R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) IN both these connected matters the petitioner and contesting respondent are same and both have been ordered to be heard together. The petitioner in both the matters is original plaintiff-landlord and the respondent is original defendant-tenant of agricultural suit land. ( 2 ) IN a proceeding under Section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) an order was passed by the Mamlatdar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal on 23rd August 1962 that the tenants Haribhai Bhikhabhai and his son Somabhai Haribhai were not willing to purchase the land held by them as tenants. It is submitted that notice was issued only to Haribhai as tenant and Somabhai was merely examined as a witness. Under Section 32-G not only the tenants and landlords but also all other persons interested in the land are entitled to appear before the tribunal. It appears that the tribunal recorded statements of the tenants that they were not willing to purchase the land and therefore the purchase had become ineffective. The order is at Annexure `a to the petition. The order observes that the petitioner stated that the land was taken back from Haribhai about seven years back and the suit land was being cultivated by Somabhai Haribhai on rent and he used to pay the rent in cash and a tobacco licence was also taken in the name of Somabhai. Somabhai also stated that he was cultivating the land and the licence was taken in his name. It is also observed that the petitioner landlord had stated that the rent was paid in cash whereas Somabhai stated that he was working free. From the deposition the tribunal held that the suit land was being cultivated by the father and the son as tenants and since they were not willing to purchase the land purchase was declared ineffective. ( 3 ) IN pursuance of the above order it appears that further proceedings were taken under Section 32 The suit land was required to be disposed of by the Collector. Section 32-P (when the order was passed on 8-5-1963) provided that where the purchase of any land by tenant under Section 32 becomes ineffective under Section 32-G land is required to be disposed of by the Collector after holding an enquiry and directing its disposal. Section 32-P (when the order was passed on 8-5-1963) provided that where the purchase of any land by tenant under Section 32 becomes ineffective under Section 32-G land is required to be disposed of by the Collector after holding an enquiry and directing its disposal. Sub-section 2 provided that such direction shall provide that the tenancy in respect of the land shall be terminated and the tenant be summarily evicted and that the land shall be surrendered to the landlord subject to the provisions of Section 50 From the order which is produced at pages 22 to 24 of the paper book it appears that the notice was issued to Haribhai Bhikhabhai and in his absence ex-parte order was passed. The order states that the tenant had returned the land to the landlord 5 to 7 years back and therefore he had refused to purchase the land and that since the land is already returned to the landlord the right of the tenant is extinguished and therefore there was no question of yield to him from the land. It was further observed that the landlord himself was cultivating land and since the landlord was personally cultivating the land his prayer for disposal of the land in his favour was considered reasonable and he was held entitled to the suit land. The additional Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal ordered that the tenancy of the tenant was terminated and the land was ordered to be given to the landlord for personal cultivation. ( 4 ) SOMABHAI was held to be a tenant in the earlier order and who was admittedly cultivating the land was not issued any notice and was not heard while passing the above order. According to Somabhai he continued in possession and continued to cultivate the land and also continued to be 1/2 sharer of the plaintiff landlord. ( 5 ) IN view of the fact that illiterate and ignorant mass of agricultural tenants have not been able to get the land they till there have been subsequent legislative amendments in order to effect the purpose of benevolent land reform legislation of giving land to the tiller. ( 5 ) IN view of the fact that illiterate and ignorant mass of agricultural tenants have not been able to get the land they till there have been subsequent legislative amendments in order to effect the purpose of benevolent land reform legislation of giving land to the tiller. One such amendment is Section 32-PP which gave further opportunity to the tenant to purchase the land in respect of which he had already declared his unwillingness to purchase the land and an order to that effect had already been passed under Section 32 and further order under Section 32-P had also been passed. Section 32-PP provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 32-G and 32-P where any land has been disposed of by the Collector under Section 32-P on account of the purchase of land by the tenant thereof having become ineffective under sub-section (3) of Section 32-G by reason of the tenant