Maharani Chopra v. Darshan Lal — 1984 DIGILAW 778 (ALL)

JUDGMENT B. D. Agarwal, J. 1. This appeal under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is directed against an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (VI Additional District Judge), Saharanpur, dated July 27, 1978. 2. Dharampal Chopra, aged about 63 years, was on way back to Saharanpur from his brick-kiln situate at a distance of about 2 miles on November 8, 1975, at about 9.45 a. m. on his scooter Rajdoot No. U. S. V. 8291. Bus No. H. R. D. 4669 belonging to the State of Haryana and driven by respondent no 1 was proceeding from behind. Chopra was to his left. The bus, however, dashed against him and dragged him to some distance. This caused severe injuries to the victim who succumbed to them at the spot. First Information Report was lodged the same day followed by post-mortem examination which revealed that the death took place due to the fracture of the skull and injuries caused to the brain. On December 2, 1975, the appellants before us, who are the widow and the son of the deceased respectively filed a Claim Petition under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal, Saharanpur. The mother of DHARAMPAL Chopra was also one of the claimants. She, however, died on June 17, 1976, during the pendency of the petition before the Tribunal and by an order of the Tribunal dated October 12, 1976, the appellant-claimants have been shown as her legal representatives as well. The claimants contended that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving by the respondent no. 1. The deceased was earning between rupees sixteen thousand to rupees twenty thousand per year from the business carried on by him in partnership with his son under the name and style of M/s Bricks Supply Co. Ambala Road, Saharanpur. The compensation claimed was a sum of Rs. 2,50,000 including a sum of Rs. 5000 for the damage to the scooter. In defence it was refuted that the accident took place due to any rashness or negligence on the part of respondent no. 1. Ambala Road, Saharanpur. The compensation claimed was a sum of Rs. 2,50,000 including a sum of Rs. 5000 for the damage to the scooter. In defence it was refuted that the accident took place due to any rashness or negligence on the part of respondent no. 1. The plea raised was that the cover on the right side of the scooter engine driven by the deceased had fallen down on the right and he took a turn to the right in order to pick that up and this resulted in his being dashed against the bus. The amount of compensation claimed was also disputed asserting that this was highly exaggerated. The Tribunal came to the finding that the scooter was being driven by Dharampal Chopra at a slow speed; the bus, however, was driven rashly and it was on account of negligence and rashness on the part of the driver of the bus that the accident took place. The theory that the panel of the scooter had fallen and the deceased took a turn to the right to pick that up was disbelieved. It was pointed, considering the testimony of respondent no. 1 himself, that if he had taken care to reduce the speed of the bus at the sight of the deceased proceeding ahead on the scooter, the mishap may have been averted. On the point of compensation the Tribunal stated that it will be presumed that the appellant no. 2 (the wife) was being maintained by the deceased. In regard to the son it was observed that he was running the brick-kiln business in partnership with his father and the evidence does not disclose that he was driving pecuniary benefit from the father as such during his life time. The Tribunal has then gone on to consider the assets left over by the deceased and observed that they are of the value of nearly 2, 85, 000/-. This means, in the opinion of the Tribunal, that the widow and the son respectively would inherit or be benefited to the extent of about Rs. 1, 40, 000/- each besides getting share in the bank account maintained by the victim. The life expectancy of Dharampal Chopra was estimated at about 70 years and it was said that if the income of the deceased were taken at Rs. 15.000/- per annum, the amount in all would come to Rs. 1, 40, 000/- each besides getting share in the bank account maintained by the victim. The life expectancy of Dharampal Chopra was estimated at about 70 years and it was said that if the income of the deceased were taken at Rs. 15.000/- per annum, the amount in all would come to Rs. 1, 05, 000/-only (Rs. 15, 000 x 7) and since the assets which would pass on to these claimants exceed this amount, therefore, they cannot lay claim to any compensation whatsoever. The Claim Petition was thus dismissed in entirety on this basis. 3. Aggrieved, the widow and the son of Dharampal Chopra deceased have preferred this appeal. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants. None has appeared for the respondents despite notice. 