JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member- This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a case u/s 176 of the UPZA and LR Act which was dismissed by the learned trial court on 8.6.1971 holding that the ancestors of the parties had a family settlement so that holding of Navinagar went exclusively to the defendants 1 to 6 descendants of Hira Lal and the holding of Anjani went to the plaintiffs being descendants of Uddhomal. The learned Additional Commissioner Meerut Division, Meerut has concurred vide judgment dated 23.10.1972. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. During the pendency of this appeal two substitution applications were filed, one on 13.3.74 for substitution of heirs of the respondent number 5 deceased and the other on 13.1.1983 for the substitution of heirs of the respondent number 2 deceased with prayer to condone the delay and set aside abatement. In the latter case, the respondent number 2 died in a Delhi Colony and the appellant claimed knowledge on 9.1.1983, There is no objection. Therefore, the two applications for substitution are allowed, condoning delay in latter case. There is another application dated 9.2.1973 filed with the second appeal for allowing impleadment of four sons of Raghubar Dayal deceased as respondents which is allowed. 4. The plaintiff's case is that they along with the defendants 1 to 6 or their ancestors have been recorded co-tenure holders and the share of the plaintiffs being descendants of Uddhomal is half. The defendants case is that Lachhmandas common ancestor had land in two villages Navi Nagar and Anjani, Lachhmandas had two sons Hira Lal and Udhomal, plaintiffs are descendants of Udhomal and the defendants are the descendants of Hira Lal and that there was a family settlement by which the land in Anjani was given to Uddhomal's branch and the land of Navinagar went to Hira Lal's branch. In the alternative the defendants claimed exclusive right by adverse possession but this question was not examined as the courts below accepted the family settlement and dismissed the suit. 5. In the alternative the defendants claimed exclusive right by adverse possession but this question was not examined as the courts below accepted the family settlement and dismissed the suit. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that there was no family settlement at all, though an oral family settlement can be possible, but in this case there is neither any document or memorandum of family settlement nor there is any evidence of such settlement, that no family settlement was acted upon as the entries in records were not changed or corrected that there is no evidence nor any particulars of land of Anjani village which the family settlement is supposed to cover, that the sole witness DW-1 Raghubar Dyal deposed about family settlement, without corroboration from other witnesses, that other witnesses depose about possession only, that the burden to prove family settlement lay on the defendants but no particulars as to year, land members to the family settlement have been proved, that the courts below have relied on circumstances like house of Navinagar sold by the plaintiffs, receipts of rent from 1305 to 1336 F with the defendants, plaintiffs residence in Anjani village and holding of Anjani village in name of the plaintiffs only as proof of family settlement, that the inferences drawn by the courts below cannot be drawn by a reasonable person on the evidence on record, that there is no evidence of any dispute necessitating family settlement, that in spite of allegation that the plaintiffs tried to take possession 12 years back no action was taken by the defendants, that in cases of family settlement u/s 49 of the UP Tenancy Act or u/s 37 of the Agra Tenancy Act the consent of zamindar was needed which has not been established, that the defendants 4 to 6 have admitted the shares according to pedigree and that a suit no. 91 u/s 229-B of the UPZA and LR Act by Raghubar Dayal (defendant number 1 in this case) was dismissed in default on 9.9.1969 and will operate as res judicata against his claim. 6. 91 u/s 229-B of the UPZA and LR Act by Raghubar Dayal (defendant number 1 in this case) was dismissed in default on 9.9.1969 and will operate as res judicata against his claim. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that no written partition is needed and an oral family settlement is acceptable that Khatauni 1296 F of Anjani village shows the name of Lachhmandas, that the consent of zamindar can be implied by acquisence in support cited ruling reported in 1955 RD 39, that the settlement was acted upon by separate possession and management on spot and that the land of Anjani is exclusively claimed by the plaintiffs which also support the family settlement. 7. On considering these various aspects in depth I find that the peculiar feature in this case is that the family settlement has been deemed proved by circumstances. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the fact of the family settlement has been based on no evidence. It is true that no precise period or year is available or is established when this family settlement was arrived at. No parties to this settlement are mentioned. It is generally said that it covers the holding in village Navinagar and Anjani but while the holding of Navinagar is described in the plaint, the holding of Anjani was not been described either in the written statement by the defendants 1 to 3 or by others or even in the evidence. 8. The main question in this appeal is whether a family settlement can be inferred from circumstances much after the family settlement, even in the absence of essential particulars of a family settlement viz. parties to the settlement, the holdings included in the settlement and the period when it was entered. The learned trial court or even the learned Additional Commissioner have not considered any evidence showing common ancestors entered on the holding i-Anjani village, in fact no details of such holdings have been discussed. parties to the settlement, the holdings included in the settlement and the period when it was entered. The learned trial court or even the learned Additional Commissioner have not considered any evidence showing common ancestors entered on the holding i-Anjani village, in fact no details of such holdings have been discussed. When full holding of one village goes to one party by a family settlement, it is necessary to find what other holding of any other village went to other party, if it was not shown it would no longer be a family settlement but only a surrender of rights by one branch as has been pleaded by the defendants about the descendants of Banshidhar who went to another village surrendering their rights in favour of the defendants 1 to 6. Since in this case, about the holding of Navinagar no surrender of rights is pleaded, a family settlement as pleaded had to be established and it is another subsidiary question if the defendants discharged their burden. 