JUDGMENT : S. Saghir Ahmad, J. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The Petitioner, it appears, had applied for sanction of a building plan which was allowed by the Municipal Board on 16-3-1982. This order was challenged by the opposite party No. 2 in an appeal filed u/s 318 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on 30-9-1982. Since the appeal was filed beyond the time prescribed under the Act, an application for condonation of delay was also moved. The appeal as also the application for condonation of delay were dismissed in default on 23-11-1982. The next day, i.e. 24-11-1982, an application was made for restoration of the appeal. The application was opposed by the Petitioner who filed objections on 21-9-1983. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, however, by his order dated 14-10-1983 set aside the order dated 23-11-1982 and restored the appeal to its original number on payment of Rs. 25/- as costs which was required to be paid within 15 days failing which the application for restoration was to be treated as rejected. It is this order which has been impugned in the writ petition. 3. By an order dated 16-7-1984, passed by brother Sharma, J. notice of the petition was required to be issued to opposite party No. 3 to show cause why the petition be not admitted. It was also required to be indicated in the notice that the petition itself was likely to be heard and disposed of finally. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties who have stated that the writ petition itself may be disposed of finally. 5. It has been contended on behalf of the Petitioner that there is no provision in the U.P. Municipalities Act which authorises the appellate authority to restore an appeal to its original number if the appeal is once dismissed in default and consequently, restoration can be ordered only in exercise of its review power u/s 321 of the Act but then, it is further contended, an order reviewing the earlier order and restoring the appeal has to be passed within three months from the date of the original order as required by the proviso to Section 321. Since in the instant case, the impugned order was passed on 14-10-1983 i.e. much after the expiry of three months from the date of the original order, the same, it is submitted, is liable to be quashed as on the expiry of three months from 23-11-1983, the date on which the appeal was dismissed in default, the appellate authority had ceased to have any jurisdiction in the matter. Section 318 of the Act provides as under: 318(1). Any person aggrieved by any order or direction made by a board under the powers conferred upon it by Sections 180(1), 186, 204, 205(1), 208, 211, 212, 222(6). 241(2), 245, 278, 285 or under a bye-law made under heading G of Section 298, may within thirty days from the date of such direction or order, exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy thereof, appeal to such officer as the State Government may appoint for the purpose of hearing such appeals or any of them, or, failing such appointment, to the (2)... (3) No appeal shall be dismissed or allowed in part or whole unless reasonable opportunity of showing cause or being heard has been given to the parties. Section 321 of the Act provides as under: 321(1) No order or direction referred to in Section 318 shall be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided therein. (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying any such order or direction shall be final: Provided that it shall be lawful for the appellate authority, upon application, and after giving notice to the other party, to review any order passed by him in appeal by a further order passed within three months from the date of his original order. 6. u/s 318 of the Act, the appellate authority has to dispose of the appeal after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. It is, therefore, unquestionably a quasi judicial power. That being so, the appellate authority has not only the power to dismiss the appeal in default, it has also the power to restore the appeal. 7. 6. u/s 318 of the Act, the appellate authority has to dispose of the appeal after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. It is, therefore, unquestionably a quasi judicial power. That being so, the appellate authority has not only the power to dismiss the appeal in default, it has also the power to restore the appeal. 7. The restoration of the appeal can be done in exercise of the review power available to the appellate authority u/s 321 and if that power is exercised then the question of limitation can be invoked and it can be rightly urged that the power can be exercised only within the period indicated in the proviso to Section 321. The exercise of power of review beyond the period of time prescribed under the said proviso would not be valid and the order passed in violation of that provision would be liable to be quashed. The appeal, however, can also be restored by the appellate authority in exercise of its inherent power and for exercise of this power, it would not be bound by the period of limitation laid down in the proviso to Section 321. 8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has referred to the Single Judge decision of this Court in Jagdish Lal Vs. Municipal Board, Bahraich and Others, AIR 1973 All 189 , in which it has been laid down as under: The power of review is conferred on the appellate authority under the proviso to Section 321. But there is time-limit for the exercise of this power, time-limit being three months. It is further clear that this limitation of three months has to be counted "from the date of his original order" from which it follows that the period of three months for exercise of the power of review must be counted from 6-12-1969 on which the appeal was dismissed in default. Not only was the order on the first application for review (annexure-3) passed beyond this period of three months counted from the date of dismissal of the appeal in default, but the order on the second application for review was also passed long after this period of limitation. 9. This decision has noticed only one aspect of the matter e.g. the order dismissing an appeal in default can be recalled in exercise of the review powers u/s 321. 9. This decision has noticed only one aspect of the matter e.g. the order dismissing an appeal in default can be recalled in exercise of the review powers u/s 321. But the other aspect of the matter was considered by a Division Bench in Sampat Ram Varma v. Addl. District Magistrate 1982 ALJ 333 in which it has been held as under: There is one another aspect of the case. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in Gum Prasad Dixit v. State of U.P. 1969 ALJ 460. In this case, an application was dismissed in default by the Rent Control Officer. Hon. Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) took the view that in a case where no prescribed procedure is laid down for a quasi-judicial proceedings the power to pass an ex-parte order of dismissal for default was linked and integrated with the power to set aside such an order when sufficient cause for the default is shown... The appellate authority, u/s 160 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, is a quasi-judicial authority. Since it has the power to dismiss the appeal in default or pass an ex-parte order it has also the power to recall that order. 10. That being so, the appeal can be restored by the appellate authority in exercise of its inherent powers as well. 11. In the instant case, opposite party No. 2 had filed an application for restoration of the appeal the very next day of its dismissed in default. The appeal could also be restored by the appellate authority in exercise of the inherent power and since in the instant case, the appellate authority has restored the appeal, not in exercise of its review power, but, in exercise of its general power, the Petitioner cannot be heard to contend that the order having been passed after the expiry of three months, should be set aside. The exercise of inherent powers by the appellate authority for ordering restoration of the appeal dismissed in default is not fettered by any period of limitation. 12. In view of the above, the impugned order does not call for any interference and the writ petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs.