JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - This is a defendant's appeal. 2. Facts relevant lie within a narrow compass. The case has had chequered career. The respondent instituted the suit giving rise to this appeal on January 29, 1963, against Ramchandra (since dead) claiming the relief of eviction from the shop described in the plaint and a sum of Rs. 66.37 as arrears of rent. Ram Chandra was the tenant of the respondent in this shop. The rent payable was Rs. 20/- per month. The tenancy was determined by notice under S. 106, Transfer of Property Act, given on December 5, 1962 which was served on the defendant on December 7, 1962. The respondent had obtained permission from the State Government under S. 7-F of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, (hereinafter as the `Act'). to sue the defendant for eviction. on November 19, 1962. In defence, it was pleaded that the defendant had been earlier tenant of three apartments only in the said shop on rent at the rate Rs. 12/- per month. With effect from March 22, 1952 tenancy was created in his favour in support of the fourth apartment also and the rent was raised to Rs. 20/- per month. Possession was, however, not delivered to him over that apartment and hence it was claimed that the rent was liable to be suspended. The validity of the notice was disputed. It was further stated that the permission granted by the State Government was void. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had rejected the application made by the landlord under S. 3 of the Act, in the revision filed before the Commissioner, the permission was granted to sue the defendant for eviction in respect of two of the apartments only. Against this the defendant-tenant made a reference to the State Government which, however, proceeded to reject it and further to grant permission in the entire accommodation in favour of the respondent without according opportunity to the defendant. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit in plaintiff's favour on August 8, 1963. It repelled the contention of the defendant- tenant that the State Government could not on its own grant the permission to sue for eviction under S. 3 and the contention of the defendant that possession had not been given to him over the fourth apartment was not accepted. It repelled the contention of the defendant- tenant that the State Government could not on its own grant the permission to sue for eviction under S. 3 and the contention of the defendant that possession had not been given to him over the fourth apartment was not accepted. Ram Chandra was found to have been the tenant of the entire accommodation and the notice was found to be valid. In appeal, the lower appellate Court confirmed the decree on April 30, 1964 under the assumption that the power exercised by the State Govt. under S. 7-F was administrative in character. It was held that on this account opportunity was not required to be given to the defendant- tenant, and that the State Government was competent not merely to rescind the order passed by the lower authority but also to grant permission in the positive. The finding of the trial Court that the defendant had been in occupation of the entire accommodation was also affirmed. 4. Aggrieved, the defendant-tenant preferred this appeal. The appeal was allowed by D. D. Seth, J. on April 8, 1971. Against this, the respondent filed an application for review. The same was allowed on February 15, 1974, observing that the plea that the State Government had not passed a reasoned order was taken for the first time in the course of argument in the appeal, and hence the respondent could not at that stage of the case bring to the notice of the court the fact that reasons had been recorded by the State Government. The respondent had, in the meantime, by application dated July 11, 1971, obtained a copy of the reasons recorded on the file of the State Government. This was brought on record of the review petition. Ram Chandra, the appellant, had, however, died on January 26, 1974, before the review petition was decided. His legal representatives sought that the order be repealed on this ground. This was allowed on April 11, 1974, and the order passed on February 15, 1974 was recalled. An application for substitution was made by Kishan Lal, respondent, on August 16, 1974 whereby the legal representatives of Ram Chandra were brought on record of the review petition. His legal representatives sought that the order be repealed on this ground. This was allowed on April 11, 1974, and the order passed on February 15, 1974 was recalled. An application for substitution was made by Kishan Lal, respondent, on August 16, 1974 whereby the legal representatives of Ram Chandra were brought on record of the review petition. The review petition was decided ultimately on July 31, 1979 and allowed on the sole ground that the learned single Judge had on April, 8, 1971 set aside the decree for arrears of rent also, even though on the defendant's own showings his liability to pay rent existed. Thus, the appeal came to be reheard before me. 5. Sri Prakash Krishan, learned counsel for the appellants, raised twofold contentions in support of the appeal. (i) the order made by the State Government under S. 7-F of the Act dated November 19, 1962, is void being non- speaking; and, (ii) the order aforesaid passed by the State Government is vitiated also on account of absence of opportunity to the deceased defendant-tenant to meet the contention of the plaintiff-landlord seeking permission to evict the defendant from the entire accommodation filed in reply to the reference made by the defendant. 6. Section 3 of the Act imposed restrictions on the eviction of tenant. No suit could be filed for eviction without the permission of the District Magistrate except on the grounds specified in this section. The permission granted by the District Magistrate to sue for eviction in the Civil Court was made subject to an order that the Commissioner may pass in revision under sub-sec. (3). Section 7-F provided : "7-F. Power of State Government. - The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or, refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in S. 3 or requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person under S. 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under S. 7-A, and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice." 7. In regard to ground No. 1, there is no dispute that the proceeding under S. 7-F of the Act arising out of orders under S. 3 relating to the grant of permission to file a suit were quasi-judicial in nature, the law is settled by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, 1965 All LJ 353 : AIR 1965 SC 1767 and Vasudeo Chaube v. Vaidya Nand Kishore, 1968 All LJ 1021. This was also the unanimous view expressed by the Full Bench of this court in Ram Murti Saran v. State of U.P., 1970 All LJ 1177 : AIR 1971 All 54 endorsing the majority view taken in Haji Mansoor Ahmad v. State of U.P., 1968 All LJ 809 : AIR 1970 All 467 (FB). 8. It is also not disputed that it was incumbent upon the State Government in exercise of powers under S. 7-F to record reasons. The majority in the Full Bench decisions in cases of Ram Murti Saran v. State of U.P. (supra) and Prem Prakash Virmani, 1970 All LJ 1197 : AIR 1971 All 82 (supra) held that the State Government is bound to give reasons for its orders under S. 7-F in proceedings arising out of an application, as in this case, under S. 3 for permission to landlord to file a suit in the Civil Court for the eviction of a tenant from an accommodation. 9. The impugned order made by the State Government on 19th November, 1962 granting permission to the respondent to sue for eviction of the tenant from the entire accommodation does not assign any reason whatever in its support (Ext. 4). It states barely that the conclusion was arrived at after considering the matter including the contention of the landlord opposite party. Sri Jagdish Swarup argued for the respondent that reasons were recorded on the file and that the communication thereof to the revisionist tenant was not necessary. It appears that during the stage of review against the decision of this appeal dated April 8, 1971 the respondent applied on July 11, 1971 to the State Government whereupon a copy of the reasons recorded on the file was furnished to him on 16th August, 1971. It appears that during the stage of review against the decision of this appeal dated April 8, 1971 the respondent applied on July 11, 1971 to the State Government whereupon a copy of the reasons recorded on the file was furnished to him on 16th August, 1971. It is well established that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. "Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and. conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." See Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 , Mohinder Singh Gill, AIR 1978 SC 851 . The question herein is not of correctness or adequacy of the reasons assigned which, as observed also in Ramji Das v. Trilok Chand, AIR 1971 SC 2361 , cited for the respondent, does not attract interference of the Court. It, instead, is a case where the order communicated does not at all specify the reasons in support thereof. 10. The contention of Sri Jagdish Swarup that the order impugned be treated as speaking since reasons were contained on the file and that the communication thereof to the party affected be not considered essential, is, in my opinion, unacceptable since this is basically in conflict with the concept underlying the requirement to record the reasons. A presentation of reasons would go some way to ensuring reasonableness and improvement in the responsible exercise of discretion. The rule of law is most effective when people not only understand the rule but the reason for it as well. 11. A presentation of reasons would go some way to ensuring reasonableness and improvement in the responsible exercise of discretion. The rule of law is most effective when people not only understand the rule but the reason for it as well. 11. A person prejudicially affected by a decision must be adequately notified of the case he has to meet in order to exercise any right he may have to make further representations or effectively to exercise a right of appeal "(de Smith : Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edition 1980, P. 149) Paul Jacksan in Natural Justice (1979) observes at page 95 that there is no doubt that in many circumstances there is a duty to give reasons and that the courts and the legislature increasingly recognise the desirability of such a duty and further that "with the desirability of giving reasons for decision so widely recognised it surely can be argued that a failure to do so amounts to a failure to be manifestly seen to be doing justice, whether the body concerned is a court, a statutory tribunal or a domestic tribunal". According to the learned author- "Except in a system of palm tree justice a party is entitled to know why a decision was reached, or how else can be challenge its' correctness?. 