JUDGMENT M. Wahajuddin, J. - Opposite party landlords brought a suit for ejectment, arrears of rent and mesne profit against the revisionist defendant. The trial court has struck off the defence of the revisionist-defendant by its order dated 15-9-1984 under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. as enforced in Utter Pradesh. That provision runs as follows : "5. Striking of defence on non-deposit of admitted rent, etc :-(1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof, whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for use and occupation, admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent, or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default in this regard, the Court may, unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to entertain any defence or as the case may be, or strike-off his defence". The trial court after referring to the periods of default and dates of deposit held that no good and sufficient reasons have been given for delayed deposit. It is being urged that the precedence lay down that the court should exercise its mind and should not strike-off the defence on technical considerations and, if the delayed deposit is bona fide, the trial court should give benefit to the tenant as the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. are penal in nature. It has also been held in one of the rulings cited that even in absence of any representation the court should consider the material on record as to pass orders. 2. The learned counsel for the opposite party relied upon Jitendra v. Ist Addl. District Judge, 1981 A.R.C. 445. It has also been held in one of the rulings cited that even in absence of any representation the court should consider the material on record as to pass orders. 2. The learned counsel for the opposite party relied upon Jitendra v. Ist Addl. District Judge, 1981 A.R.C. 445. a single Judge pronouncement laying down that representation, if filed beyond the prescribed time, should not be entertained and the court has no option but to reject the defence. It would be found that as per order 15 Rule 5 of Explanation 3 in sub-rule (2) it has been provided that the court may consider representation of the defendant considering the delay, it is made within 10 days of the date of first hearing, namely, the date when the written statement is filed. It would appear that the suit itself was instituted in February, 1984, and the service was effected upon the defendant and written statement was filed on 7-3-1984 and about this there is no dispute. The representation itself was filed on 15-9-1984. The representation, thus, was undoubtedly belated, but I have to bear in mind the principles laid down in a number of pronouncement in this connection. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the revisionist are Vimal Chand Jain v. Gopal Agrawal, 1981 A.L.J. 908. Sudesh Kumar v. Nargapai and others, 1984 A.R.C. 242. and Pooran Chand Gupta v. Second Addl. District Judge Agra, 1983 A.R.C. 817. The gist and ratio of these pronouncements are that the court should exercise its mind, must consider the matter of bona fides, should not reject the tenant's plea on technical grounds, must consider the materials on record, etc. and in the Supreme Court case of Vimal Chand Jain (supra) it has been further observed that notwithstanding want of any representation the court should exercise discretion considering every fact and circumstances. 3. The matter is, therefore, to be approached in the background and context of the broad principles and guidance contained in the aforesaid pronouncements and while exercising discretion mind has to be exercised and materials on record are to be taken into consideration. But I may hasten to add that for either side technicalities should not prevail as such if the matter can be disposed of by this Court in revision, unnecessary delay should not be caused. 4. I have given my anxious considerations to the arguments urged. But I may hasten to add that for either side technicalities should not prevail as such if the matter can be disposed of by this Court in revision, unnecessary delay should not be caused. 4. I have given my anxious considerations to the arguments urged. It would appear that a written representation was made and it is Annexure"1". and it was stated therein that the delay in deposit of three months rent, i.e. May, June and July, 1984 made in August, 1984, was due to two factors, namely, the closure of court for Vacation in June and wife's serious illness in July, 1984. On scrutiny of the record it would be found that there was another default also and there is not a word in the representation explaining the delay concerning the same. It would appear that the suit was filed in February, 1984, and appearance was made on 7th March, 1984. By that time the rent and mesne profit from December, 1983 to February, 1984, was due. After appearance one month's further rent by way mesne profit for March, 1984, also became due. Under the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. all the amount due for the said period upto February, 1984, should have been deposited by the date of first hearing, i.e. 7th March, 1984, which would mean that dues for period upto February, 1984, should have been deposited by 7th March, 1984, and the dues for March 1984 again should have been deposited within a week of its falling due. This the revisionist has not done. It would be found from the judgment of the trial court that all this amount was deposited together on 25th April, 1984. This delay and default has neither been explained in the representation, nor I find any bona fide for it. Discreations are to be exercised judicially and not at arbitrarily. The legislative intent is always to be borne in mind. If the legislature has specified the period by which the amount due should have been deposited, then it must be deposited unless the court is in a position to say that the delay was bona fide and well explained. This is not the position. The legislative intent is always to be borne in mind. If the legislature has specified the period by which the amount due should have been deposited, then it must be deposited unless the court is in a position to say that the delay was bona fide and well explained. This is not the position. True, the court will not act on technicalities, but at the same time it will not completely overlook the provisions of law, and the arguments that in any case the amount stood deposited though on 25th April, 1984, will have no force. As regards the second period concerning May, June and July, 1984, it would not doubt appear that explanation was offered and the trial court should have considered the matter in a proper and well discussed manner. I may observe that the plea of vacation is uncalled for when the grounds of wife's illness is there. But I again find that according to the very medical certificate (Annexure "2") the illness was upto 2-8-1984 and there was no justification for further delay in the deposit while the deposit has been made on 17th August, 1984. 5. When that is the position, I do not find any force in this revision and the defence has been rightly rejected. The revision is summarily rejected The parties shall bear their own costs. 6. A copy of this order may be given, if possible by tomorrow on payment of usual charges. 7. Before the judgment was signed the revisionist counsel then brought my notice the case of Vimal Chand Jain, v. Shri Gopal Agrawal, 1983 A.R.C. 203 (S.C.). It has been observed in the very beginning that on the individual facts of that case written statement is entertained imposing certain conditions. So that pronouncement concerned the individual facts of that particular case. As regards the present case I have already discussed the matter threadbare as to come to my aforesaid view and this ruling will not help.