JUDGMENT K. C. Agarwal, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Meerut, dated April 27. 1983, dismissing the revision filed by the petitioner under Section 24-C of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 2. S. P. Jain, respondent 3, is the owner and landlord of house no. 217-218, Machchli Bazar, Sadar, Meerut Cantonment, the first floor of which is in the tenancy of the petitioner on monthly rent of Rs. 60/. Respondent 3 was posted as Superintendent, Military Farm Meerut Cantonment. In that capacity, he was alloted Government Quarter No. 47, belonging to the Union of India. On November 8, 1979, he was given a "Vacation of Government Quarter" notice by the Deputy Assistant Director, intimating that since respondent 3 had his own house at Meerut Cantonment, he was directed to vacate the Government quarter no. 47, allotted to him by the order dated August 8, 1979. The notice required respondent 3 to vacate the same as early as possible as the sams was required for providing family accommodation to other essential staff of the Farm. On receiving the said order, the respondent 3 applied to the Additional District Magistrate (E), who had the delegated authority under Section 24-C of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 for recovery of possession of the first floor portion of the aforesaid house, which was in the tenancy of the petitioner. Respondent 3 alleged that as he had been required by the Government order aforesaid to vacate the premises due to himself owning a house and he was required to hand over its possession at an early date, the order for release of the first floor in possession of the petitioner be made in favour of respondent 3. Respondent 3 alleged that his family consisted of himself, his wife and two sons, who were although married but as they were posted on non-family stations the filed area, they were required to keep their families generally with respondent 3. He also claimed that apart from the two sons, he had a married daughter whose husband was posted in Goa. His son-in-law was shortly going to Iraq for two years and, as such, the daughter of respondent 3 would also come to live with him. He also claimed that apart from the two sons, he had a married daughter whose husband was posted in Goa. His son-in-law was shortly going to Iraq for two years and, as such, the daughter of respondent 3 would also come to live with him. Respondent 3 claimed that the accommodation on the ground floor of house 217-218, Machchli Bazar, Sadar, Meerut Cantonment, which was in his possession, consisted of only two small rooms and one store and boxroom and, as such, was totally insufficient to accommodate him. 3. The application was contested by the petitioner on a number of grounds, including that the accommodation in possession of respondent 3 was sufficient to accommodate his family members. 4. By the order dated 17-8-1981, the application of respondent 3 was allowed by the delegated authority against which a revision was filed by the petitioner under sub-section (7) of Section 24-C of the Act to the District Judge, which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Meerut, on 27th April, 1983. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-tenant has filed the present writ. By means of an amendment made by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976, the U. P. Legislature added Chapter IV-A in the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. This Chapter provides for "summary trial of certain applications." This was enacted on the lines of Chapter III-A of the Delhi Rent Act. The object of adding Chapter IV-A finds mention in the Preamble of U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 itself. It reads as under ;- "If a government servant is asked to live in the house of his own after vacating the house under his tenancy then in order to get his own house vacated early, the procedure for its vacation is being adopted on the lines of the Delhi Rent Act." 5. From the facts of the present case, it would be found that respondent 3 was posted as Superintendent Military Farm, Meerut Cantonment, and in that capacity he had been allotted a government quarter by the Union of India. He was asked to vacate the said 'quarter by the authorities when they learnt that respondent 3 had his own house at Meerut, where he was posted. 6. Section 14-A came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in two cases. He was asked to vacate the said 'quarter by the authorities when they learnt that respondent 3 had his own house at Meerut, where he was posted. 6. Section 14-A came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in two cases. The Supreme Court explained the purpose of the project in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, AIR 1977 SC 266 as under : "The object of Section 14-A, as shown by its marginal note, is to confer a right on certain landlords to recover "immediate possession of premises" belonging to them and which are in the possession of their tenants. In the significant language of the marginal note, such a right is "to accrue" to a class of persons. The same concept is pursued and clarified in the body of Section 14-A by providing that in the contingencies mentioned in the section, a right will accure to the landlord "to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him......... "Whatever be the merits of that philosophy, the theory is that an allottee from the Central Government or a local authority should not be at the mercy of law's delays while being faced with instant eviction by his landlord......" This case was followed by the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz v. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569 . The Supreme Court in this case observed : "To attract Section 14-A, the landlord must be in occupation of 'residential premises' allotted to him by the Central Government. He must be required by order of that Government to vacate such 'residential accommodation'. These are fulfilled here. The ground for such order to vacate must be that he owns in the Union Territory of Delhi, a residential accommodation.' If so, there accrues to such landlord the right 'to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him." 7. To achieve the object with which Chapter III-A was added in the Delhi Rent Act, that Chapter IV-A was inserted in U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. To achieve the object with which Chapter III-A was added in the Delhi Rent Act, that Chapter IV-A was inserted in U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Section 24-B confers on a landlord who, being a person in occupation of any residential building, is required, by or in pursuance of, any general or special order, to vacate such building, on the ground that he owns, in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, a residential building in his own name or in the name of any member of his family, on and from the date of such order, to such landlord, a right to recover immediately possession of any building let out by him. Section 24-C deals with the procedure laying down the manner as to how an application under Section 24-B would be filed and dealt with by the District Magistrate or his delegated authority. 8. In the present case, the building is situate within the Cantonment of Meerut. The U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976, while adding. Chapter IV-A did not mention as to whether this Chapter would apply to buildings constructed and situated within the municipal limits. By means of a notification issued in exercise Of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, the Central Government extended to all the cantonments in Uttar Pradesh the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, as in force on the date of that notification, in the State of U. P. As a result of issuance of this notification, Chapter IV-A became applicable to the Cantonment areas. One of the arguments raised before me by learned counsel for the petitioner was that as Chapter IV-A had been applied to the Cantonment areas on a subsequent date, that is, 27th February, 1982, the Act being not applicable to the accommodation in question in November 1979, when the application under Section 24-B was filed by respondent 3, the same was liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, conceded that this Act had become applicable when the order was passed by the Additional District Judge in revision on 27th April, 1983. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, conceded that this Act had become applicable when the order was passed by the Additional District Judge in revision on 27th April, 1983. Counsel submitted that the proper course in the circumstances of the instant case would have been to set aside the order of the delegated authority and to sent the case back for a fresh decision. 9. The contention of the petitioner's counsel that the proceedings before the delegated authority were without jurisdiction was sought to be countered by the learned counsel appearing for respondent 3 on the ground that the Central Government under Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, had power to apply the provisions of the Rent Control Act to the cantonment areas retrospectively, hence the notification issued should be deemed to have come into operation in November 1979 and, as such the proceedings could not be considered to be without jurisdiction. For this proposition, reliance was placed by respondent 3 on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi v. Maman Chand, AIR 1983 SC 1201 . 10. After hearing counsel for the parties, I am of opinion that as the writ petition is entitled to succeed on the second point, which I will presently mention, it is not necessary for me to decide the aforesaid controversy in the present writ. The second argument of the petitioner's counsel was that as, admittedly, respondent 3 was living in the ground floor of house no. 217-218, Machchli Bazar, Sadar, Meerut Cantonment, the first floor of which was in the tenancy of the petitioner, the application filed under Section 24-B was not maintainable. This submission appears to be well founded. Section 24-B entitles a landlord on whom a notice has been served to vacate a building let out to him by the Central Government or the State government, as the case may be, if such a landlord owns another residential building in the same city, to recover immediately possession of any building let out by him. The central idea of conferring the power on such a landlord to recover immediately possession was that he is made entitled to get possession of the building due to which he is being evicted from the government residential building. The legislature did not want to leave such a person at the mercy of law's delays. The central idea of conferring the power on such a landlord to recover immediately possession was that he is made entitled to get possession of the building due to which he is being evicted from the government residential building. The legislature did not want to leave such a person at the mercy of law's delays. Such a landlord is a class by himself, as held by the Supreme Court in Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161 . 11. In a case where a landlord, who has been asked to vacate, is already living in the accommodation belonging to him, Section 24-B will not apply inasmuch as such a person is not required to obtain possession of the house immediately which has been let out by him. For a landlord like him, the question can only be that the accommodation in his possession is less than his requirement. In that event, he would be relegated to the same position as other landlords covered by U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. His position would not be precarious as that of the landlord on whom an order of the Central Government has been served calling upon him to vacate the premises immediately. 