12. Is anything more likely to ensure that a person reaches the right decision than an obligation to justify it by reasons Lord Bramwell put this argument in Allcroft v. Bishop of London, (1891) AC 666 and cited with approval the answer given by Lindley L.J. to the suggestion that the order being final, no statement of reasons be required, namely, that it is that he may be under the necessity of forming a careful opinion, and one that will bear public examination" (Emphasis mine). "Reasons", says the Supreme Court, "are the lines between the material on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions they disclose, how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision. Whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial, they should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable" vide Union of India v. M.L. Capoor, (1973) 2 SCC 836 at page 854 : AIR 1974 SC 87 at p. 98. Whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial, they should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable" vide Union of India v. M.L. Capoor, (1973) 2 SCC 836 at page 854 : AIR 1974 SC 87 at p. 98. The finality attached to the order of the State Government under S. 7-F subject to the supervisory powers of the High Court under Article 227 and the appellate powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Those would be placed under a great disadvantage if "no reasons are given, and the appeal is dismissed without recording and communicating any reasons" See Mahabir Pd. Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 SC 1302 . The order passed by the District Magistrate cancelling the licence in that case was quasi-judicial. The relevant rules granted a right to appeal to the State Government against this order. It was held that this right could be effectively exercised if reasons be recorded by the District Magistrate and supplied to the aggrieved party. If the aggrieved party is not supplied the reasons, the right to appeal is an empty formality. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, a party to the dispute is ordinarily "entitled to know" the grounds on which the authority has rejected his claim. If the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reasons is greater. The court insists upon disclosure of reasons on the ground inter alia that the party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or the Supreme Court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous vide Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India dated 28-10-1969, Reported in AIR 1971 SC 862 . Reference in this connection may also be made to the decisions in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, AIR 1969 SC 1297 ; Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606 . Emphasis was laid again upon this aspect in Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decisions in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, AIR 1969 SC 1297 ; Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1606 . Emphasis was laid again upon this aspect in Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981 : AIR 1976 SC 1785 at p. 1789 stating - "If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring- reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." 13. The State Government in the present case, moreover, did not affirm as such the order passed by the Commissioner on 6-10-1961. Whereas the Commissioner had granted permission in respect only of part of accommodation and the reference to Government was by the aggrieved tenant, and not the landlord, the latter thought fit to modify the order and permit eviction against the entire accommodation. Consideration of fair play in action would certainly require in the minimum a disclosure of reasons in the order communicated to the tenant for departure from the Commissioner's order in this manner. Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1977) 1 SCC 472 : AIR 1977 SC 567 . 14. To maintain, therefore, that reasons recorded on the file by an authority exercising quasi-judicial jurisdiction need not be communicated to the party affected would defeat the object and run counter to the insistence behind the recording of reasons. Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1977) 1 SCC 472 : AIR 1977 SC 567 . 14. To maintain, therefore, that reasons recorded on the file by an authority exercising quasi-judicial jurisdiction need not be communicated to the party affected would defeat the object and run counter to the insistence behind the recording of reasons. That would' help neither to safeguard against arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion nor enable the party effectively to agitate against the same in superior courts. The courts would be handicapped since they would not know in that event the working behind the text of the order itself. 