failing to appear before the Tribunal or making a statement expressing his unwillingness to purchase the land and land so at the disposal of the Collector has not been disposed of in the manner provided in sub-section (2) of Section 32-P the tenant is given further opportunity for a declaration that the purchase had not become ineffective. The date for making an application by the tenant under this provision has been repeatedly extended from time to time in view of the fact that the tenants being illiterate have not been able to take the advantage of benevolent legislation enacted for their benefit. The tenant Somabhai made such an application on 12-8-1977 within the extended period under Section 32-PP and contended that he has been in possession of the land and has been cultivating the same and he was willing to purchase the land and the landlord had never taken possession of the suit land and has rot cultivated the suit land and he does not have any agricultural implements and he has been doing the business of selling batteries. It was also stated that the tenant Somabhai had taken the crop of tobacco flower and had taken irrigation water and produced tobacco licence and bills for sale of flower. The tenant Somabhai also stated that his statement was taken in 32-G proceeding wherein he had stated what he was asked to say by the petitioner-landlord. It was also stated that the tenant Somabhai had taken the crop of tobacco flower and had taken irrigation water and produced tobacco licence and bills for sale of flower. The tenant Somabhai also stated that his statement was taken in 32-G proceeding wherein he had stated what he was asked to say by the petitioner-landlord. Since the landlord told him to say so and he believed that if he did not say so the landlord would take away land from him he gave his evidence to such effect. He was supported by his witnesses Navnitbhai Shanker Patel Chhotabhai Fulabhai and Kanu Mangalbhai. Witness Navnitbhai stated that the land was under cultivation by Somabhai and he had taken crops of tobacco and bajri and he has never seen the petitioner landlord cultivating the land. Witness Chhotabhai is the village watchman and he has also stated that the tenant Somabhai has been cultivating the suit land since several years and the land-lord who was present in the court was never seen on the suit land. Witness Kanubhai also corroborated that tenant Somabhai and formerly his father were cultivating the land. ( 6 ) AS against that the landlord examined himself and stated that his own business was of `dealer in watches and his son was also doing the same business. He admitted that he does not keep any agricultural implements. But he stated that his nephew was cultivating the suit land since 8 to 10 years and prior to that his grand-father was cultivating the land. This story of the nephew cultivating the land came out for the first time in his deposition. He had never stated in earlier proceedings that the nephew was cultivating the land. It is not even suggested to any of the witnesses examined on behalf of the tenant that the nephew of the landlord was cultivating the land. Even the nephew is not examined to prove that. The landlord even failed to reply as to whom the produce from the lands were sold. He also admitted that the order under Section 32-G had become final and he had not preferred any appeal against the same. Even the nephew is not examined to prove that. The landlord even failed to reply as to whom the produce from the lands were sold. He also admitted that the order under Section 32-G had become final and he had not preferred any appeal against the same. On the above oral evidence coupled with the documentary evidence of tobacco licence and bills of the goods sold the tribunal found as a matter of fact that the suit land continued to be in possession of the tenant Somabhai and the petitioner landlord had not taken actual possession of the suit land. The tribunal also held that the story of the nephew cultivating the land was got up. The tribunal also held that in the earlier proceedings under Section 32-G Somabhai was held to be a tenant and deemed purchaser and he had expressed his unwillingness to purchase the land and therefore the purchase had become ineffective. ( 7 ) THE petitioner-landlord contended that the order under Section 32-G was a nullity because on the tillers day the tenant was not in possession. Section 32 provides that on the tillers day (1-4-1957) every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from his land-lord the land and under Section 32-G the Tribunal was required to ascertain the willingness of the tenant to purchase the land and if he was unwilling to declare the purchase ineffective. The landlord in the present case says that the tenant was cultivating the land and the tenant was not willing to purchase the land and therefore the tribunal was invited by the landlord him-self to declare the deemed purchase by this tenant to be ineffective and in fact he had obtained such orders. That order as become final the same having not been appealed against. The tribunal held that the tenant Somabhai was the tenant of the suit land and because of his unwillingness