ORDER R. K. Verma, J. 1. This is a revision filed by applicant defendant No.2 against the order dated 20-1-1984 passed by the IInd Additional Judge to the Court of the District Judge, Dhar in Misc. Appeal No.1 of 1984 whereby the appellate Court has reversed the order dated 29-12-1983 passed by the Civil Judge, Class II, Dhar in Civil Suit No. 202 of 1983 and granted temporary injunction to the plaintiff non applicant No. 1. 2. The plaintiff has brought the instant suit for declaration and permanent injunction on the allegation that in the year 1950 the plaintiff and one Kaluram the deceased husband of the applicant defendant No.2 had jointly purchased the 'Pan Gumti' existing on the suit plot admeasuring 6'X6' from one Badrilal who was a lessee from the Dhar Municipality. In the year 1968 the plot in question was treated as Nazul and the lease could duly be renewed by the State Government. In the year 1975 the 'Gumti' was removed from the plot on the ground that it was an encroachment. It appears that a Patta (lease) was granted in favour of defendant No.2 Kaushalyabai in 1976-77 on her application, she being a widow of ex-serviceman Kaluram. The plaintiff's application was rejected by the Revenue Authorities throughout. 3. The plaintiff alleges that he has been putting his 'Pan Thela' on the suit plot after removal of the 'Gumti' in the year 1975 and as such he claims to be in possession. In para 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff has alleged that after 1968 the suit plot came under Nazul Administration and the plots in respect of which Dhar Municipality used to renew the lease, the Nazul Department renewed the leases. It is not the case of the plaintiff that there was renewal of lease of suit plot either by the municipality or by the Nazul Department at any time in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was treated to be an encroacher on Nazul land and his 'Gumti', which was a structure standing on suit plot, was demolished and removed in the year 1975 by the Collector and a patta (lease) was instead granted in favour of defendant No.2 Kaushalyabai in 1976-77 as aforesaid. It appears that the plaintiff challenged the grant of patta in favour of Kaushalyabai before the Additional Commissioner, Indore and State Government, but without success. It appears that the plaintiff challenged the grant of patta in favour of Kaushalyabai before the Additional Commissioner, Indore and State Government, but without success. In the instant suit for declaration and permanent injunction the plaintiff filed an application for temporary injunction which was opposed by the defendant No.2. The trial Court rejected the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction by order dated 29-12-1983. Against the order of the trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the Second Additional Judge to the Court of the District Judge, Dhar who has by the order under revision allowed the appeal and granted temporary injunction against the defendants. 4. The defendant No.2 being aggrieved by the impugned order has filed the present revision. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the learned lower appellate Court erred in not considering the fact that there was no prima facie case in favour of the non-applicant No.1. Admittedly the non-applicant No. 1 has no subsisting lease in his favour in respect of the suit plot which belonged to Nazul Department after 1968 as per plaintiff's pleading. There was no lease granted in favour of non-applicant No.1 by Nazul Department. The 'Gumti' which was a superstructure on the suit plot had admittedly been demolished and removed in 1975 on the ground that it was an encroachment by plaintiff on Nazul land. The plaintiff has thus been dispossessed. Apparently the plaintiff has pleaded no title right or interest subsequent to his dispossession in 1975. The plaintiff could not be held to be in possession on the date of suit merely because he puts a 'Pan Thela' on the suit plot. The plaintiff has already been dispossessed under order of Competent Revenue Court and he failed to get the grant of lease from the Revenue Authority. On the contrary lease of suit plot has been granted to the applicant. Learned counsel argued that the learned lower appellate Court failed to consider necessary ingredients for granting of temporary injunction which is a material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. He cited a decision of this Court in Prabhakar Kulkarni v. Dayaram 1979 JLJ 67 , in support of his contention. Learned counsel argued that the learned lower appellate Court failed to consider necessary ingredients for granting of temporary injunction which is a material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. He cited a decision of this Court in Prabhakar Kulkarni v. Dayaram 1979 JLJ 67 , in support of his contention. In that case, while considering the question of prima facie case and also the question about injury that could be allowed within the meaning of the language of Order 39, Rule 2, Sub clause (c), it was observed:- "What is apprehended in this case is that the defendant-petitioner by executing the order passed by the Revenue Tribunals would take possession of the agricultural lands and this could not be said to be an injury within