M. L. Jain ( 1 ) THE appellant Harmohan Das Bagai took on rent a shop in the ground floor in a building No. 8531/34,5 Arakashan Road, Pahar Ganj, Delhi, now belonging to the respondent. A room in the first floor above the shop was taken for purposes of residence on 7-1-1955, at Rs. 70. 00 p. m. vide Ex. A-7. One more room was taken on the first floor on rent on 1-9-1956 at Rs. 50. 00 p. m. vide Ex. A-8. An eviction petition was filed against him on 15-4-1968 under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-S. (1) of sectton 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act ). In the written statement, he appears to have contended that there ware two tenancies; the first one was taken for residential- cum-commercial purposes, while the second was taken exclusively for business purposes. The petition ended in a compromise and was dismissed as withdrawn on 29-1-1973. According to the compromise, the rent was increased to Rs. 120. 00 for the first tenancy and Rs. 8 ). 00 for the second; in all Rs. 200. 00. A receipt (Ex. A-2=r-29) was issued on 29-1-1973 for the flat in the name of of Mohan Bagai. On the receipt (Ex. A-3) issued on 14-5-1975, the words "residential flat" has been written on the top thereof. Same is the position in respect of receipt (Ex. A-4) dated 17-12-1975 and receipt (Ex. A-5) dated 21-8-1976. Inreceipt (Ex. A-6)dited 11-3-1977, the two rooms have been shown as residential. On 5-7-1977, the landlord sent notice of termination to the tenant that the was the tenant in the residential flat on the first floor bearing No. 8531-34 consisting of two rooms, etc. at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 p. m, that he had acquired vacant possession of a residential flat No. 17 in Reviera Apartment on the 4th floor, 45 Shamnath Marg Delhi, and that ihe tenant had kept the disputed premises locked. Inreply dated 22-7-1977, the tenant said that the premises were taken by him for business and residential purposes and are being used for the said purposes, that the tenant had acquired the said flat in early 1972 and this fact was in the knowledge of the landlord. Inreply dated 22-7-1977, the tenant said that the premises were taken by him for business and residential purposes and are being used for the said purposes, that the tenant had acquired the said flat in early 1972 and this fact was in the knowledge of the landlord. He maintained that there were two separate tenancies and the receipts were issued in the name of Mohan Bagai which was the business name of the tenant. Fresh notices (Ex. A-9 and Ex. A-10 of 6-8-1977 were issued terminating the tenancies separately. On 23-8-1977 the tenant sent the reply which was almost similar to the earlier reply. ( 2 ) ON 13-9-1977, the present petition for eviction was filed under clauses (d) and (h) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec-14 of the Act. This time clause (e) was not. invoked. The Addl. Controller by his judgment dated 21-12-1983 decreed the eviction on both the grounds. The learned Rent Controller Tribunal by its judgment dated 19-11-1983 upheld both the grounds of eviction and dismissed the appeal. Hence, this second appeal. ( 3 ) THERE is no doubt that the findings of the Tribunal below are of fac and are not amenable to interference, vide Karam Chand v. Om Devi,1980 Raj. L. R. 432. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, the first question that falls for determination under clauses (d) and (h) of Sec. 14 (1) of the Act is whether the premises in question were let out for residential purposes only. This is clear from the words of clause (d) itself and in respect of clause (h), it was so held in Hari Shankar Gupta v. Musaddi Lal, 1970 RCR 782. The contention of the tenant is that the purpose of letting was not exclusively residential. The basis for so contending firstly is that after 29-1-1973 the tenancy has changed in the name of Mohan Bagai and the rent receipts were issued in the name of Mohan Bagai which is the business name of the tenant Harmohan Das Bagai, and secondly, is that he has been conducting his business in and from these premises. ( 5 ) HE stated that he was an agent of M/s Associated Apparels Pvt. Ltd. , M/s Eves Apparels Pvt. Ltd. , and Metropolitan Trading Co. , all three of Bombay, engaged in manufacture of garments. ( 5 ) HE stated that he was an agent of M/s Associated Apparels Pvt. Ltd. , M/s Eves Apparels Pvt. Ltd. , and Metropolitan Trading Co. , all three of Bombay, engaged in manufacture of garments. He has been receiving business letters from all these three firms in the name of Mohan Bagai. He kept their samples in the disputed premises for the customers who used to come to him for placing orders. His turn-over in respect of the said three concerns was near about Rs. 60. 