Lahiri, J.:- We propose to dispose of Civil Rule Nos. 1292 of 1982 and 1163 of 1982 by a common order to-day and right now in view of the imperative order of the Supreme Court to dispose of the matters "as expeditiously as possible and in any event not later than 2 months from today", passed in Civil Appeal No. 5742 of 1983 disposed on 9.11.83. Only yesterday the matters were listed before us, for hearing. How­ever, the records of the Board of Revenue, the appellate authority, were not before us. Accordingly, we directed produc­tion of the records forthwith, got them, partly heard learned counsel for the parties yesterday and immediately on conclusion of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the parties in both the civil rules, we propose to dispose of the Civil Rules. 2. A relevant diary of facts and dales will help focus attention of the primary legal questions posed before us by the petitioners. The Jorhat Town Country Spirit Shop No. 1 is what is popularly known as "a Double Lessee Shop". Rule 232 of the Assam Excise Rules 1945 as amended, for short "the Rules", framed under the Assam Excise Act 1910 empowers the State Government to settle some country spirit shops which may be considered by them to be ''big shops" with two or more partners. This shop was to be settled with a partnership of two persons. The petitioners of both the Civil Rules as well as Respondents 1 & 2 (Bishnu Ram Borah and Bipin Chandra Borah) each form a pair of partnership. The petiti­oners in both the civil rules and respondents 1 and 2 of the first writ application along with others vied for the shop and submitted their tenders. According to "the Rules" their tenders were considered by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector, Jorhat aided and assisted by the Advisory Committee. Rule 208 of "the Rule" provides, inter alia, that the Collector shall make settlement of excise shops in consultation with the Advisory Committee of not more than 5 non-official gentlemen of standing to be nominated by him. Ordinarily such non-official 'gentlemen of standing' are chosen from persons having direct knowledge of the local conditions and having knowledge and/or experience of settlement of excise shops. Ordinarily such non-official 'gentlemen of standing' are chosen from persons having direct knowledge of the local conditions and having knowledge and/or experience of settlement of excise shops. The respondents of the first civil rule namely Bishnu Ram Borah and his partner were selected and granted the settlement of the shop by the Collector-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Jorhat in consultation with the Advisory Committee. The settlements are made on the basis of suitability of tenderers and after taking note of their financial capacity to run the shop. It is not out of place to mention that Bishnu and Bipin were the sitting lessees of the shop in question since 1980. It thus appears that the suitability of Bishnu and Bipin had been tested in the earlier settlement proceedings and they having had qualified themselves got the settlement for the pre­vious terms, of course on appeal preferred by them to the Board of Revenue. It is thus seen that they had qualified the test of "suitability" and ''financial soundness" by the appellate authority and that too in respect of the very shop in the earlier settlement. 3. Being aggrieved by the order of settlement made by “the primary authority" in favour of Bishnu and his partner. Dayararn and his partner and Parag and his partner preferred appeals, along with another set of partners. The appeals were entered in the Board of Revenue and registered as Appeal Nos. 60E, of 1981, 61E of 1981 and 83E of 1981. The appeals pre­ferred by all the appellants were turned down and the order of settlement in favour of Bishnu and his partner, made by the primary authority on 28.8.81, was upheld. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of settlement, Parag and his partner filed on application under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Civil Rule No. 215/82 a Division Bench of the Court upon hearing parties, namely, Parag and his partner, (the petitioner) and Bishnu and his partner (the Respondents) accepted the peti­tion, quashed the order of the Board of Revenue passed on 11.2.82 and remitted the matter back to the Board of Revenue by an order dated 4. 11. 82. It appears that in the mean time Dayaram and his partner filed a writ application on 3. 11.82 against the same order of the Board of Revenue dated 11. 2. 82 and it was entered as civil Rule 1163 of 1982. 11. 82. It appears that in the mean time Dayaram and his partner filed a writ application on 3. 11.82 against the same order of the Board of Revenue dated 11. 2. 82 and it was entered as civil Rule 1163 of 1982. However, the matter came up before a Division Bench of this Court on 11.11.82, a Rule was issued, Parag and his partner being the settlement holders desired to be intervener, the Court allowed the prayer. In the said writ petition Bishnu and Bipin were made respon­dents. It thus appears to us that before Rule was issued in Civil Rule 1163 of 1982, the order impugned in the writ petition had been quashed by the order dated 4. 11. 