the meaning of sub clause (c). But the learned Court below did not even bother to consider this question. Learned Court below, it appears felt that because a suit of permanent injunction is failed and the plaintiff is in possession, this is enough for grant of a temporary injunction in his favour. This apparently goes to slow that the learned Judge did not consider what was necessary while exercising the jurisdiction under Order 39, rule 1 and, therefore, the learned Court below committed a material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. It is no doubt true that ordinarily if on merits an injunction has been granted, this Court would not interfere. But where the learned Courts below failed to consider the question which is necessary and thereby committed material irregularity, this Court can interfere in such cases exercising its revisional jurisdiction." x x x x 6. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the instant case is similar in the circumstances to the case cited inasmuch as, the non-applicant No. 1 has been dispossessed in execution of the order passed by the competent Revenue Authority. 7. learned counsel for the applicant further contended that the plaintiff is not entitled in law for issuance of any order of temporary injunction against the applicant even on the plaintiff's own showing because according to the plaintiff's case he and the applicant's husband were joint purchasers of the 'Gumti' from one Badrilal on 23-12-1950 and as such even if any right or title of ownership could be claimed by the plaintiff the applicant will have to be treated as a co-owner against whom the plaintiff could not seek injunction. Learned counsel cited a decision of this Court in Gendalal Rathore v. Beena Bai 1984 MPWN 12 , in support of his contention that a co-owner cannot claim temporary injunction against other co-owner. 8. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the Courts powers on the question of grant or refusal of temporary injunction being discretionary, the learned lower appellate Court bas committed an error in interfering with the discretionary order of the trial Court in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He relied on a decision in Kanhaialal Chordia v. Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills 1983 MPWN 119. 9. Learned counsel for the applicant bas also argued that the initial lease of the suit plot having expired and never renewed in favour of plaintiff , be bad no prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction. He relied on a decision in Nandlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1982 MPWN 436 . 10. Learned counsel for the non-applicant has in reply contended that the High Court should not interfere in revision whether the order is right or wrong or in accordance with law or not, unless it has exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Learned counsel has relied on two decisions of the supreme Court, viz., The Managing Direction (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway AIR 1973 SC 76 , and M/s. D. L. F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh and others AIR 1971 SC 2324 . 11. In my opinion, the learned lower appellate Court has exercised the jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity in interfering with the order of the trial Court whereby the temporary injunction had been refused to the plaintiff-non-applicant. The plaintiff had no subsisting lease in respect of the suit plot. He was treated as an encroacher and his 'Gumti' on the suit plot was removed by order of the Revenue Authority. The plaintiff failed to acquire a fresh lease. A lease has been granted by the Nazul Authority in favour of the applicant whose husband was a co-tenant with the plaintiff when the plot was initially acquired in the year 1950. The plaintiff has apparently not pleaded any serious question as to right or title in the suit plot from which he was dispossessed in the year 1975, having been held as an encroacher by Revenue Authorities. . The plaintiff has apparently not pleaded any serious question as to right or title in the suit plot from which he was dispossessed in the year 1975, having been held as an encroacher by Revenue Authorities. . It is not disputed that the suit plot is Nazul land and the plaintiff does not claim to have acquired the suit plot from Nazul Authorities. The plaintiff's averment that he puts a 'Pan Thela' on the suit plot is not by itself sufficient to create any right in, plaintiff or give rise to any triable issue in the suit so as to hold a prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction. In these circumstances, the order of the trial Court refusing injunction was a proper exercise of its discretionary power under order 39 rule 1 C.P.C. and the interference with that order by the learned lower appellate Court is an exercise of jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. The order under revision is, therefore, liable to be set aside and that of the trial Court restored. 12. In the result, this revision is allowed. The order under revision is set aside and that of the trial Court refusing injunction is restored. The plaintiff non-applicant shall pay the costs of this revision to the applicant. Counsel's fee Rs. 50/- if certified.