JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. 1. This appeal is directed against an order dated 20-8-1977 passed by the District Judge, Mirzapur, deciding issue No. 4. The issue was, 'Whether the suit is undervalued and the court fee paid is insufficient?' The learned District Judge held that the court fees paid by the plaintiffs was sufficient and the suit has been rightly valued. 2. The plaintiffs had filed a suit for two reliefs, namely, for a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to the entire property detailed in the plaint and secondly, for permanent injunction against the Administrator General, defendant No. 1 restraining him from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession over the property in suit or withdrawing money in Central Bank of India, Mirzapur and Post Office and elsewhere or in the firm standing in the name or Khata of Sri Bhairo Prasad deceased. The learned District Judge held that the court fees of Rs. 200/- paid for the aforesaid first relief and Rs. 500/- paid for the second relief was more than that was due under the U. P. Court fees Act. He held that the relief of injunction flowed directly from the right which the plaintiffs have desired to be declared and amounted to a consequential relief. The suit was, therefore, held to be covered by the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (a) of the Court Fees Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The learned District Judge, however, applied the provisions of Section 7 (iv-B) of the Act to hold that Rs. 500/- would be the maximum amount of court fees leviable for the relief of injunction, and in regard to the relief for declaratory decree the learned District Judge applied the provisions of item No. 17 (in) (d) of Schedule II of the Act and held that the proper fees would be Rs. 200/-. This appeal came up before us on the 12th September, 1984 and after hearing learned Chief Standing Counsel and the counsel for the defendant-respondents, we proceeded to dictate an order and completed it, but before signing the same certain doubts arose and we directed that the matter be listed for further hearing. The case was thereafter listed before us on 28th September, 1984 when we heard the counsel once again. We now proceed to give our reasons. 3. The case was thereafter listed before us on 28th September, 1984 when we heard the counsel once again. We now proceed to give our reasons. 3. The present appeal has been filed by the Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P. under section 6-B of the Court Fees Act. Originally, it was headed as Civil Revision, but the office reported that it should be filed as First Appeal From Order and that it would be cognizable by a Bench of two Judges. The matter thereafter came up before a Division Bench when it was admitted on 14th of December, 1977 for hearing. 4. The provision of Section 6-B of the Act empowers the Chief Inspector of Stamps to file an application in writing to the court to which an appeal lies from a decree in the suit if the order of the court passed under sub-section (3) of Section 6 is at variance with the opinion of the officer by whom the question of deficiency in court-fee has been raised. Such an application has to be made within three months from the date of the receipt of the order by the Chief Inspector of Stamps. Sub-section (2) of Section 6-B of the Act lays down that if the Court is of the opinion that proper court-fee had not been paid on the claim to which the order relates, it shall record a declaration to that effect and determine the amount of deficiency in court fee. There is a proviso to sub-section (2) which lays down that no declaration shall be made until the party liable to pay the court-fee has had an opportunity of being heard. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act requires the Court to record a finding whether the court fee paid is sufficient or not where a question of deficiency in court fee in respect of a plaint or memorandum of appeal is raised by the officer under section 24-A of the Act. In the event it is found by the court that the court fee paid is insufficient, the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, may be called upon to make good the deficiency within a time fixed by the court and in case of default reject the plaint or the memorandum of appeal. In the event it is found by the court that the court fee paid is insufficient, the plaintiff or the appellant, as the case may be, may be called upon to make good the deficiency within a time fixed by the court and in case of default reject the plaint or the memorandum of appeal. Section 6-A of the Act affords an opportunity to a person to file an appeal where he has been called upon to make good the deficiency in court fee. Where, however, the Court rules that there is no deficiency and overrules the objection of the officer, who is empowered to raise such objections, the Stamp Reporter or the Munsarim, Chief Inspector of Stamps is entitled to move the appellate court under section 6-B of the Act. 5. A question arises here whether the application made by the Chief Inspector of Stamps is an appeal or a revision. Section 6-B uses the words, "the Commissioner of Stamps may......... ... move, by an application in writing, the court to which an appeal lies from a decree in the suit or appeal in which such order has been passed for revision of such order. " The Chief Inspector of Stamps is entitled under section 6-B to move an application in writing for the revision of the order holding that the court fee paid is sufficient. Here the word 'revision' does not connote the nature of the jurisdiction that the court is to exercise but amounts to revising the order i.e. reconsidering the order passed by the court below rejecting the application of the Stamp Reporter. Although we have been referred to certain decided cases where applications filed by the Chief Inspector of Stamps were to be revised, but it was ruled that the scope of the power under section 6-B of the Act was much wider than a Civil Revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is nothing in the Court Fees Act, which lays down the extent of the power of the Court exercising revisional power under the Act. If the scope were to be limited as under section 115 of the Code, then instead of using the expression 'for revision of such order', the Statute would have mentioned revision under section 115 of the Code. If the scope were to be limited as under section 115 of the Code, then instead of using the expression 'for revision of such order', the Statute would have mentioned revision under section 115 of the Code. A perusal of Section 6-B of the Act gives an indication that the power of the Court is as wide as that of an appeal. The reason is that the appellate court is called upon to consider the order passed by the Court below and to revise it, i.e. to reconsider it both on questions of fact and law. There is nothing in Section 6-B which indicates that the exercise of the power by the appellate court is restricted in any way. If that were so, the aforesaid section would have said so. We are satisfied that whether it is an appeal or a revision, the power that the Court exercises is analogous to that of appellate power of the Court. We would, therefore, treat this to be an appeal and proceed accordingly. 6. The proviso to Section 6-B shows that an order be passed only after the party liable to pay the court fee had had an opportunity of being heard. In the present case, the plaintiffs opposite parties are respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3, Bhagwati Prasad, Sankatha Prasad and Mata Prasad. Notices of the appeal were sent to them by registered post. Respondent No. 2 was served. The notices sent to respondents nos. 1 and 3 were neither returned undelivered nor the acknowledgment-card after delivery was returned back. The Joint Registrar held that the service on respondents nos. 1 and 3 to be sufficient under Chapter VIII Rule 12 of the Rules of the Court. The appeal was admitted on 14-12-1977 and ex- parte stay order was also passed on the same day. Respondent No. 4 is the Administrator General, U. P. He is represented by Mr. V. Sahai. In spite of service on respondent no. 2 he is not represented by any counsel in this Court. In view of the order passed by the Joint Registrar deeming the service of the notice of appeal on respondents nos. 1 and 3 to be sufficient and the fact that all three of them are brothers and that one of them had been personally served, we will presume that the respondents nos. In view of the order passed by the Joint Registrar deeming the service of the notice of appeal on respondents nos. 1 and 3 to be sufficient and the fact that all three of them are brothers and that one of them had been personally served, we will presume that the respondents nos. 1 and 3 had knowledge of the appeal in this Court. Sufficient opportunity had been given to them to appear and contest the matter. None of them had appeared although one of them, i. e. respondent no. 2 was personally served. We will now proceed to decide the appeal. There is a clear finding by the learned District Judge that the computation of court fees on the plaint would be as in a suit under section 7 (iv) (a) of the Act, i.e. for a declaratory decree with consequential relief. That provision lays down as under Computation 7. The amount of fee payable under this Act in the of fees pay- suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as able in certain follows - suits. (iv) In suits- For a declara- (a) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where story decree with consequential relief other than reliefs specified in sub- consequential section (iv-A) is prayed. " relief. The first two provisos read as under : " Provided that in suits falling under clause (a), such amount shall be the value of the consequential relief and if such relief is incapable of valuation, then the value of the immovable property computed in accordance with subsection (v), (v-A) or (v-B) of this section as the case may be. Provided further, that in all suits falling under clause (a) such amount shall in no case be less than Rs. 300/- " 7. The first proviso makes it clear that when there is a suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief (other than reliefs specified in subsection (iv-A) with reference to an immovable property, such amount shall be the value of the consequential relief. Where however such relief is incapable of valuation, then it lays down the procedure for computing valuation of Immovable property in accordance of sub-section (v-A) or (v-B) cf Section 7 of the Act, as the case may be. Where however such relief is incapable of valuation, then it lays down the procedure for computing valuation of Immovable property in accordance of sub-section (v-A) or (v-B) cf Section 7 of the Act, as the case may be. It is, therefore, clear that once the court comes to the conclusion that the suit is for a declaratory decree with consequential relief then the determining factor for valuing the suit is to value the consequential relief. It is only when the consequential relief is in