the purchase had become ineffective and there-after the landlord had obtained order under Section 32-P for disposal of the land in his favour for personal cultivation without issuing any notice to the tenant Somabhai. The tribunal came to the conclusion that in pursuance of such order under Section 32-P (2) the landlord had not taken the actual possession of the suit land from the tenant. The tribunal came to the conclusion that in pursuance of such order under Section 32-P (2) the landlord had not taken the actual possession of the suit land from the tenant. Therefore finally it is clear that the tenant Somabhai was tenant of the suit land from the beginning and was continuing in actual possession and cultivation of the suit land and there-fore his request for declaring that the purchase had not become ineffective was granted and it was ordered to fix the purchase price under the provisions of Section 32-G (4 ). ( 8 ) AGAINST the above order of the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal dated 23-2-1979 (Annexure-B to the petition) the petitioner preferred tenancy appeal to the Deputy Collector and contended that in the earlier proceeding the purchase had become ineffective and the land was disposed of in his favour and he continued in possession of the suit land and there-fore under Section 32-PP the application was not maintainable. The appellate court dismissed the appeal by judgment and order dated 21st May 81 Annexure `c holding that Somabhai is the tenant and has been in possession and cultivation of the land. The appellate court also held that even though an order under Section 32-P (2) was passed the said order was never implemented and in pursuance of the said order the landlord has never taken actual possession of the land and the tenant was all throughout in possession of the land. While coming to the conclusion as to the possession by tenant Somabhai the Court also relied upon documentary evidence such as tobacco licence bills and receipts etc. and also relied upon the fact that there was no evidence of possession by the landlord. As a result the appellate court held that tenant Somabhai was entitled to exercise the further opportunity provided by Section 32-PP and was entitled to purchase the land and to have the purchase price fixed. There-fore the appeal was dismissed by order dated 21st May 1981 Annexure `c to the petition. As a result the appellate court held that tenant Somabhai was entitled to exercise the further opportunity provided by Section 32-PP and was entitled to purchase the land and to have the purchase price fixed. There-fore the appeal was dismissed by order dated 21st May 1981 Annexure `c to the petition. ( 9 ) IN spite of the above orders and findings that the tenant Somabhai was in possession of the suit land the petitioner landlord filed a Civil Suit No. 336/82 on 23-8-1982 for a declaration and permanent injunction that the petitioner-landlord was in possession of the suit land and that the defendant Somabhai threatened dispossession and therefore the suit was filed alongwith an application for interim injunction during the pendency of the suit. The learned Trial Judge granted ex-parte ad-interim injunction on 16 and confirmed the same on 22-8-1982. The tenant Somabhai preferred C. M. A. 94/ 82 against the order of interim injunction and the learned Extra Assistant Judge allowed the appeal and vacated the injunction. While doing so the learned Assistant Judge relied on the orders and findings of the tenancy aurities and other evidence and dismissed the injunction application Exhibit 5. This judgment and order is dated 11 Against the said judgment the petitioner landlord has preferred Civil Revision Application No. 2033/82. ( 10 ) AGAINST the order of the Deputy Collector in tenancy appeal the land-lord had preferred a revision application to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has dismissed the revision application by judgment and order dated 15-6-1983 Annexure `d. Against that order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in tenancy proceedings Special Civil Application No. 3952/83 is preferred by the landlord. ( 11 ) IN the judgment of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal it is observed in para 4 as follows :"shri A. J. Patel on behalf of the applicant has not challenged the concurrent findings of fact by the lower court to the effect that the present opponent is in possession of the suit land as a tenant". ( 11 ) IN the judgment of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal it is observed in para 4 as follows :"shri A. J. Patel on behalf of the applicant has not challenged the concurrent findings of fact by the lower court to the effect that the present opponent is in possession of the suit land as a tenant". ( 12 ) IN para 5 also it is observed that : In this case there is a concurrent finding of fact which is not challenged at this revisional stage to the effect that the present opponent i. e. tenant has not been dispossessed of the suit land in spite of the order of the Mamlatdar under unamended Section 32 (i) (ii) of the Act. ( 13 ) IN the petition in ground No. (xiii) it is contended that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal has committed an error apparent on the face of record in holding against the petitioner merely because he did not choose to dispossess the respondent No. 1 of the said lands. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner-landlord has contended that the application under Section 32-PP by the respondent Somabhai is not maintainable at all because under Section 32-G the tribunal was required only to deal with the tenancy of his father Haribhai to whom the notice was issued and therefore the question of tenancy of Somabhai and to have his willingness or otherwise ascertained and decided under Section 32-G did not arise and therefore the order u/s 32-G was a nullity and hence the application under Section 32-P (2) was not maintainable. It was also contended that the order of disposal of the land in favour of the Landlord under Section 32-P was also qua Haribhai and the respondent Somabhai was not at all concerned with that. Secondly it was contended that the land was not at the disposal of the Collector the same having been already disposed of by order in 1963 and therefore the application under Section 32 in 1977 was incompetent. Secondly it was contended that the land was not at the disposal of the Collector the same having been already disposed of by order in 1963 and therefore the application under Section 32 in 1977 was incompetent. Thirdly it was contended that the order of the agricultural lands tribunal holding Somabhai a tenant was without jurisdiction on the ground that that jurisdiction vests exclusively in the Mamlatdar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy and for that purpose the reliance was placed on the Division Bench Judgment in the case of Bhikhabhai Jethabhai v. J. B. Vyas reported in 1963 (4) GLR 873. ( 15 ) THE first contention is based on misconception of the nature of proceedings under Section 32-G. The contention proceeds on an assumption that the tribunal is to decide only the question between the landlord and the tenant to whom the notices have been issued. But in an enquiry u/s 32 not only the landlord and the tenant but all interested persons are entitled to be heard because the Section requires that the tribunal shall issue a public notice calling upon all tenants and all landlords and all other persons interested. Somabhai was before the tribunal. In fact it is clear that the landlord wanted Somabhai also to declare his unwillingness to purchase the land. Admittedly Somabhai was cultivating the land and in fact the tobacco licence was also issued in his favour. Therefore it was absolutely necessary to decide about him and therefore the landlord got a declaration from him that he was not willing to purchase the land. He had interest in the land and in fact the tribunal had accepted his interest and held him to be a tenant and took a declaration from him that he was not willing to purchase the land and acting on such declaration the tribunal had declared that the purchase had become ineffective. Therefore the ground that no notice was issued to Somabhai as a tenant does not deprive the tribunal of the jurisdiction to hear other persons interested and to deal with the matter in accordance with law. ( 16 ) THERE was no lack of jurisdiction. In fact the requirement of a public notice shows the nature of the proceeding. Therefore the ground that no notice was issued to Somabhai as a tenant does not deprive the tribunal of the jurisdiction to hear other persons interested and to deal with the matter in accordance with law. ( 16 ) THERE was no lack of jurisdiction. In fact the requirement of a public notice shows the nature of the proceeding. If the landlord had any legitimate ground for being aggrieved with that order he ought to have preferred appeal against the same and the person claiming tenancy right would have been heard and the appellate court would have decided the question in accordance with law. However the land-lord did not choose to prefer any appeal against the order holding Somabhai also as a tenant. That order binds the landlord because he is a party to that proceeding and since the tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 32-G the order cannot be said to be nullity in any sense. It cannot be said that the purchase was not declared ineffective. The tribunal did hold Somabhai also a tenant and record his unwillingness to purchase and make a declaration to that effect in favour of the landlord. ( 17 ) THE landlord acting upon that order that the purchase of the suit land had become ineffective obtained an order under Section 32-P (2) without any notice to Somabhai and only by a notice to Haribhai who did not appear and the landlord obtained an ex-parte order. The ex-parte order is also based on the version given by the petitioner landlord that the tenant had already abandoned the land and surrendered actual possession to the landlord and further version of the landlord that he himself was personally cultivating the land. Since Somabhai was not a party to this order that order does not bind him and can-not operate against him and cannot adversely affect him. Even at the time when the earlier order was passed declaring the