JUDGMENT N.N. SHARMA, J. 1. THIS is a defendant's revision directed against the judgment and decree of learned Judge Small Cause Courts, Deoria Sri R. C. Chaturvedi, (II Additional District Judge) in SCC suit no. 3 of 1981. Plaintiff's suit for recovery of possession and arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 3240/- at the rate of Rs. 90/- per month was decreed; mesne profits at the aforesaid rate till the date of recovery of possession were also allowed on payment of necessary court fees, alongwith the costs of the suit. 2. THE suit was filed with the allegations that plaintiff was the sole landlord and defendant was the tenant in the disputed premises on the basis of a Kabuliyat dated 6-1-1973. That document was executed by defendant himself. THE tenant fell in arrears of rent which remained unpaid despite a composite notice of demand and ejectment which was refused on 11-12-1980. The claim was resisted on the ground that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant subsisting between the parties; defendant was the tenant of plaintiff and his brothers who were members of joint Hindu family; it was not open to the plaintiff to bring an action in the court of Judge Small Causes claiming himself to be the sole landlord; there was no default in payment of rent; plaintiff deliberately evaded to receive the rent in order to eject the defendant by hook or crook. Rent has been deposited under section 30 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act no. 13 of 1972) from 20-3-1981. 3. LEARNED trial Judge framed five issues in the suit. He found under issue no. 1 that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties; in a partition decree the disputed premises fell in share of plaintiff. 4. UNDER issue no. 2 he found that defendant committed default in payment of rent. He further found that the notice was valid. In the result claim was decreed as given above. Aggrieved by the decision defendant has filed this appeal. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 6. ON behalf of the revisionist it was submitted that the Notification issued by the High Court conferring upon all the District Judges and Addl. In the result claim was decreed as given above. Aggrieved by the decision defendant has filed this appeal. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 6. ON behalf of the revisionist it was submitted that the Notification issued by the High Court conferring upon all the District Judges and Addl. District Judges the jurisdiction of Judge Small Causes Court was ineffective because on 25-10-1972 the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 did not permit such conferment of jurisdiction. Section 15 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act was a bar to such conferment of jurisdiction. That bar was removed by enactment of sub-section (4) of Section 25 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. This sub-section (4) was enacted by U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1973 which came into force on October 19, 1973, although sub-section (4) of Section 25 was given retrospective operation from 20-9-1972 yet the Notification of the High Court date 25-10-1972 was not validated. The notification did not become effective. Learned counsel for the revisionist further argued that delegation of powers to Small Cause Court of jurisdiction for deciding the suit irrespective of its valuation was purely arbitrary, discriminatory and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 7. LEARNED counsel for the revisionist further pointed out that such courts were known as courts of Small Causes on account of the limited pecuniary jurisdiction. LEARNED counsel for the revisionist took me through the statement of objects and reasons of Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and the various amendments introduced in the Act through subsequent amendments. There was no reasonable classification for conferring such unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction on the court of Small Causes when the suits on regular side provide for at least an appeal. The evidence in trial of such suits was not recorded in full; even the Court was empowered not to frame proper issues and dispose of the suits in a summary fashion irrespective of its valuation. Such unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction could not be conferred on Judge of Small Causes Court without any reasonable basis. Such summary disposal of suits of unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction was unjust. 8. Such unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction could not be conferred on Judge of Small Causes Court without any reasonable basis. Such summary disposal of suits of unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction was unjust. 8. IN this connection learned counsel for the revisionist invited my attention to State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas reported in AIR 1976 SC page 490 and K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1961, SC page 552 and Nellivil Kunhali v. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1966, Kerala page 14. I have carefully gone through all these authorities. None of these authorities cover a case under section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Court Act. All these authorities are wide off the mark. None of these authorities stigmatises such conferment of powers as arbitrary or irrational. There are several authorities of this court against such submissions. I may only refer to Rajendra Shah v. Smt. Kamla Devi reported in Allahabad Rent Cases, 1983, page 337 which lays down:- "(A) Provincial Small Cause Court Act, 1887, Section 15-Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, Section 25-Conferment of jurisdiction of Small Cause Court-Sec. 15 of PSCC Act confers, such jurisdiction on Courts constituted and established by Small Cause Courts Act only-When other classes of Civil Courts are conferred with jurisdiction of Small Cause Court that is dealt with by Section 25 of BAACC Act-State Government and High Court, has been given powers by Section 25 to confer jurisdiction of Small Cause Court on District Judges and Additional District Judges-Thus, Notification issued on October 25, 1972 by High Court is valid and effective since the date it was issued. " 9. I am bound by aforesaid authority and see no good reason to strike a discordant note and refer the matter to a larger Bench for decision afresh as prayed. So this contention is repelled. 