4. So far as the cause resulting in the accident dated November 8, 1975 is concerned, the evidence adduced from the claimants' side clearly bears it out. P. W. Gandharva Pal, the son of the victim, was going along side on a motor cycle. He had just taken the motor cycle ever the right Patri which led to his escape. He has narrated in detail an eye-witness account of the accident. P. W. Shamsha was on way to the factory where he is employed when he saw the accident and he was also helpful in catching hold of the driver. He supports the claimants' version. D. W. Darshan Lal, respondent no. 1, came to the witness box, but, as the Tribunal observed, his evidence indicates that there was an attempt to overtake the scooter. The distance obtaining between the two was got reduced because the bus was being driven at a speed higher than that of the scooter. It has been found that this was maintaining a speed of nearly 50-60 kms. in excess of the permitted normal speed of 40 kms. per hour only while the scooter was slow in its movement. The Tribunal may not be said to have erred consequently in reaching the finding it did on this aspect of the matter after considering the evidence placed on the record. In regard to the compensation awardable, the Tribunal has cited in extenso certain decisions of the Supreme Court which lay down the general principle for assessment in such cases. The Tribunal may not be said to have erred consequently in reaching the finding it did on this aspect of the matter after considering the evidence placed on the record. In regard to the compensation awardable, the Tribunal has cited in extenso certain decisions of the Supreme Court which lay down the general principle for assessment in such cases. From these citations, deduction made by the Tribunal is that since the benefit accruing to the claimants from the death of Dharampal Chopra must be taken into account, therefore, the entire value of his assets estimated at Rs. 2, 85, 000 roughly is to be set off against the compensation claimed. The Tribunal has gone on further to hold that because on the claimants' showing they would be entitled to Rs. 1, 05, 000 only and since each of them obtains assets to the value of nearly 1, 40, 000/-hence nothing remains payable towards the compensation. The determination of compensation has not actually been made since the Tribunal proceeded on assumption that the general principles do not justify award of any amount on these facts. In this, as will presently appear the Tribunal has grossly erred in our opinion. 5. Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act empowers the Tribunal to adjudicate upon claims for compensation in accordance with section 110-B, the Tribunal may make award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. The powers conferred under this provision upon the Tribunal are thus wide and general. In Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R. M. K. Valuswami, AIR 1962 SC 1 it was laid down that the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever sources came to (sic) death, that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependent by the death must be ascertained. Their Lordships referred to the obser- vations of Lord Wright in 1942 AC 601 to the effect that the damages are to be based on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit reducible to money value. The same principle was reiterated in C. K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikutt Nair, AIR 1970 SO 376 observing that the compensation is for loss of pecuniary benefit reasonably to be expected. The same principle was reiterated in C. K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikutt Nair, AIR 1970 SO 376 observing that the compensation is for loss of pecuniary benefit reasonably to be expected. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1971 ACJ 206 Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. A Division Bench of this Court followed these decisions in Vishwa Mitra Chadhdha v. Amrit Kaur, 1972 ACJ 213 and laid down that damages are to be based upon the reasonable expectation of the pecuniary benefit or benefit reducible to money value and the various imponderables have to be taken into consideration in this bahalf. Reliance was also put on the following passage in Winfield on Torts (7th Edn.) at page 135 which has been cited with approval also by the Supreme Court : "The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how much was requited or expended for his own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a detum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a number of years' purchase. That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having regard to the uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and other like matters of speculations and doubt. The number of years purchase is left fluid, from twelve to fifteen has been quite a common multiple in the case of a healthy man, and number should not be materially reduced by reason of the hazardous nature of the occupation of the deceased man." 6. Controversy does not exist with respect to this principle being binding upon the Tribunal but the difficulty arises in the proper application thereof to the facts and circumstances of 'he case. In seeking to apply this principle the Tribunal has taken the stand that the entire value of the assets of the deceased must be set off against the claim laid for compensation. It was said that the deceased had a truck of the value of Rs. 30,000/- approximately; the brick-kiln was of the value of