JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - The petitioner was appointed to the post of Professor and Head of the Department of Geography in the K. B. Post-Graduate College, Mirzapur, which is affiliated to the Gorakhpur University, on Aug. 3, 1964 and was confirmed on the Post on Aug. 3. 1966. He is aggrieved by an order of the Vice-Chancellor dated Mar. 9, 1981 rejecting his representation against the order dated Dec. 17, 1967, purporting to terminate the services of the petitioner by giving him 3 months notice, on the ground that his representation was not maintainable. The petitioner has in the alternative, also assailed the validity of the order of termination dated Dec. 17, 1967 passed by the Committee of Management. 2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner was appointed to the aforesaid post on August 3, 1964 and after the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, Gorakhpur University, he was confirmed on the said post on August 3, 1966. The Management asserts that there were some complaints as a result of which at a meeting of the Managing Committee a sub-committee of three members, namely, Sarvsri A. K. Bannerji, Mahendra Prasad Agarwal and Bisheshwar Nath Seth, was constituted to enquire into those complaints. The sub-committee is said to have enquired into the matter and submitted its report. This report has, however, not been made part of the record, though a copy of the same was produced by the counsel for the respondent from a perusal of which it is clear that there was no complaint against the petitioner so as to bring his case within any of sub-clauses (d) to of Statute 24 (4) to be mentioned hereafter. That report also shows that the sub-committee recommended that the services of the petitioner be terminated under Cl. (5) of Statute 24 of Chap. XIV of the First Statutes of the Gorakhpur University (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent-Management Committee asserts that on a consideration of this report it was unanimously decided at a meeting held on Dec. 17, 1967 by the Committee of Management to terminate the petitioners services by giving him three months notice. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the Committee of Management the petitioner filed a civil suit No. 21 of 1968 which was finally dismissed by the Supreme Court with the dismissal of the special leave petition on April 2, 1980. 17, 1967 by the Committee of Management to terminate the petitioners services by giving him three months notice. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the Committee of Management the petitioner filed a civil suit No. 21 of 1968 which was finally dismissed by the Supreme Court with the dismissal of the special leave petition on April 2, 1980. Thereafter the petitioner challenged the order by way of an appeal before the Vice-Chancellor who dismissed the same by an order dated Mar. 9, 1981 on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to review an order of termination passed under the old statutes. 4. Having failed to obtain any relief both from the Civil Court as well as from the Vice-Chancellor; the petitioner approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. At this point, it may be mentioned that the petitioners suit was dismissed not on merits but on the ground that the same was not maintainable. Following the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1976 SC 888 ; (1976 Lab IC 576), Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain it was held that the petitioner could not be granted the relief of reinstatement. Hence this petition. 5. So far as the order of the Vice-Chancellor dated Mar. 9, 1981 is concerned, we do not find any merit in the petitioner's contention that the Vice-Chancellor was empowered to entertain the petitioners representation. The impugned order of termination was passed in the purported exercise of powers under Clause (5) of Statute 24 of the First Statutes of the Gorakhpur University framed under the Gorakhpur University Act, 1956. 6. The Gorakhpur University Act as well as the statutes framed thereunder have since been replaced by the U.P. State Universities Act and the statutes framed thereunder. Neither the U.P. State Universities Act nor the First Statutes framed in respect of Gorakhpur University thereunder have authorised the Vice-Chancellor to entertain any representation or appeal in respect of complaints founded on alleged breach of the First Statutes of the Gorakhpur University framed under the Gorakhpur University Act, 1956. No proceedings in any form were pending on the date of coming into force of the State Universities Act in respect of the termination of the petitioner's services. No proceedings in any form were pending on the date of coming into force of the State Universities Act in respect of the termination of the petitioner's services. Indeed learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any statutory provision under which the Vice-Chancellor may have been authorised to adjudicate a dispute arising under the First Statutes of the Gorakhpur University Act. 7. It may be mentioned that the representation itself was filed by the petitioner before the Vice-Chancellor only on April 2, 1980 (vide Annexure 1 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner). 8. We, therefore, turn to the main contention raised by the petitioner in support of this petition assailing the validity of the basic order of termination dated Dec. 17, 1967. Before, however, deal with that contention on merits, we may dispose of a subsidiary argument raised by the learned counsel to the effect that in point of fact no such resolution was passed by the Committee of Management either on Dec. 17, 1967 or on any other date and that the records maintained by the Management have been manipulated and tampered with in this connection. It was urged that the so-called resolution dated Dec. 17, 1967 was the result of forgery and fraud and that the same is not a genuine piece of document. We, however, find it difficult to give any concluded finding on this question of fact in these proceedings. The original records were not got summoned by the petitioner and, in the absence of the same, it would not be safe or proper to express any final opinion on this highly disputed issue of fact. The assertions of the petitioner in this behalf have been denied by the respondent-management in its counter-affidavit. However, one thing seems clear that the words to the effect that the enquiry report of the sub-committee with regard to Sri Shyam Narain Pande, Head of the Department of Geography was considered and thereafter the resolution was passed unanimously, were added subsequently, allegedly, as a result of corrections made in the minutes of the meeting held on Dec. 17, 1967 under a subsequent resolution dated Jan. 13, 1968 (vide Annexure 5 to the petition). Be that as it may, it is not possible for this Court to give any concluded finding on the genuineness of the minutes of the meeting held on Dec. 17, 1967. 9. 17, 1967 under a subsequent resolution dated Jan. 13, 1968 (vide Annexure 5 to the petition). Be that as it may, it is not possible for this Court to give any concluded finding on the genuineness of the minutes of the meeting held on Dec. 17, 1967. 9. We will, therefore, assume that the petitioners services were terminated as a result of the resolution passed on Dec. 17, 1967. A true copy of the minutes has been annexed as Annexure 4 to the petition which mentions against item No. 6 the subject as follows :- "Consideration of the enquiry report of the sub-committee with regard to Shri Shyam Narain Pande, Head of the Geography Department and decision thereon." 10. Thereafter the resolution states "resolved unanimously that the services of Sri Shyam Narain Pande, Head of the Department of Geography be terminated with effect from three months from the date of the service of the notice of termination of his services upon him. The Secretary should serve the notice of termination of service on Sri Shyam Narain Pande immediately." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Management had no power to terminate the services of the petitioner by a simple notice of termination without assigning any reasons. It was urged that the terms and conditions of the teachers of an affiliated college were controlled and regulated by the First Statutes of the Gorakhpur University. The Management did not enjoy the freedom to terminate the petitioners services at will. It could dispense with the services of the petitioner only in accordance with the statutes laying down the terms and conditions of the services of the teachers of affiliated colleges according to which the petitioners services could be terminated on three months notice only on the grounds mentioned in sub-clauses (d) to (f) of Clause (4) of Statute 24 of Chapter XIV of the First Statutes of the Gorakhpur University. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent-management, on the other hand, vehemently contended that the employment of the petitioner was governed by ordinary rule of master and servant and that in view of sub-section (3) of Section 34, the management had an absolute right to terminate the services of its teacher without assigning any reasons. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent-management, on the other hand, vehemently contended that the employment of the petitioner was governed by ordinary rule of master and servant and that in view of sub-section (3) of Section 34, the management had an absolute right to terminate the services of its teacher without assigning any reasons. It was contended that this right of the Management was not and could not legally be whittled down or curtailed by the statutes framed under the Gorakhpur University Act. 13. Alternatively, it was urged that Statute 24 which purports to place restrictions on this absolute right of the Management guaranteed under Section 34 of the Act was ultra vires the Act. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length, and having given the matter our careful consideration, we find considerable force in the petitioners contention and we are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent-management: 15. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it will be necessary to have a look at the relevant statutes. Under Section 14 (4) of the Gorakhpur University Act, 1956 the Vice-Chancellor was authorised to exercise general control over the affairs of the University and the affiliated colleges. Again, under sub-section (4) of Section 28 the appointment of teachers of the affiliated colleges was subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. Section 34 of the Act says that the conditions of affiliation of a college shall be such as may be laid down by the Executive Council. Under sub-sec.(3) of Section 34, the management of an affiliated college was free to manage and control the affairs of the college except as provided by this Act which obviously includes statutes lawfully made thereunder. There is then Section 38 which provides that any dispute arising out of any contract between an affiliated college and a teacher of the same, shall, on the request of the teacher concerned, be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration consisting of one member nominated by the Management, one member nominated by the party concerned and as umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final. Section 39 of the Act makes provision for the making of statutes on any matter generally and, in particular, the various subjects enumerated thereunder as Clauses (a) to (o). Section 39 of the Act makes provision for the making of statutes on any matter generally and, in particular, the various subjects enumerated thereunder as Clauses (a) to (o). Clause (1) of Sec. 39 mentions the conditions under which the college and the institutions may be affiliated to the University. Acting under this provision, the Executive Council of the Gorakhpur University made the First Statutes of the Gorakhpur University. 