JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE applicants-plaintiffs feeling aggrieved by the order dated 22nd February, 1983 passed by the IV Additional District Judge, raipur in Civil Suit No. 5-A of 81 requiring them to pay deficit court-fees have approached this Court by filing the present revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 2. ) THE plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration and title of the disputed property and paid court-fees of Rs. 30 for the relief of declaration and the requisite court-fees for relief of possession. Their case, as contained in the plaint was that the land originally belonged to one Jagannath who died on 22-5-1981. Being widow and daughter of the deceased Jagannath applicants-plaintiffs claim to succeed to the aforesaid land. They alleged that jagannath was ailing since last several years and was otherwise old, infirm and illiterate person. It is alleged that the non-applicants mother acting on behalf of the applicants got a sale-deed executed regarding the suit land and house from deceased Jagannath for a sum of Rs. 32,000 after making a fraudulent representation that such a course of action was required to properly manage the property. It was further alleged that the said Shri jagannath was not paid any consideration for the aforesaid sale. Later on, when the deceased Jagannath learnt of the fraudulent activities he requested the non-applicants parents to get the sale-deed cancelled. They also alleged that the said sale was effected by fraud and misrepresentation and hence was void. The applicants did not seek any relief of cancellation of sale-deed but prayed for a declaration that it was void and ineffective. ( 3. ) THE non-applicants-defendants raised an objection that the suit was not properly valued for court-fees inasmuch as no court-fees had been paid for the relief of cancellation of sale-deed. It was also submitted that the plaint has been very cleverly worded so that though the main relief is the relief of cancellation of sale-deed it seeks only the relief of declaration. The trial Court has upheld the objection and hence the present revision. In Santoshchandra v. Smt. Gyansundarbai, 1970 MPLJ 363 . a Full Bench of this Court considered the requirement of payment of court-fees and reiterated its earlier view in Dattaji Parasharamji Patil v. Mst. Bliagirathi ILR 1939 Nag 373. The trial Court has upheld the objection and hence the present revision. In Santoshchandra v. Smt. Gyansundarbai, 1970 MPLJ 363 . a Full Bench of this Court considered the requirement of payment of court-fees and reiterated its earlier view in Dattaji Parasharamji Patil v. Mst. Bliagirathi ILR 1939 Nag 373. by clearly stating "that in a suit where the declaration prayed for, if given, involves the granting of consequential relief, such as the cancellation of the document or the avoidance of a decree, the plaintiff will be deemed to have prayed for the consequential relief and the suit will fall under section 7 (iv) (c) of the court Fees Act and will not be governed by Article I7 (iii) of Schedule II. " The law on the subject has been summarized by the Full Bench as under :-"thus, all these cases lay down the proposition that where it is necessary for a plaintiff to avoid an agreement or a decree or a liability imposed, it is necessary for him to avoid that and unless he seeks the relief of having that decree, agreement, document or liability set aside, he is not entitled to a declaration simplicitor. In such cases the question of court-fees has to be determined under section 7 (iv) (c) of the act. However, where a plaintiff is not a party to such a decree, agreement, instrument or liability, and he cannot be deemed to be a representative in interest of the person who is bound by that decree, agreement, instrument or liability, he can sue for a declaration simpliciter provided he is also in possession of the property. The matter may be different if he is not in possession of the property. In that event, the proviso to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act might be a bar to the tenability of a suit framed for the relief of declaration simpliciter. But, that would be a different aspect. All the same, if the plaintiff is not bound by that decree or agreement or liability and if he is not required to have it set aside, he can claim to pay court-fees under any of the clauses of Article 17, Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. But, that would be a different aspect. All the same, if the plaintiff is not bound by that decree or agreement or liability and if he is not required to have it set aside, he can claim to pay court-fees under any of the clauses of Article 17, Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. " Following the aforesaid law, a single Bench of this Court in Pratap Kunji v. Puniya Bai, 1976 MPLJ 627 , held "that where a person who is a party to an agreement or transaction and his allegation is that it is not binding on him because it was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, it is necessary for him to seek the consequential relief of setting aside such agreement or transaction and as such the suit falls within the purview of section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court fees Act. But the question of avoiding an agreement or an instrument arises only where it is voidable. If it is wholly void a mere declaration that it is so, is sufficient and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to seek the relief of setting aside something which has no existence in law. " This Court thus clearly stated that "it is not necessary to ask for relief of setting aside an agreement or an instrument which is wholly void. " The aforesaid view seems to have been followed uniformly by this Court as would be clear from Thumaribai v. Mankibai (1981) (1)MPWN Note 63. , Johanram v. Dasmatbai, 1982 MPWN Note 464. and Bisahin v. Mehtar 1983 MPLJ Note 31. The aforesaid view of this Court is fully supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ningwa v. Byrappa Hirekurabar AIR 1968 SC 956 . where their lordships have clarified the distinction between a contract which is voidable and remains valid until it is avoided and a contract which is void for which it is not necessary to seek any relief. It is true that this decision of the Supreme Court was not in context of court-fees but was in the context of limitation and yet its relevancy in the present context cannot be disputed. If the sale-deed is void and hence non-existent in law, it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to seek the relief of setting aside the same and hence no court-fees would be payable. If the sale-deed is void and hence non-existent in law, it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to seek the relief of setting aside the same and hence no court-fees would be payable. The facts of the present case would, therefore, require examination in the light of the aforesaid settled law. ( 4. ) A plain reading of the plaint clearly indicates that the plaintiffs have approached the Court with a case for Jagannath Sahu was an old, sick and illiterate person and taking advantage of the same, defendants mothers in collusion with their husbands, represented to late Jagannath Sahu that it was necessary to execute a document for proper management of the agriculture field and thereby got the present sale-deed executed fraudulently (para 3 (h) of the plaint ). It was also their case that no consideration at the time of execution of sale-deed was paid. Now, if late Jagannath Sahu was an old, sick and infirm person and was never told that the document being executed by him, was a sale-deed but was told that the document was required for ensuring proper management of his lands, then the fraudulent misrepresentation would be not merely as to the contents of the document but also its character. In such a case, according to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ningwas case (supra) the alleged sale-deed would be wholly void and not merely voidable. In such circumstances, it would not be necessary for the applicants to seek the relief of setting aside the sale-deed. In such a case it cannot be accepted that the consequential relief of setting aside the sale-deed is implicit in the relief of the declaration and requires ad valorem court-fees under section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. In this view of the matter it must be held that the trial Court has committed a serious illegality in interpreting the document and requiring the applicants to pay the court-fees. ( 5. ) THE revision consequently succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the trial Court is directed to proceed with the trial of the suit without requiring the applicants to pay the court-fees. Revision allowed.