JUDGMENT : R.C. Deo Sharma, J. The Petitioner who is a Defendant in a suit for rent and ejectment filed by the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 has, through this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution prayed that the orders dated 30th May, 1983 (Annexure 5) and 28th February, 1984 (Annexure 7) passed by the trial court and the revisional court opposite parties Nos. 2 and 1 respectively, whereby they dismissed the Petitioner's application for rejecting the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC be quashed. The suit in question had originally been filed by opposite party No. 3 against the Petitioner on the ground that she was his tenant in a portion of the building on a monthly rent of Rs. 385/- and her tenancy had been terminated by a notice since the building in question was not governed by the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1973, but she had not complied with the notice by making payment of the rent or mesne profits or vacating the premises, and hence relief for eviction and arrears of rent and damages was prayed. 2. The contest on behalf of the Petitioner was on the ground that she was not a tenant of the premises and that her father-in-law Sri Nasar Mahmud had been residing in the disputed premises as a tenant. 3. The building in question was undisputedly constructed in 1970 and the first assessment was made on 1-4-1971. Thus when the suit in question was filed on 24-9-1977 the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable to the premises because it had not completed the age of ten years. During the pendency of the suit, however, the ten years' period was completed and consequently the Act became applicable to the premises. Meanwhile the original landlord had sold the premises to opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 who were added as Plaintiffs in the suit and have accordingly been imploded as opposite parties in the petition. The Petitioner thereafter made an application for amendment of the written statement to state that the premises were governed by the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The amendment was allowed. 4 and 5 who were added as Plaintiffs in the suit and have accordingly been imploded as opposite parties in the petition. The Petitioner thereafter made an application for amendment of the written statement to state that the premises were governed by the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The amendment was allowed. She made another application to the effect that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action after the Act became applicable to the premises and consequently the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. The landlord contested this application and after hearing the trial court found in favour of the landlord and rejected the application of the Petitioner. In a revision filed against the aforesaid order, the learned Additional District Judge agreed with the trial court and dismissed the revision. It is in these circumstances that the present petition has been filed for the aforesaid reliefs. 4. The opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 in their counter-affidavit asserted that the Petitioner was the tenant of the premises and further contended that the suit had been filed when the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable to the premises and though during the pendency of the suit the aforesaid Act became applicable yet the Petitioner not having complied with the provisions of Section 39 of the said Act was not entitled to any relief against eviction and the cause of action as disclosed in the original plaint still subsisted. It was also cotended that the suit having been filed before the said Act became applicable to the premises it was not necessary to base the claim on arrears of rent of four months or more and their remaining unpaid within one month of the notice of demand. 5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that; the Act became applicable to the premises after completion of ten years from the date of the first assessment. There can be no doubt about this legal position although Some earlier decisions of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court supported the contrary view. The matter has, however, been set at rest and for that a reference may be made to a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera 1984 AWC 128 . 6. The matter has, however, been set at rest and for that a reference may be made to a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera 1984 AWC 128 . 6. The main contention of the Petitioner's learned Counsel, however, was that a suit for eviction in respect of a premises to which the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 applied could not be decreed except on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 20 of the Act and because the only ground that could be applicable on the facts of the case was arrears of rent for four months or more remaining unpaid for one month on the service of the notice of demand, the Plaintiff-opposite parties could not succeed because the amount of arrears claimed in the suit including the damages for use and occupation after the service of notice terminating the tenancy was for less than a month. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on a decision of this Court in Hunt. Savitri Devi v. Lal Chand 1984 AWC 255 . In that case also, the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable to the premises when the suit was filed. However, on the view then prevailing due to the decision in Ratan Lal Singhal's case, the trial court held that the suit was governed by the said Act. The premises, however, completed ten years from the date of the first assessment during the pendency of the litigation and consequently the said Act became applicable. It was observed in Savitri Devi's case that once the Act applied to the premises the suit could not be decreed without notice given under Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the said Act. It was also observed that the only ground on which a tenant could be evicted was available u/s 20(2) of the said Act. In other words, the tenant should have been in arrears of rent for not less than four months and should have also failed to pay the same within one month from the date of service of the notice of demand upon him. In other words, the tenant should have been in arrears of rent for not less than four months and should have also failed to pay the same within one month from the date of service of the notice of demand upon him. Undoubtedly these observations appear to support the contention but it may be observed that the aforesaid observations of this Court in Savitri, Devi's case are in the nature of an obiter because ultimately the matter was decided on the basis of the applicability of Section 39 of the said Act. The benefit of Section 39 was not extended by the revising authority in that case on the plea that the tenant's claim that the building was governed by the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was accepted whereas Section 39 applied to buildings to which the provisions were not initially applicable but became applicable only after the filing of the suit. On facts, however, it was found that the Act started applying to the premises during the pendency of the litigation and consequently it was held that the revising authority committed an error in refusing to extend the benefit of Section 39 to the tenant. Savitri Devi's case was therefore, decided on the ground of the applicability of Section 39. It appears that the tenant in that case had complied with the provisions of Section 39 by depositing rent, interest and costs, etc. because had it not been so, the question of applicability of Section 39 would have been out of consideration. It cannot therefore, be said that the. Savitri Devi's case was decided on the basis of the applicability of bar of Section 20. 7. A reference may also be made to another decision of this Court in Mangey Ram v. Shripal Jain 1978 AWC 76. The facts of that case were very much similar so far as the applicability of the Act to the premises was concerned. There also it v. as during the pendency of the litigation that the Act started applying to the premises. The tenant had however, deposited the amount of arrears, interest and costs etc. u/s 39 and claimed relief against eviction. The arrears claimed in that case were also for less than three months. There also it v. as during the pendency of the litigation that the Act started applying to the premises. The tenant had however, deposited the amount of arrears, interest and costs etc. u/s 39 and claimed relief against eviction. The arrears claimed in that case were also for less than three months. This Court in the circumstances allowed the benefit of Section 39 of the Act and the matter was remanded to the revisional court with a direction that if on appraisal of evidence the revisional court came to the conclusion that the Defendant had complied with the requirements of Section 39 the Plaintiff's suit for eviction would fail, but in case it was found that the tenant had failed to make the requisite deposit as required by Section 39 the landlord would be entitled to a decree for the tenant's eviction. Obviously, therefore, the contention of the Plaintiff that the arrears due were for less than four months was not accepted and the suit was ordered to be decreed for eviction in case compliance of Section 39 had not been made. In the instant case, it has been conceded on behalf of the Petitioner that the amount of rent, interest and costs as required to be deposited in pursuance of Section 39 has not been deposited. That being so, it cannot be said that the cause of action for eviction has disappeared after the said Act became applicable to the premises. 8. When the suit was filed the Act was not applicable to the premises. If the matter had come up for final decision before the Act became applicable to the premises, it is clear that subject to the validity of the notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the claim could have been decreed for eviction. The U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 afforded certain protections to the tenants. It also imposed certain obligations on the tenants it they wanted relief against eviction. The U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 afforded certain protections to the tenants. It also imposed certain obligations on the tenants it they wanted relief against eviction. If a tenant could claim protection against eviction on the plea that be was not in arrears of four months rent, he was also obliged to deposit the arrears of rent whatever be the amount besides the interest and costs of the suit within one month as required by Section 39 of the Act if he wanted to be protected against eviction in a case to which the Act became applicable during the pendency of the litigation. This obligation has not been fulfilled in the instant case. In the circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that the cause of action for the claim had disappeared or that the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. The petition therefore, cannot succeed. 9. Learned Counsel for the opposite parties has pointed out that the suit as originally filed in 1977 and has not come up for final decision even So the trial court because of the delays made on the part of the tenant on one ground or the other. In the circumstances it is expected that the trial court shall finally decide the matter expeditiously. 10. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Since the matter involved was a purely legal and arguable matter, there shall be no order as to costs.