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1984 DIGILAW 803 (ALL)

Jwala Prasad v. Syed Naqi Raja

1984-09-27

I.P.SINGH

body1984
JUDGMENT I.P. Singh, J. - Heard the learned counsel for the appellant on the maintainability of this Second Appeal perused the judgments of the courts below. The brief facts appearing from those judgments arc that initially the suit was filed in the court of Judge Small Causes (Munsif Banda) for ejectment of the defendants from the house in suit, recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits for various periods as well as for pendentelite mesne profits after the tenancy was duly terminated. The suit was purely filed on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant. 2. During the pendency of that suit the court returned the plaint under Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, on 30.7.75 and the same was presented on the regular side on 5.8.1975 in the court of Munsif, Banda. Subsequently it was transferred to the court of Civil Judge who decided the same on regular side. 3. The present second appeal is sought to be filed by the defendant appellant. The question arises as to whether the second appeal is barred under Section 102 C. P. C. or not. Section 102 C. P. C. provides that no second appeal shall lie in any suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees. In the present suit the valuation was less than three thousand and the only question is as to whether after the plaint was returned under Section 23 of the Small Cause Courts Act, the nature of the suit changes from that of small cause or not. 4. The law on the matter is well-settled that primarily all suits are of small cause nature except those mentioned in Schedule II of the Small Cause Courts, Act. In Uttar Pradesh Article 4 of the Second Schedule has been substituted whereby the suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him as compensation for use and occupation of that building after such determination of lessee shall be a suit of small cause nature. That is why for the above reliefs the suit was filed by the plaintiff initially in the court of small causes. 5. That is why for the above reliefs the suit was filed by the plaintiff initially in the court of small causes. 5. It is also well settled law that the nature of character of a suit is determined from the allegations made in the plaint or, in other words, the suit as framed and presented before the court. The nature of the suit will not be altered (a) by the contentions put forward by the defendant in the written statement or at any other stage. (b) The nature would also not change by the findings arrived at by the court. 6. Here the mainstay of the contention is that when the question of title was involved and the plaint was returned under Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and the suit was fought on the regular side then the nature of the suit was changed. To my (sic), an order under Section 23 of the said Act would not alter the nature of the suit. I am fortified in this view of mine by the decision in Jagannath Dalwala v. Bhola Nath and others, (A.I.R. 1963 Allahabad 258) where it was observed : "An order under Section 23 does not have the effect of converting the suit from one of small cause nature to a title suit. As soon as the Small Cause Court Judge exercises his discretion under Section 23 of the Act and returns the plaint to be presented to a Court having jurisdiction to determine the issue relating to title the bar of Section 16 is removed and the civil court is authorised to entertain the plaint as such and to try the suit as framed." It was held in the case of Bisheshwar Prasad Gautain v. R.K. Agrawal (AIR 1977 Allahabad (F. B.) 103) : "It cannot be gainsaid that the present suit became small causes in nature after the coming into force of the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972. It is true that under Section 9 of the Amending Act such suit was triable by the Small Cause Court and was liable to be transferred to it from the regular side, but none the less it continued to retain its nature, namely, small causes. In that event Section 102 which applies to suits of the nature of small causes but which are tried on the regular side, is fully applicable. In that event Section 102 which applies to suits of the nature of small causes but which are tried on the regular side, is fully applicable. Under it no second appeal lies." Further argument was advanced that it will become a suit of small cause nature only if the tenancy is determined by some overt act on the past of the plaintiff meaning thereby that some notice or the like should be given by the plaintiff to the defendant for that purpose. The learned counsel maintains that this would visualise determination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act and not in any other manner and a notice under Section 111 sub-clause (9) would not be of any avail. But I fail to appreciate this argument. The words in this regard appearing in Article 4 of the Second Schedule of Small Cause Courts Act are "after such determination of lease." It only envisages the factum of determination of lease and not the mode in which the said determination of lease occurs. Section 111 of the Transfer of property Act envisages different modes in which the lease stands determined. So the mode of determination will be immaterial and only the factum of the lease having been determined will be material. 7. For all these reasons I uphold that the nature of the suit was and always remained small cause nature. This second appeal is therefore, not maintainable and is hereby dismissed. The stay order dated 12.1.84 and the subsequent stay order dated 6.9.84 stand vacated. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for both the parties on payment of usual charges by 29.9.84