00 lakhs a year. He also had a shop Greenland Apparels at 1/c Ram Nagar, Delhi, vide acknowledgement Ex. A-4. Part of his office was in F-66 Bhagat Singh Market. The shop below the disputed premises was known as India Apparels which was commenced in 1973-74. But that shop was used as a store and no work was done in that shop. He, however, admitted that the office of India Apparels was 5, Arakashan Road. He did say that India Apparels was a partnership firm with three partners, Mohan Bagai, Manmohan Bagai and Atul Bagai. He further said that he used the name Harmohan Bagai in his domestic matters and in business, he is known as Mohan Bagai. But that does not mean that Mohan Bagai was the name of his concerns. He admitted that he never used M/s or Messrs against that name. He had filed an affidavit (Mark A) of 18-2-1975 in the Sales-tax Department in the name of Mohan Bagai, s/o D. D. Bagai to the effect that he is a partner of the firm M/s India Apparels. Thus, Mohan Bagai cannot be a business name because business came cannot swear an affidavit. Even if one were to hold that in the business circles, Harmohan Das Bagai was known as Mohan Bagai and the rent receipts were issued in the name of Mohan Bagai,, it does not follow or even raise presumption that the premises were let both for residential and business purposes. The respondent also produced two invitation cards, one of February 1960 (Ex. A-39) and the other of April 1974 (Ex. A-40) issued by him. In them, he did not give his name as Harmohan Das, but as Mohan Bagai. These invitation cards further belied the stand that Mohan Bagai was a business name. The respondent also produced two invitation cards, one of February 1960 (Ex. A-39) and the other of April 1974 (Ex. A-40) issued by him. In them, he did not give his name as Harmohan Das, but as Mohan Bagai. These invitation cards further belied the stand that Mohan Bagai was a business name. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly concluded that the original documents stated that the premises were taken for residential purposes and continued to be residential and that Mohan Bagai is not the business name but that Mohan Bagai and Harmohan Das Bagai are two names of the same person. The Tribunal rejected as unreliable the oral evidence of his witnesses to the contrary. Shri Sabharwal on behalf of the landlord submitted that the tenant in the written statement took up the plea that there were two tenancies. If that is so, then the documentary evidence from the commencement of the said tenancy shows that the premises were taken for residential purposes only. Now, he cannot turn round and take a different stand as he has done in his statement that after 29-1-1973 there was one consolidated tenancy which was for business purposes as well. Moreover, he has failed to show that the purpose had undergone a change. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant REFERRED TO to Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj and another, AIR 1963 SC 337 , wherein in connection with clause (e) and its explanation in sec. 13 (1) of the 1952 Rent Act (now sec. 14 (l) (e), the Supreme Court observed that "the professional use of a substantial part of the premises with the consent of the landlord takes the case outside sec. 14 (l) (e ). In other words, where premises are let for residential purposes and it is shown that they are used by the tenant incidentally for commercial, professional or other purposes with the consent of the landlord, the landlord is not entitled to eject the tenant even if he proves that he needs the premises bona fide for his personal use becuasethe premises have by their user ceased to be premises let for residential purposes alone. " In Munshi Ram Sakhya v. Ram Pershad, 1981 Rent L. R. Note 20, the tenant was using one room as aclinic to the full knowledge of the landlord. " In Munshi Ram Sakhya v. Ram Pershad, 1981 Rent L. R. Note 20, the tenant was using one room as aclinic to the full knowledge of the landlord. It was held that the landlord cannot seek eviction under sec. 14 (l) (e ). It was contended that the rooms came to be used for business purposes as well and that fact being in the knowledge of the landlord, the premises ceased to be let for residential purposes alone. But, it appers to me that where a Substantial portion of the premises in dispute is used for purposes other than residential to the knowledge of the landlord, then, letting may in certain circumstances amount to one for residential-cum-non-residential purposes. In this case, from the evidence on record, it clearly appears that the premises were let for residential purposes alone and the purpose does not change even if they were incidentally used for business purposes. As a matter of fact, there is no credible evidence that they were at all so used. With seven members residing therein, it was indeed not possible to do so. ( 7 ) HAVING now known that the premises were let out for residence only, let us now see if the landlord has been