Rs. In seeking to apply this principle the Tribunal has taken the stand that the entire value of the assets of the deceased must be set off against the claim laid for compensation. It was said that the deceased had a truck of the value of Rs. 30,000/- approximately; the brick-kiln was of the value of Rs. 25,000/-; there was nearly 96 bighas of land of the value of about Rs. 2,00,010/- and he had one-fourth share in a house in Chandigarh the value where of comes to Rs 30.000/- and thus in total the assets amounted to Rs. 2,85,000/-, which, in the opinion of the Tribunal, exceeded Rs, 1,50,000/- which at the most the claimant-appellants might lay claim to and hence nothing was payable to them by way of compensation. In adopting this approach, the Tribunal has altogether ignored that these assets would have passed on to these claimants even upon his death in natural course, subject of course to these persons surviving the deceased and that at the most it might only be said that due to the untimely death of the victim the succession to the assets was accelerated. We will consider later the deduction that may, if at all, be made on account of the accelerated succession, but it may suffice at this stage to point that neither on principle nor upon authorities there is justification to hold that the entire value of the assets devolving upon succession should be set off against the amount of compensation claimed. True, the pecuniary advantage accruing by estate of the death of the victim has to be taken into account but this is not the method permissible to do so. The Tribunal has also overlooked that there has been the loss in the quantum of the assets which might have devolved upon the claimants in case the deceased had not met the untimely death and had continued in business upto the normal expectency of active life. In regard to the widow, the Tribunal, as mentioned above, presumes, and rightly, that she will have been maintained by the deceased. There was no suggestion upon the record as to there being any other source to maintain her. In regard to the widow, the Tribunal, as mentioned above, presumes, and rightly, that she will have been maintained by the deceased. There was no suggestion upon the record as to there being any other source to maintain her. Being therefore the dependent of the deceased within the meaning of section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, and also being a legal representation for the purposes of section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, she is entitled to compensation on the death of her husband as a result of the accident. In regard to the son, the observation of the Tribunal is that there is no evidence that he was receiving pecuniary benefit from the father. It has been said that he was receiving his share as a partner in the brick-kiln business. Even son, there is no escape from the fact that be is one of the legal representatives of the deceased and as such entitled to compensation. Indisputedly, the son, the widow and for that matter the mother also are heirs under section 8 (c)/Class I of the Schedule of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and legal representatives within the meaning of section 2 (11), Code of Civil Procedure read with Rule 2 (c) of the U. P. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1967. 7. In Gobald Motor Service Ltd. case (Supra) the Supreme Court approved the mode for estimating the damages as laid down by Viscount Sirmon in Davies v. Pawell Duffron Associated Collieries Ltd. 1942 AC 601. The pecuniary loss on the one hand and the future pecuniary benefit on the other must be such as flow by reason of the death. This implies, in our view, causal relationship of loss or benefit with the factum of death; the benefit, in other words, should be such as can be attributed to the death taking place at that point of time. If death bad not then occurred, the devolution to assets of the deceased may have been postponed to uncertainities of the future. Accidental death in such cases can be said to have only accelerated the process of the claimants' ownership. Any gain to the estate of the deceased from a policy of insurance, annuity or life interest is considered irrelevant and has been disregarded in calculating the damages (Winfield: Law of Torts, p. 608). Accidental death in such cases can be said to have only accelerated the process of the claimants' ownership. Any gain to the estate of the deceased from a policy of insurance, annuity or life interest is considered irrelevant and has been disregarded in calculating the damages (Winfield: Law of Torts, p. 608). This Court has also been of the view that it is not permissible to deduct the amount of insurance policy, gratuity or provident fund, (see The Divisional Manager LIC v. Smt. Rai Kumari Mittal, 1984 AWC 237 , Smt. Krishna Sehgal v. U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1983 Alld 1593 Smt. Radha Agarwal v. State of U. P., 1983 AWC 638 . In M/s. Hirjee Veerjee and Co. v. Smt. Saroja Narayan Shetty, AIR 1982 Bombay 467 the Full Bench considered whether the life Insurance amount can be said to be such a pecuniary advantage that the whole of it must be deducted from the amount of compensation