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1984 DIGILAW 823 (ALL)

K. Gopal v. Sushila Agarwal

1984-10-09

N.N.SHARMA

body1984
ORDER N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a tenant's revision directed against the order dated 4-7-1984 recorded by learned IX Addl. District Judge. Moradahad in Suit No. 27 of 1983. by which defence of applicant-revisionist was struck off under O. XV. R. 5 of the Civil Procedure Code Plaintiff-opposite party filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment against the revisionist. Rate of rent was alleged as Rs: 850- per month. The suit was filed on 19-7-1983. Defendant disputed the rite of 'rent in his written statement dated 2-A-198.4. He pleaded payment of rent at_the rate of Rs. 500 per month wiping out-the liability of rent up to 14-5-1985 vide receipt executed by landlady for a sum of Rs. 20.000/-. This is Annexure-IV. to the affidavit of revisionist d t. 20-8-1984. 2. Pending this suit No. 22 of 1983 in the Court of J. S. C. C. Moradahad an application paper No. 19C was moved by plaintiff to strike off the defence under 0. XV. R. 5 of the Civil Procedure Code as monthly rent had not, been paid along with compensation, etc. within a week of its accrual. 3. Defendant-revisionist filed an objection paper No. 21-C. Learned trial Judge found that the defendant was bound to deposit the monthly rent as and when it fell due irrespective of their admission about the liability. In the result the defence was struck off on 4-7-1984. 4. 1 have heard learned Advocate for the parties and perused the record. 5. On behalf of the revisionist it was argued before me that the receipt filed in defence for a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was not held as bogus by learned trial Judge.. He did not consider this plea of the tenant and ruled out his defence illegally. 6. On behalf of the opposite party counter-affidavit was filed to show that in the written-statement filed by defendant it was alleged that rent up to 14-9-1984 had been paid up. Another application for amendment of the written statement was filed on the ground that due to clerical error it could not be pleaded that rent up to 14-5-1985 had been paid up. That leave to amend the written statement has not been disposed of so far. Under such circumstances it is obvious that defendant was rightly penalised. 7. I have carefully considered over the matter. 8. That leave to amend the written statement has not been disposed of so far. Under such circumstances it is obvious that defendant was rightly penalised. 7. I have carefully considered over the matter. 8. On behalf of revisionist my attention was invited to Bimal Chand Jain v. Gopal Agarwal, reported in 1981 All Rent Cas 463 where O. XV. R. 5, Civil Procedure Code as interpreted. It was held that before Makin,, an order for striking off the defence the Court has to consider representation made by defendant in that behalf within ten days of the first hearing. It was further provided that even in the absence of representation it was open to the Court not to strike off the defence as no obligation was cast on the Court to strike off the defence. It was posited at p. 466 t of 1981 All Rent Cast : At p. 910 of All LJ) ...... This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred there is good reason for it. Now, it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event, can it he said that sub-rule 11) obliges the Court to strike off defence? We must remember that an order under sub-rule ( 1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the Court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is reserve of discretion vested in the Court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record if finds good reason for not doing so. It will always be a matter for the judgment of the Court to decide whether on the material before it. notwithstanding the absence of a representation under sub- r. (2). the defence should or should not be struck off. The word "may" in sub-r. (1) merely vests power in the Court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand (1981 All LJ 82) I supra)............ 9. The word "may" in sub-r. (1) merely vests power in the Court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand (1981 All LJ 82) I supra)............ 9. A similar view was held in Dr. Jaipal Singh Pippal v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Aligarh, reported in 1984 All Rent Cas 343. In that case defence had not been struck off by learned trial Court but was struck off by learned Ist Addl. District Judge. Aligarh. That order was set aside in the writ petition. 10. In Abdul Sattar v. Mohd. Shafi Quaraishi, reported in 1984 All Rent Cas 59. plaintiffs prayer for striking off the defence under O. XV. R. 5. C. P. C. was allowed and the defence was struck off. 11. On behalf of the respondent it was pointed out that revisionist did not deposit the rent even after institution of the suit and he did not regularly deposit the rent. He pointed out that O. XV. R. 5 Civil Procedure Code reads as below : "5. Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent. etc. (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the determination of his lease. and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease. or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof. whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, the defendant shall. at or before the first hearing of the suit. (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount. of rent. or compensation for use and occupation. admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit. deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent, or compensation for use and occupation. due to the rate admitted by him. and in the event of any default in this regard, the Court may. unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount. refuse to entertain any defence or. due to the rate admitted by him. and in the event of any default in this regard, the Court may. unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount. refuse to entertain any defence or. as the case may be. strike off his defence. (2) The provisions of this rule are in addition to and not in derogation of anything contained in Rule 10 Order XXXIX. (l;. P. Act No. 37 of 1972) for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation. the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent. per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. and in the event of any default in making. the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2). strike off his defence. Explanation 1-The expression 'first hearing' means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned. the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2-The expression 'entire amount admitted by him to be due' means the entire gross amount. where as rent or compensation for use and occupation. calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any. paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount. if any. deposited in any Court under S. 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972.". Thus he pointed out that an obligation was cast on the tenant to deposit the monthly rent 'within a week from the date of its accrual irrespective of admission of his liability. Since he did not comply with this obligation imposed on him through this provision inserted by C. P. C. (Amendment Act). Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972.". Thus he pointed out that an obligation was cast on the tenant to deposit the monthly rent 'within a week from the date of its accrual irrespective of admission of his liability. Since he did not comply with this obligation imposed on him through this provision inserted by C. P. C. (Amendment Act). 1976 S. 65 so learned trial Judge did not commit any error in striking off the defence. In this connection reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohan Lal Shah, reported in AIR 1980 SC 954 in which S. 12(3) of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. 1947. was considered and it was held by the Supreme Court that the provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with. 12. Learned advocate for the respondent also relied upon Uma Kant Mukerji v. II Addl. District Judge, Varanasi, reported in 1983 All Rent Cas 547 . It appears that all these authorities were considered in Abdul Sattar v. Mohd. Shafi Quaraishi, reported in 1984 All Rent Cas 59 (supra). 13. I respectfully agree with the aforesaid view taken by Hon'ble B. N. Sapru. J. 14. A similar question came up for consideration in Prem Narain Pathak v . Ist Addl. District Judge. Shahjahanpur, reported in 1983 All W C 876 . In that case there was a dispute about the adjustment of Rs. 145/-deposited on 15-12-1977 by tenant. It was observed at p. 877 (at All WC) : (At p. 362 All LJ) : ......Assuming that in absence of order dated 4th October. 1978 the deposit of Rs. 135/- could not be taken as payment to landlord on the date when defence was struck off. The amount. however. was in deposit with Court. Anxiety. should be to decide after hearing in accordance with law. If the petitioner had deposited Rs. 130/- and that was over and above the arrears it should have been adjusted towards current rent as landlord could be interested in the amount which was due against petitioner and that is the legislature's intention culled out from Order XV. Anxiety. should be to decide after hearing in accordance with law. If the petitioner had deposited Rs. 130/- and that was over and above the arrears it should have been adjusted towards current rent as landlord could be interested in the amount which was due against petitioner and that is the legislature's intention culled out from Order XV. The Legislature never intended this penal provision to be utilised harshly to scuttle the defence of the tenant on one or.the other technicality." It must be held that sub-rule (2) of O. XV R. 5 Civil Procedure Code mandates the Court before making an order for striking vii the defence to consider the representation made by the defendant in that behalf. No distinction is made about two positions of 0. X V. R. 5(1). Civil Procedure Code In the instant case learned trial Judge did not go into the matter at all. He did not record a finding that the receipt relied upon by the defendant was spurious. The defence was struck off even prior to 149-1984. Under such circumstances I find that the defendant has been penalised in the instant case and the impugned order is assailable. 15. In the result revision is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the court below with the directions to admit the written statement of the defendant and thereafter to afford opportunity to the parties to adduce such evidence in support of their rival contentions as they are minded. Thus the suit shall be disposed of expeditiously in accordance with law. The record. if already received. shall be sent back to the court below forthwith. Interim stay order dated 23-8-1984 is vacated. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs of these proceedings in this Court.