14A. For the respondent the submission was also made that the plea to this effect was raised for the appellants for the first time in this appeal and that the tenant could have applied to the State Government and obtained a copy of the reasons appearing on the file just as the respondent did by putting in application dated 11-7-71. This is without force. The plea raised is of law that goes to the root and is founded on material placed on record. The respondent got adequate notice of this when this appeal was decided earlier on April 8, 1971. The respondent sought review against that decision but it is nowhere stated that the tenant had been communicated the reasons. There is no duty cast upon the tenant in such a situation to go about enquiring from the State Government the reasons governing the order. The failure on his part to do so does not impart validity to the order. In England the Tribunals and Enquiries Act, 1971 lays a duty to supply reasons when requested to do so. In our country the duty to communicate reasons is not conditional upon the same being applied for. Section 7-F of the Act does not in terms, it is true, as argued for the respondent, provide for the supply of reasons but then this also does not say in so many words that the State Government has to record reasons. This is regarded as implicit consideration being had to the nature of the power exercised, the effect that this might have upon the rights of the parties, and the fact that there is nothing to exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. 15. This is regarded as implicit consideration being had to the nature of the power exercised, the effect that this might have upon the rights of the parties, and the fact that there is nothing to exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. 15. Taking up now the ground No. 2, there may be no denial that the power conferred under S. 7-F of the Act is wide. Upon the facts placed before it, the State Government could act suo motu and make such orders as it deemed just and proper. It could rescind the order passed by the Commissioner on an application under S. 3 or affirm the same or modify it as might be appropriate. The question, however, is, could the State Government modify the order to the prejudice of the tenant revisionist without apprising him that it so intended or the basis therefore. To this, in my view, the answer is in the negative. Natural justice generally requires that persons liable to be directly affected by proposed decisions be given adequate notice of what is proposed, so that they may be in a position to make representations on their own behalf or effectively to prepare their own case and to answer the case they have to meet (de Smith : Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn. page 196). This is not to say that the party aggrieved is entitled as of right to personal hearing. The ends of justice might in a given situation be met by affording him the opportunity to put in a written representation in this behalf. The principle underlying is that a quasi- judicial tribunal cannot make any decision adverse to a party without giving him an effective opportunity of meeting any relevant allegation against him, vide M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671 . The defendant-tenant could have legitimate expectation that in the event of the State Government according to the contention of the respondent and deciding to worsen the defendant's position, he would be apprised of the basis for the same to enable him to put forward his case. The defendant-tenant could have legitimate expectation that in the event of the State Government according to the contention of the respondent and deciding to worsen the defendant's position, he would be apprised of the basis for the same to enable him to put forward his case. The exercise of powers of the State Government suo motu had to be on notice to the defendant revisionist to enable him to show cause, vide D.N. Roy v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1045 which has been followed in Changoo Lal v. D.D.C., 1972 Rev. Dec. 43 and also in Badri Vishal Pandey v. State T.A. Tribunal, 1982 All LJ 128. 16. In paragraph 12 of the written statement, the defendant-appellant pleaded that the order made by the State Government as void since the permission had been granted to sue for his eviction from the entire accommodation without according opportunity to him. This was reiterated also in appeal before the lower appellate court as is manifest from ground No. 2. In his deposition, Kishan lal, plaintiff-respondent, admits that in reply to the reference made by the appellant, he had raised objections and also put forward his contention. There is no suggestion absolutely at any stage from the side of the respondent that copy of this reply submitted by Kishan Lal, respondent, was furnished to the appellant, Ram Chandra, to enable him to put forward his plea in reference thereto. The permission granted by the Commissioner was in respect only of the part of the accommodation: the appellant had filed the revision before the State Government seeking that order to be rescinded, in case the State Government thought fit to entertain the landlord's plea to permit him to evict the tenant from the entire accommodation, it was essential in all fairness that the defendant should have been apprised of the grounds taken by the landlord to enable him to meet the same, if possible. Due to this opportunity being denied to the defendant-appellant, there was clearly a breach of principles of natural justice. 17. It may not be doubted that a void Act and decision are destitute of legal effect and they can be ignored with impunity. Their validity can be attached, if necessary, in collateral or in direct proceedings. They confer no legal rights on anybody. 