or did the pecuniary benefit lie merely in the fact that there is an acceleration in getting the benefit of the amount of insurance which on the death of the deceased becomes a part of the estate of the deceased. It was held that there could be no question of deducting the entire insurance amount from the compensation awardable. The view expressed was ; "The insurance amount as a part of his estate would have sooner or later come to them by inheritance. All that happans on the unnatural or accidental death of the deceased is that the pecuniary benefit in the form of insurance amount which would have come to the heirs by inheritance as a part of the estate of the deceased after the natural death of the deceased now comes to them much earlier in point of time, though as a result of the unfortunate circumstances of the death of the deceased. Properly looked at, therefore, the benefit to the claimants truly lies only in the fact of acceleration in the succession to the estate of deceased including the insurance amount and not in the fact that the entire estate has come to them, which in any case would have come by way of inheritance." 8. Authorities are not uniform on the point whether deduction can be made on the basis of acceleration of the claimants' interest in the estate. Authorities are not uniform on the point whether deduction can be made on the basis of acceleration of the claimants' interest in the estate. In M/s. Hirjee Veerjee and Co. (Supra) the Bombay High Court took the view that deduction on account of accelerated succession can be made because ''in the case of a death by a factual accident, the heirs succeed to the estate much earlier than when they would have otherwise succeeded, the benefit is implicit and it is this benefit of accelerated succession which, authorities have decided, must be taken into account while making a balance sheet of the pecuniary loss and the pecuniary gain." Reliance placed inter alia is on Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. Jennings, (1888) 13 AC 800, Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., 1942 AC 601, Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd. 1951 AC 601. The decisions of Karnataka High Court in Paryatamma v. Syed Ahmad, 1977 ACJ 72 and of a learned Single Judge in Pushpa Rani Chopra v. Anokha Singh, 1975 ACJ 396 (Delhi) were also referred to. In Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd. it was observed " Life insurance, in as much as its receipt was not solely brought about by the death but was merely accelerated by it was, it is true, to be taken into account but only to the extent of the benefit arising from its acceleration." In Vasanthy G. Kamath v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, 1981 ACJ 353 in which the victim was a person with a definite money income, Khalid J. (as he then was) expressed the view in the concurring judgment of the Division Bench that " Courts in awarding compensation should guard themselves against paying over compensation. When a decree for compensation is passed, the Court puts into the dependents hands future contribution before they would have actually received. This is otherwise known as accelerated benefit. To avoid this, the safe method is to find out the present value of the future contribution that is to be awarded. We will refer to the method adopted by us in this case presently. Any future contribution that we give now to the dependents can be invested by them. They can enjoy the income therefrom and keep intact the lump sum granted. We will refer to the method adopted by us in this case presently. Any future contribution that we give now to the dependents can be invested by them. They can enjoy the income therefrom and keep intact the lump sum granted. The policy of the courts should be to put into the dependents' hands by the decree only that amount which after investment and reinvestment gets reduced to nothing on the expiry of the period for their maintenance for that period. In such calculations the court is bound to be in the realm of hypothesis, which cannot be avoided. It may not always be possible to arrive at a figure with mathematical precision, for there are so often many impounderables. Courts are loath to adopt actuarial statistics and annuity tables, for it is said that in the region of such calculations "arithmetic is a good servant, but a bad master." 9. A contrary note was struck by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Damyanti Devi v. Sita Devi, 1972 ACJ 334 . At page 346 it was laid down " ... in every case the nature and extent of the assets left by the deceased is to be determined, that is, if the assets are such of which benefit was being taken by or was available to the family during his life time, the value of those assets has not to be taken into consideration in mitigation of the damages. .The accelerated succession to those assets does not bring any additional benefit to the heirs which is liable to set off against the loss occasioned by the death. Again, if the assets are such which were being created by the deceased out of his savings to be utilised for the benefit of the members of the family on various occasions like marriage, higher education of the children etc. etc. those assets should also be kept out of consideration while determining the just compensation. Such assets cannot be said to confer any undue or untimely benefit on the legal representatives because of the death of the person on whom they were dependent." 10. The finding in that case was that the site and the building of the factory belonged to family. The business run therein was intended to be a joint family business. Such assets cannot be said to confer any undue or untimely benefit on the legal representatives because of the death of the person on whom they were dependent." 10. The finding in that case was that the site and the building of the factory belonged to family. The business run therein was intended to be a joint family business. Any provision made by the deceased himself by taking out a policy of insurance could not be said to be the benefit derived by the legal representatives on account of his death. The insurance amount represents the compensation in respect of the capacity to save of the deceased which existed at the time of his death by accident any may have continued in future also. The house was being used for the residence of the family during the life time of the deceased as well and was still used for that purpose. It had not become a source of income to the family after his death. The factory had closed after it while the factory site and the building had been, available to the family even during his life time. In Gomathi Ammal v. Ram Chandran Pillai, 1967 ACJ 15 (Madras) the Court did not allow any deduction though the claimants got the family residential house from the deceased. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh Kalya, 1978 ACJ 21 (Orissa) where the Tribunal deducted from the loss sustained by the family of deceased driver a sum of Rs. 1,000/- as the claimants were enjoying and would enjoy the income of one acre of land which the deceased had and which on his death would go to the claimants, the deduction was disallowed by the High Court relying on Damyanti Devi's case (Supra). 11. A Division Bench of the Assam High Court in Assam State Transport Corporation v. Mahadevi Nayak, 1982 ACJ 83 referred to the observations of Lord Guest in Daniels v. Jenes, (1965) 2 All ER 875 to the effect i "This is a highly speculative matter, and having regard to the anticipated savings which might reasonably have been expected to be made by the deceased, if he bad lived, no deduction ought to be made on the score of accelerated benefit, as these two figures very largely cancel out." 12. The decisions in 1978 ACJ 21 (Orissa), 1972 ACJ 334 (Punjab and Haryana), 1967 ACJ 15 (Madras) (supra) were also cited and the conclusion drawn is : "From the above decisions it is clear that the recent trend is not to allow deduction on account of acceleration of interest except in extreme cases clearly justifying such deduction." Having considered the various authorities we are of the opinion that on principle it is permissible to make deduction attributable to acceleration of succession to the estate but the Tribunal must proceed with good deal of caution in this behalf. The formula of Viscount Sirmon adopted by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. case (supra) includes "fourthly, further deduction must be made for the benefit accruing to the widow from the acceleration of her interest in his estate." True, this case was decided under the Fatal Accidents Act, but that cannot be claimed to make difference on principle. For compensation to be just within Section 110-B, Motor Vehicles Act, the Tribunal cannot overlook what is manifestly equitable and supported with reason. Deduction for lump sum payment is well recognised. The Supreme Court appended its seal of approval to this in M. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Sudhakar, 1977 ACJ 290. The uncertainties of life and the fact of accelarated payment that the claimants would be getting a lump sum payment which but for the accidental death would have been available to them in driblets over a number of years are some of the factors to be taken into account. The acceleration brought about in devolution of the estate is essentially a facet of the same principle. 13. The Tribunal must exclude however from consideration property the benefit whereof was being enjoyed by the family even before the death of the victim. In respect of such property as was in the use or available to the claimants before the accidental death occurred there is no extra benefit attributable to the factum of death. The facts and circumstances of each case, particularly, the nature of the property and untimely benefit, if any, accruing to the legal representatives by reason of death is to be borne in mind. If the accelerated succession to certain assets does not bring any additional benefit to the heirs there would arise no question of set off against the loss occasioned by the death. If the accelerated succession to certain assets does not bring any additional benefit to the heirs there would arise no question of set off against the loss occasioned by the death. Equally important is the consideration whether the assets are such which the deceased created out of his savings to be utilized for the benefit of the members of the family on occasions like marriage, higher education of the children etc. Assets of this nature also do not confer any undue or untimely benefit on the legal representatives. The loss of earnings during the last years may be another factor to be considered. The extent of the additional benefit may be taken to be represented ultimately by the use or interest of the estate during the period of acceleration which would be the difference between the normal life expectancy of the deceased and the age at which he met the fatal accident. The effort should be to minimise the sphere of speculation which to appreciable extent remains inevitable. 