respect of immovable property and such relief is incapable of valuation, then only the method outlined above for computing the value of the property is to be gone into. 8. "A perusal of the plaint shows that the total amount which was sought to be the value for the purposes of jurisdiction ana court fee was Rs. 3,00,000/-. Schedule 'A' accompanying the plaint was in respect of Immovable properties as well as certain movable properties in the shape of U. P. Zamindari Abolition Bonds, National Plan Saving Certificates, Treasury Saving Deposit Certificates, Defence Certificates, Gold Bonds, Deposits in Banks besides a motor car, gun and revolver, the valuation of the movable items, namely, vinous bond, certificates and deposits in Banks amounting to Rs. 187,253/73 the car, gun and revolver have been valued at Rs. 3.400/-. Movables, therefore, were valued at approximately Rs. 190,653/73. Schedule 'B' also contains immovable properties situated outside the State. The total value of the immovable properties would be Rs. 109346.27. Since the valuation of both the reliefs have been computed at Rs. 3,00,000/- advalorem court fee was required to be paid under section 3 of the Act. The advalorem court fee in a suit valued at Rs. 3,00,000/- would be Rs. 22,907.50. The plaintiffs in this case have filed a suit on payment of court fee amounting to Rs. 700/-only. There is thus a deficiency of Rs. 22,207.50. In the present case, a perusal of the plaint shows that there are six items of immovable property in Schedule 'A' situated in Mohalla Ganeshganj, Mirzipur consisting of house properties and thereafter 39 items of movable property consisting of Bonds, Fixed Deposits and money in deposit. Items 46 and 47 are Motor- Car, gun or revolver, all of which are movable property. Items 46 and 47 are Motor- Car, gun or revolver, all of which are movable property. Schedule 'B' consists of residential houses and gardens situated outside the State of U. P. In the plaint relief for injunction viz, consequential relief with respect to properties mentioned in Schedule 'A' was prayed. The valuation of all the movable properties has been mentioned in Schedule 'A'. The valuation of the six items in Schedule 'A' is also determinable because these are urban properties, and clauses (v-A) or (v-B) of Section 7 are not at all attracted, for the subject matter is neither superior proprietary or under proprietary land nor for possessary suit between the tenants. It is, therefore, apparent that the consequential relief can be determined and valued in this case easily. The valuation of the movable properties is already contained in Schedule 'A' and the six items of immovable property can also be determined easily. Thus, there is no question of holding that the relief is incapable of valuation. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into any other provision of the Court Fees Act. 9. In our opinion, the court below has fallen into an error in proceeding to value the suit as if it is a suit for declaration and injunction separately. Once a finding is arrived at that the relief for injunction is a consequential relief, then the Court ought to have proceeded under the provisions of Sec. 7 (iv) (a) of the Act. In the present case, the court has valued the consequential relief of permanent injunction as a separate relief and applied the provisions of Section 7 (iv-B) of the Act, which was wholly uncalled for. 10. The court below has referred to a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chief Inspector of Stamps U. P. Allahabad v. Mahant Laxmi Narain, 1969 AWR 879. In our opinion, the law laid down by the Full Bench is fully applicable to the present case, but the court below has misapplied the observations made by the Full Bench in respect of another aspect of the case. We will refer to the relevant observations in this case. In paragraph 22 of the Report, their Lordships have said " Section 7 (iv) (a) applies to a suit to obtain a declaratory decree or order in which a consequential relief is prayed. We will refer to the relevant observations in this case. In paragraph 22 of the Report, their Lordships have said " Section 7 (iv) (a) applies to a suit to obtain a declaratory decree or order in which a consequential relief is prayed. The suit must principally be for a declaration and in that suit some other relief should also be claimed. The two reliefs may be asked for either as one composite relief or as two distinct reliefs. The words 'consequential relief imply that the other relief should be one which flows directly from the declaration which the plaintiff desires to be made. This means that the plaintiff should be entitled to the other relief only as a necessary consequence or result of the granting of the declaratory relief. The other relief must be so dependent on the declaratory relief that it cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused. " Here too if the principal relief viz., the declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to the entire properties detailed in the plaint is not granted, the consequential relief of permanent injunction would not stand by itself. The relief of injunction is therefore a consequential relief and the suit is covered by Sec. 7 (iv) (a) of the Act. The court below also came to this conclusion. In paragraph 23 of the Report, their Lordships observed ; "The next question, which arises for consideration, is as to the manner in which the reliefs are to be valued under sub-section (iv) (a). Sub-section (iv) (a) treats a suit for a declaratory decree or order, in which a consequential