17. It may not be doubted that a void Act and decision are destitute of legal effect and they can be ignored with impunity. Their validity can be attached, if necessary, in collateral or in direct proceedings. They confer no legal rights on anybody. A permission to institute a suit by or under an order passed under S. 7-F in contravention of the principles of natural justice is invalid and the suit for ejectment can be successfully defended on this ground. vide Lal Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chardra, 1965 All LJ 353 : AIR 1965 SC 1767 (supra). Section 16 of the Act will not come in the way to the defence on this ground since this would be a case where the order impugned enabling the suit to be instituted was passed in contravention of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure and in breach of the settled principles of natural justice. 18. Sri Jagdish Swarup, learned counsel, then urged that even if the order made by the State Government under S. 7-F of the Act were discarded as void or non est, the plaintiff-landlord would be in position to sue the defendant for eviction on the basis of the permission that had been granted to him by the Commissioner on Oct. 6, 1961 against which the reference had been made by the tenant to the State Government. The submission for the appellant is that the order passed by the Commissioner be taken to have merged into the order made by the State Government. The justification of the doctrine of merger is sought in the principle that there cannot be at one and the same time more than one operating order governing the same subject matter. Therefore the judgment of an inferior court or Tribunal, if subjected to an examination by the superior court or authority, ceases to have existence in the eye of law and is treated as being superseded by the judgment of the superior court or authority, as the case may be. The judgment of the inferior authority loses its identity. This principle applies as well to the proceedings before the quasi-judicial and executive authorities, see Gojer Brothers (Pvt.) Limited v. Sri Ratan Lal Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 453 , at page 460 : AIR 1974 SC 1380 at p. 1384. The judgment of the inferior authority loses its identity. This principle applies as well to the proceedings before the quasi-judicial and executive authorities, see Gojer Brothers (Pvt.) Limited v. Sri Ratan Lal Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 453 , at page 460 : AIR 1974 SC 1380 at p. 1384. In the instant case, however, it might be said that since the order passed by the State Government had been found to be nonest or void, there should be no question of merger of the direction made by the Commissioner into the same. The order of the State Government may, in other words, be ignored as non-existent. This does not conclude the matter because the plaintiff-landlord could not under the law sue the defendant-appellant for eviction on the strength of the order given by the Commissioner which was in respect only of the part of the accommodation. What is meant by "accommodation" as defined in S. 2(a) of the Act is an exclusive occupation whether in the whole of a building or in a part of it. When a part of the building is an accommodation, it follows that another part may be another accommodation, vide, Dr. A.C. Dass v. T.R.O. and D.S.O. Lucknow, 1962 All LJ 553 (FB). In N.C. Agarwal v. Krishan Lal Mehra, 1960 All LJ 755, another Full Bench of this court held that a District Magistrate could not under S. 7 (2) of the Act order the proprietor landlord to let portion of the accommodation to one person and the remaining portion of that accommodation to another. The District Magistrate had to consider the entire accommodation as one unit just as it had been a unit of tenancy from before. He could not create several accommodations out of one unit of accommodation and then order a landlord to let those divided portions to different persons. The Act deals with accommodations in their entirety. There is no provision relating to a portion of an accommodation. The same principle will apply, in my view, where the question of granting permission to the landlord to sue for eviction under S. 3 is concerned. It was not open, therefore, to the District Magistrate or the Commissioner for that matter to grant permission to the landlord to sue the tenant for eviction in respect only of the part of the accommodation. It was not open, therefore, to the District Magistrate or the Commissioner for that matter to grant permission to the landlord to sue the tenant for eviction in respect only of the part of the accommodation. The Legislature has made it departure in this behalf under S. 21(1) of the new Act No. 13 of 1972, as is also clear from R.16(1)(d) framed thereunder whereby the eviction may be directed by the prescribed authority in respect only of a part of the building also. Both the courts below in this case have recorded the finding that the defendant had been tenant in occupation of the entire shop comprising of the four apartments and that entire shop is the subject matter of the suit as is manifest from the description appearing in the plaint. The order made by the Commissioner dated 6-10-1961 would, therefore, stand vitiated on this account and it may not be, therefore, of assistance to the plaintiff-respondent. 19. For the discussion made above, the appeal succeeds in part. The suit shall stand dismissed in so far as the relief of eviction against the appellants is concerned. The judgment and decree of the court below are set aside accordingly to the extent. In the circumstances, the costs shall be borne by the parties.