be applicable to the petitioner. 10. For the reasons stated above and the reasons given in our judgment in the above Civil Rule No. 51/77/2/77, this peti­tion is found to be without merit and is rejected. The interim stay order passed on 28. 1. 1977 and allowed to continue on 29.4.1980 stands vacated. Under the peculiar facts and circum­stances of the case, we pass no order as to costs. Rule discharged.