16. Chapter XIV of the aforesaid Statutes deals with the affiliation of colleges. Statute 23 provides that the scales of pay for teachers of affiliated colleges shall be those which may be prescribed by the Executive Council. Statute 24 in so far as it is relevant for our purposes, reads as follows :- "24. Principals and all other members of the staff of Colleges, other than those maintained by the Government, shall be appointed on a definite written contract of permanent service which shall embody the following points, besides such other points as each individual College may think fit to include in its own forms of Agreement. (1) to (3) ................. (4) No teacher shall be dismissed or removed from service except on the following grounds: (a) wilful neglect of duty; (b) misconduct; including disobedience to the orders of the Principal in the case of teacher; (c) breach of any of the terms of contract; (d) physical or mental unfitness; (e) in competence, provided that the plea of incompetence shall not be used against a teacher alter he or she has put in two years service after confirmation; (f) Abolition of the Post. (5) Except when termination of service has taken place under sub-clause (a), (b) or (c) of Statute 24 (4) above neither the party of the first part nor the party of the second part shall terminate this contract except by giving to the other party three calendar months notice in writing or by paying to the other party a sum equivalent to thrice the monthly salary, which the party of the first part then earning: Provided that the parties will be free to waive this condition by mutual agreement. Note :- The period of notice referred to above shall not include the summer vacation or any part thereof. Note :- The period of notice referred to above shall not include the summer vacation or any part thereof. (6) Provision of a Tribunal (as in Section 38) consisting of one member nominated by the Managing Committee of the College, one member nominated by the teacher concerned and an umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor, shall be made to settle disputes arising in connection with termination of services under sub-clause (4) above. The decision of the Tribunal shall be final and the provisions of Arbitration Act of 1940 (Act 10 of 1940) with the exception of Section 2 thereof shall as far as possible apply. (7) In all other disputes the decision of the Vice-Chancellor shall be final. The form of Agreement to be adopted by each College shall be approved by the Executive Council before they are put in force, " (Emphasis added) 17. Statute 25 deals with how the services of the members of the staff of a College appointed temporarily or on probation could be terminated. We are not concerned with this statute as the petitioner in the present case was a confirmed teacher. 18. A brief survey of the relevant statutory provisions leads to the conclusion that the terms and conditions of the teachers of an affiliated college are controlled and regulated by statutory provisions and that they can be removed or dismissed or their services terminated on express grounds mentioned in the aforesaid Statutes, namely, sub-cls. (a) to (f) of Clause (4) of Statute 24 which are required under that statute to be incorporated in the form of an Agreement which must receive the approval of the Executive Council before they are put in force. The scheme of the Act and the statutes framed thereunder, in our opinion, completely exclude the existence of any overriding or residuary power in the Management to do away with the services of the teachers of an affiliated college at its sweet will. Clause (4) of Statute 24 totally prohibits dismissal or removal save on the grounds specifically mentioned therein. Clause (5) has to be read with Clause (4). The term `removal' and termination have been used interchangeably as held in two decisions cited below. It follows, therefore, that services of a teacher cannot be terminated by a simple notice save on grounds mentioned in sub-clauses (d) to (f). 19. Clause (5) has to be read with Clause (4). The term `removal' and termination have been used interchangeably as held in two decisions cited below. It follows, therefore, that services of a teacher cannot be terminated by a simple notice save on grounds mentioned in sub-clauses (d) to (f). 19. Clause (5) of Statute 24 which provides for termination of the contract of service by giving three months notice on grounds other than those mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (c) of Statute 24 (4) simply means that in cases covered by sub-clauses (a) to (c) of Statute 24 (4) of the contract can be put an end to without giving any such notice, but where the contract is being sought to be terminated on grounds other than those mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Statute 24 (4) three months notice is essential. Clause (5) does not, however, imply that the management can terminate the services by such a notice on any other grounds whatsoever. 