JUDGMENT K.C. AGARWAL, J. 1. THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by the State of U. P. against the judgment of the District Judge, Meerut, dated 30th September, 1981, accepting the appeal of Respondent 1 Prem Chandra Jain filed under Section 33 of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. RESPONDENT 1 Prem Chandra Jain submitted a statement under Section 6 (1) of the Act on 14-2-1977. This statement was in respect of five properties: (i) House No. 13/1596/1/3 Mutriban Street, Saharanpur City, which is double storeyed building (residential unit), measuring 246.25 square meters, totally covered with no vacant land, (ii) House No. 13/1616, Mutriban Street, Saharanpur City, measuring 18.50 square metres, totally built up, residential unit (iii) plot no. 30/15/48/1, Mutriban Street, measuring 31.35 square metres, (iv) House No. 2/1414 on Rampur Road, Saharanpur (commercial unit) in which built up area is 582.10 square metres and appurtenant land is 1248 square metres, and (v) plots nos. 32 to 35, 43 and 44 of Pardhuman Nagar, Saharanpur City measuring 3020 square metres. After perusal of the statement and making the necessary enquiry, as was felt necessary, the Competent Authority proposed to declare 1792.60 square metres as excess vacant land. An objection was filed by respondent 1 to the draft statement. The Competent Authority dismissed the objection and confirmed the proposal of the draft intending to declare 1972.60 square metres as surplus. Against this judgment, Respondent 1 preferred an appeal. The learned District Judge, Meerut, allowed the appeal by holding that as no constructions were permissible on an area measuring 1966.35 square metres on account of Regulation 20 of U. P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, this area was liable to be excluded from the definition of vacant land. According to this view, construction was permissible only on 1580 square metres which was well within the ceiling limit prescribed for Meerut, where the properties in question are situate. In this view, he allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Competent Authority by holding that Respondent 1 did not possess any land liable to be declared as surplus. Aggrieved, the State has filed the present writ. 3. In this view, he allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Competent Authority by holding that Respondent 1 did not possess any land liable to be declared as surplus. Aggrieved, the State has filed the present writ. 3. THE first question that arises for decision in the instant case is whether Section 2 (q) (i) could be applied to the land required to be left vacant under Regulation 20 of U. P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958. "Vacant land" has been defined in Section 2 (q) (i), which reads as under:- "Vacant land means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include- (i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulation in force in the area in which such land is situated." 4. THIS controversy came up for decision before this Court in State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson, 1978 AWC 731 . In that case, the question for consideration was whether under Section 2 (q) (i), the land, which is required to be left open under the Municipal bye-laws or the building regulations, falls outside the purview of the 'vacant land' and was to be excluded from consideration in addition to "land appurtenant", as defined in Section 2 (g) of the Act. The District Judge, against whose judgment the writ petition had been preferred, took the view that apart from the built in area and the land appurtenant to the building, an area of 1092 square metres, which the land holder was required to keep as open space under the bye-laws of the City Board, Dehra Dun, had also to be excluded under Section 2 (q) (i) while computing the area of vacant land. The Division Bench disapproved the above finding of the District Judge by holding that the area, which is required to be kept as open space under the bye-laws, does not fall within the purview of Section 2 (q) (i) and to that extent the District Judge was wrong in applying the aforesaid provision. The Division Bench disapproved the above finding of the District Judge by holding that the area, which is required to be kept as open space under the bye-laws, does not fall within the purview of Section 2 (q) (i) and to that extent the District Judge was wrong in applying the aforesaid provision. However, on Section 4 (9), the view of the Division Bench was that:- "Section 4 (9) of the Act provides that the extent of such other land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person. The use of the expression "any other land" makes it abundantly clear that the provision applies where there is a vacant land and another piece of land having a dwelling unit whether contiguously situated or not." On the interpretation of Section 4 (9), the Division Bench held that the owner of the building in that case did not have any surplus. 5. AGAINST this decision of the Division Bench, the State of U. P. preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court ; State of U. P. v. L.J. Johnson, 1983 AWC SO 798. The Supreme Court decided this appeal along with several others and took a different view of Section 4 (9). The view taken by the Supreme Court was that for applying Section 4 (9), it was not necessary that a person must have a land other than the land on which a dwelling unit has been constructed and in respect of which proceedings under the Act are being taken. It, however, appears that the Supreme Court took the same view of Section 2 (q) (i) as the view was that of the High Court. The Supreme Court held "Further, if there are any bye-laws requiring a portion of the land to be kept vacant, the land holder would be allowed to set apart the said land to the maximum extent of 500 sq. metres. He would also be allowed to retain an additional area of 500 square metres for the beneficial use of the building so that he may enjoy the use of a little compound also for various purposes." 7. metres. He would also be allowed to retain an additional area of 500 square metres for the beneficial use of the building so that he may enjoy the use of a little compound also for various purposes." 