14. In the instant case the Tribunal has had no consideration to any of the relevant factors in taking decision to set off the entire value of the assets against the loss occasioned by the death. It did not take into account whether the claimants derived benefit from the assets during the life time of Dharmapal also. Nor has the tribunal calculated the extent of extra benefit occurring, if any. In Ramesh Chandra v. M. P. State Road Transport Corporation, (1983) TAC 510 (M. P.) a Division Bench speaking through O. P. Singh, C. J. took the view that damages recoverable for loss to the estate in case of death must include damages for loss of earnings of the period during which the deceased would have continued to work but for his death. Reliance was put on the decisions of the House of Lords in Pickett v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., 1980 ACJ 261 and Gammel v. Wilson, 1982 ACJ 409. Reliance was put on the decisions of the House of Lords in Pickett v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., 1980 ACJ 261 and Gammel v. Wilson, 1982 ACJ 409. In Gammel following Pickett's case it was observed; "The loss to the estate is what the deceased would have been likely to make available to save, spend or distribute after meeting the cost of his living at a standard which his job and career prospects at time of death would suggest he was reasonably likely to achieve." This might be another item to be considered depending on the facts and circumstances of a case though in the present we do not find it necessary to express final opinion on this aspect. 15. The appellant's counsel argued then that the Tribunal erred in not awarding any compensation to the mother of the deceased. The impression seems to have been that she could not get anything as she had died during the pendency of the claim petition. The accident took place on 8-11-1975; she died on 11-6-1976. In the petition moved on 2-12-1975 she was also a claimant. It may not be doubted that being heir under Section 8 (a) read with Class I of the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she could claim to be a legal representative vis-a-vis the estate of her deceased son. The factum of her death does not wipe off the cause of action ; upon her death before the claim could be adjudicated the right which had accrued in her favour devolved upon her heir. In accordance with Section 15 (1) (a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, her heir would be the appellant no. 2 being the son of predeceased son. There is no question herein to attract the maxim 'Actio Personalis Meritur cum Persona'. In S. Muniyappa v. H. L. Narasimhaicha, AIR 1984 Karnataka 63 arising out of personal injury, the injured (claimant) died during the pendency of the appeal which he had filed claiming enhanced compensation. It was upon these facts that the appeal was found to have abated. The instant case is governed under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, where under the right to prosecute an action existing in favour of a person at the time of his death survives after his death. It was not disputed that the mother was dependent upon the earning of Dharampal deceased. The instant case is governed under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, where under the right to prosecute an action existing in favour of a person at the time of his death survives after his death. It was not disputed that the mother was dependent upon the earning of Dharampal deceased. This may ultimately be found to be, however, more in the nature of an academic exercise because she died within six months of the accident and hence the amount payable to her credit can only be nominal. 16. The claimants laid claim to damages for the loss of the scooter also that belonged to Dharampal deceased. The Tribunal dismissed this observing that it being a claim arising out of tort, the claimants have to pursue their remedy in the civil court. This is clearly faulty being in Ignorance of Section 110 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act which, as amended by the Central Act 56 of 1969 with effect from March 2, 1970, provides that claim for damages to any property of a third party will also be in the Tribunal. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The award impugned is set aside. The case is remanded to the Tribunal which shall determine in the light of the observations contained herein the compensation to which the appellants are entitled under the law. The costs of this appeal shall abide the result. Appeal allowed.