82 in Civil Rule 215 of 1982. However, Civil Rule No. 1163/82 continued to pend before this Court and in the mean time the Board of Revenue as ordered by the High Court in civil Rule 215/82, heard the matter afresh and dismissed the appeal of Parag and his partner by order dated 3.12.82. Against the order of the Board of Revenue, Parag and his partner preferred another writ petition bring Civil Rule 1292 of 1982 a Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 7. 5. 83 quashed the order of the Board of Revenue, and, inter alia, directed settlement be made in favour of Parag and his partner. However, Civil Rule 1163 of 1982 filed by Dayaram and his partner continued to remain pending. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of Division Banch in Civil Rule 1292/82 (since reported in (1983) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 78 -Parag Saikia & Anr. vs. Bishnu Ram Bora & Anr.) Bishnu and his partner preferred an appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 5742/83. Their Lord­ships accepted the appeal, quashed the order of the High Court and directed rehearing of Civil Rule No. 1292/82 along with Civil Rule 1163/82 (Dayaram vs. Assam Board of Revenue) and in the course of judgment their of Lordships made certain observations and directions to be followed by this Court. It appears from the records that the judgment and order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was received at this end on 3.1.84, the matter was placed before the Chief Justice and his Lordship directed that it should come up before the very Bench which had heard Civil Rule 1292/82. It appears from the records that the judgment and order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was received at this end on 3.1.84, the matter was placed before the Chief Justice and his Lordship directed that it should come up before the very Bench which had heard Civil Rule 1292/82. However, learned Judges constituting the Bench desired that it should be placed before any other bench, and there upon, the Hon'ble Chief Jus­tice ordered that the matters should be listed in Court No. 2, and, accordingly the matters came up for hearing yesterday. 5. We have heard Mr. K. C. Das, learned counsel for Parag and his partner, the petitioners in Civil Rule 1292/82, Mr. S. K. Sen, learned counsel for Dayaram and his partner, the peti­tioner in Civil Rule 1163/82 as well as Mr. G. K. Talukdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Bishnu Ram Bora and his partner Respondents and intervenors in both the Civil Rules. All possible opportunities were granted to learned counsel and they were heard. At the outset Mr. S.K. Sen learned counsel for Dayaram prayed that Dayaram and others be allowed to intervene in Civil Rule 1292/82. Upon hearing learned counsel we allowed the prayer. Mr. S.K. Sen, learned counsel for Dayaram has submitted that the period of the settlement is round the corner and he has instructions to submit before us that the period of settlement is going to expire by March 31, 1984, his client will not derive any benefit in pursuing the Civil Rule filed by them, namely Civil Rule No. 1163/82, and, the said petitioners shall be content if their interests are upheld by quashing the observations made by the Assam Board of Revenue about their financial soundness in Appeal No. 82E of 1981 so that the observations might not be used in future and/or in future set­tlement proceedings in respect of the shop or any other shop. Learned counsel for the parties, namely, Shri G.K. Talukdar and Shri K. C. Das have stated that they have no objection if the observations made by the Board of Revenue about financial soundness of Dayaram and his partner are quashed or set aside. Learned counsel for the parties, namely, Shri G.K. Talukdar and Shri K. C. Das have stated that they have no objection if the observations made by the Board of Revenue about financial soundness of Dayaram and his partner are quashed or set aside. Learned counsel concede that the observations made by the learned Board of Revenue were all confined to the particular settlement and there is no direction of the Board of Revenue that they would amount a slur or block or stigma in future settlements. 6. In every settlement of excise shops the question of finan­cial soundness comes up for consideration in view of rule 208 (4) of "the Rules". In support of the claim a tenderer produces documents or materials, they are considered and a decision is reached either way. In the instant case we find that learned Board of Revenue was not satisfied with the materials and ob­served that Dayaram and his partner were not financially sound to run the excise shop for the settled period. The Board of Revenue never expressed that the financial conditions of Dayaram and his partner was such that they should be debarred or pro­hibited to participate in future settlement proceedings. Under these circumstances the apprehension of Dayaram and his partner that the observation would be used in future cases appears to us as mere apprehension. On the facts and circumstances as they existed on the date of decision of the case, the Board of Revenue held that they were found to be not financially sound to run the shop for the period in question. It is just a decision given in that particular case. We are of the firm opinion that the observations about the financial soundness of Dayaram