JUDGMENT : S. Saghir Ahmad, J. The Petitioner was elected Pradhan of village Sarai Manik, Pargana Parshadepur, tahsil Salon, district Rae Bareli in the general election held on 28-4-1982. His election was challenged by means of an election petition u/s 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by opposite party No. 2 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Salon, district Rae Bareli. The Petitioner filed a written statement in which the allegations made by the opposite party No. 2 were denied. The election petition, of which a copy was placed before me by the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, bears 4th June, 1982 as the date on which the petition was said to have been filed. On 11-1-1983 an application was filed by opposite party No. 2 for recounting of the votes polled at the election. The Petitioner filed an application for amendment of the written statement in which he raised the plea regarding insufficiency of court fee paid on the election petition. Both these applications were disposed of by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 30-12-83. The Petitioner's application containing the proposed amendment was allowed and 4th January, 1984 was fixed as the date for hearing. The application for recounting, which was filed by the opposite party No. 1 was also allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on that date by a separate order passed on that application. This order is contained at the foot of Annexure-1, which is reproduced below: Ubhai Pakchhono ko Suna Gaya. Punah Matgarna ka Prarthana Patra Sweekar kiya jata hai. Prayog kiyagaya mat patron ko D.P.R.O. key yahasey mangayey janey ki patrawali ko wastey matgarna pesh ho. 2. It is this order of the Sub-Divisional Officer which has been challenged in the present petition in which the Petitioner has also raised the question of payment of court fee on the election petition. He has, as a consequence thereof, contended that because the court fee paid was insufficient, the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the election petition. 3. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the court fee payable on election petition has been indicated in Article 22 of Schedule II of the Court Fee Act, which is reproduced below: * * * * * * * * * 4. 3. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the court fee payable on election petition has been indicated in Article 22 of Schedule II of the Court Fee Act, which is reproduced below: * * * * * * * * * 4. He has contended that because the court fee has not been indicated in the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, the fee prescribed under the Court Fee Act would have to be paid on an election petition filed u/s 12-C of the Act. It has been held by this Court in Kali Charan v. Sub-Divisional Officer 1974 ALJ 659 that neither Schedule 11 of the Court Fee Act nor the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act or the Rules framed thereunder expressly authorise levy of court fee on an application filed u/s 12-C of the Act questioning the election of a person as Pradhan of the Gion Sabha. It has been held that the expression "any other local authority" in Article 22 of Schedule II of the Court fee Act does not include a Gaon Sabha and consequently a court fee of Rs. 1.50 on the application challenging the election of Pradhan was sufficient. I am in respectful agreement with the above decision and I am also of the view that the court fee prescribed under Article 22 of Schedule II of the Court Fee Act was not required to be paid on an election petition filed u/s 12-G of the Act, It is not disputed that a court fee of Rs. 1.50 has been paid on the application filed u/s 12-C of the Act. That being so, the court fee paid by opposite party No. 2 on the election petition was sufficient and the Sub-Divisional Officer had full jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing of the election petition. 5. It is next contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the order by which the application of opposite party No. 2 for recounting of votes was allowed cannot, in any case, be sustained as it is contrary not only to the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder but also against the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court in various decisions. 6. I have already quoted the impugned order which does not give any reason. 6. I have already quoted the impugned order which does not give any reason. The order exhibits an arbitrary exercise of power by the Sub-Divisional Officer in allowing the application for recounting of votes. The law is well settled that before an application for recounting of votes can be allowed, the person challenging the election has to make out a prima facie case supported by prima facie evidence. He has to state the material facts and the grounds on which the election was questioned. In Bhabhi Vs. Sheo Govind and Others, (1976) 1 SCC 687 , it has been laid down by the Court as under: (1) That it is important to maintain the secrecy of the ballot which is sacrosant and should not be allowed to be violated on frivolous, vague and indefinite allegations. (2) That before inspection is allowed, the allegations made against the elected candidate must be clear and specific and must be supported by adequate statement of material facts. (3) The court must be prima facie satisfied on the materials produced before the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount. (4) That the Court must come to the conclusion that in order to grant prayer for inspection it is necessary and imperative to do full justice between the parties: (5) That the discretion conferred on the Court should not be exercised in such a way so as to enable the Applicant to indulge in a roving inquiry with a view to fish materials for declaring the election to be void and (6) That on the special facts of a given case sample inspection may be ordered to lend further assurance to the prima facie satisfaction of the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount and not for the purpose of fishing out materials. 7. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision as also in a series of other decisions it is not possible to sustain the order impugned in this writ petition, which is liable to be quashed. 8. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has, however, contended that this petition itself was not maintainable as the Petitioner had an alternative remedy of approaching the District Judge by way of a revision u/s 12-C(6) of the Act. 8. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has, however, contended that this petition itself was not maintainable as the Petitioner had an alternative remedy of approaching the District Judge by way of a revision u/s 12-C(6) of the Act. The relevant portion of Section 12-C (6) is reproduced below: 12-C(6)--Any party aggrieved by an order of the Prescribed Authority upon an application under Sub-section (1) may, within 30 days from the date of the order, apply to the District Judge for revision of such order on any one or more of the following grounds. 9. Section 12-C(1) contemplates the questioning of an election petition by means of an application. It is the disposal of this application by a specific order which has been made revisable u/s 12-C(6) of the Act. The order impugned in the writ petition is an interlocutory order by which the application for recounting of votes has been allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. This order cannot be said to be an order disposing of the election petition filed u/s 12-C(1) of the Act. Consequently, the order impugned in the petition would not be covered by the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section 12-C of the Act. The Petitioner, in the circumstances cannot be said to have had an alternative remedy. 10. In view of the above the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 30-12-83 contained at the foot of Annexure-1, which was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and by which the application of opposite party No. 2 for recounting of votes was allowed, is hereby quashed. The Sub-Divisional Officer shall now proceed to dispose of the election petition expeditiously on merits. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs.