Judgment This is a petition filed by one T.K. Kodandaram to punish respondents 1 and 2 for contempt of this Court for prejudicing the due course of the judicial proceedings. He has also filed an application (Application No. 270 of 1983) for permission to his brother Deenadayalu to appear and argue on his behalf in the above contempt case, in the interests of justice. In support of the petition the petitioner filed an affidavit stating that Shri Vedula Jagannadha Rao, Advocate, has agreed to file vakalat on his behalf in the Contempt Case. But he did not file vakalat for obvious reasons. Therefore, his brother Deenadayalu may be permitted to argue the matter on his behalf. 2. The Court issued notice to the learned Advocate General to appear in the matter to assist the Court. 3. Therefore Sri Subrahmanya Reddy Advocate General appears and assisted the Court in the matter. He referred to section 32 of the Advocates Act which is as under: “Power of Court to permit appearance in particular cases: Notwithstanding anything contained in this chapter any court, authority or person may permit any person, not enrolled as an Advocate under this Act to appear before it or him in any particular case”. 4. This section was brought into force on 4th January, 1963. 5. With reference to this section the learned Advocate General submitted that it is open to the Court to permit any person not enrolled as an Advocate under the Advocates Act to appear before it in any particular case. Therefore, it is open to the Court to grant permission or to refuse permission to a private person to appear for the petitioner in the case. The learned Advocate General also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Harishankar v. Girdhari (1978) 2 S.C.J. 488: (1978) MLJ. (Crl.) 640: (1978) 3 S.C.R. 493 : (1978) Crl.L.J. 778: (1978) 2 S.C.C. 165 : (1978) S.C.C. (Crl.) 163: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1019. The short question that arose for decision in that case was whether a person who is not an Advocate by profession could be permitted to plea on behalf of the petitioner? (Crl.) 640: (1978) 3 S.C.R. 493 : (1978) Crl.L.J. 778: (1978) 2 S.C.C. 165 : (1978) S.C.C. (Crl.) 163: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1019. The short question that arose for decision in that case was whether a person who is not an Advocate by profession could be permitted to plea on behalf of the petitioner? Krishna Iyer, J. dealing with that question discussed the relevant provisions of the Advocates Act and ultimately held in paragraph 4 of the Judgment: “Having regard to this conspectus of considerations I hold that a private person who is not an Advocate, has no right to barge into Court and claim to argue for a party. He must get the prior permission of the Court, for which the action must come from the party himself. Is is open to the Court to giant or withhold permission in its discretion. In fact, the Court may, even after grant of permission, withdraw it half-way through if the representative proves himself reprehensible. The anticidents the relationship the reasons for requisitioning the services of the private person and a variety of other circumstances must be gathered before grant of refusal of permission”. The learned Judge further observed: “In the present case I have noticed the petitioner and his friend who is to represent him come together with mutual confidence. The party somehow has not shown sufficient confidence in advocates he has come by. This bodies ill for him.” Ultimately the learned Judge granted the petitioner permission to be represented by a private person as prayed for with the condition that if this latter proves unworthy, the permission would be withdrawn. In the instant case the petitioner wanted permission to be granted to his own brother. Nothing particular is stated in the affidavit in the Court But no Advocate is prepared to appear for the petitioner. In these circumstances, 1 think it is just and proper to grant permission accordingly permission is granted. The petition is ordered accordingly. 6. Now I will take up the contempt application filed by the petitioner. 7. The learned Advocate General took a preliminary objection that without obtaining the permission of the Advocate General a private party cannot file a criminal contempt application under section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The petition is ordered accordingly. 6. Now I will take up the contempt application filed by the petitioner. 7. The learned Advocate General took a preliminary objection that without obtaining the permission of the Advocate General a private party cannot file a criminal contempt application under section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. He referred to section 15(1) of the Act, which is as under: “15(1) in the case of a Criminal Contempt other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by- (a) (b) any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General.” In this connection the learned Advocate General referred tothe decisions in U.N.R.Rao v. M.Shanmuga Vel (1977) Crl.L.J. 639: (1977) 1 S.C.C. 741 : (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 172: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 639 and B.K.Misra v. C.J.Orissa A.I.R. 1974 Orissa 1. 8. The present contempt application is not filed under section 12 read with sections 11 and 14 of the Act. It is also pointed out that during the course of arguments whenever a contempt, is committed before the High Court section 15 is not attracted, but the provisions of section 14 are alone attracted. In the instant case it is alleged that contempt is committed during the proceedings before the High Court. Therefore, the provisions of section 15 are not attracted and action has to be taken only under section 14 of the Act. 9. In order to examine this point, it will be relevant to refer the section 14 of the Act. Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to the extent relevant runs as under: “14. Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court-(1)when it is alleged or appears to the Supreme Court or the High Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or bearing the Court may cause such person to be detained in custody …………..” In the instant case it is alleged that contempt is committed in the face of this Court during the proceedings itself and therefore, the provisions of section 15 are not attracted. 9. 9. The learned Advocate General submitted that a petition under section 14 is not maintainable as the Court itself takes cognizance of the matter and no application can be filed under that section by any private individual. It is, on the other hand, submitted for the petitioner that the words used in the section namely “when it is alleged that a person has been guilty of contempt…….” Indicate that even a private individual can file a petition alleging that a particular individual committed contempt of Court. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion, it cannot be said that no petition under section 14 is maintainable. 10. Even otherwise also, it is submitted for the petitioner that if it is assumed that the petition filed herein is one under section 15 of the Act, still the Court has the absolute discretion to entertain the same. In support of this submission reliance is placed on a decision in Board of Revenue v. Vinay Chandra Board of Revenue v. Vinay Chandra (1981)1 S.C.J. 415: (1931) MLJ. (Crl.) 281: (1981) 2 S.C.R. 331 : (1981) Crl.L.J. 283: (1981) 1 S.C.C. 426: (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 175: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 723. In that case a petition-under section 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act was filed before the High Court to take suo motu action against the opposite party (Contemnor). The High Court on receipt of the petition straight away issued notice to the contemnor as to why proceedings should not be taken for committing contempt of Court. The preliminary objection taken by the contemnor that the High Court could not take cognizance of the alleged contempt unless referred by the Subordinate Court or moved by the High Court. Against the order rejecting the objection the contemnor made an appeal before the Supreme Court, Dealing with the question converted by the preliminary objection, the Supreme Court referred to Articles 122 and 215 of the Constitution and to the relevant sections of the Contempt of Courts Act. Against the order rejecting the objection the contemnor made an appeal before the Supreme Court, Dealing with the question converted by the preliminary objection, the Supreme Court referred to Articles 122 and 215 of the Constitution and to the relevant sections of the Contempt of Courts Act. Making a comparison between sub- sections (1) and (2) of section 15, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the question: “Does the omission in section 15(2) of the mode of taking suo motu cognizance indicate a legislative intention to debar the High Court from taking cognizance in that mode of any criminal contempt of a subordinate Court?” Dealing with this question, the Supreme Court observed: “If this question is answered in the affirmative then such a construction of sub- section (2) will be inconsistent with section 10 which makes the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of a subordinate Court, co-extensive and congruent with its power to punish for its own contempt, not only in regard to quantum or pre-requisites for punishment but also in the matter of procedure and practice………Harmonious construed sub- section (2) of section 15 does not deprive the High Court of the power of faking cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate Court, on its own motion also”. Then the Supreme Court took up the question, whether the High Court can refuse to entertain action for contempt on the ground that it has been made without the consent in writing of Advocate General or that it was not referred by the Subordinate Court, but the information was brought to its notice through a petition by a party. The Supreme Court hold that the High Court has the discretion to refuse to entertain the petition or to take cognizance on its own motion on the basis of the information supplied to it. Therefore the present petition assuming to be one filed under section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, entirely falls within the discretion of the High Court in so far as the question of its entertaining is concerned. 11. As a matter of fact, the present petition is filed under section 12 read with sections 11 and 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is already held earlier that the present petition under section 14 is maintainable. 11. As a matter of fact, the present petition is filed under section 12 read with sections 11 and 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is already held earlier that the present petition under section 14 is maintainable. Incidentally it may be mentioned that section 11 deals with the power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found outside jurisdiction. Since the petition is maintainable. I will now examine the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the petition. 12. The petitioner has impleaded Mr. C.Manohar, Additional Advocate General as the respondent and Sri N.T.Rama Rao the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh as the 2nd respondent. The petitioner prayed to punish the respondents for contempt of this Court for prejudicing the due course of the judicial proceeding. One T.K.Kodandaram filed an affidavit in support of the petition. It is stated that the deponent understood that on Monday the 21st November, 1983 the 1st respondent while arguing on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh in W.P. No. 5829 of 1983 before me told hat he would persuade me that the petitioner herein (who is also the petitioner in W.P. No. 9631 of 1983) is taught a lesson for having filed a writ petition of that sort with all frivolous allegations and that the petitioner should be put behind the bars for six months. It is further stated that since I could not catch up properly, the 1st respondent repeated it when I said we will see. It is also stated that threatening the petitioner for filing W.P. No 9631 of 1983 would prejudice this Court against the petitioner in respect of his writ petition. It is next stated that since the 1st respondent committed the above contempt under the instructions, guidance and instigation of the 2nd respondent, the 2nd respondent is also liable for punishment for contempt of Court. 13. The affidavit was sworn to on 24th November, 1983. The contempt complained of is that while arguing W.P. No. 5829 of 1983 the 1st respondent made an attempt to prejudice the due course of judicial proceedings in W.P. No. 9631 of 1983 by saying that he would persuade me to teach a lesson to the petitioner by putting him behind the bars for 6 months for filing W.P. No. 9631 of 1983 with all frivolous allegations. It is not evident as to how these facts constitute contempt of this Court-taking those facts as having been stated by the 1st respondent. While arguing W.P. No. 5829 of 1983 may be that he passed some remarks with reference to the writ petition filed by the petitioner. According to the affidavit since I could not catch the statement properly the 1st respondent repeated the same, when I observed “we will See”. Therefore, the question of contempt of Court is not all involved in the affidavit. More over, the exact words spoken to by the 1st respondent, which according to the petitioner amount to contempt of Court are not incorporated in the affidavit. But for the statement made in the affidavit nothing more is stated to hold that the 1st respondent committed contempt of Court. Therefore, this Court is absolutely of the view that no action needs to be taken against the 1st respondent under the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, this court is absolutely of the view that no action needs to be taken against the 1st respondent under the Contempt of Courts Act. So far as the 2nd respondent is concerned, it is stated that the 1st respondent seems to have been instructed, guided and instigated by the 2nd respondent in the above threatening. This is obviously a pure conjucture of the petitioner and accordingly no proceedings need be initiated on the basis of this petition. The petition is absolutely devoid of merits and it is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.