and his partner were made by the Board of Revenue for deciding that particular case. We make it clear that the observation shall not stand as a bar or in any way affect the claim of Dayaram and his partner to ask for settlement and/or to get settlement of a country spirit shop, including the present shop provided they are found sound and suitable. Mr. We make it clear that the observation shall not stand as a bar or in any way affect the claim of Dayaram and his partner to ask for settlement and/or to get settlement of a country spirit shop, including the present shop provided they are found sound and suitable. Mr. S.K. Sen learned counsel for Dayaram and his partner has very rightly did not enter into the question of merits of the case in view of the fact that- (1) that the period of settlement is going to be over by March 31, 1984; (2) that by virtue of the order of the Supreme Court, Bishnu and his partner have been put in pos­session of the shop and they are enjoying the shop in question, and. no useful purpose would be served in contesting the claim of either Bishnu and his partner and/or Parag and his partner; (3) that the impugned order of the Board of Revenue had been quashed and no longer in existence, and (4) that, in place of the impugned order dated 11.5.82, a fresh order was passed by the Board of Revenue on 3.12.82 and against the said order Dayaram and his partner have not preferred any writ appli­cation. 7. It will be seen that the Judgment and Order dated 11.2.82 of the Board, impugned in Civil Mule 215/82, contai­ning the observations against Dayaram and his partner were quashed by a Division Bench of this Court by quashing the judgment and order dated 4.11.83. The impugned order of the Board was a consolidated order in respect of all the appeals, including the appeal of Dayaram and his partner. There is nothing to show that only a part of the impugned order of the Board of Revenue dated 11.2.82 was quashed. As such, the order of the Board of Revenue dated 11.2.82 has been quashed and along with it all those observations made by the Board against Dayaram and his partner were also quashed and, there­fore, they are non-est. The contention made by Mr. Sen has strong force and the same is accepted. As such the question of quashing the order observations does not arise. We hold that the observations against Dayaram and his partner are non-est Mr. The contention made by Mr. Sen has strong force and the same is accepted. As such the question of quashing the order observations does not arise. We hold that the observations against Dayaram and his partner are non-est Mr. G. K. Talukdar, learned counsel for Bishnu and his partner and Mr K. C. Das learned counsel for Parag and Ms partner have fully conceded to the contention of Mr. Sen, In the result we hold that the observations made against Dayaram and his partner cannot be used by any authority as they were quashed by an order dated 4.11.82 in Civil Rule 215/82. 8. Now, let us turn to the contentions raised by Mr. K. C. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners in Civil Rule 1292/82. They may be summed up as follows. First, Parag and his partner were, at all relevant time, 'educated unemployed youth', and as such, they were best entitled to preference under rule 223(2) of "the Rules" and the Board of Revenue acted illegally and without jurisdiction in not giving them prefereace over Respondents 1 and 2, Bishnu and his partner. The second contention is that the Board of Revenue has admitted and used the reports of the Collector-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Jorhat, which it had no jurisdiction to accept and/or use as materials; it has resulted in a failure of justice. It amounted to consideration of irrelevant material as relevant and the error is apparent on the face of the records. The last contention although very feably made, is that Respondents 1 and 2 were not financially sound. No other contention has been raised be­fore us. 9. Indeed, rule 223(2) of "the Rules" provides for granting preference to educated unemployed youths, but the question is whether the petitioners were unemployed youths, at all relevant period. Admittedly, when the settlement was made and/or the appeals were heard Petitioner No. 2, Prafulla Barua was a student undergoing his studies. We extract the provisions of role 223(2) along with note beneath the rule:- “223. (1)” (2) In making settlement to any person preference shall always be given to the educated unemployed youths or to Co-operatives and Co-opt. Firms formed by such edu­cated unemployed youth. We extract the provisions of role 223(2) along with note beneath the rule:- “223. (1)” (2) In making settlement to any person preference shall always be given to the educated unemployed youths or to Co-operatives and Co-opt. Firms formed by such edu­cated unemployed youth. Preference shall also be given to the persons belonging to the more backward community of the other Backward classes." (3) * * * (4) * * * "Note.