12. At this place, reference may also be made to Section 21 (1-A) inserted by U. P. Act 28 of 1976. This provision also confers a rights on a landlord, who has been a government servant, to apply for release of his premises to the Prescribed Authority. There is, however, a difference between the two provisions. Not only that Chapter IV-A, which incorporates Section 24-B and 24-C, is summary in nature, but also the objects of the two provisions differ. This distinction has been made out in Paragraph 9 of the decision reported in J. C. Gupta v. District Judge, Dehra Dun, 1978 ALJ 1306. In Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599 the Supreme Court held that this emergency provision is available to put a government servant back into his residential accommodation and it cannot be used as a weapon for evicting several tenants if he has many houses let out to various persons. A landlord under Section 24-B is entitled to get possession of his house as he is required to move out of the government premises. A landlord under Section 24-B is entitled to get possession of his house as he is required to move out of the government premises. If he is, however, already in possession of a residential building belonging to him, Section 24-B would not apply. While dealing with the scope of Section 14-A, the Supreme Court in Busching Schmitz v. Menghani (supra) observed ; "Underlying the whole legislative plan and provision is the fundamental anxiety to recover, for the officer's occupation his own premises. Once we grasp this cardinal point the officer's application for eviction under Sec. 14-A can be entertained only on his averment that he, having been asked to vacate, must get into possession of his own. For instance, if he has a vacant house of his own and, on getting an order to vacate, he moves into his vacant house, he cannot thereafter demand recovery under Sec. 14-A. The cause of action is not only the government order to vacate, but his consequential urgency to recover his own building. That is the ratione legis. To interpret otherwise is to vindicate Mr Bumble. We hold that Shri Nirman's apprehension is unfounded and Section 14-A is largely a rider to Section 14 and the condition indicated in Sec. 19 must, mutatis mutandis, bind the landlord. Parliament cannot be assumed not to intend the obvious, or to intend the ludicrous, Laterality is not right where absurdity is the result." 13. What has been said above completely covers the controversy in question. 14. Learned counsel for Respondent 3 strenuously contended that as the accommodation in possession of the said respondent was short and much less than his requirement and some essential amenities of latrine and bath room were common with that of the petitioner, the benefit of Section 24-B could not be denied to respondent 3 on the ground of his possessing another residential building. Counsel argued that the Proviso to Section 24-B requires a dwelling house in possession of a landlord and as the house in possession of respondent 3 was not a dwelling house, he could not be denied the benefit of Section 24-B on that ground. Counsel argued that the Proviso to Section 24-B requires a dwelling house in possession of a landlord and as the house in possession of respondent 3 was not a dwelling house, he could not be denied the benefit of Section 24-B on that ground. The submission has been made on a wrong interpretation of the Proviso to Section 24-B. The proviso is meant for curtailing the right of a landlord who has been asked to vacate the premises by means of a notice of the State Government or the Central Government. The Proviso takes precaution of restraining the right of a landlord to one dwelling house and it was for that purpose that this proviso was enacted. Section 24-B may not be taken advantage of by a government servant for evicting all of his tenants, hence the Proviso was enacted, restricting the right of such a landlord to choose one out of various dwelling houses which may be belonging to him. Where a government servant applied under Section 21 (1-A) for release of a residential accommodation, which had been let out by him to a tenant, on the cessation of his employment, the High Court on a finding that he was already occupying his own house, rejected the application for release. In doing so, the Division Bench approved the decision in J. C. Gupta v. The District Judge, Dehra Dun (supra) and observed ; " It is implicit in Section 21 (1) (1-A) that a landlord can invoke it only if he does not already have in his possession an accommodation which he can occupy in his own right after vacating the public building allotted to him in consequence of his employment......" 15. For what I have said above, it appears to me that if Respondent no. 3 had accommodation short of his requirement, his remedy lay in applying under Section 21 (1) (a) for release against the petitioner. He could not apply under Section 24-B for getting immediate possession. The expression "to recover immediately possession" indicates the ground where Section 24-B can be applied. The cause of action for applying Section 24-B is not only the government order to vacate, but also his consequential urgency to recover his building. There would be no consequential urgency to recover if he is already in possession of a dwelling house or where it can be available to him at his choice. 16. The cause of action for applying Section 24-B is not only the government order to vacate, but also his consequential urgency to recover his building. There would be no consequential urgency to recover if he is already in possession of a dwelling house or where it can be available to him at his choice. 16. For these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment of the Additional District Judge, Meerut, dated 27-4-1983 as well as that of the delegated authority dated 17-8-1981 are quashed. Petition allowed.