JUDGMENT E.P. SINGH, J. 1. THIS is a defendant's writ petition arising out of a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment regarding house no. 89, Beni Ganj, Allahabad. 2. THE plaintiff had alleged that the defendant was a tenant of the premises in question at the rate of rent of Rs. 80/- per month and that the defendant defaulted in making payment of rent, hence his tenancy was terminated through notice dated 13-7-1981 and thereafter the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the defendant was filed. The defence in the case was that the defendant was tenant of the plaintiff's wife and that the rate of rent was only Rs. 17/- per month and that the defendant was not in arrears of rent as he had deposited the rent under Section 30 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and that the notice served upon the defendant was bad in law and ineffective and various other pleas were taken to negative the plaintiff's claim. 3. THE trial court through its judgment dated 6-12-1982 decreed the plaintiff's suit for ejectment against the defendant and accepted the rate of rent set up by the defendant. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court the defendant petitioner had preferred a revision petition which has been dismissed by the revisional court through its judgment dated 10-3-1983. Against the judgment of the revisional court the defendant petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. THE learned counsel for the petitioner contends before me that there does not exist any relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant hence the suit was wrongly decreed by the trial court and the revisional court has failed to examine the points raised on behalf of the petitioner. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the notice served upon the defendant was bad in law hence the suit for ejectment could not be decreed. 5. THE learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the plaintiffs suit was rightly decreed. He also submitted that the notice served upon the defendant was not defective and the defendant had defaulted, hence his tenancy stood terminated and that the suit was rightly decreed. 6. He also submitted that the notice served upon the defendant was not defective and the defendant had defaulted, hence his tenancy stood terminated and that the suit was rightly decreed. 6. THE learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has placed reliance upon the rulings reported in 1977 ARC page 75 and 1983 ARC page 697. According to him the defendant had entered into possession over the premises in question through an agreement with the plaintiff, hence there existed a valid contract between the parties and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there existed no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties should be rejected. He has also stressed that in view of the ruling reported in 1983 ARC 697 there did come into existence a valid tenancy in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. He has also referred to the ruling reported in AIR 1980 Andhra Pradesh 85. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the plaintiff's suit could not be decreed in the circumstances of the present case in view of the ruling reported in 1983 ARC 50, Navin Chandra Sharma v. VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut. He has emphasized that the aforesaid ruling is based upon a Division Bench case of this Court reported in 1982 ALJ857. Paragraph 12 of the aforesaid ruling has been stressed. It has been contended that the revisional court has patently erred in not entertaining the question raised on behalf of the petitioner that the agreement between the defendant and the plaintiff was bad in law in view of the provisions of Sections 11 and 13 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 7. I find that the revisional court has noted the contentions raised on behalf of the defendant petitioner in paragraph 12 of its judgment and has answered the same in paragraph 13 as below:- "The learned trial court after trial had returned the finding that the defendant revisionist is the tenant on behalf of the plaintiff opposite party. This is a finding of fact which cannot be looked into unless it is perverse and based on no evidence. This is a finding of fact which cannot be looked into unless it is perverse and based on no evidence. The revisionist cannot be allowed to take the opposite party by surprise and to contend at the stage of argument that the agreement of tenancy was void being against the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 and the same cannot be enforced by the plaintiff against him. In these circumstances the decision in 1983 ARC 50 referred to above can be of no avail to the defendant-revisions in the present revision." 8. IN my opinion the revisional court has patently erred in not examining the question raised on behalf of the defendant petitioner that the tenancy set up by the plaintiff was void in view of the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly contended that a point which goes to the very foot of the matter should have been considered by the revisional court even at the stage when it was pressed before it. He has placed reliance upon para 2 of the ruling reported in AIR 1972 Supreme Court 782. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the ruling reported in AIR 1962 Allahabad 248, Ram Chandra v. Muneshwar wherein a Division Bench of this Court has made the following observation in paragraph 15 "In Mula v. Babu Ram, 1960 ALJ 314 AIR 1960 All. 573 Dhavan, J. expressed the opinion that if this point in regard to the propriety or otherwise of remitting an issue to the revenue court or vice versa had not been raised in the court below, then such a question could not for the first time be raised in second appeal. The proposition that was laid down by Dhavan, J. in the aforementioned case could not and we say so with respect-be so stated in view of what had been stated in this Court earlier in Shri Kishan Lal v. Bijai Singh, 1932 ALJ 857 s AIR 1932 All 701, and by the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 . In view of what we have said above, we could not appropriately refrain from going into the question for we are of the opinion, as already pointed out above, that such a question, even if raised for the first time in second appeal should appropriately be not only permitted to be raised but should be determined." 9. I think that the revisional court in the circumstances of the present case has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. It was the duty of the revisional court to have entertained the point raised on behalf of the petitioner and to have examined its worth. As the revisional court has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, I think it proper to quash the impugned judgment and ask the revisional court to re-examine the claims of the parties strictly in accordance with law. 10. DURING the course of argument the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party had tried to Impress that in view of the ruling reported in 1983 ARC 697 and the ruling reported in 1977 ARC 75, the plaintiff's suit was rightly decreed. A controversy has arisen before me as to when the defendants' tenancy qua the premises in question started. The learned counsel for the petitioner has stressed that according to the notice served upon the defendant the tenancy was alleged to have started in the year 1970 whereas the learned counsel for the plaintiff opposite party has submitted that according to the defence in the case the tenancy in question had started in the year 1976. Therefore, the decree in favour of the plaintiff should be maintained in view of the dictum of law laid down by this Court in 1983 ARC 697. The ends of justice damands that the controversy about the date of the tenancy in favour of the defendant should be specifically determined by the revisional court hereafter in the light of the pleadings and evidence on record. Thereafter the claims of the parties be determined strictly in accordance with law keeping in view the various authorities of this Court on the point. As I am sending the case back to the revisional court for reexamination of the disputes between the parties, it is not necessary to deal with other contentions raised on behalf of the parties regarding the validity of notice or the waiver. As I am sending the case back to the revisional court for reexamination of the disputes between the parties, it is not necessary to deal with other contentions raised on behalf of the parties regarding the validity of notice or the waiver. It would be open to the parties to canvass their points before the revisional court. 11. IN view of the discussions above, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the revisional court dated 10-3-1983 in Civil Revision No. 828 of 1982 Raja Ram Maurya v. Shitla Prasad Srivastava is hereby quashed and the revisional court is directed to re-examine the claims of the parties in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.