Judgment H.L.Agarwal and S.N.Jha JJ. 1. The question arising in this writ application is whether the petitioner who was appointed as a temporary Tehsildar, is entitled to the benefit of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short the Act) or not. 2. The first appointment of the petitioner was made by the order of the Deputy Collector, Revenue Division, Biharsharif dated 5.2.1977 in the Irrigation Department. Under the appointment the petitioner was allowed to work till 23.7.1977. He was again appointed on the same post by the same officer by his order dated 27.1.1979. His services were terminated this time on 31.1.1979 (sic). It may be mentioned that these appointments were made on purely temporary basis for the purpose of collection of irrigation fees from the cultivators to boost up the recovery target. The petitioner got yet another appointment along with two others by the order of the same officer dated 31-7-1979 (Annexure 3). One of the stipulations made in this office order was that this appointment was made till the Selection Committee made regular appointment for the collection. This order was modified by another office order dated 11.9.1980 to this extent that the appointment of the petitioner was purely seasonal (Bilkul Samayik) and his services could be terminated without any prior information. Whereas the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the order, Annexure 4 simply modified the appointment of the petitioner under the order Annexure 3 and that did not amount to any fresh appointment, the learned Advocate General on the other hand contended that Annexure 4 would amount to a fresh appointment of the petitioner. Be that as it may, the points with which we are confronted, this dispute is not at all relevant but at the same time we feel inclined to accept the contention that the order contained in Annexure 4 was in continuation of Annexure 3 and it simply purported to modify the term mentioned above. The petitioner continued in his service by virtue of this appointment until the impugned order dated 31.1.81 was passed by the Deputy Collector (Respondent No. 3). 3. The petitioner challenges this order on the ground that it infringes the conditions laid down under Sec.25F of the Act as neither any notice nor one months wages in lieu thereof, was given to the petitioner. 4. 3. The petitioner challenges this order on the ground that it infringes the conditions laid down under Sec.25F of the Act as neither any notice nor one months wages in lieu thereof, was given to the petitioner. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents and the stand taken by them is that the appointment of the petitioner and Ors. was purely seasonal in nature because no sanctioned post was created by the Government. With reference to the claim of the petitioner of the benefit of Sec.25F, their stand is that this provision was not applicable to the Irrigation Department and the petitioner was not entitled to the protection. It has further been stated that the posts of three Tehsildars was sanctioned by the Government on a seasonal basis only till 31. 3. 1981 and respondent No. 3, therefore, issued the termination order (Annexure 5) in compliance of the Government order. 5. During the course of argument, learned Advocate General also referred to the definition of the word Employer in Sec.2(g) of the Act which reads as follows: An employer under Sec.2 (g) means in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed in that behalf or where no such authority is prescribed the head of the department. and contended on this basis that the prescribed authority in this case would be the Commissioner of Irrigation, being the head of the Department and in as much as the employment orders were. issued by respondent No. 3 (the Deputy Collector of the Revenue Division), the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of 25F of the Act as his employer was a different man. 6. We shall first dispose of the last point raised by the learned Advocate General, namely, as to whether the State Government could be deemed to be the employer of the petitioner or not regard being had to the definition of the term employer. In this view of the matter, our attention has been invited to the Industrial Disputes (Bihar) Rules, 1961 by Mr. In this view of the matter, our attention has been invited to the Industrial Disputes (Bihar) Rules, 1961 by Mr. Shivkirti Singh, These Rules are to apply to an industrial dispute concerning any industry in which the Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules, 1951 do not extend and to such industrial disputes in industries in respect of which Central Government have, under Sec.39 of the Act delegated their powers to the State Government. Rule 2 which is a rule of interpretation, also defines in Clause (f), the term Employer occuring in Sec.2(g) of the Act and states that: With reference to Clause (g) of Sec.2 it is hereby prescribed that in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of a department of he State Government the Officer in-charge of the Industrial establishment shall be "employer" in respect of that establishment. 7. On this definition or interpretation of the word employer it was contended by Mr. Shiv Kriti Singh that so far as the Irrigation Department was concerned, not the head of the department but the officer incharge of the establishment shall be the employer on behalf of the State. It was further contended that Irrigation Department was not an industrial establishment and, therefore, this interpretation given in rule 2(f) would be of no help to the petitioner. In Sub-rule (3) of rule 1 it has further been clarified that these rules, inter alia shall also apply to an industrial dispute concerning any industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. 8. At the time when the 1961 rules were framed by the State Government, it could not be conceived that various Government Departments could also be covered within the mischief of industry and, therefore, all that could be contended were some establisnment or industry used in common parlance. The controversy has however, since been set at rest by an authoritative Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Bijoy Kumar Bharti and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. 1983 (31) B.L.J.R. 536 where Irrigation Department of the State Government has been clearly held to be an industry. 