7. In State of U.P. v. L. J. Johnson (supra), the High Court had negatived the argument that since construction of a building was not permissible under the municipal bye-laws or under the building regulations over such land it could not be treated as vacant land and an allowance had to be made for it in addition to "appurtenant land". The attention of the High Court was also invited to certain provisions of U. P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, and the municipal bye-laws framed by some municipal boards, which provide for set back lines from the plinth of the building. The Division Bench while rejecting the argument held:- "It cannot be disputed that such requirements are enforced for the purpose of allowing a minimum extent of land around the building for convenient enjoyment of the building and also for town planning and environmental purposes. It is for the same purposes that the Act has made provision for land appurtenant in relation to a building. What is contemplated under Section 2 (q) (i) is that land which is to be maintained as open space like green park, play ground etc., where no construction is permissible at all under any regulations contained in the Master Plan or the law governing the construction of buildings. It does not cover cases where a part of the land is to be left open for beneficial and convenient enjoyment of the building or to satisfy the requirements for town planning and environmental purposes." 6. THE view expressed with regard to Section 2 (q) (i) has been approved by the Supreme Court, when it observed:- "Coming now to Johnson's case, while the High Court of Allahabad was right in interpreting these provisions in so far as it held that the built area plus upto 500 sq. metres allowed under the municipal bye-laws and 500 sq. metres as additional area for beneficial enjoyment had to be excluded." At this point, it may be useful to point out that the total area of urban land in Jhonson's case was 2530 square metres, including built area, Built area, was 464 square metres. metres allowed under the municipal bye-laws and 500 sq. metres as additional area for beneficial enjoyment had to be excluded." At this point, it may be useful to point out that the total area of urban land in Jhonson's case was 2530 square metres, including built area, Built area, was 464 square metres. The Supreme Court excluded this built area, then the deductions allowed under Section 2 (g), i.e., 1000 sq. metres. The total deductions came to 1464 square metres. As the ceiling limit prescribed for Dehradun, from where the case arose, was 2000 square metres, but the actual area was 2530 square metres, 530 square metres was declared as surplus. These would indicate that the Supreme Court having held that 500 square metres allowable as land appurtenant included the land required to be left under the municipal bye-laws and, therefore, in addition to 500 nothing more could be left out or excluded. Since 500 square metres had been left out as land appurtenant, to leave land in addition to this area would be conferring double benefit on the person possessing the property. It was for this purpose that the legislature had thought of giving 500 square metres. 7. I have mentioned above that the District Judge had taken the view that apart from the built area and the land appurtenant to the building, an area of 1092 square metres, which the land holder was required to keep as open space under the building regulations, had also to be excluded under Section 2 (q) (i) while computing the area of vacant land. This had not been approved by the High Court and was found to be based on wrong interpretation of Section 2 (q) (i). To the same effect is the view of the Supreme Court. Clause (i) of Section 2 (q) is not applicable to land which is required to be left as open space under the municipal bye-laws or the building regulations. The land provided as "land appurtenant" to a building by Section 2 (g) takes care of the bye-laws and the building regulations. Nothing more or over and above it is permissible to be given or excluded. 8. FOR that I have said above, it is demonstrated that the controversy relating to Section 2 (q) (i) is concluded by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court which has been approved by the Supreme Court. Nothing more or over and above it is permissible to be given or excluded. 8. FOR that I have said above, it is demonstrated that the controversy relating to Section 2 (q) (i) is concluded by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court which has been approved by the Supreme Court. There is no ambiguity in it. The State of U. P. v. Gurmit Singh, 1981 AWC 795 in Writ Petition No. 1563 of 1981, State of U. P. v. Mangalsen, decided on 25-7-84 and in Writ Petition No. 8367 of 1981, P. N. Duggal v. State of U. P., decided on 16-8-1984, the same view was taken. 9. LEARNED counsel for Respondent No. 1 contended that as there was a conflict on the above controversy between the decision of this Court reported in State of U. P. v. Gurmit Singh (supra) and State of U. P. v. Someshwar Prasad, 1982 AWC 442 and also because of general importance of the question involved, a learned Single Judge has referred the question of applicability of Section 2 (q) (i) in such a matter, this Court should in all propriety await the decision of the Division Bench. Counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakur v. Ratilal Motilal Patel, AIR 1968 SC 370 where the Supreme Court has held that when it appears to a Single Judge or a Division Bench that there are conflicting decisions of the same Court, or there are decisions of other High Courts in India which are persuasive and a different view from the view which prevails in his or other High Courts, the Judge or the Bench should order the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice with a request to form a special or Full Bench to hear and dispose of the case or the questions raised in the case. For this proposition, the learned counsel relied on other decisions referred to by the Supreme Court in this judgment. 