JUDGMENT K.C. Dhuliya, J.- These three writ petitions are directed against the judgments of prescribed Authority and Appellate Court III Additional District judge. Allahabad arising out in the U.P. Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (In short the Act). 2. The short question that is involved in all the cases is that as to whether earlier decisions given by the prescribed Authority holding that the respondents cannot be deemed to be unauthorised occupants as after retirement from service they continued to occupy the Government premises and thereafter the Government realised rent from them. The Prescribed Authority in all the cases came to the conclusion that they cannot be evicted under the Act and the notice issued to them under Section 4 of the Act is mis-conceived and the application for eviction of respondent was rejected. 3. The state did not file any appeal against the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority in any of the cases. 4. Thereafter fresh proceedings were started before the prescribed Authority by the State on the same ground. The prescribed Authority held that the principles of general res judicata will apply in the present case and as such the applications filed by the State were dismissed. 5. The State filed appeals before learned III Additional District judge and the learned III Additional District judge also took the same view and dismissed all the appeals of the state. 6. It is against the appellate orders as well as the orders passed by the prescribed Authority refusing to interfere in the matter on the ground that principles of general res judicata are applicable in all the case, that all these three petitions have been filed by the State Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. I have heard learned Standing Counsel, Shri Bhagwati Prasad, who has urged and made prayer for short adjournment for filing rejoinder affidavit. I cannot concede to his request since on several occasions time was allowed to the State to file rejoinder affidavit and moreover the cases relate to the city of Allahabad itself. The stop order was passed by this court on 12.4.1984 by which the Standing counsel was allowed to file rejoinder affidavit within a period of three weeks. 8. On 10.5.1984 learned Standing counsel made further prayer to grant time to file rejoinder affidavit and this court again granted two weeks' time to file rejoinder affidavit. 9. The stop order was passed by this court on 12.4.1984 by which the Standing counsel was allowed to file rejoinder affidavit within a period of three weeks. 8. On 10.5.1984 learned Standing counsel made further prayer to grant time to file rejoinder affidavit and this court again granted two weeks' time to file rejoinder affidavit. 9. These cases again were listed for hearing on 7.8.1984 before me and the learned Additional Chief Standing counsel again made a prayer for further time for filing rejoinder affidavit which was allowed by me. Thereafter these cases were passed over on 14.8.1984, 17.9.1984, 19.9.1984 for one reason or the other. 10. I have heard learned Standing counsel as well as the counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents in each of the cases. I have perused the petitions as well as the judgments of the two courts below. 11. Apart from the prayer made by the learned Standing Counsel for the necessity oi filing rejoinder affidavit, I do not feel that there is even any need for filing rejoinder affidavit inasmuch as the point involved in all these cases is a pure question of law as to whether general principles of res judicata will be applicable in the instant cases or not. 12. In writ petition No. 5404 of 1980 which is against Shri Roop Lal Sharma, the earlier order passed by the prescribed Authority is dated 22.3.1978 in which House No. 34 situate in Fakirganj, Old Katra, Allahabad was involved. In that case it was held by the prescribed Authority that after his retirement his rent in 1958 was increased by the Government Estate and thus the prescribed Authority held that Act is not applicable in his case and it will be general law for evicting him from the premises in question that will be applicable. The fresh application under the Act was moved on 19.1.79. The prescribed Authority held the view that principles of res judicata will apply. The appeal of the State was dismissed on 4.3.1980. 13. In writ petition No. 5408 of 1980 the part of House No. 34 is involved. In that case also the Prescribed Authority passed order dated 22.3.1978 and held that rent was being paid by respondent and he is not covered by the Act. Fresh proceedings were also started and the same were dismissed on applying general Principles of res judicata. In writ petition No. 5408 of 1980 the part of House No. 34 is involved. In that case also the Prescribed Authority passed order dated 22.3.1978 and held that rent was being paid by respondent and he is not covered by the Act. Fresh proceedings were also started and the same were dismissed on applying general Principles of res judicata. The appeal of the State was dismissed and hence the writ petition. 14. In writ petition No, 5409 of 1980 again the part of the House No. 34, Fakirganj, Old Katra, Allahabad was involved in which prescribed Authority passed order on 21.3.78 holding that the rent was realised from the contesting respondent and the applicability of the Act is mis-conceived in the case No. appeal was filed against that order. Fresh proceedings were started under the Act which was dismissed on the ground of applicability of general principles of res judicata. The appeal was also dismissed, hence this writ petition. 15. In all the above mentioned three petitions the same principles of general res judicata are applicable. Apart from the legal question the finding in the earlier proceedings started under the Act, the prescribed Authority has clearly stated that after retirement of the respondents the Government Estate officer regularised their tenancy as the Government was charging rent and hence there is no applicability of the Act in their case. However, it will be permissible for Government to initiate fresh proceedings for eviction under general law for that the Government is not debarred. 16. In view of the above discussion I do not find any merit in these cases and all three petitions are dismissed. Cost easy.