This appeal by the defendants 1 and 2 is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court below. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 had filed a title suit No. 33 of 1969 for declaration of her title with respect to half of the land in question and cancellation of the mutation orders made in favour of the defendants. She also prayed for a decree for possesion over her share of land and also for mesne profits. The suit was resi­sted by the defendants. The trial Court decreed the suit for joint possession with defendant No. 1. Defendants 1 and 2 preferred an appeal from the said decree in the court of the District Judge who modified the decree of the trial holding that the plaintiff was entitled to half share in the land of the three pattas less 12 bighas covered by Ext. 'Ka' and was also entitled to recover prossession thereof. The defend­ants 1&2 have impugned the said decree by preferring the inst­ant second appeal. For the appellant it was submitted that the findings reached by the appellate court below with respect to the documents mentioned as 'Ka' and 'Kha', were perverse and liable to be interfered with. He also submitted that Aimanuh was not insane at the time of execution of both the said documents and the finding to the contrary was erroneous. Further it was submitted that there was ample evidence on record to show that the appellant No. 2 Reba Kanta Konwar was an adopted son of Kamaleswar Konwar and the appellate court below erred in holding otherwise. In order to substantiate his contentions the learned counsel took me through the judgment of the appellate court below and referred me to certain pieces of evidence. Having heard the learned counsel and perused the judgment and the evidence I am of the view that the findings reached by the court below are findings of fact based on evidence and cannot hence be interfered with in second appeal. It is by now well-settled that howsoever erroneous a finding of fact may be, it cannot be disturbed in second appeal unless it is shown to be based on no evidence or is such which no reasonable person will have arrive at or is totally contrary to law. It is by now well-settled that howsoever erroneous a finding of fact may be, it cannot be disturbed in second appeal unless it is shown to be based on no evidence or is such which no reasonable person will have arrive at or is totally contrary to law. It would be seen that only two questions were raised before the appellate court below, namely- (i) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to declaration of title and possession as prayed? (ii) Whether the plaintiff was lunatic, if so, whether the suit would proceed without certificate from proper authority or without adjudication by proper court? While examining the question of insanity of the plaintiff, the court below noticed that the husband of the plaintiff admi­tted that she was not insane when the first panchayat was convened and when document Ext. 'Ka' was prepared. The trial Court had held that the plaintiff was not insane at the time of the execution of the document Ext. 'ka'. The appellate court below on re-appraisal of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances concurred with the said finding of the trial court. It also found that the suit was maintainable. While dealing with the question No. 1 referred to herein-above, the appellate court once again considered the question of insanity of the plaintiff when the other document Ext. 'kha' was drawn up on 1st July, 1960. On re-appreciation of the evidence on record, the appellate court below held that Aimanuh was insane when Ext. 'Kha' was prepared. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted before me that Aimanuh was found to be sane when Ext. 'Ka' was executed, she should, therefore have been found to be sane, even at the time of execution of the Ext. 'Kha'. I find no substance in this contention. The evidence brought on record was properly weighed and sifted by the appellate court below, while examining the question of insanity of Aimanuh at the time of preparation of Ext. 'Kha'. That evidence did establish that she was insane when Ext. 'Kha' was prepared. I see no valid ground to disagree with the appellate court below on this finding of fact. The court below was, therefore, right in observing that even if Aimanuh was present and put her thumb impression on Ext. 'Kha', the same cannot be used against her even as a shield under Section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act. I see no valid ground to disagree with the appellate court below on this finding of fact. The court below was, therefore, right in observing that even if Aimanuh was present and put her thumb impression on Ext. 'Kha', the same cannot be used against her even as a shield under Section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned counsel for the appellants then urged that 'Reba' was adopted son of Kamaleswar and that he was all along been treated as an adopted son of Kamaleswar, he was given a share in the property. There is no merit in this submis­sion. It was noticed that the formalities essential for valid adoption had not been gone into. The natural mother of 'Reba' who was alive at the relevant time was not examined by the defendants. Hence the court below rejected the plea that Reba was adopted by Kamaleswar as his son. In this connec­tion the learned counsel drew ray attention to the statement of the wife of Kamaleswar and submitted that as Reba had all along been treated as adopted son by all concerned, it was not necessary to prove the factum of giving and taking in the process of adoption. There is no merit in this con­tention. The physical act of giving and receiving is absolutely necessary to the validity of adoption. In fact this ceremony is of essence of adoption. This was the position in law even prior to the enforcement of the Hindu Adoption and Mainten­ance Act. No particular form was prescribed far the ceremony but the law did require that the natural parents should hand over the adopted boy and the adopted parents should receive him. In the absence of any proof of this ceremony, an adoption made prior to the enforcement of the said Act would not be valid. Adoption results in changing the course of succession, depri­ving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring pro­perties to comparative strangers or more remote relations. It is hence necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicions of fraud and so consi­stent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. Where the facts are once ascertained, presumption arising from conduct cannot establish a right which the facts them­selves disprove. (See Kishori Lal vs. Mt. Chaltibai, A.I.R. 1959 S. C. 504). Where the facts are once ascertained, presumption arising from conduct cannot establish a right which the facts them­selves disprove. (See Kishori Lal vs. Mt. Chaltibai, A.I.R. 1959 S. C. 504). The principle of factum valet has its own limita­tions and the extent to which it is permitted to operate in cases of adoption are well-known. The application of the rule of factum valet is limited to cases in which there is neither want of authority to give or to accept, nor imperative interdic­tion of adoption. la cases in which the rule of shastra is merely directory, or only points out particular persons as more eligi­ble for adoption than others, the maxim may be usefully and properly applied. However, where there is no proof that man­datory requirement of shastra was fulfilled, the rule of factum valet would not be helfpul. In the instant case, the Court below had found that adopt­ion of Reba had not been proved in accordance with law. The ceremony of giving and taking was not a directory requirement but a mandatory one. I, therefore, see no justifiable ground to interfere with the finding reached by the appellate court in this behalf. This appeal is concluded by findings of fact and is there­fore, liable to be rejected. For the reasons in the foraging, the appeal lacking in merits is dismissed. Since no one appears on behalf of the Respondents, I make no order as to costs.