purchase ineffective Haribhai had stated that he was not cultivating the land since 5 to 6 years. Therefore when an order was sought under Section 32-P (2) Haribhai had no interest in the matter and the real person interested was Somabhai who was admittedly cultivating the land at the time when the earlier order under Section 32 was passed declaring the purchase ineffective. Therefore when an order was sought under Section 32-P (2) Haribhai had no interest in the matter and the real person interested was Somabhai who was admittedly cultivating the land at the time when the earlier order under Section 32 was passed declaring the purchase ineffective. Yet without any notice to Somabhai (who was in actual possession and cultivation of the land) the landlord obtained that order of disposal of the land in his favour on the basis that the landlord was already in possession of the land even though he was not. Since there is no disposal of the land under Section 32-P (2) and since actual possession has continued with Somabhai and since Somabhai was not a party to the proceeding under Section 32-P (2) this is a quite clear case where the land continues to be at the disposal of the Collector and it cannot be said that it has been disposed of under Section 32-P (2 ). ( 18 ) MOROVER the retrospective amendment of law and the explanation added in Section 32-PP makes the situation abundantly clear and free from any doubt. The explanation reads as follows :"notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment decree or order of any court tribunal or other authority for the purpose of clause (ii) of sub-section (1) the land shall not be deemed to have been disposed of till the person entitled to take possession of the land in pursuance of any direction issued under sub-section (2) of Section 32-P takes actual possession of such land in accordance with law". ( 19 ) THUS in spite of the order u/s 32-P (2) disposing of the land in favour of the landlord the land is deemed not to have been disposed of till the landlord takes actual possession of such land in accordance with law. In the present case the landlord has neither taken the actual possession nor in accordance with law. The actual possession all throughout continued with Somabhai. Therefore Somabhais tenancy was required to be terminated under Section 32-P (2) (A) and he was required to he evicted and there-after the land could have been surrendered to the landlord by appropriate proceedings. But in the present case no order was passed against Somabhai and therefore nothing was done in accordance with law so far as tenant Somabhai is concerned. However actual possession was never taken by the landlord. But in the present case no order was passed against Somabhai and therefore nothing was done in accordance with law so far as tenant Somabhai is concerned. However actual possession was never taken by the landlord. Therefore the land is deemed not to have been disposed of and the application under Section 32-PP was maintainable. Therefore the second contention also fails. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner strongly relied on the Division Bench Judgment in case of Bhikhabhai Jethabhai v. Vyas (Supra) and contended that the order of the ALT passed under Section 32-G in 1962 holding the respondent Somabhai as a tenant was wholly without jurisdiction because ALT had no power to decide such question and if such a question was to arise under Section 32-G it must be decided by Mamlatdar under Section 70 (a) of the Act. On the basis of this judgment the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the order under Section 32-G was without jurisdiction and nullity application u/s 32-PP is not maintainable. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the ALT was subsequently vested with the jurisdiction and the powers of Mamlatdar some-time in 1968. However that does not seem to be correct. The Supreme Court in the case of Kuberbhai Dahyabhai v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Others 1967 S. C. Notes 68 (full report which is published in the printed judgments of the Supreme Court-Civil Appeal No. 365166 decided on 7 held that : It is true that under Section 70 of the Act jurisdiction to determine whether a person is a tenant or a protracted tenant is conferred upon the Mamlatdar and that provision by implication excludes the jurisdiction of other authorities to make an enquiry for the purpose of Act into that question. But the State of Gujarat has by notification dated 9-7-1960 directed the officers designated to perform duties of the agricultural lands tribunal under Section 67 of the Act with power to perform the functions of a Mamlatdar under the Act within the areas for which they have jurisdiction. The order of the agricultural lands tribunal is not therefore open to question on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. . The order of the agricultural lands tribunal is not therefore open to question on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. . ( 21 ) THE Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of Diwan J. as he then was in Special C. A. No. 1093 decided on 26th February 1964 The learned Judge referred