9. In that view of the matter, the petitioner would be deemed to be a workman employed in an industry of the Irrigation Department of the State Government. The petitioner undisputedly has been in continuous service for not less than one year under the State Government. 9. In that view of the matter, the petitioner would be deemed to be a workman employed in an industry of the Irrigation Department of the State Government. The petitioner undisputedly has been in continuous service for not less than one year under the State Government. Even assuming for the sake of argument, if the head of department should be deemed to be the employer of the petitioner and not Deputy Collector (respondent No. 3) it is too technical in the sense that the real employer of the petitioner is the State of Bihar which, according to the counter affidavit has sanctioned itself the three posts for a particular period upto 31st January, 1981 against which the respondent No. 3 made appointment of the petitioner. With due respect to the learned Advocate General the argument on the basis of the definition of the term employer to defeat the right of the petitioner was not appreciated by us. 10. Now we come to the second point as to whether the petitioner was entitled to one months notice or salary in lieu thereof as provided under Sec.25F of the Act. This claim of the petitioner was disputed on behalf of respondents on more than one ground. At first, reliance was put on the proviso to Clause (a) of Sec.25F by the learned Advocate General according to which: No notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specified a date for the termination of service. 11. The argument on behalf of the respondent was that the appointment orders issued in favour of the petitioner vide Annexures 3 and 4 clearly state that the petitioners appointment was seasonal (Samayik). On these terms of appointment contained in the office order, it was contended by the Advocate General that no notice under Sec.25F was necessary because the appointment amounted to an agreement between the petitioner and the employer specifying a date of the termination of his service. In other words, he contended that the use of the expression Samayik was sufficient enough to communicate to the petitioner that his appointment was for a specified period. 12. It is difficult to accept this contention, merely by mentioning that the appointment of the petitioner was seasonal, however without specifying the exact date till which the petitioner was to continue in the service, the explanation would have no application to this case. 12. It is difficult to accept this contention, merely by mentioning that the appointment of the petitioner was seasonal, however without specifying the exact date till which the petitioner was to continue in the service, the explanation would have no application to this case. The proviso has been provided with a definite purpose that the workman must precisely know the period of his employment so that he may not be left in dark and then to receive a retriachment notice all of a sudden on a date to be chosen by the employer. Even this subsequent order Annexure 4 makes the position of the State all the more worse when it has stated that the he appointment of the petitioner would be termainated at any time without any prior information. This stipulation is in apparent contradiction with the legislative intendment of fixing the date expressly by an agreement contemplated by the proviso. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the proviso attached to Clause (a) of Sec.25 F contemplates a clear and unambiguous agreement between the employer and the employee specifying a definite and firm date in the matter of termination of the service of the workmen from before hand. 13. The next point of argument of the learned Advocate General in this regard was that the petitioner was not in continuous service within the meaning of Sec.25B of the Act in as much as there was a break in the service in between the office orders contained in Annexure 3 and 4 and, therefore, he did not complete the uninterrupted period of one years service. This argument also is erroneous and must be rejected in view of the clear provision in Sec.25B according to which he should have remained m employment for 240 days in one year preceding the date of his retrenchment. On this point, there is a volume of authority of this Court of the daily rated labourers of the Railway Administration when the meter guage of the track m the north Bihar was being converted into a broad guage. On this point, there is a volume of authority of this Court of the daily rated labourers of the Railway Administration when the meter guage of the track m the north Bihar was being converted into a broad guage. Reliance for his view may be put also on the case of Mohan Lai V/s. The Management of M/s Bharat Electronics Limited 1981 (42) F. L. R. 389 where the expression continuous service was considered In terms of the provision contained under Sec.25B of the Act and was very clearly laid down that Sec.25B (2) contemplated a situation where the workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days within the period of 12 calendar months commencing and counting back-wards from the relevant date i.e. the date of retrenchment. The position present case is similar and therefore, we hold that the petitioner was employed in the Irriation Department of the State Government and was in continuous service for the requisite period entiting him to the protection of the provision of either getting one months notice or wages in lieu thereof before as provided under Sec.251 could be retrenched under the impugned order Annexure 5 only on complying with the above protection. In this view of the matter this application succeeds and the order contained in Annexure 5 1S quashed. 14. The result of the petitioners success would lead to his reinstatement practically after a gap of about three years. Although the petitioner has remained out of job during this period without any fault on his part, considering the circumstances of the case and the petitioners status, he should not have remained unengaged and idle during this period. Having regard to this fact we direct that the salary in the intervening period for six months will not be paid to him on his reinstatement by virtue of this order. The Government would also be at liberty to pass any fresh order of the petitioners retrenchment m accordance with law, if so advised. In the circumstances, however, the parties will bear their own costs.