JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner, a temporary employee of the respondents, claims a writ of mandamus by filing this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution directing them to treat him on duty and pay him all his salary, emoluments etc. ( 2. ) THE respondent M. P. State Warehousing Corporation is a statutory Corporation incorporated under section 18 of the Warehousing Corporation act, 1962. The respondent Corporation has, in exercise of powers under section 42 of the said Act, framed regulations known as M. P State Warehousing Corporation Staff Regulations, 1962, which govern conditions of employment of its staff, including the petitioner. Regulation 11 of the aforesaid Regulations requires an employee to give one months notice in writing of his intention to leave or discontinue his employment and on his failure to give notice, the employee concerned is liable to pay compensation to the Corporation for the notice period. It appears that the petitioner was selected for appointment as a Lower Division Clerk and was appointed "temporarily on probation for a period of one year" by order dated 13-12-1971 (Annexure R-1 ). One of the conditions of his appointment was :-"that during the above specified probationary period if his work is not found satisfactory, his services shall be terminated without serving any notice from the Corporation at any time and after probationary period his services are liable to be terminated by giving one months notice on either side. " It appears that the petitioner was prosecuted by the authorities of gurur Police Station for an offence under section 408, I. P. C. before the judicial Magistrate First Class at Balod, District Durg in 1977 which resulted in his acquittal by judgment dated 26-11-1980. Though the State preferred an appeal against the acquittal in the High Court, the said appeal was dismissed on 22-11-1982 and hence petitioners acquittal has become final. It further appears that the aforesaid prosecution related to petitioners employment with the respondents at Gurur in June, 1975. Immediately after the report of the incident to the police, the petitioner was made to band over charge of his post. The petitioner, thereafter claims to have gone on leave in August, 1975. This claim, however, is denied by the respondents who state that he was absconding for fear of being arrested. Immediately after the report of the incident to the police, the petitioner was made to band over charge of his post. The petitioner, thereafter claims to have gone on leave in August, 1975. This claim, however, is denied by the respondents who state that he was absconding for fear of being arrested. Be that as it may, the petitioner submitted his resignation from employment w. e. f. 10-10-1975. Actual resignation letter is in the following terms :-"on the subject cited above please accept my resignation with effect from 1-10-1975. " the resignation was submitted on 1 -10-1975 at Gurur and was received in the Head Office of the respondent Corporation at Indore on 21-10-1975. The petitioner apparently took the resignation as final and did not join the employment. According to the petitioner, he was on leave with effect from 16th August, 1975 and was not allowed to join his duties after expiry of leave in the month of October, 1975. (Para 6 of the petition ). This, however, is denied by the respondents who state that these allegations are false. They have also denied that the petitioner was not permitted to join his duties any time. Indeed it is their claim that the petitioner, having resigned, was absconding because of his impending arrest by the police. (Para 7 of the return ). It is, however, clear that no effort was made by the petitioner to join his employment any time. On 13-9-1976 the petitioner served a notice on the respondents through his lawyer Shri T. K. Joshi, reiterating his having resigned employment and demanding unpaid salary for the months of August and September, 1975 and the provident fund etc. A similar request was made by the petitioner in his complaint to the Chief Secretary of the State government dated 25-1-1977. It may be noted that neither in the notice from his Advocate nor in his complaint to the Chief Secretary, the petitioner made an allegation that he was not being permitted to join his post. Apparently, therefore, the allegation that he was not permitted to join duties after alleged expiry of his leave is an afterthought. It, however, appears that after dismissal of appeal in the High Court on 22-11-1982, the petitioner submitted a copy of the judgment along with his letter dated 3-2-1983 (Annexure d) requesting that he be reinstated in service and be paid his salary from 1-7-1975. It, however, appears that after dismissal of appeal in the High Court on 22-11-1982, the petitioner submitted a copy of the judgment along with his letter dated 3-2-1983 (Annexure d) requesting that he be reinstated in service and be paid his salary from 1-7-1975. Even in this letter he did not make any allegation about his resignation nor he did state that he was not permitted to join his post. When the petitioner heard nothing from the respondents, he sent a reminder (Annexure "e) and even in this reminder, he did not write any thing about his earlier resignation or his being forced to remain out of employment. Subsequently, the lawyers notice was given on 14-3-1983 (Annexure i) requesting reinstatement and even in this notice, he did not state anything about his resignation or his not being allowed to join his employment. It is thus plain that having resigned the employment, the petitioner treated the resignation to be final and himself severed his connections with the respondents. It is only after the judgment of the High Court that he started claiming his reinstatement. It is also clear that he did not withdraw his resignation nor did he clarify his intention to withdraw it. The question is whether the resignation submitted by the petitioner has the effect of terminating his employment ? ( 3. ) BEFORE dealing with the matter further legal principles governing resignation by an employee and its effect may be stated for ready reference. In Jai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1954 S C 584. the Supreme Court considered the matter for the first time and observed as under: "it may be conceded that it is open to a servant, who has expressed desire to retire from service and applied to his superior officer to give him the requisite permission, to change his mind subsequently and ask for cancellation of the permission thus obtained; but he can be allowed to do so as long as he continues in service and not after it has terminated. " In Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 180 , the Supreme Court again considered the matter and observed as under : - "but where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the considerations of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus penitential but not thereafter. " Recently in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Mishra, AIR 1978 S C 694. a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court re-examined the entire law on the subject and restated it as under:- "the general principle that emerges from the foregoing conspectus is that in the absence of anything to the contrary in the provisions governing the terms and conditions of the office/post, an intimation in writing sent to the competent authority by the incumbent, of his intention or proposal to resign his office/post from a future specified date, can be withdrawn by him at any time before it becomes effective i. e. before it effects termination of the tenure of the office/post or the employment. " From the aforesaid, it is clear that the legal effect of the petitioners resignation will be required to be determined in the context of terms and conditions of the office held by him. ( 4. ) IT has been noticed earlier that the petitioner was a temporary employee appointed on probation for a period of one year. It was a condition of his appointment that after the expiry of the period of probation, his services were liable to be terminated by giving one months notice on either side. This condition in the letter of appointment authorises the petitioner to terminate his employment by giving one months notice. The termination under this condition of the appointment does not depend on its "acceptance" by the other side. This condition in the letter of appointment authorises the petitioner to terminate his employment by giving one months notice. The termination under this condition of the appointment does not depend on its "acceptance" by the other side. Regulation No. 11 as noticed earlier also has the same effect, ft is, therefore, clear that under the terras and conditions of his employment, the petitioner was entitled to serve a notice terminating his employment and the said termination did not depend upon acceptance of the notice by the respondents. Indeed, the petitioner himself understood his right in this manner and insisted upon payment of his salary etc. Under the circumstances, he cannot now seek a writ from this court directing his reinstatement. Reinstatement implies a right to continue in employment which right does not exist in the instant case as the petitioner himself brought his employment to an end after lawfully exercising his powers under the Regulations and terms and conditions of the employment. ( 5. ) -AS far as temporary employment is concerned, the aforesaid appears to be the normal rule. It appears to be the accepted law that a temporary employment of a government servant can be brought to an end either by the government servant or by the government after giving one months notice. In such case no sanction of resignation is required (see n. S. Subramaniam v. State 1970 SLR 180. , Nirvair Singh v. P. S. C. Board AIR 1973 Punj 322. and Bhiron Singh Vishvakarma v. Civil Surgeon 1971 LICases 121 (MP ). It must, therefore, be held that the resignation of the petitioner had become effective and his employment has come to an end. It consequently follows that the petitioner has no right to be reinstated on the aforesaid post. ( 6. ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves consideration. According to the law stated aforesaid, the right vested in the government servant is the right to withdraw his resignation before it has been accepted. Even if all the submissions of the petitioner were to be accepted, he would not be entitled to the relief of reinstatement claimed by him as he has not withdrawn his resignation which is the only right vested in him in law. The petitioner cannot claim his reinstatement without withdrawing his resignation. It is, therefore, apparent that his claim is based on no justifiable reasons whatsoever. The petitioner cannot claim his reinstatement without withdrawing his resignation. It is, therefore, apparent that his claim is based on no justifiable reasons whatsoever. ( 7. ) IT was lastly submitted that the petitioner was not paid his salary for the month of August and September, 1975 nor he has been paid his bonus and provident fund and hence it should be assumed that the petitioners resignalion has been rejected. There is no justification whatsoever for such an inference. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, conceded that the petitioner is entitled to all his salary, bonus, provident fund etc. in accordance with the Rules and would be paid without any delay. This statement should satisfy the petitioners grievance in this respect. ( 8. ) THE petition is devoid of substance and is, therefore, dismissed. No orders as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.