-The term 'educated unemployed youth' as mentioned in sub-rule (2) of Rule 223 means a person not exceeding 35 years of age who has passed the H. S. L. C. or its equivalent examination and is without any employ­ment." Dealing with the question as to whether a young person prosecuting his studies can be said to be "educated unemployed youth" for the purpose of the Rule, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, with reference to the case in hand observed as under :- ''In our judgment, the expression "educated unemployed youth” has definite legal connotation. It denotes a class of citizens who after completing their education are faced with unemployment. Rule 223(2) read with the note embodies a rule of preference. The question of grant of preference under the note beneath r. 223(2) an only arise when other conditions as regards suitability of the rival tende­rers is equal. That apart, the construction placed by the High Court on the expression "educated unemployed youth" is manifestly absurd. By no stretch of imagination can a student still undergoing his studies in a university regarded as having completed his education or being 'unemployed' youth. When a person is pursuing his course of study in a University, we fail to see any basis for treating him as an "educated unemployed youth". The judgment of the High Court directing the issue of a licence to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 being based on the rule of preference contained in the note beneath r. 223 of the Assam Excise Rules cannot therefore be sustained." 10. It is therefore seen that persons prosecuting their studies do not fall within the expressions educated unemployed youth" as defined in the Rule. Their Lordships have held that persons who after completing their education are faced with unemployment fall in the category of persons described in the rule as ''educated unemployed youth". It is therefore seen that persons prosecuting their studies do not fall within the expressions educated unemployed youth" as defined in the Rule. Their Lordships have held that persons who after completing their education are faced with unemployment fall in the category of persons described in the rule as ''educated unemployed youth". Their Lordships have further held that the question of grant of preference under the note below rule 223(2) could only arise when other conditions as regards suitability of the rival tenderers are equal. Further, their Lordships have held that by no stretch of imagination a student still undergoing his studies in a University could be regarded "as having completed his education" or "being unem­ployed youth". Their Lordships have, in an affirmative manner, held that a student prosecuting his course of study in a University cannot be treated as an "educated unemployed youth' and the contrary view which had been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court was not sustainable. In view of the deci­sion rendered and on the construction of rule 223(2) with the Note below the rule we conclude that Prafulla, petiti­oner No. 2, could not have been termed as "educated unem­ployed youth", at all relevant time. Under these circumstances the first contention of the petitioner fails. The petitioners are not entitled to any preference in view of the fact that the petitioner Prafulla was a student at all relevent period. We are inclined to hold that in the trade or business like country liquor shop young persons prosecuting their studies should not be dragged in and the rules should be accordingly moulded to prohibit young persons and/or persons prosecuting their studies in Schools, Colleges or Universities to submit tenders in view of the nature of the trade or business. 11. Now the next contention of learned counsel is regarding the acceptance of the report of the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector by the Assam Board of Revenue and using them as material against the petitioners. While dealing with the question their Lordships passed certain observations binding in nature. We find that the Collector cum-Deputy Commissioner represen­ting the settling authority submitted his para-wise comments in connection with the shop as well as another shop khown as Milan Country Spirit Shop where petitioner No. 1, Parag had also submitted tender for settlement of the shop with him. While dealing with the question their Lordships passed certain observations binding in nature. We find that the Collector cum-Deputy Commissioner represen­ting the settling authority submitted his para-wise comments in connection with the shop as well as another shop khown as Milan Country Spirit Shop where petitioner No. 1, Parag had also submitted tender for settlement of the shop with him. We extract the report of the Collector-cum-Deputy Commissioner :- "Jorhat town country spirit shop No. 1 (with which shop we are concerned) is meant for joint lessee. Just after the submission of the tender on 21.8.81 secret information was received to the effect that Shri Parag Saikia (one of the petitioners in the case) is in the private employ­ment of a prominent businessman of Dibrugarh district who is also said to be benamidar of improtant C. S. shops and Shri Saikia resides in Gauhati for the greater part of the year enjoying all the perquisites of the employer. The secret information further indicates that the said benamidar of Dibrugarh district was trying to grab impor­tant shops of Jorhat Sub-division through Parag Saikia. The matter was discussed in the Advisory Board which rejected the tender of the Joint appellant." While hearing the appeals, the Board of Revenue also perused the report of the Deputy Commissioner submitted in connection with settlement of Milan Country Spirit Shop (vide page 116 of the records of the Beard of Revenue). 