JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) The petitioner, Himayat Ullah Lakhnavi, Chief Executive Officer of Mahidpur Municipality, was a member of the M. P. State Municipal Service (Executive) and has been removed from employment by an order dated 30-11-1976 (Annexure P-8) on proved misconduct in a departmental enquiry. His review application filed under section 332 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961, remains dismissed by the order dated 4-9-1981 (Annexure P-10) and, hence the present approach to this Court by filing this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing these orders. ( 2. ) A charge-sheet dated 15-5-1973 (Annexure P-1) was served on the petitioner alleging as many as five misconducts against him. The petitioner submitted his reply to these charges on 7-7-1973 and, thereafter, faced a departmental enquiry, held in accordance with M. P. State Municipal Service (Executive) Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), framed under section 355 read with section 86 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The Enquiry Officer found charges Nos. 1, 2 and 3 proved and the other two charges as not proved. Thereafter, a show cause notice dated 28-1-1975 was served on the petitioner, proposing a penalty or removal from employment. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said notice and challenged the findings of the Enquiry Officer as perverse and unreasonable. He also submitted that the proposed punishment was harsh and excessive. The Disciplinary Authority, on consideration of material on record and after obtaining the opinion of the Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the P.S.C.) passed the impugned order removing him from employment. The Rules do not provide for an appeal against the order imposing any major penalty and, hence the petitioner submitted a review application under section 332 of the Act. It appears that the State Government, on a re-consideration of the matter was of the opinion that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was excessive and deserved substitution by a minor penalty. It further appears that by their letter dated 3-6-1978, the State Government proposed to re-instate the petitioner and inflict the punishment of stoppage of two increments for a period of one year. It also appears that this proposal was sent to the P.S.C. for obtaining their opinion. It further appears that by their letter dated 3-6-1978, the State Government proposed to re-instate the petitioner and inflict the punishment of stoppage of two increments for a period of one year. It also appears that this proposal was sent to the P.S.C. for obtaining their opinion. The P.S.C., by its letter dated 28-2- 1979 (Annexure R-6), did not agree with the proposed order of the State Government and advised that the review application be rejected. Consequently, his review application has been rejected by the order dated 4-9-81. This order contains no reasons and does not even state how the respondent State Government changed its earlier view. ( 3. ) The impugned orders are characterized as illegal and unconstitutional on grounds that (i) findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were perverse, (ii) the enquiry against the petitioner was vitiated for non-supply of documents mentioned at serial Nos. 11 and 13 of Annexure P-2, (iii) while inflicting punishment, the P.S.C. appears to have taken into consideration the petitioners service record, for which no intimation was given to the petitioner; and, hence, the punishment is not based on the charges as levelled, and (iv) the order passed in review proceedings contains no reasons and is apparently influenced by the opinion of the P.S.C. and is illegal. ( 4. ) That the petitioner is a member of M. P. State Municipal Service (Executive) constituted under section 86 of the Act, and is governed by the Rules, is not denied. Chapter IX of the Rules deals with Discipline and Appeals and provides the procedure to be followed for imposing penalties. Rule 31 of these Rules prescribes penalties that may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed on a member of the service and removal form service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment, is one of the penalties. The words "for good and sufficient reasons" clearly and precisely indicate that the imposition of penalty cannot be done arbitrarily and without good and sufficient cause. These words also appear in Rule 11 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and Rule 10 of M. P. Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and must be given the same meaning. These words also appear in Rule 11 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and Rule 10 of M. P. Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and must be given the same meaning. It must, therefore, be held that penalties must be based on a charge which must be found proved in a departmental enquiry and that the finding must be based on good and sufficient reasons. Grounds on which the penalties may be imposed, are not stated in the Rules and, yet, Rule 33 requires a finding on charge or charges - indicating thereby that the penalty must be based on a properly framed charge and on proof thereof. Though the subject-matter of charge is not indicated in these Rules, it may be assumed that charges may relate to the petitioners work and conduct as a member of the service. It may, therefore, be assumed that the charge must have reasonable relation with the discharge of duties as a member of the Municipal Service. It must consequently be held that allegations must be clearly and precisely stated and proved by evidence on record. Similarly, the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer that charge has been proved against him, should be based on acceptable evidence and should be reasonable. It has to be accepted that suspicion howsoever strong, cannot be accepted as a substitute for "good and sufficient reasons" provided under these Rules. It is however true that it is for the Enquiry Officer appointed under these Rules, to appreciate evidence on record and come to his own conclusions. It is equally true that while so doing, the Enquiry Officer is not required to act as a Court of Law, nor is he required to insist on proof as in a criminal trial and, yet he has to act in accordance with principles of natural justice and reach conclusions which are supported by acceptable evidence. If these requirements have been sufficiently complied with, this court shall not re-examine and re-assess the evidence in writ proceedings. [(See : K. L. Shinde vs. State of Mysore ( AIR 1976 SC 1080 ) and Nandkishore vs. State of Bihar ( AIR 1978 SC 1277 )}. ( 5. If these requirements have been sufficiently complied with, this court shall not re-examine and re-assess the evidence in writ proceedings. [(See : K. L. Shinde vs. State of Mysore ( AIR 1976 SC 1080 ) and Nandkishore vs. State of Bihar ( AIR 1978 SC 1277 )}. ( 5. ) Though this Court, acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, is bound by the law, as aforesaid, there appears to be no such limitation on the powers of the reviewing authority under section 332 of the Act. This section vests in the State Government the power to review any order passed by itself. The power so given is apparently which in is scope and amplitude and is intended to enable the State Government to do justice in the matter. Proviso to section 332 prescribes those procedural safeguards which ensure justice - the end-result of the exercise of power. In the absence of any limitation, it must be assumed that the State Government, while exercising these powers, could re-appreciate and re-weigh the evidence on record and reach a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the Enquiry Officer. It could also substitute the punishment if the facts and circumstances of the case so warranted. The power of review under this section being statutory, is not dependent upon the opinion of the P.S.C. It is, however, not clear from the record as to how the matter was sent to the P.S.C. for obtaining their opinion at the stage of review. Indeed, neither the Act nor the Rules provide for such consultation. It, however, appears that direct recruitment and promotions to the service is done by the respondent State Government on the recommendation of a selection committee, which includes the chairman or the nominee of the P.S.C. and the list prepared by this committee forms the select list for purpose of appointment and or promotion. The State Government may have felt that consultation with the P.S.C. even while considering review application, would be in the wider interest of justice and, hence, resorted to the said procedure. As long as the State Government does not abdicate its statutory functions, there can be no objection to its obtaining opinion of the P.S.C. in the matter. Indeed, no such objection had been taken by the petitioner in the present petition. ( 6. As long as the State Government does not abdicate its statutory functions, there can be no objection to its obtaining opinion of the P.S.C. in the matter. Indeed, no such objection had been taken by the petitioner in the present petition. ( 6. ) The objection of the petitioner regarding review however appears to be that the State Government has abdicated its functions under section 332 of the Act and has simply accepted the opinion of the P.S.C. without recording its own reasons. As discussed earlier, the power under section 332 of the Act, is a wider power and is similar to power given to the Authorities under Rule 29 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. Those Rules have been considered by this Court and several other High Courts as imposing statutory obligation upon the reviewing authority to consider the entire matter in accordance with law. [Krishan Gopal Sharma vs. Union of India {1979(2) S.L.R. 839)]. It has been the consistent view that the order of reviewing authority must contain reasons and should indicate that it has itself considered the entire matter. [M. Venugopala Chetty vs. Union of India (1971 (1) S.L.R. 853), T.C. Sharma vs. Inspector General of Prisons (1977 M.P.L.J. 292) and Kishnapal Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1980 (2) S.L.R. 717)]. This appears to be in line with the current thinking in this Court that orders of statutory authorities, in order to be valid must contain reasons. ]Anil Kumar vs. Appellate Authority (1984 M.P.L.J. 508)]. In the instant case, however, these requirements remain unsatisfied. Documents placed on record by the respondent State (Annexure R-6) clearly indicate that it had felt that the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner, was harsh and excessive and needed modification. This view does not appear to be unjustified. A perusal of charges as found proved, indicates that the petitioner was found guilty of technical breaches alone. Charge No. .1 is based on the petitioners understanding of repeal and saving clause in the Act and therefore, reliance on rules framed under the repealed Act. Similarly, charges Nos. 2 and 3 are based on procedural lapses. As long as the petitioner himself was not responsible for accepting tender or issuing cheques, the charge proved could not be accepted as amounting to serious mis-demeanour. Similarly, charges Nos. 2 and 3 are based on procedural lapses. As long as the petitioner himself was not responsible for accepting tender or issuing cheques, the charge proved could not be accepted as amounting to serious mis-demeanour. The view of the State Government, therefore, that the punishment of removal was harsh and excessive, does not appear to be unjustified. It is true that the State Government was not bound by this view, and was entitled to change the same. There is, however, nothing on record to indicate how it decided to change the aforesaid proposed opinion. The order rejecting the review application (Annexure R-10) is sketchy and contains nothing whatsoever. Apparently, therefore, the complaint of the petitioner that the State Government had mechanically acted on the advice of the P.S.C. appears to be justified. This clearly indicates that the petitioners review application has not been disposed of in accordance with law. ( 7. ) The question, however, is about the relief that should be granted to the petitioner in the instant petition. The claim of the petitioner that this Court should, by issue of appropriate writ, enforce the minor penalty proposed by the respondent State does not deserve acceptance. It cannot be disputed that the jurisdiction of this Court, while exercising its power under Article - 226 of the Constitution, is hedged by several limitations and does not extend to substituting punishment or re-appreciating evidence to reach a different conclusion than the one reached by the Enquiry Officer. The powers of the reviewing authority, however, do not suffer from any such limitations. Under the circumstances, it will be just and proper not to decide the matter finally in this Court and remand the matter to the reviewing authority for considering the same in accordance with law. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the correctness of other submissions of the petitioner, which, this Court believes, will receive consideration of the reviewing authority. ( 8. ) The petition succeeds in part and is, consequently, allowed. The impugned order passed by the reviewing authority dated 4-9-1981 (Annexure P-10 and Annexure R-10), is quashed. The respondents are directed to re-consider the petitioners review application in accordance with law. No order as to costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner. Order accordingly