10. THE next contention was that the rent-note dated 6-1-1973 which was the basis of the suit was inadmissible in evidence and was void being unregistered and did not create any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was executed by defendant under deception and the relationship of landlord and tenant could not arise in the teeth of Section 11 of Act No. XIII of 1972. In this connection reliance was placed upon Naveen Chandra Sharma v. VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut reported in AIR 1983 Allahabad page 116. It was executed by defendant under deception and the relationship of landlord and tenant could not arise in the teeth of Section 11 of Act No. XIII of 1972. In this connection reliance was placed upon Naveen Chandra Sharma v. VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut reported in AIR 1983 Allahabad page 116. In that case a contract of tenancy was entered into after coming into force of U. P. Act no. XIII of 1972. The lesser brought a suit for ejectment and rent on its basis. It was held that Sections 11, 13 and 31 sub-clause (1) of the aforesaid Act (Act no. XIII of 1972) renders such contract void and the plaintiff-landlord was not entitled to any relief. Learned counsel for the respondent Sri T. P. Singh pointed out that defendant was a tenant of the Joint Hindu Family prior to the coming in operation of the aforesaid Act no. XIII of 1972. He filed a memorandum of partition dated 30-3-1972 and decree dated 10-3-1973 to show that the said rent-note came to be executed subsequently. In the instant case Section 14 of the aforesaid Act regularises the relationship of the parties. Section 14 is worded as below:- "Regularisation of occupation of existing tenants-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any licensee (within the meaning of Section 2-A) or a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976, not being a person against whom any suit or proceeding for eviction is pending before any court or authority on the date of such commencement shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or tenant of such building." 11. THUS any irregularity in creation of tenancy prior to 5-7-1976 stood cured by operation of Section 14 of the Act which was amended on that date. 12. IN this connection reliance was also placed upon Bishan Chand Chaurasiya v. III Additional District Judge, Aligarh reported in U. P. Rent Control Cases, 1983, page 126 which explained the ingredients of Section 14. Section 14 operated only when the tenant was in possession with the consent of the landlord Immediately before commencement of U. P. Act no. 12. IN this connection reliance was also placed upon Bishan Chand Chaurasiya v. III Additional District Judge, Aligarh reported in U. P. Rent Control Cases, 1983, page 126 which explained the ingredients of Section 14. Section 14 operated only when the tenant was in possession with the consent of the landlord Immediately before commencement of U. P. Act no. 28 of 1976 and no suit or proceeding for his eviction were pending on the date of such commencement. So despite passing the order of allotment such occupation could not be deemed as unauthorised. The next authority relied upon by him has been reported in Girish Nath Pandey v. Jagar Nath Prasad, U. P. Rent Control Cases, 1983, page 730 where it was laid that any person in possession of any premises as tenant with the consent of landlord immediately before 5-7-1976 would automatically be tenant under the Act notwithstanding the provision of Section 13 of the Act to the contrary. 13. NONE of these authorities is in point because it was never admitted by the tenant that plaintiff was his landlord and occupied the premises in pursuance of such relationship prior to the coming in operation of the said Act. He emphatically denied the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisting between the parties. A suit on regular side would have lain to evict the trespasser but no suit under Small Cause Courts side would lie unless there was a relationship of landlord and tenant subsisting between the parties. Under the circumstances when plaintiff based himself in his plaint simply on the aforesaid rent-note which created the tenancy subsequent to the coming in operation of the said Act and defect was not curable and no relief was award able to the plaintiff. 14. THERE is yet another point in favour of the revisionist. The rent-note aforesaid was for unlimited period and was unregistered and thus violated the provisions of Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act and Section 49 of Registration Act. 15. THERE is no averment in the plaint to show that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant subsisting between the parties prior to the execution of the Kabuliyat which was simply executed for collateral purposes as was argued before me by learned counsel for the respondent. 16. A mere look at the aforesaid Kabuliyat shall go to disclose that rent at the rate of Rs. 16. A mere look at the aforesaid Kabuliyat shall go to disclose that rent at the rate of Rs. 90/- per month was payable; it was to expire at the end of the month and commence from Phussudiam Samvat 2029. Whenever the tenant was to vacate the premises he had to deliver the possession to the landlord. There was no specification of the period of tenancy. There is nothing on record to show that the tenant was already party to any partition decree. There is no averment in the plaint to show that the tenancy was created prior to the execution of rent-note. Defendant never admitted the plaintiff as the sole landlord as was the case put forward by him in the plaint, Parties are tied down to their pleadings. 17. IN Ram Saran v. Smt. Laxmi Devi reported in ARC 1984 page 47 it was observed:- "The proposition that an unregistered instrument like the Kabuliyat in the present case, cannot be looked into for finding out the terms of the lease between the parties, is well-settled. It is also equally settled that such a document can be looked into for a collateral purpose. The character and nature of possession is such a collateral purpose about which an unregistered document like a Kabuliyat can be looked into but that will be of no avail to the applicant in the instant case for the simple reason that Smt. Laxmi Devi, admittedly, had continued in possession over the property in suit from before the execution of the Kabuliyat by her. IN such a situation, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Mst. Kripal Kaur v. Bechan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 199 , the admission of an unregistered document like a Kabuliyat for determining the nature of possession after the date of its execution "would be to treat it as operating to destroy the nature of the previous possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession and, therefore, to give effect to the agreement contained in it which admittedly cannot be done for want of registration. The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that to admit such a document in evidence, for the purposes sought, would really amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by Section 49 of the Registration Act. The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that to admit such a document in evidence, for the purposes sought, would really amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by Section 49 of the Registration Act. It is clear from the plaint of the instant case that no oral tenancy was set up by the plaintiff. The plaintiff baldly stated in his plaint that he was the landlord of the property in suit of which Smt. Laxmi Devi was the tenant and when this assertion was countered by Smt. Laxmi Devi, he came out with the unregistered Kabuliyat to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and Smt. Laxmi Devi. This being the sole basis upon which plaintiff Ram Saran brought to establish his right to eject Smt. Laxmi Devi, it is obvious that he could not fall back upon the unregistered Kabuliyat even for the purpose of showing that Smt. Laxmi Devi was in possession of the property under permission from him." 18. SO on a careful perusal of the pleadings of the parties and their statements I find that the aforesaid rent-note was inadmissible for any collateral purpose. There was nothing in the conduct of defendant to disentitle him from raising the aforesaid pleas which went to the root of the matter. In the result the revision is allowed. The impugned judgment and order are set aside. However, in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs of this revision. Revision allowed.