JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. 1. This is a writ petition by Ajai Kumar Jain, landlord of premises no. 13/20, Chowk, Allahabad, which he purchased under a sale deed dated 29-9-1971 against his tenant, Ram Chandra Pathak. 2. Ajai Kumar Jain filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against Ram Chandra Pathak on the ground that AJAI Kumar Jain had his residential accommodation on the upper portion of the building while on the ground floor there were four shops including the one in the tenancy of Ram Chandra Pathak. One of the shops was in the possession of M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal. There was a staircase which goes through the shop in the tenancy of M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal to the residential premises of the petitioner. The petitioner asserts that during the business hours he could use the staircase but after the business hours after the shop is closed, he could not use it. The petitioner wanted a passage through the shop in the tenancy of the respondent to the first floor. The second ground on which the release was sought was that the petitioner wanted the shop for starting his own business. 3. The respondent resisted the petition, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner was living in his joint family house, namely 26, Mahajani Tola, and hence the case set up by the petitioner that he needed it to have access to the residential portion of his building through the staircase set up by the petitioner, was false. It was further asserted that the so-called residential occupation was not, in fact, a residential accommodation at all but was a godown of M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal. 4. There is further controversy between the parties which has to be mentioned. TheRE is a Firm M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal which was admittedly a joint family firm of which the head was Sri Hira Lal Jain and Sri Surendra Kumar Jain, Sri Ashok Kumar Jain and the petitioner, who were the sons of Sri Hira Lal Jain were partners. According to the petitioner, this firm was converted into a partnership in 1967. This was done by getting a partial partition of the family properties. According to the petitioner, this firm was converted into a partnership in 1967. This was done by getting a partial partition of the family properties. House No. 26, Mahajani Tola, continued to be the joint family property but the business of M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal became a partnership firm. The petitioner became major on. 21-11-1971 and retired from the partnership firm while his father and his two brothers continued to be the members of the partnership firm. The petitioner now desired to start his own independent business in electrical goods, lanterns and other allied articles in the shop in dispute for which he needed the shop. In reply on behalf of the respondent, it was asserted that the transformation of joint Hindu family firm M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal into a registered partnership was illegal. It was also asserted that a Hindu joint family business had distinct heritable assets and is ancestral property. In other words, it was contended that the petitioner continued to have an interest in the firm M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal despite his withdrawal from the so-called partnership. 5. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application holding that the need of the petitioner was genuine and his need was greater than that of the tenant. 6. Against the decision of the Prescribed Authority an appeal was filed by the tenant. The appellate authority partly allowed the appeal of the tenant and directed the release of 2-1/2 feet space from the disputed premises for the purpose of extending the staircase and installing a show-case. The application stood dismissed for the release of the whole accommodation. Against this judgment dated 12-4-1977, Ram Chandra Pathak filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1244 of 1977 and the landlord, Ajai Kumar Jain, filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 963 of 1977. Both these writ petitions were heard and decided together by the High Court. The judgment of the II Additional District Judge, Allahabad, was quashed and the matter was ordered to be decided afresh in the light of the observations made by the High Court. 7. This time Sri K. L. Sharma, the II Additional District Judge, Allahabad, allowed the appeal of the tenant and rejected the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for release of the shop in dispute. 8. 7. This time Sri K. L. Sharma, the II Additional District Judge, Allahabad, allowed the appeal of the tenant and rejected the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for release of the shop in dispute. 8. The appellate authority taking up the question of the present need of the landlord for having an access to the first floor of the accommodation, found that there was no substance in this ground. The reason given by the learned appellate authority was that the petitioner residing jointly with his father and the two brothers who were running the firm M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal in the ground floor of the same building and as such there was no difficulty in the petitioner's egress and ingress to the upper residential portion of the building. He found that it was quite evident that all the members of the joint family were using the staircase situated in the ground floor shop of M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal for going to upper residential portion. The appellate authority decided the appeal on 7-3-1981. It is an admitted fact that the father of the petitioner had died on 1-5-1976, hence there was no question of the petitioner living with his father and other family members in the upper portion of the premises on the date when the appeal was being decided. 9. In the second place, the case of the respondent was that the petitioner was living at 26, Mahajani Tola, and the first floor of the premises was a godown of M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal. This case apparently escaped the notice of the appellate authority. 10. Sri K. B. L. Gaur, appearing on behalf of the respondent, contended that the mistake made by the appellate authority was an act of omission on its part. He pointed out that a commission was appointed and the report of the commission is on record. The report indicates that the upper portion was, in fact, used as a godown and there was only one room which apparently was used as Gaddi of the shop of M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal. This Court is not there to substitute its finding for that of the appellate authority. The mistake of the appellate authority in regard to the use of the first floor is apparent and vitiates the judgment. 11. This Court is not there to substitute its finding for that of the appellate authority. The mistake of the appellate authority in regard to the use of the first floor is apparent and vitiates the judgment. 11. As far as the need of the petitioner to start his own independent business is concerned, the appellate authority recorded a finding that, in effect, the firm M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal despite being registered as a partnership firm under the Indian Partnership Act, continued in law to be a joint Hindu family business and consequently the petitioner had a right to become a partner in the joint Hindu family firm. It was on this basis that the appellate authority held that the petitioner had a right to become a partner again in the partnership firm M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal. 12. There is an apparent error of law manifest on the face of the record in the judgment of the appellate authority when it recorded this finding. Once the firm M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal was registered under the Indian Partnership Act and the shares of the partners were defined then it was governed by the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act. It ceased to be joint Hindu family business. When the petitioner withdrew from the firm he ceased to have any legally enforceable interest in the firm M/s. Gur Prasad Hira Lal. See in this connection the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Sir Sunder Singh Majithia v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, C. P. and U. P., 1942 Income Tax Reports 457. However, the legal position, as explained above, in relation to partial partition governs this case unless the appellate authority finds that the partial partition pleaded by the petitioner was a sham transaction. The finding on the question of comparative hardship is also vitiated because of the errors of fact and law pointed out in this judgment. 13. In the result the judgment of the appellate authority cannot be sustained. 14. The writ petition is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the appellate authority is quashed and the appellate authority is directed to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law. The parties will bear their own costs. Petition allowed.