relief is prayed, as one for a single relief. It provides that the court-fee payable in such suits shall be according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. This gives the plaintiff a right to put any valuation, which he considers proper, on the combined declaratory and consequential reliefs. This right of the plaintiff is subject to two restrictions imposed by the first and the second provisos. The second proviso makes it incumbent on the plaintiff to value the relief at an amount not less than Rs. 300/-. The first proviso has already been set out earlier. It is applicable only to suits falling under sub-section (iv) (a) in which the relief sought is with reference to immovable property. The second proviso makes it incumbent on the plaintiff to value the relief at an amount not less than Rs. 300/-. The first proviso has already been set out earlier. It is applicable only to suits falling under sub-section (iv) (a) in which the relief sought is with reference to immovable property. It provides for the following three things : (i) That the plaintiff shall value the relief according to the value of the consequential relief. This means that the declaratory relief and the consequential relief have to be treated as one relief and the value of such relief has to be the value of the consequential relief. (ii) That, if the consequential relief is capable of valuation, then the plaintiff shall value the relief at an amount according to this valuation ; and (iii) that, if the consequential relief is incapable of valuation, then the plaintiff shall value the relief at an amount which is the value of the immovable property computed in accordance with sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B), as the case may be." 11. The court below has quoted this paragraph in its judgment, but it appears that it did not pause to consider what has been stated above. If it had, it would not have proceeded to quote further from the latter part of paragraph 23 beginning with the words, 'If the relief, which is prayed for as a consequential relief, is specifically provided for in the Act, then it is capable of valuation and must be valued according to the provision made in respect of it, where the relief, which is prayed for as a consequential reliefs, is the relief for injunction, it is capable of valuation under sub-section (iv-B) and must be valued according to the provisions of this sub-section ". The court below thereafter applied the provisions of Sec. 7 (iv-B) of the Act. In our opinion, the court below has fallen into an error in following what has been quoted above. The court below has thus proceeded on the basis that the reliefs on declaration and injunction are to be separately valued and has computed the court-fee payable separately. The court below thereafter applied the provisions of Sec. 7 (iv-B) of the Act. In our opinion, the court below has fallen into an error in following what has been quoted above. The court below has thus proceeded on the basis that the reliefs on declaration and injunction are to be separately valued and has computed the court-fee payable separately. Having held that the relief of injunction was a consequential relief in a suit for declaration and trearing the suit to be one under Sec. 7 (iv) (a) of the Act, and not having held that it was not capable of valuation the court below was not justified in law to value the two reliefs in the suit separately. The court below therefore fell into an error in not following what has been laid down in the Full Bench case. 12. As indicated earlier, it was laid down in the Full Bench case that if the consequential relief is capable of valuation, the plaintiff shall value the relief at an amount according to this valuation. Once the consequential relief is capable of valuation, there is no question of looking into any other provision of Court Fees Act for the purposes of valuing the relief. The case is thus covered under Sec. 7 (iv) (a) of the Act. Where a consequential relief is asked for and the relief is capable of valuation, it is not necessary to value the relief separately. We are, therefore, of the opinion that although the court below proceeded in the right direction by quoting the observations of the Full Bench upto the first part of paragraph 23, but fell into an error in quoting and following what has been laid down in the latter part of paragraph 23 of the Report. We have already indicated above that the relief for declaration and injunction as a consequential relief was capable of valuation and therefore the procedure laid down in Sec. 7 (iv) (a) of the Act was to be followed. For the reasons indicated above, we are of the opinion that the learned District Judge erred in holding that the court fee paid by the plaintiffs was sufficient. We are also of the opinion that proper court fee has not been paid on the plaint in this case. The proper court fee would have been Rs. 22,907.50. Out of this only a sum of Rs. We are also of the opinion that proper court fee has not been paid on the plaint in this case. The proper court fee would have been Rs. 22,907.50. Out of this only a sum of Rs. 700/- has been paid. Thus, the plaintiffs are liable to pay a further court fee of Rs. 22,207.50 on the plaint. We hold accordingly. 13. The appeal is consequently allowed, and it is held that the plaintiffs are liable to pay a further sum of Rs. 22,207.50 towards court fee. The learned District Judge should now grant adequate time to the plaintiffs to make good the deficiency in court fee and then proceed in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.