JUDGMENT K.N. Misra, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 21101978 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Lakhimpur Kheri, in Revision No. 2894 of 1978 filed by the opposite party Ram Roop. By this order other three revisions which were also against the orders passed in proceedings for allotment of chaks, were also disposed of, Aggrieved by this order, petitioner filed this writ petition. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are as follows : 3. Petitioner had filed an objection under Section 9A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act', in respect of plot No. 145 Minjumla, area 8 acres of khata No. 161 situate in village Parsahiya, Pergana and Tahsil Nighasan, District Lakhimpur Kheri. This objection was filed by the petitioner against recorded tenureholder Ram Niwas who has been arrayed as opposite party No. 4 in this writ petition. Petitioner had claimed in his aforesaid objection Sirdari rights in the said plots on the basis of adverse possession. The said objection was dismissed in default of both the parties on 30th November, 1977. However, on the same date restoration application was moved and it was restored on 151277. In this writ petition filed on 28th March, 1979, it has been averred that the said objection filed by petitioner under Section 9A (2) is still pending. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not state as to whether the said objection wherein petitioner had claimed title in the plot in question on the basis of adverse possession has been disposed of or not. However, the fact remains that when the writ petition was filed, objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act was still pending for decision before the Consolidation Officer. It has been averred by the petitioner that the Consolidation authorities revised the Khetauni (annual register) and the annual register was published in the unit although final orders were not passed by the Consolidation Officer in the objection filed by the petitioner which was restored on 15121977. It has been averred by the petitioner that the Consolidation authorities revised the Khetauni (annual register) and the annual register was published in the unit although final orders were not passed by the Consolidation Officer in the objection filed by the petitioner which was restored on 15121977. It has further beer averred that in the provisional consolidation scheme prepared by the Consolidation Officer under Section 19A of the Act the petitioner was not allotted any land nor that land was included in the chak of Ram Niwas opposite party No. 4the recorded tenureholder against whom the petitioner had filed objection u/s 9A(2) of the Act. The said plot was allotted in the chak of opposite parties 6 and 7 namely, Shiv Lal and Hari Singh. Since it could lead to the dispossession of the petitioner from the land in dispute about which his objection was still pending before the Consolidation Officer, and, as such, the petitioner being person affected, filed an objection under Section 20 (2) of the Act, but it was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer, vide order dated 1141978, a copy of which has been annexed to the counter affidavit as Annexure C3. Aggrieved by that order, petitioner preferred appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, which was heard and allowed only to the extent that the plot in respect of which the petitioner was litigating with the opposite party Ram Niwas was directed to be allotted in the chak of Ram Niwas, the chakholder No. 212. The petitioner felt satisfied with that order and did not prefer revision against it. Revisions were filed by opposite parties 4 to 7 namely, Ram Niwas, Ram Roop, Shiv Lal and Hari Singh in which petitioner was arrayed as one of the opposite parties. The said revisions were allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 21101978, on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the aforesaid opposite parties who had agreed that the chaks which were allotted at the stage of Assistant Consolidation Officer be restored. The other chak holder Nos. 297, 127 and 261 whose chaks were also to be affected in case the said compromise was to be accepted, urged before the Deputy Director of Consolidation that their chaks be not altered in pursuance of the compromise arrived at between the revisionists. The other chak holder Nos. 297, 127 and 261 whose chaks were also to be affected in case the said compromise was to be accepted, urged before the Deputy Director of Consolidation that their chaks be not altered in pursuance of the compromise arrived at between the revisionists. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, however, passed the impugned order dated 211078 and the chaks of the revisionists including that of Ram Niwas, the chakholder No. 212, were altered as per adjustment chart, appended to the said order. Aggrieved by order petitioner has filed this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Diwan Singh Randhawa, urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in setting aside the order passed in the objection by which plot in dispute No. 145M in respect of which petitioner's objection was still pending under Section 9A (2) of the Act, stood allotted in the chak of other opposite parties. Learned counsel urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has decided the case by a nonspeaking order without adverting to said question as to whether the said plot in respect of which objection is pending under Section 9A (2) of the Act should remain allotted in the chak of the recorded tenureholder Ram Niwas so that the petitioner be not dispossessed meanwhile and if ultimately, he succeeds in his objection, he may get land allotted as against the valuation of the said plot. His further contention was that since objection under Section 9A (2) filed by the petitioner in respect of the said plots, were not finally disposed of by the consolidation authorities, and, as such, the statement of proposals could not be prepared by the consolidation authorities. He, thus, urged that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation deserved to be set aside and the statement of proposals prepared by the consolidation authorities under Section 19 of the Act in the unit deserved to be quashed. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to a decision reported in Ganga Prasad and another Vs. The Deputy Director (Consolidation), Meerut and others (AWR 1968, P. 869) wherein Hon'ble Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was), held : Sec. 19 lays down the conditions to be fulfilled by a consolidation scheme. U/cl. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to a decision reported in Ganga Prasad and another Vs. The Deputy Director (Consolidation), Meerut and others (AWR 1968, P. 869) wherein Hon'ble Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was), held : Sec. 19 lays down the conditions to be fulfilled by a consolidation scheme. U/cl. (a) it has to mention the rights and liabilities of a tenureholder, as recorded in the annual register prepared u/s. 10. U/S. 10, the annual register has to be revised on the basis of the orders passed under SubS. (1) and subS. (2) of S. 9A. It is, thereafter, prepared in the Form prescribed and published in the unit. The consolidation scheme cannot be prepared until orders u/s. 9A of the Act have been passed. After such orders have been passed, the register is revised u/s. 10 and only then could the scheme be prepared. Where the authorities were going about preparing the scheme without disposing of the objections and passing orders u/s 9A, held that, that is clearly illegal. 5. The said decision, though apparently supports the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, is based on the facts of that case. In the said case, the petitioners had filed objection under Section 9 of the Act in respect of the plot Nos. 551 and 522. The Land Management Committee also raised the objections claiming these plots for the Gaon Sabha. The Consolidation authorities did not take steps to adjudicate these objections. 6. Petitioner in aforesaid case had also filed objection in relation to plot No. 548 as also in respect of the well situate in the village. All these objections were not decided but the Consolidation Officer started preparing provisional consolidation scheme under Sections 19, 19A and 20 of the Act. The petitioner and other tenureholders thereupon requested the Consolidation Officer to stay the preparation of scheme till the objections had been disposed of. On 1111966 the Settlement Officer Consolidation stayed the preparation of the consolidation scheme. But in the last week of November, 1968 he, without giving any notice to the petitioner, vacated that order. On the petitioner's request he again passed an order of stay which, in turn, was again vacated subsequently. On 1111966 the Settlement Officer Consolidation stayed the preparation of the consolidation scheme. But in the last week of November, 1968 he, without giving any notice to the petitioner, vacated that order. On the petitioner's request he again passed an order of stay which, in turn, was again vacated subsequently. The petitioner went to the Deputy Director of Consolidation with an application for stay, who granted order of stay but on the request of the opposite party the order of stay was vacated. In these circumstances the said writ petition was filed. It is, thus, evident that the objections which were filed by the petitioners and the Land Management Committee under Section 9 of the Act were not disposed of by any order by the Consolidation Officer and the same were pending when the consolidation authorities proceeded to prepare the consolidation scheme under Section 19, 19A and 20 of the Act. 7. In the present case, we find that the objection which was filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer in default, vide order dated 30111977 which was restored subsequently on 15121977. It, therefore, cannot be said that the objection u/s. 9A (2) of the Act was not disposed of by the Consolidation Officer at any point of time. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the dismissal of the objection in default would not amount to disposal of the objection by the Consolidation Officer, and, as such, the consolidation authorities could not proceed to publish annual registers u/s 10 (1) of the Act merely on the basis of such decision passed on such objection. His submission, in other words, was that the annual registers could be revised under Section 10 (1) of the Act on the basis of only such orders which were passed on merits under subsection (1) or Subsection (2) of Section 9A of the Act and it is on the final disposal of the objections under Section 9A (2) of the Act on merits that the annual registers could be prepared in the prescribed form and published in the unit. I do not find any merits in this contention as well. 9. The Consolidation Officer could legitimately and validly pass an order dismissing the objection in default if the objector failed to appear to attend the court on that date fixed for disposal of the objection. I do not find any merits in this contention as well. 9. The Consolidation Officer could legitimately and validly pass an order dismissing the objection in default if the