10. IN the instant case, I find that the order referring the case by a learned Single Judge to a larger Bench is not a decision, which is capable of being treated as binding precedent. Salmond on Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, on pages 223 and 224 deals with as to what a precedent is. 10. IN the instant case, I find that the order referring the case by a learned Single Judge to a larger Bench is not a decision, which is capable of being treated as binding precedent. Salmond on Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, on pages 223 and 224 deals with as to what a precedent is. According to Salmond:- "A precedent, therefore, is a judicial decision which contains in itself, a principle. The underlying principle which thus forms its authoritative element is often termed the ratio decidendi. The concrete decision is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as regards the world at large. The only use of authorities or decided cases says Sir George Jessel is the establishment of some principle which the Judge can follow out in deciding the case before him." "The only thing" says the same distinguished Judge in another case, 'in a Judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case was decided." The only judicial principles which are authoritative are those which are thus relevant in their subject matter and limited in their scope. All others, at the best, are of merely persuasive efficacy. They are not true ratio decidendi, and are distinguished from them under the name of dicta or obiter dicta, things said by the way ......The prerogative of judges is not to make law formulating and declaring it- this pertains to the legislature-but to make law by applying it. Judicial declaration, unaccompanied by judicial application, is not of binding authority." 11. THIS passage has been followed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Shaikh Dawood v. Collector of Central Excise, Madras, AIR 1961 Madras, page 1. 12. FROM the above, it would appear that an order making a reference to a larger Bench since is not a decision, it cannot be considered to be a precedent and, as such, is not binding. The precedent means a decision which has been given after due consideration to serve as a rule for future guidance in the same or analogous matters. Accordingly, the decisions which do not decide any controversy are not precedents. To my mind, the controversy is squarely covered by the Division Bench of this Court and the decision of the Supreme Court, referred to above. Accordingly, the decisions which do not decide any controversy are not precedents. To my mind, the controversy is squarely covered by the Division Bench of this Court and the decision of the Supreme Court, referred to above. Before the Judge who decided State of U. P. v. Someshwar Prasad (supra), neither was the judgment of the Supreme Court nor of the Division Bench cited where the learned Judge deciding State of U. P. v. Gurmit Singh (supra) had relied on the judgment of the Division Bench. 13. THE Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, also in Part I, Socialisation of Urban Land, has made a similar validation of Section 2 (q), at page 20 as under J "(1) There is no contradiction between clauses (g) and (q) of Section 2. (2) As regards the question whether under sub-clause (1) of Section 2 (q), the land in excess of the extent allowed as 'land appurtenant' could be treated as being excluded from the definition of 'vacant land', it may be pointed out that in view of the provisions contained in Section 42 of the Act, the definition of 'land appurtenant' provided in the Act will prevail over the definition of 'land appurtenant' provided in any other municipal bye-law or building regulation the provisions contained in clauses (g) and (q) (i) of Section 2 have to be read together and in a harmonious way together the correct definition of 'vacant land'. Consequently, if the 'appurtenant land' under the building regulations happens to be much more than 500 square metres permitted under section 2 (g) as 'land appurtenant', the same will be restricted to 500 square metres and the excess land will not be covered by Section 2 (q) (i) and will be treated as 'vacant land'. (3) Some Municipal bye-laws provide only for some set-back lines from the plinth of the buildings. Such requirements are enforced for purposes of allowing a minimum extent of land around the building for convenient enjoyment of the building and also for town planning and environmental purposes. Such land falling within set -backs will also fall within the purview of 'land appurtenant' as defined in the Act and cannot be treated as separate from 'land appurtenant'. Such requirements are enforced for purposes of allowing a minimum extent of land around the building for convenient enjoyment of the building and also for town planning and environmental purposes. Such land falling within set -backs will also fall within the purview of 'land appurtenant' as defined in the Act and cannot be treated as separate from 'land appurtenant'. (4) Under section 2 (q) (i), what is really excluded from the definition of the term 'vacant land' relates to areas which are to be maintained as open space like green park, playground etc. In other words, the reference is to lands where no construction is permissible under any regulations contained in the Master Plan or the law in force governing the construction of buildings ". THE Idea set in the Preface of the Book is "the real intention behind the issue of these guidelines has been that they may provide guidance to the authorities concerned in the States and Union Territories to achieve a broad measure of uniformity while implementing the provisions of the Act in their respective jurisdiction." 14. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court recently in Prabbakar Narhar Pawar v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1984 Bombay 122, has taken the same view. Learned counsel for Respondent 1 submitted that there were other points also in the appeal before the District Judge, but as he had applied Section 2 (q) (i), he did not consider them and, as such, after quashing his judgment, the appeal should be sent back to him for a fresh decision on these points. There is substance in this submission. 15. LEARNED counsel for Respondent 1 further contended that during the pendency of the writ petition, the said respondent had disposed of some of the plots or lands belonging to him on being found by the District Judge that he had no surplus. Counsel submitted that, in these circumstances, respondent 1 be given the option to give choice. If law permits, respondent 1 will have the same. 16. FOR these reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge, Meerut, dated 30-9-1981 is quashed, and he is directed to decide the appeal of respondent no. 1 afresh. The State of U. P. will be entitled to costs from respondent no. 1. Petition allowed.