20. The effect of the various provisions of the Act mentioned above generally and, in particular, of Statute 24 was the subject of a close scrutiny both by the learned single Judge in the first instance and subsequently by a Division Bench of this Court in Spl. Appeal No. 569 of 1970, decided on Feb. 13, 1974 (filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge in Writ No. 4334 of 1967, Sheo Govind Tewari v. Principal D. A. V. College Azamgarh, decided on May 7, 1970). The services of Sheo Govind Tewari, a lecturer in The D. A. V. College, Azamgarh, which was affiliated to the Gorakhpur University, had been terminated by the Management by a simple notice terminating the contract of service of the petitioner without assigning any reason. The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court and contended that the Management had no such power and that the right of the Management to terminate the service of a teacher was specifically restricted by Clauses (4) and (5) of Statute 24. The contention of the petitioner was upheld by the learned single Judge by an order dated May 7, 1970 which was affirmed by the Division Bench in an appeal filed by the Management. The contention of the petitioner was upheld by the learned single Judge by an order dated May 7, 1970 which was affirmed by the Division Bench in an appeal filed by the Management. The Division Bench held that the contract of service of the petitioner was, in view of the terms of the Act and the statutes referred to here in above, statutory in nature and that the Management had on right to terminate the services of the teacher by giving him a simple notice of termination without assigning any reasons. The Division Bench specifically adverted to the legal effect of Clauses (4) and (5) of the Statute and Clauses (9) and (12) of the contract of service, which were in terms identical with Clauses (4) and (5) of Statute 24 and held that the management did not enjoy any inherent or general power to terminate the services of its teachers apart from the express provisions of Clauses (4) and (5) of Statute 24. 21. The Division Bench placed reliance on another Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1969 All LJ 612, Committee of Management, Meerut College, Meerut v. Dr. V. Puri. The case reported in 1969 All LJ 612 dealt with an identical controversy. The only difference was that it was dealing with the provisions of the Meerut University Act and the statutes framed thereunder. However, the learned single Judge who decided the case of Sheo Govind Tewari (supra) rightly observed that the form of Agreement which was the subject of consideration in Dr. Puri,s case as well as the statutes applicable in his case were in pari materia with those with which we are concerned and applied the dictum of Dr. Puri,s case to the case dealt with by him. In Dr. Puri,s case the Division Bench held that the management of the affiliated college did not enjoy any inherent or general power to terminate the services of a teacher at will. Their Lordships held that the grounds on which the services of a confirmed teacher could be terminated were only those which were specifically mentioned in Statute 29 (A) (4) which is an exact reproduction of Cl. (4) of Statute 24 of the Gorakhpur University. The special appeal Bench in the case of Sheo Govind Tewari entirely agreed with this dictum. 22. (4) of Statute 24 of the Gorakhpur University. The special appeal Bench in the case of Sheo Govind Tewari entirely agreed with this dictum. 22. With respect, we find ourselves in entire agreement with the decisions cited above and hold that the impugned resolution and the communication issued to the petitioner pursuant thereto purporting to terminate the services of the petitioner without assigning any reason arc null and void. It is not the case of the respondent-management that the petitioners case was covered by sub-cls. (d) to (f) of Statute 24 (4). The termination of the petitioners service, therefore, in the purported exercise of powers under Clause (5) of Statute 24 was thus entirely ineffectual in law. It may be mentioned here that the only plea raised by the Management in its counter-affidavit was that the impugned order was passed in the simple exercise of its powers as the employer of the petitioner and that the ordinary rule of master and servant applied to the case. This plea has already been negatived by us for the reasons stated above. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent-management however, placed strong reliance on sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act and contended that this provision vested in the Management an absolute power to manage and control its affair's and this power could not be whittled down by the Statutes framed under the Act. It was urged that right of the management to terminate the petitioners service was hence not confined to the grounds mentioned in Cls. (d) to (f) of Statute 24 (f). 24. We are unable to agree sub-section (3) specifically makes this power in the Management to manage and control the affairs of the College subject to the provisions of this Act, and therefore, also to the Statutes made by the Executive Council under the express provisions of the Act the argument of the learned counsel for the management completely ignores the words `except' as provided by this Act, which preface sub-section (3) of Section 34. 25. For the same reason the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-management that the Statutes purporting to curtail the right of the Management to manage and control the affairs of the College are ultra vires, is also entirely unacceptable to us. 25. For the same reason the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-management that the Statutes purporting to curtail the right of the Management to manage and control the affairs of the College are ultra vires, is also entirely unacceptable to us. In our opinion, sub-section (3) of Section 34 does not vest in the Management an absolute and uncontrolled power to manage the affairs of the College. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 will have to be read along with Section 39 which specifically provides for the making of statutes laying down the condition under which the College and other institutions may be affiliated to the University. Under this power the Executive Council was fully competent to make statutes laying down the terms and conditions of the service of the teachers of an affiliated college. We do not find any inconsistency between the statutes in question and Section 34 (3). Further we have already adverted to other provisions in the Act indicating that the Vice-Chancellor exercises general control over the affairs of the affiliated colleges including the appointment of their teachers. We, therefore, find no merit in the contention that the Statutes under review are ultra vires the Act. 26. Learned counsel for the respondent-management next contended that the petitioner had a remedy available to him under Section 38 of the Act by way of a reference to a Tribunal of Arbitration. In addition he had another alternative remedy by way of a reference to the same tribunal in respect of the dispute arising in connection with the termination of his services under sub-clause (4) of Statute 24, neither of which having been availed by the petitioner the petition should be dismissed on this ground alone. We are unable accept the contention. In our opinion it would not be just and proper, having found that the impugned order is wholly void and ineffectual in law, to dismiss this petition on the ground of alternative remedy. The reason is that the petitioners main contention from the beginning was that in point of fact no resolution was passed for his termination and that the resolution relied on had been manufactured for getting rid of the petitioner. Such a dispute may not, strictly, be covered either under Sec. 38 or sub-clause (6) of Statute 24. The reason is that the petitioners main contention from the beginning was that in point of fact no resolution was passed for his termination and that the resolution relied on had been manufactured for getting rid of the petitioner. Such a dispute may not, strictly, be covered either under Sec. 38 or sub-clause (6) of Statute 24. It is only in the alternative that the petitioner contends that the resolution in question is null and void not being authorised by the Statutes. Further, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the stand taken by the petitioner that no resolution was passed in fact by the Managing Committee he thought that none of the remedies provided under the Act or the Statutes was available to him, seems reasonably plausible and cannot be rejected out of hand. 27. Finally, counsel for the respondent-management submitted that the petition is highly belated insofar as the original order dated Dec. 17, 1967 is concerned and consequently the petition should be dismissed on grounds of laches. 28. Having given the matter a very careful consideration we are of the opinion that in the facts of the present case it does not appear that the petitioner was really guilty of laches so as to disentitle him to the discretionary reliefs obtainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29. The suit referred to above was filed by the petitioner in 1967 and it was dismissed finally by the High Court on Feb. 5, 1980, relying 0n the decision of the Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College (supra) and the special leave petition filed by the Management was dismissed on March 9, 1981. The question whether the suit of the nature filed by the petitioner is maintainable or not is highly vexed and has eluded a satisfactory answer for long. Indeed it is difficult to say whether the law has yet been finally settled on the point 30. Be that as it may the position is that the petitioner cannot be said to have been sleeping over his rights. He was agitating the matter before a forum which he though was competent to give him the necessary relief. He may have in good faith thought that the relief of declaration that no resolution was in fact passed by the management could be granted only by the civil court. He was agitating the matter before a forum which he though was competent to give him the necessary relief. He may have in good faith thought that the relief of declaration that no resolution was in fact passed by the management could be granted only by the civil court. Besides, the petitioner was also granted an ad-interim injunction which operated throughout the pendency of the litigation terminating with the dismissal of the suit on April 3, 1979 on the strength of which he was allowed to work and receive his salary except for a few months in between. His attempt to seek relief before the Vice-Chancellor also proved abortive. It is thereafter that the petitioner filed this petition without any further loss of time. 31. In the backdrop of aforesaid facts it is difficult to hold that the petitioner has been guilty of such laches as to deny him the relief's claimed herein. It may be mentioned that the respondents have not alleged that by the delay in filing this petition rights of some third parties have come into existence. In this view we are not inclined to dismiss this petition on the ground of delay. 32. In the premise, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned resolution dated Dec. 17, 1967 as well as the notice it. Dec. 17, 1967 issued by the Secretary of the respondent-managing committee are both quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated forthwith and be entitled to the arrears of his salary and other allowances due to him in consequence of the impugned orders having been quashed after deducting therefrom the amounts which have already been paid to the petitioner under the interim injunction issued by the courts. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs from the respondent No. 3.