objector failed to appear to attend the court on that date fixed for disposal of the objection. On the dismissal of the objection the case would stand disposed of and it will not be deemed to be pending unless it is restored on an application moved by the objector for restoration of the objection u/s 201 of the Land Revenue Act read with Section 41 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. When an objection is dismissed in default the two remedies are available to the objector. He may apply for restoration under the said provisions or he may file an appeal against that order under Section 11 (i) of the Act as held in Pheku Vs. Joint Director of Consolidation, Varanasi (ALJ 1981, P. 1233). If the objection which was dismissed in default is restored either on the application moved for restoration by the objector or on appeal filed by him against that order, the proceedings initiated on the objection would revive and the Consolidation Officer would then proceed to dispose it of on merits. Thus, we find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if an objection u/s 9A (2) of the Act is dismissed in default then that order will not amount to an order passed by the Consolidation Officer disposing of an objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act. 10. The words order passed under subsections (i) & (ii) of Sec. 9A, occurring in Sec. 10 (1) of the Act, cannot be so construed as to mean only the final orders passed on merits by the Consolidation Officer and not the order passed dismissing the objection in default. In my opinion the said provision cannot be construed so as to cover only those orders which are passed on merits by the Consolidation Officer in the absence of any such words being there in said section so as to convey that meaning or such legislative intent on the point. Thus, the consolidation authorities, in my opinion, could proceed to revise the annual register on the basis of order passed by the Consolidation Officer dismissing the objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act. Thus, the consolidation authorities, in my opinion, could proceed to revise the annual register on the basis of order passed by the Consolidation Officer dismissing the objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act. Once such an order is passed, the consolidation authorities could proceed to revise and prepare annual register in the Prescribed Form and publish in the unit. After publication of the revised annual register under Section 10 (1) of the Act, the consolidation authorities could validly proceed to prepare the consolidation scheme of the unit on the basis of the annual register published under the said provisions. The restoration of the objection would not affect the proceedings regarding preparation of provisional consolidation scheme. The annual register prepared and published under subsection (i) could be modified in pursuance of the order passed in the objection by the Consolidation Officer or in subsequent appeal or revision filed. A reference of such orders along with an extract of its operative portion would be noted against the said entry as is required under subsection (ii) of Sec. 10 of the Act. In Rule 28 it is provided that annual register in C. H. Form 11 shall be prepared by the consolidation Lekhpal incorporating all orders relating to rights and liabilities in respect of the land passed by the Consolidation Officer under Section 9A (i). The orders passed by the Consolidation Officer dismissing the objection is default by which, undoubtedly, the objection stands disposed of, has also got to be incorporated in C.H. Form 11, because until restored this case cannot be deemed to be pending. The restoration of the objection would not take away the effect of the disposal of the objection nor it can be so construed as to defer the proceedings regarding preparation and publication of annual registers under Section 10 (1) of the Act; nor it would invalidate the proceedings regarding preparation of provisional consolidation scheme under Sections 19, 19A, and 20 of the Act. 11. 11. It is well settled that the allotment of chaks will not bar the claim of the petitioners set out in their objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act with regard to land in dispute because provisions of Section 11A of the Act will net be attracted and will not operate as a bar against the petitioner in either filing objection under subsection (2) of Sec. 20 of the Act upon the publication of consolidation scheme or in getting pending objection disposed of on merits 12. Thus, I do not find that merely because objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act, concerning title in respect of the land in dispute are pending, the consolidation authorities cannot proceed to prepare and publish provisional consolidation scheme. Similar view was taken by me in Smt. Kabutri and others Vs. Consolidation Officer, Lakhimpur Kheri and others, (1983 Lucknow Law Journal, 264 : 1983 AWC 1001). If the petitioner would ultimately succeed in his objection filed under Section 9A (2) of the Act and would be declared to be tenureholder of the land in dispute, he would be entitled to get land allotted to the extent of valuation of the said plot and the consolidation authorities would be bound to make adjustments in the Chaks and to allot the chak to the petitioner as against the land in dispute in the light of adjudication of the right and title of the parties under Section 9A (2) of the Act. Such allotment would be done by making reference under Section 48 (3) of the Act even if the consolidation scheme has been confirmed under Section 23 (i) of the Act. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the consolidation scheme prepared by the consolidation authorities in the unit and also in respect of the land in dispute was illegally made. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, next, contended that the petitioner being person aggrieved could file objection in respect of the plot in question under Section 20 (2) of the Act. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, next, contended that the petitioner being person aggrieved could file objection in respect of the plot in question under Section 20 (2) of the Act. The further contention was that appeal filed by the petitioner against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer rejecting the objection was maintainable and the same was rightly allowed by ordering that the land in dispute be kept allotted in the chak of Ram Niwas the recorded tenureholder with whom he was litigating in proceedings under Section 9A (2) of the Act in respect of the plots in dispute. Learned counsel urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation acted illegally in setting aside that order passed in appeal and modifying the chak of Ram Niwas on the basis of compromise to which he was not a party. He, thus, urged that by allotment of the plot in dispute to the opposite parties 5 to 7, the petitioner has been materially prejudiced as he will be dispossessed from the land in dispute and he will not be getting land allotted in his name if he will ultimately succeed. I am unable to agree with this contention. Since the petitioner was not recorded tenureholder, he could not claim allotment of chak in proceedings under Section 20 of the Act. The petitioner would be entitled to get a chak in respect of the land in dispute if he will ultimately succeed in the objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act. If in any proceeding under Section 20 of the Act the plot in question has been allotted in the chak of other tenureholder, the petitioner would get the land allotted, equal to its valuation, on his success in proceeding under Section 9A (2) of the Act. He will, therefore, not be prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. The consolidation authorities would give effect to the order passed in favour of the petitioner and would allot a chak to him as against the land in dispute. Since the petitioners' title as tenureholder in respect of the land in dispute was not determined, the consolidation authorities, in my opinion, committed no error in allotting the plot in question to other tenureholders while adjusting their chaks in pursuance of a compromise between the recorded tenureholders. The compromise would not fail merely on the ground that the petitioner had not joined in the compromise. The compromise would not fail merely on the ground that the petitioner had not joined in the compromise. Since the petitioner's title in respect of the land in dispute was not disposed of by then, he could not be treated to be tenureholder of that land and the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not obliged to decide his claim in the revision arising out of the proceedings under Section 20 of the Act. I also do not find any merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the plot in question should have been allotted in the chak of Ram Niwas so that the petitioner should not be dispossessed from the land in question. It is well settled that while preparing consolidation scheme under the provisions of Section 19, 19A, and 20 of the Act, all the Sand which is within the consolidation scheme is pooled together and the chaks are carved out allotting land to various tenureholders. Thus, in the process of adjustments of chaks of various tenureholders the land which is claimed by the petitioner falls in the chak of the opposite parties 5 to 7, he cannot claim nor he can get immunity from dispossession. Although it may be considered to be appropriate to keep the land allotted in the chak of the tenureholder with whom the objector is litigating under Section 9A (2) of the Act with regard to it but if that has not been done it would not vitiate the allotment, and, thus, the allotment of such land in the chak of the other tenureholder in the process of appropriate necessary adjustment of chaks would not invalidate the allotment of land so made to other tenureholders. No interference, therefore, can be made with the impugned order in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the aforesaid ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. The petitioners' claim regarding title in the land in dispute would be determined on merits in his pending objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act irrespective of allotment and confirmation of chaks. 14. The petitioners' claim regarding title in the land in dispute would be determined on merits in his pending objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act irrespective of allotment and confirmation of chaks. The petitioner would be entitled to get land allotted in his name as against the land in dispute on his success in the said pending case but until disposal of objection in his favour he cannot claim an allotment of chak in respect of the land in dispute because he is not the recorded tenureholder and his pending case under Section 9A (2) of the Act has not yet been disposed of, as has been indicated by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 16. In the result, the writ petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed and it is, accordingly, dismissed. The stay order, if any, is vacated. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs. (Petition dismissed)