Writ petitioner's grievance in this application is short but substantial. He has been treated shabbily by the authorities of Posts and Telegraphs Department who disconnected his telephone in a shabby manner impairing his valuable right to the use thereof for his business and profession. This is the burden of his complaint. His telephone was disconnected as far back on 25.12.80. The telephone No. in question is DR 1192. This was done, compl­ains the petitioner, on a flimsy ground and he has not been beard either before or after the act. Though the authority concerned asked him to produce evidence which he had produced the matter stopped there. The disconnection stood and is stand­ing. The petitioner's explanation and his evidence remains unconsidered and undisposed of. 2. The story which leads to this application is unfolded by two letters which are marked Annexures 1 & 11 of the writ petition. On 19.12.80 the Accounts Officer of the Office of the Divisional Engineer, Telephones (Revenue) Dibrugarh (Respondent No. 3) issued a letter (Amiexure-1) to the petition making some allegations against him that the telephone in question was misused. In otter words, allegation appears to have stemmed from a letter dated 21. 10. 80 that it was being used by persons other than the subscriber. This allegation appears to have stemmed from a letter dated 21. 10. 80 to the deptt by a lawyer. The petitioner was asked to produce relevant documents showing full particulars of the partners of the firm, on or before 24. 12.80 to show that the facts alleged were not correct. It was also stated that his failure to do so shall entail disconnection of the telephone on 25. 12. 80. On 7. 1. 81 the petitioner replied by Annexure II wherein he stated that the said letter was received by him only on 31.12.80. He also admitted therein that the deadline as fixed for disconnection of the telephone was adhered to by the Deptt. As it appeared to him to have been disconnected, he prayed that the connection be restored to him as the disconnection was not warranted in the facts and circumstances, of the case there being no evidence that it was not used by the original subscriber. As it appeared to him to have been disconnected, he prayed that the connection be restored to him as the disconnection was not warranted in the facts and circumstances, of the case there being no evidence that it was not used by the original subscriber. The deed of partnership asked for vide Annexure I, was annexed (in copy) to the letter and it was averred that the telephone had been in the constant use of the firm. There was a further prayer for exempt of liability of Telephone No. DR. 420. To this letter the petitioner did not get any reply and his telephone was also not reconnected. He was also not given any hearing to enable him to support the averments made by him. He accordingly came to this court asserting that there is neither any default on his part in payment of dues of the concerned telephone No. DR- 1192 nor on any other ground, sustainable in law, the telephone could be disconnected in the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. Mr. P. G. Barua, learned counsel for the petitioner has made a simple and short submission before us that the 3rd respondent was a public official discharging public duty and it was incumbent on him to act in a responsible and reasonable manner while dealing with a valuable right of the petitioner. This has not been done in this case. Petitioner's grievance that the telephone was disconnected illegally was not heard and in doing so the respondent has shown a total disregard to the responsibility of his office by refusing to give him a hearing and by maintaining arbitrarily his own action of disconnecting the telephone. Our attention in this connection was drawn by Mr. Barua to a Bench decision by this Court reparted in AIR 1984 Gau. 54 (Raghubir Singh vs. State of Assam) wherein this Court observed that public officials discharging public duties must act in a reasonable and responsible manner whiledealing with statutory rights of citizens. A public official is not expected to act like a robot or automation. We may observe that even in a case where his own action is challenged it will be negation of prin­ciples of natural justice if he does not hear the grievance and exercise his power of review which is inherent in an authority passing a purely administrative order in a purely administrative manner. We may observe that even in a case where his own action is challenged it will be negation of prin­ciples of natural justice if he does not hear the grievance and exercise his power of review which is inherent in an authority passing a purely administrative order in a purely administrative manner. Because, he cannot deny to the aggrieved person the right, at least, to a post-decisional hearing to efface any patent arbitrariness writ on his action or order. 4. We have no manner of doubt that to have a telephone connection is not a pure and simple contractual right; the right is regulated by law. Because it is a state monopoly it also acquires the character of langesses postulating a challenge to any arbitrary action taken in respect thereof. (See Ramanna vs. I. A. Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). Any citizen can have a valid grievance in this regard if a public authority refuses to review his arbitrary action. We are satisfied that in this case principles of natural justice are violated as the petitioner was denied hearing at any stage either before or after the tele­phone was disconnected. In a democratic society where public officers are but public servants it is lamentable that even rudi­ments of these "principles" are thrown to the wind. The fact-situation of this case expose the wide gap in the region of public accountability of public servants in our country. Whether in such situations an Ombudsman may not only provide the correct legal answer (remedy) to the problem put also galvenise the motivational machinery in all fields of public activities is however an open question to which the Legislature or the Exe­cutive may very well address themselves. However, we may only judicially say this much that a public officer is not relieved of the duty to give a post-decisional hearing merely because he had done something, passed some orders and the same has to be maintained to feed his ego. This indeed is an extended or expostulated view of what was held in Raghubir Singh (supra). 5. Mr. S. N. Chetia, the learned Additional Standing Counsel for Central Govt., does not dispute the position, as per affidavit in opposition by 3rd respondent, that the telephone remains disconnected. This indeed is an extended or expostulated view of what was held in Raghubir Singh (supra). 5. Mr. S. N. Chetia, the learned Additional Standing Counsel for Central Govt., does not dispute the position, as per affidavit in opposition by 3rd respondent, that the telephone remains disconnected. It is also not disputed that no hearing was given to the petitioner either before doing so or even later after he had filed the deed of partnarship vide his letter dated 7.1.81. It is true that at paragraph 8 of their counter (filed as late as on 14.6.84. without Court's permission) the respondent over that the telephone was not disconnected without notice or without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed action. What cannot however be denied is that what was done, or rather not done, after petitioner gave his reply vide Annexure II, is not sustainable in law. Because, it is not averred that the petitioner was ever heard thereafter. Respondent have also averred in their counter that as some amounts remained due payable against some other tele­phones, with whom the petitioner is connected, the telephone in question was right by disconnected as provided by relevant P & T Rules. Mr. Chetia supported the impugned action of the authorities, on the basis of this averment. This stand, how­ever, appears us to be novel because the reason for disconne­ction given in Anaexure I, as alluded, was entirely different. It was not disconnected for non-payment of any dues but for misuse of the concerned telephone. It is not open to the res­pondent to open a new case at this stage and to confront the petitioner against such a stand, to which, we hold, he is not called upon to reply here in this court in this case. We do not propose in this case to say anything as to whether respon­dents can disconnect petitioners telephone for non-payment of dues in respect of some other telephones. 6. Mr. Chetia could not satisfy us that the impugned action could, in any view of the matter, be sustained in law because the same apparently is violative of the principles of K natural justice. 6. Mr. Chetia could not satisfy us that the impugned action could, in any view of the matter, be sustained in law because the same apparently is violative of the principles of K natural justice. We have, therefore, no hesitation to direct that the 3rd respondent shall give a hearing to the petitioner on his application dated 7.1.81 and if he finds that the petitioner has successfully established that the telephone was not misused the connection shall then be restored to him. However, it shall be open to the respondent to do so only after making sure that all dues in respect of the concerned telephone payable by the petitioner are cleared. The petitioner shall appear before the 3rd respondent and apply for a dale of hearing to be fixed and thereafter, upon hearing him, the third respondent shall pass nesessary orders in the matter within one month. 7. With the above direction the rule is made absolute but in the fails and circumstances of the case we make n& order as to costs.