to the Case of Bhikhabhai (Supra) and pointed out that Bhikhabhais Case arose out of the proceedings and the decision of the ALT was given on March 8 1960 and after the decision on July 9 1960 the Government of Gujarat had issued a notification published in `gujarat Government Gazette Part IV-B dated August 1 1960 at page 66 to the effect that each officer appointed under Section 67 of the Act as the tribunal in the area of the State shall perform the duties of Mamlatdar under the said Act within that area. Therefore as a result of that notification all officers appointed as ALT under Section 67 also became Mamlatdar under the Act in all respects. The ALT besides discharging his own function would also discharge the duties and functions of Mamlatdar. The separation of functions was the basis of the decision in Bhikhabhais Case and by operation of subsequent notification the ALT also became Mamlatdar and for all practical purposes it could decide these questions which were left for the determination of the Mamlatdar also. As pointed out earlier this view has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in the Case of Kuberbhai (Supra ). Therefore the contention that the decision under Section 32-G holding Somabhai as a tenant is without jurisdiction is without any substance and foundation. This question was not raised before any of the courts below and it was raised for the first time during the course of arguments. It is not even raised in the petition. However I allow this question to be raised on the ground that it was purely a question of law and jurisdiction and going to the root of the matter. In fact I might have allowed the petition on that question. But on the next day of hearing I came across the Supreme Court judgment in the Case of Kuberbhai and the reference to a subsequent notification. In fact I might have allowed the petition on that question. But on the next day of hearing I came across the Supreme Court judgment in the Case of Kuberbhai and the reference to a subsequent notification. The petitioner had not made any averment that the ALT has no jurisdiction to exercise the powers of Mamlatdar and the factual basis and the premises on which the judgment in 4 GLR 873 is based was lacking. Before the hearing was over this judgment was pointed out to the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the confusion was clear. ( 22 ) THUS all the contentions raised by the petitioner landlord fail and the Special CA. No. 3952 fails and the rule is discharged with costs. Interim relief vacated. ( 23 ) IN Civil Revision Application No. 2033/82 the landlord claims an interim injunction restraining the opponent defendant from interfering with the possession of the suit land by the land-lord. The lower appellate court has vacated such injunction holding that the petitioner was not in possession on the date of the suit. The learned appellate Judge has relied on the findings and orders of the tenancy courts and the evidence in the trial court. In view of the concurrent findings by all the courts regarding facts and especially in view of the clear evidence the learned Counsel for the landlord has fairly admitted that the landlord had not challenged the concurrent findings of facts by the lower courts to the effect that the present opponent is in possession of the suit land. Even the learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that if the Special C. A. was to be dismissed C. R. A. does not survive end has to be dismissed. Even otherwise irrespective of the result of the Special C. A. also the petitioner landlord will not be entitled to any interim injunction as to possession because he was not in possession of the suit land on the date of the suit. Since he was not in possession on the date of the suit and since the respondent tenant is found to be in possession of the suit land on the date of the suit the interim injunction in favour of the landlord cannot be issued under any circumstances in the facts of this case. In the result the revision application also fails and rule is discharged with costs throughout. In the result the revision application also fails and rule is discharged with costs throughout. Interim relief is vacated. By virtue of the interim injunction obtained in the suit and continued the respondent tenant has been restrained from entering into the suit land and therefore when the interim relief is vacated the petitioner landlord who has entered into the possession under such interim order is required to be directed to return the possession of the suit land to the respondent Somabhai. It is therefore directed that the petitioner shall hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the suit land to the respondent Somabhai forthwith so as to restore the possession existing on the date of the suit before passing of the interim order. ( 24 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the operation of this judgment and order may be stayed for a period of four weeks in order to enable the petitioner landlord to take further proceedings in the Supreme Court. These orders shall be stayed for a period of four weeks from today. Rule discharged in both the matters. Rule discharged. .