able to show that the tenant had acquired other residence within the meaning of clause (h) which entitles him to eviction. The tenant admitted in the written statement that he acquired the premises in 1972 and the landlord knew about it on 29-1-1973 when the previous petition was compromised. But it was urged, the ground of clause (h) was taken as late as in the year 1977. Such an inordinate delay deprives the landlord of the cause of action under this clause. Shri Arun Kumar relies upon Batta Mat v. Rameshwar Noth. etc. 1970 0 RCJ 635, for this contention, but what was held in that case is that "where the landlord files the eviction petition too long after the tenant occupies vacant possession of a residence for himself, then the tenant may defend the eviction petition on the ground that he had in the meanwhile let out his own residence to some other person as he was not bound to keep it vacant waiting for the landlord to file an eviction petition. following Battu Mal (supra) I said in Smt. Sheet v. Utpal Hari Chand, 1979 RIR 345. following Battu Mal (supra) I said in Smt. Sheet v. Utpal Hari Chand, 1979 RIR 345. "it is possible that in some cases, the landlord, if he unduly delays his action, may be defeated not because there exists no ground or cause of action but because it lacks bonafides or is barred by estoppel. " But this is not the case here. Here vacant possession was available to the tenant and be had shifted to the premises and it is not his case that acting upon an express or implied assurance that this clause (h) will not be used against him, he disposed of the premises or give them on rent to some One else. The defence of delay does not arise in this case. Apart from this, the tenant could not succeed in showing that there has been any inordinate delay. The letters Ex. AW 3/2 and Ex. AW/3 written by the tenant to the Municipal Corporation on 26-11-1971 and 25-2-1971 show that the flat is lying vacant since 1971. In this written statement he said that he got possession of the flat in Reviera Apartment in 1972, but in his cross-examination he deposed that he got it in 1970-71 and had shifted there in 1971, and the landlord never objected. He further clarified in cross-examination that his two sons after their marriage had occupied it in 1974. He himself had shifted there only in 1980 when he suffered a heart attack. Therefore, it is difficult to say that it was within the knowledge of the landlord that the flat has been acquired in 1970 and shifting had even taken place in 1974. Even if the landlord came to know of the acquisition of the flat in 1973 or 1974, the delay in filing the petition is not in the circumstance of the case long enough to disentitle the landlord to seek eviction. Shri Sabharwal explained that the tenant look considerable time to collect the evidence in this regard before he could hasten with the eviction application. I see force in this contention of the landlord. J uphold the decision of the Tribunal below in this respect. ( 8 ) THE second ground of eviction was that the tenant was not living in the premises for six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition. Both the Tribunals have found against the tenant. I see force in this contention of the landlord. J uphold the decision of the Tribunal below in this respect. ( 8 ) THE second ground of eviction was that the tenant was not living in the premises for six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition. Both the Tribunals have found against the tenant. The learned counsel for the landlord pointed out that the record of the Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking Ex. AW/2 shows that the dispuled premises were found locked on 12-5-1977 and 16-5-1977. The Corporation s tax department s inspection report Ex. AW5/1 further disclosed that on 14-5-1979 the premises were again found locked. Therefore, the landlord s case that the tenant ceased to reside in the premises more than six months prior to the institution of the petition has lobe believed. That some members of the family were living in the premises is based upon the question put in cross-examination to Styapal Vig, (RW5), whether his son Harish and no one else was living in the premises. Shri Arun Kumar urged that this suggestion shows that the landlord admitted that Harish was living in the premises And son being a member of it cannot be said that no member of family has been residing in the premises. But one cannot ignore the statement of the tenant that his son Harish had shifted to the new premises in 1974, I, therefore, see no reason to disturb the finding of fact arrived at by the courts below that the premises were lying locked continuously for six months before the petition was filed. ( 9 ) THERE is no force in any of the contentions of the appellant. He has no case either in fact or in law. ( 10 ) I, therefore, reject this appeal. No costs.