JUDGMENT S. Saghir Ahmad, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was filed on 6th August, 1984 and notices were directed to be issued to opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 to show cause why the petition be not admitted. The parties have put in appearance and have exchanged the affidavits. 2. The opposite party no. 2 is the owner/landlord of House No. 136/96/13 Durvijaiganj, Ward Bashiratganj, Lucknow. Opposite party no. 3 Chhotu Ram, who is the father of the present petitioners, was said to be the tenant of the said house and against him regular Suit No. 960 of 1978 for recovery of arrears of rent and for ejectment was filed in the Court of Judge, Small Causes, Lucknow. There were two principal controversies raised in that suit. One related to the rate of rent with which we are not concerned in this petition and the other related to the status of Chhotu Ram who had claimed that his father, Ganpat Ram and not he was the tenant. The trial court recorded a finding that Ganpat Ram was the tenant and consequently dismissed the suit on 8978. It may be stated that Ganpat Ram had died on 13877, i.e., during the pendency of the suit. 3. The order of the trial court was challenged by opposite party no. 2 in Civil Revision No. 195 of 1978 filed in the Court of the District Judge, Lucknow under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The parties entered into a compromise in the revisional court and consequently the suit was disposed of on 23483 in terms of the compromise (Annexure1) in which it was, inter alia, stated that the relief of ejectment was given up and that Chhotu Ram (opposite party no. 3) on admitting himself to be the tenant of opposite party no. 2 had agreed to pay the arrears of rent. 4. It may be stated that Sukh Deo Prasad (opposite party no. 2) had, in the meantime, also filed an application under section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for eviction of Chhotu Ram from the premises in question and for its release in his favour. The application was allowed on 13582. 4. It may be stated that Sukh Deo Prasad (opposite party no. 2) had, in the meantime, also filed an application under section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 for eviction of Chhotu Ram from the premises in question and for its release in his favour. The application was allowed on 13582. This order was challenged in an appeal which was dismissed by the District Judge, Lucknow by his judgment and order dated 161082 on the ground that it was barred by time and that there was no occasion to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal. Chhotu Ram thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 5153 of 1982 in this Court which was dismissed on 10583 but on his giving an undertaking that he would vacate the premises on the expiry of four months, it was provided that the order of eviction would not be executed for four months. Chhotu Ram did not honour the undertaking given to this Court and, consequently, an application under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act was filed against him which was registered as Criminal Misc. Case No. 3289 of 1983. Chhotu Ram was found guilty and was sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months vide judgment dated 83.S4 passed by brother S.C. Mathur, J. It is stated that an appeal against the order of eviction is pending in this Court. In the meantime opposite party no. 2 Sukhdeo Prasad approached the Prescribed Authority for executing the order of eviction passed against Chhotu Ram. It was at this stage that the petitioners intervened in the proceedings by filing an application (Annexure3) on 17983 in which it was set out by them that their grand father, Ganpat Ram, was the tenant and on his death they had also become tenantsincommon of the premises in question along with Chhotu Ram, their father. It was also stated in this application that Chhotu Ram had colluded with the landlord and consequently the order of eviction was passed in proceedings in which the petitioner were not impleaded as parties although they, being tenantsincommon with Chhotu Ram, ought to have been impleaded as such. It was claimed by them that the order of eviction could not be executed against them. It was claimed by them that the order of eviction could not be executed against them. They, consequently, prayed that the order dated 13582 by which Sukh Deo Prasad's application under section 21 of the Act was allowed, may be recalled and that they may be impleaded as parties in the proceedings and the matter may, thereafter, be decided on merits. This application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by his judgment and order dated 28784 (Annexure6) and, consequently, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 5. Opposite party no. 2 in his counteraffidavit has stated that Chhotu Ram and not his father, Ganpat Ram, was the tenant of the premises in question. The tenancy was admitted in Regular Suit No. 960 of 1974 at the revisional stage and a decree for arrears of rent was also passed against him. He had also fought out the proceedings under section 21 of the Act upto the stage of that writ petition in this Court and had lost in every court. At the time of the decision of the writ petition in this Court he gave an undertaking to vacate the premises on the expiry of four months and since he did not vacate the premises, he was convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act. After having lost the matter in every court, his sons, who have come forward with a false case that they are also tenantsincommon, cannot be heard in these proceedings, particularly as the order passed under section 21 of the Act has already been upheld by the District Judge, Lucknow and this Court. 6. The petitioners have filed the rejoinderaffidavit. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that Ganpat Ram was the original tenant of the premises in question and on his death his grand sons, i.e. the present petitioners, became the tenants along with their father Chhotu Ram in view of the definition of the word family as contained in Section 3 (g) of the Act. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that Ganpat Ram was the original tenant of the premises in question and on his death his grand sons, i.e. the present petitioners, became the tenants along with their father Chhotu Ram in view of the definition of the word family as contained in Section 3 (g) of the Act. The present petitioners, it is contended, should, therefore, have been impleaded as parties in the application filed by Sukhdeo Prasad under section 21 of the Act and since they have not been impleaded in those proceedings the order of eviction is not binding on them and they cannot be evicted from the premises in question in execution of that order. 9. Learned counsel for Sukh Deo Prasad (opposite party no. 2) has, on the other hand, contended that Chhotu Ram was the tenant and even if Ganpat Ram was treated to be the tenant, the petitioners would not become tenants on his death. He also contended that the word tenant has been separately defined and, consequently, the controversy in question is to be resolved in the light of the definition of tenant and not on the basis of the definition of family. Section 3 (g) provides as under : 3 (g) Family'', in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building means, his or her (i) spouse, (ii) male lineal descendants, (iii) such parents, grand parents and any unmarried or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building. Section 3 (a) provides as under : 3 (a) tenant, in relation to a building, means a person by whom its rent is payable, and on the tenant's death, (1) in the case of a residential building, such only of his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death ; (2) in the case of a nonresidential building, his heirs. 10. The definition of family in section 3 (g) of the Act, in my opinion, would not be relevant for purposes of resolving the controversy in this case. Family has been defined with the specific purpose of limiting the considerations of need and hardship to persons specified in the definition. 10. The definition of family in section 3 (g) of the Act, in my opinion, would not be relevant for purposes of resolving the controversy in this case. Family has been defined with the specific purpose of limiting the considerations of need and hardship to persons specified in the definition. Under section 21 of the Act a landlord can apply for the release of the accommodation in his favour on the ground of his bona fide need or the need of any member of his family. If it is not his personal need but is the need of his family, the said need has to be confined to the person specified in the definition of family. The need in respect of the person who does not fall within the statutory definition would not be considered by the Prescribed Authority. Similarly a tenant can plead the hardship likely to be caused to a member of his family on a release application being allowed. The consideration of hardship has to be limited to the members specified in the definition of family. The definition of family would, therefore, not be relevant for determining the question as to who would become the tenant on the death of the original tenant. 11. A perusal of the definition of tenant in section 3 (a) of the Act would indicate that a tenant is a person by whom the rent is payable and on his death, his heir becomes a tenant. The Act contemplates distinction between the residential and nonresidential accommodation. In the case of a residential accommodation such of the heirs as have been living with the tenant would alone become tenant. The definition does not connote that every member of the tenant's family, though he was not residing with him and though he was not his heir, would become the tenant. What is necessary is that the person should be an heir of the deceased tenant and in the case of residential accommodation, should have been residing with him. It is obvious that if such a person was not an heir of the deceased tenant, he would not become the tenant although he might be a member of his family. It is also obvious that even if he was an heir of the deceased tenant but was not living with him, he would not become a tenant of the residential accommodation. It is also obvious that even if he was an heir of the deceased tenant but was not living with him, he would not become a tenant of the residential accommodation. The word ''heir as commonly understood, means a person who normally inherits the estate of the deceased. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the word heir has been defined as under : Heir One who inherits or is entitled to succeed to the possession of the property after the death of its owner as (1) Heir AT LAW (2) Heir (3) One who in modern Civil Codes based upon the Civil law (as in Europe) succeeds to the entire estate of a person by operation of law or by testament and has a right of renunciation and us a right of entry with the benefit of inventory (4) SCOTS LAW: one taking heritable property by destination : one who succeeds only to movable estate (5) one who receives some of the property of a deceased person by operation of law, by virtue of a will, or in any of various other ways b : one who receives or is entitled to receive property during the lifetime of a former owner made his fiend of the farm after deciding to live elsewhere 2 : one who inherits or is entitled to succeed to a hereditary rank, title, or office upon the death or removal from office by other cause (as abdication) of the holder to the principality of Monaco succession to the throne by the King's following his abdication, 3 : one to whom something other than property as a position of leadership, participation in a tradition or culture, a natural talent, a quality of character is transmitted or seems to be transmitted in accordance with or apart from wish of a predecessor and with or without necessity of direct succession. 12. In view of the clear and specific meaning of the word heir what has to be seen is whether the petitioners would inherit the properties of Ganpat Ram (assuming that he was the original tenant). Succession to the property of a Hindu dying intestate has been indicated in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 12. In view of the clear and specific meaning of the word heir what has to be seen is whether the petitioners would inherit the properties of Ganpat Ram (assuming that he was the original tenant). Succession to the property of a Hindu dying intestate has been indicated in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 8 of the said Act provides that the property shall devolve upon the heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule and if there was no heir of Class I then upon the heirs specified in Class II and so on. A grand son in the lifetime of his father would not inherit the properties of the grand father dying intestate. Tenancy right is immovable property. It is heritable as any other immovable property. 13. On the death of Ganpat Ram (assuming that he was the original tenant), the tenancy right would devolve upon his heir in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and consequently Chhotu Ram alone, in his capacity as son and heir of Ganpat Ram, would become the tenant of the premises in question. The petitioners in their capacity as grand children of Ganpat Ram would not inherit the tenancy right in the presence of their father, Chhotu Ram. In any case since it was at no time pleaded that the petitioners along with their father and grand father constituted a joint Hindu family, it is not required of me to look to the provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act under which the interest of the deceased devolves upon the surviving members of coparcenary. The Prescribed Authority, therefore, does not appear to have committed any error in rejecting the application of the petitioners on the ground that they have not inherited tenancy rights and that they were not necessary parties to the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioners has laid emphasis on the findings recorded by the trial court in Regular Suit No. 960 of 1974 that Ganpat Ram was the tenant of the premises in question. It will be noticed that the judgment of the trial court was challenged in a revision before the District Judge where the parties had entered into a compromise and the suit was decreed for arrears of rent in terms of the compromise. It will be noticed that the judgment of the trial court was challenged in a revision before the District Judge where the parties had entered into a compromise and the suit was decreed for arrears of rent in terms of the compromise. The findings of the trial court cannot, therefore, be pressed in aid of the arguments that Ganpat Ram was the tenant. It will be pertinent to point out that there was no documentary evidence on record in the aforesaid suit No 960 of 1974 to indicate that Ganpat Ram was the tenant although if he was tenant, the rent receipts issued in his favour could well have been filed to establish his status as a tenant. It will also be worthwhile to mention that before the institution of Regular Suit No. 960 of 1974, Sukhdeo Prasad (opposite party no. 2) had issued a notice of demand and in reply to that notice, which was sent on 17174 by Chhotu Ram through his counsel, it was not stated that Ganpat Ram was the tenant of the premises in question. A perusal of the reply would indicate that Chhotu Ram at the earliest stage, even when the suit was not filed, had admitted himself to be the tenant of the premises in question this reply is Annexure C5 to the counteraffidavit filed by Sukhdeo Prasad. This plea was also not raised by Chhotu Ram in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act which were decided against him. Chhotu Ram's statement was also recorded in proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. A copy of the statement is Annexure C1 to the counteraffidavit in which again he did not say that Ganpat Ram was the tenant or that his sons were in occupation of the premises in question in their own rights. Learned counsel for the petitioners then referred to me to Annexure8 to the rejoinderaffidavit which is a copy of the objection filed on behalf of Sukh Deo Prasad against the petitioners' application under Section 34 of the Act. It has been stated in para 1 of these objections that only the opposite party no. 2 succeeded the tenancy rights in respect of accommodation No. 136/96/14, situate at Durvijaiganj, Lucknow............ It was also stated in para 10 of the objections that the applicants were not necessary parties as the tenancy rights devolved on Chhotu Ram alone. 15. It has been stated in para 1 of these objections that only the opposite party no. 2 succeeded the tenancy rights in respect of accommodation No. 136/96/14, situate at Durvijaiganj, Lucknow............ It was also stated in para 10 of the objections that the applicants were not necessary parties as the tenancy rights devolved on Chhotu Ram alone. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners has on the basis of these averments contended that the fact that tenancy rights were said to have devolved upon Chhotu Ram would indicate that Ganpat Ram was the original tenant. I am not prepared to accept this contention. It is nowhere stated in the objection that Ganpat Ram was the tenant. As pointed out earlier even before the institution of Regular suit No. 960 of 1974, Chhotu Ram had admitted himself to be the tenant as early as in 1974. He also admitted himself to be the tenant in a compromise filed before the District Judge. He did not set up Ganpat Ram as tenant in proceedings under section 21 of the Act or in appeal which was filed against the judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 of the Act. Ganpat Ram had also not stated himself to be a tenant in writ petition No. 5153 of 1982. In this background, the averments made in the objection (Annexure8 to the rejoinderaffidavit) are of no significance. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, next, contended that their father Chhotu Ram had colluded with the landlord and that the ejectment decree being a collusive decree was not binding on them. The contention is wholly unfounded. Para 10 of the counteraffidavit filed by Sukhdeo Prasad would indicate that summons of civil revision, which was filed by him in the court of the District Judge, Lucknow against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in Regular suit No. 960 of 1974, was served on Chhotu Ram's Son Om Prakash, who is petitioner no. 1 in this case. Om Prakash, thus, had full knowledge of the pendency of the case against Chhotu Ram. Chhotu Ram's affidavit dated July, 1982 (Annexure C2 to the counteraffidavit) which was filed in the court of District Judge, Lucknow in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would show that even his elder son had attended the court on 13582. Chhotu Ram's affidavit dated July, 1982 (Annexure C2 to the counteraffidavit) which was filed in the court of District Judge, Lucknow in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would show that even his elder son had attended the court on 13582. Even the District Judge, Lucknow, while rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has held that not only Chhotu Ram's counsel but also his son had full knowledge of the decision of the Prescribed Authority. In this connection it may also be pointed out that the petitioners had impleaded Chhotu Ram as an opposite party in their application filed under Section 34 of the Act before the Prescribed Authority for recalling the order dated 13582. Notice of this petition was issued to Chhotu Ram who filed his reply (Annexure C4) in which he admitted the entire contents of the application of the petitioners who had made wild allegations against him. Chhotu Ram further stated in his reply that his counsel had colluded with the landlord. All these indicate that the petitioners are hands in glove with their father Chhotu Ram who has been directed to be evicted from the premises in question. The application filed by the petitioners under Section 34 of the Act was absolutely misconceived as the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, which has already been upheld by the District Judge and by this Court, could not have been set aside at the instance of certain persons who were not parties to the proceedings and who had no subsisting interest in the tenancy rights of the premises in question. To me, it appears that it was an attempt on the part of Chhotu Ram and his sons to wriggle out of the clutches of the eviction decree. 17. The petition, in my view, lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. (Petition dismissed)