12. It is thus seen that just after the submission of the tenders the Deputy Commissioner received secret information about Parag, one of the petitioners in the Civil Rule to the effect that he was in private employment of a prominent businessman of Dibrugarh and was said to be a 'benamidar' of important country spirit shop. His employer or 'benamidar' was trying to grab important shops of Jorhat Sub-division through Parag and the matter was in fact considered in the Advisory Commi­ttee, and, on that consideration the tender of the petitioner and his partner was rejected by the Advisory Committee. Mr. Das has contended that the statement of fact contained therein are incorrect. However, the fact remains that these are reports emanating from a responsible officer, who is directly connected with settlement of excise shops. It is not a stray report. We find similar report against petitioner No. 1 in Milan Country Spirit Shop. Mr. Das has contended that the statement of fact contained therein are incorrect. However, the fact remains that these are reports emanating from a responsible officer, who is directly connected with settlement of excise shops. It is not a stray report. We find similar report against petitioner No. 1 in Milan Country Spirit Shop. The requisite qualities of diligence, perseverance and capacity to run a shop were found absent in Parag. That apart, his dealings and conduct as contained in the reports were not found to be congenial for granting licence for the shop. Indeed, their Lordships have held that such reports may be admitted and used. Their Lordships observed, in respect of the reports, as under:- "The rules of natural justice must necessarily vary with the nature of the right and the attending circumstances in the matter of grant of a liquor licence. Further, the Board was entitled to call for a report from the Deputy Commissioner in an appeal of this nature." These reports are sent in connection with every case and they are used by the Board of Revenue in the appeals in favour or against a party. This is the existing practice, as we have noticed. It was never used behind the back of the petitioners, as is revealed from the records. The reports form a part of the case records and they were before the Board of Revenue and the parties had full scope and opportunity of perusing the same. These are clearly revealed from the records of the case. Of course, the confidential reports on the basis of which the reports were submitted by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector, were not before the Board nor were they shown to the parties. In the instant case, what we find from the records is that the reports are usual reports which are taken note of by the Board of Revenue in the usual course of hearing. It is entirely for the appellate authority acting under section 9 of the Assam Excise Act, 1910 read with rule 339 of "the Rules" to accept or to reject the reports. The Board may accept or reject the report by giving reasons therefor. However, the reports came from a responsible officer who has had no grudge whatsoever against the petitioners. The reports speak in one voice. They go to show that petitioner No. 1 (Parag) was not suitable to get the settlement. The Board may accept or reject the report by giving reasons therefor. However, the reports came from a responsible officer who has had no grudge whatsoever against the petitioners. The reports speak in one voice. They go to show that petitioner No. 1 (Parag) was not suitable to get the settlement. In the result we find that there were mate­rials which the Board of Revenue could have accepted or rejected. The Board of Revenue has accepted and has given reasons for accepting the reports. Section 9 of "the Act" is an enabling provision and describes the contour of powers of the Board of Revenue. It may call for the proceedings held by the Collector--cum-Deputy Commissioner and pass such order or orders thereon as it thinks fit. Mr. Das has fairly conceded that those reports, which we have extracted above, were before the Board of Revenue, these were open for perusal by the parties, and, therefore the parties had full opportunity to counter them. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that these reports were used behind the back of the petitioners and/or any of the parties as they formed part of the records of the appeals. Secondly, Mr. Das has failed to show where the Bo­ard of Revenue has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law and/or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed error apparent on the face of the records in placing reliance on those documents and holding that the petitioner, Parag Saikia, was not suitable to have the settlement. The Board of Revenue is the highest appellate authority and it has acted on the basis of documents which could be used by it, and, reached the con­clusion. No reason has been ascribed as to why the findings based on materials should be quashed, in exercise of our power under Article 226 of the Constitution. When there existed such materials, it was in fitnes of things that the Board held that the petitioner, Parag was not "suitable" to get the settlement. 13. We are of the firm opinion that the finding reached by the Board of Revenue on the basis of the materials refe­rred to above cannot be interfered with by this Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The view as to the unsuitability of petitioner No. 1, Parag Saikia, is based on documentary materials. 13. We are of the firm opinion that the finding reached by the Board of Revenue on the basis of the materials refe­rred to above cannot be interfered with by this Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The view as to the unsuitability of petitioner No. 1, Parag Saikia, is based on documentary materials. Even if the findings of the Board are incorrect this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the same. We have dealt with the ambit of power under Article 226 in Lilaram Pegu vs. Assam Board of Revenue, 1983 (1) Gauhati Law Reports 96 as well. Therein after considering the decision of the Supreme Court we reached the conclusion that error of fact based on material cannot be disturbed, the basic reason of the restrictive attitude is that the Court exercising Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution never sits as an appellate Court and its function is merely supervisory. We have held- "Any finding of fact arrived at on oral or documentary material cannot be touched unless it is based on "no material or inadmissible material or is patently wrong" so much so that no person instructed in law could have arrived at the conclusion----" We hold the same view as we did in Lilaram (supra). Accordingly we reject the contentions. 14. The last contention concerns the financial soundness of the respondents. However, Mr. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner was in a visible dilema and could not meet the con­tention of Mr. G. K. Talukdar to the effect that the respon­dents were the sitting lessees of the very shop. They had been settled with the shop after establishing their suitability and financial soundness, and, therefore, nobody could question their financial soundness without establishing that the respondents were afflicted by such startling events or circumstances which ruined or affected their financial stability or capacity. We find that the respondents were sitting lessees of the very shop. It was a very relevant consideration in support of the fact that they were financially sound to run the shop. The question of financial soundness had been gone into by the Board of Revenue on earlier appeal and it found the respondents financially sound. We find that the respondents were sitting lessees of the very shop. It was a very relevant consideration in support of the fact that they were financially sound to run the shop. The question of financial soundness had been gone into by the Board of Revenue on earlier appeal and it found the respondents financially sound. The question was also gone into by their Lordships in the Supreme Court when the question of handing over possession of the shop to respondents 1 and 2 came up before their Lordships. Considering the financial status of the respondents, their Lordships directed them to take over possession of the shop pending final disposal of the Civil Rule. Now, amongst the petitioners, as well as respondents 1 and 2, we find that the petitioners in both the Civil Rules are not entitled to get any preference. Admittedly the petitioner No. 1 was not found to be suitable on the basis of materials on record. On the basis of the materials the Board of Revenue reached the conclusion that respondents 1 and 2 were more 'suitable' and thereafter the Board considered their financial soundness and held respon­dents 1 and 2 to be financially sound and upheld the order of settlement. The order of the Board of Revenue is not the pri­mary order of settlement but it is an order confirming the settlement made by the primary authority, who, upon considera­tion of the facts and circumstances of the,, case found the respondents best entitled to get the settlement. These aspects were considered and dealt with by their Lordships in the appeal and found in favour of Respondents 1 and 2. In the result we hold that in the instant case there is no scope for interference with the impugned orders of the Board of Revenue on the grounds contended by learned counsel for the petitioners. 15. In the result we hold that both the petitioners are liable to be dismissed, which we do hereby. However, the obser­vations made by the Board against Dayaram and his partner (in Civil Rule 1163/82) shall not be made use of by any autho­rity in any settlement proceedings of liquor shops or any other settlement. As a matter of fact the observation made against the said petitioners stood quashed by virtue of the judgment and order of a Division Beach of this Court in Civil Rule 215 of 1982. As a matter of fact the observation made against the said petitioners stood quashed by virtue of the judgment and order of a Division Beach of this Court in Civil Rule 215 of 1982. Subject to the observations the writ petitions fail. We make no order as to cost. However, the costs awarded by the Board of Revenue against Parag and his partner must be depo­sited by them into the Board of Revenue within 2 months from to-day. Send down the records forthwith.