9. The family settlement, although it can be oral as held in AIR 1976 SC 807 , has to be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family. A family settlement is not a situation or a continuing condition but a fact, rather an act by which disputes are resolved and the property is finally settled. To such an act, there are participants who at a point of time which cannot remain vague or diffused into decades, settle the property which also must be defined and not left vague otherwise the settlement would not be final. One cannot say that a family settlement took shape by evolution in several decades which appears to be all the case established by the defendants in this case. To prove a family settlement, the evidence has to establish who were the actual participants even though they might have abided by the decision of the head of family. Again the evidence has to show when this act of family settlement was performed. At least some ides of the specific year had to be ascertainable from evidence. All the property settled had to be shown included in the settlement and spelt out, besides the principle of fair and equitable division being reflected from the settlement. Again the evidence has to show when this act of family settlement was performed. At least some ides of the specific year had to be ascertainable from evidence. All the property settled had to be shown included in the settlement and spelt out, besides the principle of fair and equitable division being reflected from the settlement. Nothing of all this is there in this case and I am constrained to observe that the courts below have found this vague settlement on almost no evidence. 10. The inference of a family settlement could not be drawn on the evidence on record and I find it a fit case to reconsider the finding of fact, relying on the ruling reported in AIR 1973 SC 997 . The court below have also taken for granted that all the defendants opposed the plaintiffs claim while in fact the defendants 4 to 6 have admitted the plaintiff's claim while in fact the defendants 4 to 6 have admitted the plaintiff's claim and only asserted that in view of the branch of Banshidhar surrendering its rights in favour of the branch of Basudeo, the defendants 4 to 6 would have ? share together. This misreading of pleading also requires going into the finding of fact again in this second appeal. 11. The entries of 1296 F and 1324 F show both branches, of Hira Lal and Udhomal entered in equal shares in the holding of Navinagar. These entries have continued in 1375 F also, the defendants have failed to point out in which generation the family settlement was arrived at. Rather, the evidence relates to possession and management only which is generally done for convenience of management. All the factors as circumstances considered by the two courts below are also applicable in the case of practical arrangements for convenience of management of cultivation but such arrangement is not equivalent to division of holding. In practical arrangements the title remains joint and so it is not necessary to consider a fair and equitable division but when making the family settlement it becomes necessary and whenever such consideration is done, that is the precise period of settlement. The members have to apply their mind for an equitable division of title on holding, it must be done in one or more sittings, such family settlement is man-made, it cannot be automatic which can be possible with practical cultivatory arrangement. The members have to apply their mind for an equitable division of title on holding, it must be done in one or more sittings, such family settlement is man-made, it cannot be automatic which can be possible with practical cultivatory arrangement. This important and must be fully understood so as not to confuse one for the other as has been done in the instant case. 12. For this very reason of diffusive nature of the alleged family arrangement, the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in AIR 1966 Orissa 228 will not be applicable to present case. The ruling deals with a case where settlement was through arbitration award acted upon schedules Ka and Kha allotted to Sulla and the defendant, continuing in their respective possessions after the award, while in the instant case nothing is specific. The courts below have discussed evidence to give a finding of family settlement but have actually found only a continuity of a settled state with regard to parties and management of cultivation; this in my considered view does not prove a family settlement, which as clarified above, is an act and not a situation. I am thus convinced that the evidence on record did not lead to the conclusion that a family settlement had been arrived at any time in this family and that a division of holding already in accordance with such settlement existed. There is no sufficient basis for dismissing the suit and the division is therefore to be decided by the court. 13. In view of the above position, the decrees by the courts below can not be maintained. The plaintiffs admittedly had half share in the total property of Lachhmandas which also applies for the land in suit, of village Navinagar and the plaintiffs must be held to have half share in it. Defendants 1 to 3 each and the defendants 4 to 6 together have ? share each. No other defendants have any share as also admitted by them. This appeal is accordingly allowed the judgment and decrees dated 8.6.1971 and 23.1.1972 are hereby set aside and the case is decided for shares of the plaintiffs together and the defendants 1 to 6 half each, the shares amongst the defendants 1 to 6 are specified as 1/8 for defendants 1 to 3 each and 1/8 for defendants 4 to 6 together. A preliminary decree be prepared accordingly and the case be remanded to the learned trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law.