Bahar Uddin v. Board of Revenue — 1984 DIGILAW 903 (ALL)

JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - These two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution raise identical questions for consideration. They were heard together and are being decided by a common judgment. Baharuddiri s case was treated as the leading case on the request of the counsel for the parties. 2. The two questions that were canvassed before us are, firstly, whether the Board of Revenue for the State of U.P. has its principal seat at Allahabad and, if so, can it transact any business at a place other than Allahabad and, secondly, whether it is open to the Board to decide a matter coming up before it in its revisional jurisdiction either under the U.P. Land. Revenue Act or the U.P. Zaniindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 without affording an opportunity of hearing to a party which has not claimed such opportunity by filing an objection before the Commissioner under Paragraphs 188 and 189 of the Revenue Court Manual. We will deal with these questions one by one but before doing so we may notice the BACKGROUND 2A. Baharuddin was recorded occupant of certain plots in village Nagia Mai of pargana Nagi Kada in Tehsil Sirathu of district Allahabad and was found to be in possession thereof during proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In January, 1970 a report was made by the Lekhpal on the basis whereof proceedings under S. 122-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act were initiated against him. Baharuddin filed an objection in February, 1970 but in vain. The Assistant Collector (Tahsildar, Sirathu) passed an order in May, 1970 directing the ejectment of Baharuddin from the land and requiring him to pay some amount by way of damages on his view that Baharuddin was a trespasser over the land which belonged to the Gaon Sabha. Aggrieved, Baharuddin filed a revision in the court of Commissioner, Allahabad Division and reiterated his claim that he was a Sirdar of the land and could not be ejected on the footing that he was a trespasser over Gaon Sabha land. The Additional Commissioner, who heard the matter, made a recommendation to the Board of Revenue on June 3, 1971 that the revision be dismissed. This was under Para 188 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual. The Additional Commissioner, who heard the matter, made a recommendation to the Board of Revenue on June 3, 1971 that the revision be dismissed. This was under Para 188 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual. Under sub-paragraph (2) of this Paragraph, to which we will refer at the appropriate stage, information was given to the petitioner to file an objection against the recommendation within 30 days. The case of Baharuddin is that he did file such an objection but on facts it has been found by the Board of Revenue that no such objection was filed. Be that as it may, the recommendation was accepted by one Member of the Board and the revision was rejected in Chambers. When he came to know about it, Baharuddin filed a restoration/review petition No. 352 of 1971-72 of which notice was issued to the contesting respondents by a single Member of the Board on June 9, 1972. The learned Member felt that the matter be heard by a Full Bench of the Board of Revenue and referred it for consideration to the Full Bench. On May 31, 1975, the Full Bench of three Members answered the reference upholding the dismissal of the revision in chambers. The decision is reported as Babu Lal v. Saheb Singh 1975 Rev Dec 235 as that case was also heard with the case of Baharuddin. A review petition was thereafter filed on July 24, 1975 which was referred for hearing before a larger Bench of five Members for deciding the questions (1) Can Members of the Board sitting singly or in Bench entertain, hear and decide appeals and revisions under the Land Revenue Act and under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act at any district headquarters in the State or at Lucknow or Allahabad only? (2) Was it open to the Board to dismiss an application for revision without giving a hearing to the parties and, (3) Are the principles contained in paragraphs 186 to 189 of the Revenue Court Manual valid and legal? 3. (2) Was it open to the Board to dismiss an application for revision without giving a hearing to the parties and, (3) Are the principles contained in paragraphs 186 to 189 of the Revenue Court Manual valid and legal? 3. On January 2, 1976, a Five Member Full Bench of the Board returned its answers to the above questions in these words : (1) "The members of the Board sitting singly or in Bench can entertain, hear and decide appeals and revisions under the U.P. Land Revenue Act and under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act at any district headquarters in the State or at Lucknow and Allahabad. However, the jurisdiction of the Members - both territorial and Act-wise has to he governed by the decisions of the full Board taken in exercise of the powers vested in it by Sections 7 and 8 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, and Rules 170 and 170-A of the Revenue Court Manual." (2) "It is open to the Board to dismiss an application in revision without giving a hearing to the parties, and (3) .... "these rules are perfectly valid and legal and although a little change may be considered necessary by virtue of the insertion of the new Section 333-A yet these changes should be considered to be mutatis mutandis without having any hearing whatsoever on the validity and legality of these rules." 4. The decision is reported as Bahar Uddin v. Gaon Sabha in 1976 Rev. Dec. 53. Bahar Uddin then came to this Court in writ petition No. 8921 of 1975 assailing the correctness of the view taken by the Board of Revenue. 5. In the connected petition also, a revision filed by Mansoor Ali was dismissed by the Board of Revenue without hearing him, after accepting the recommendation of the Commissioner, upholding the plea that the claim of tenancy rights made by Mansoor Ali in certain plots was barred by S. 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Mansoor Ali had claimed to be a co-tenant with some others in the written statement filed by him in a suit filed by Ismail Khan and others under S. 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act claiming sole tenancy rights in those plots. CHRONOLOGY 6. We may begin with Bengal Regulations' II of 1793 which was passed by the Governor General in Council. CHRONOLOGY 6. We may begin with Bengal Regulations' II of 1793 which was passed by the Governor General in Council. The collection of land revenue payable in each Zila was to be made by an officer styled as Collector of the Zila. The Board of Revenue was entrusted with the work of collection of revenue and the Collectors were to follow all instructions given to them by the Board. The judicial function of the Board as a court of appeal was abolished and the judicial powers were transferred to the court of Diwani Adalat. The other Regulations III and IV of 1793 need not detain us nor Regulations XXV of 1803 for they primarily dealt with the supervision to be exercised by the Board of Revenue in the matter of collection of revenue. In the year 1822, the Governor General in Council passed Regulation III of 1822. By it, the Boards of Revenue for the lower, Central and Western Provinces were established in place of the at Fort William. The composition, powers, functions and duties of these Boards were enumerated in Sections 4 and 5 of the Regulations. We may only notice that the Governor General was empowered to authorise any one or more members of the Board to exercise the powers of the Board or to divide the business of the Board and assign any special duty to any member separately. Also, in the case of difference of opinion between two members, the matter was to be referred to a third member for which purpose, if necessary, the Governor General in Council could appoint one or more temporary or provisional member. We may also notice that under S. 4, the place of the Sadar station was to be fixed under clause "third". 7. In 1829, a major change was brought about by Bengal Regulations I of 1829. In order to rationalise the system and for supervising the magistracy and the police and for controlling and directing the Executive Revenue Officers as well as to make a better arrangement for determination of questions relating to the assessment of land under settlement and for judicial decision of cases relating to the fiscal interest of the State, the magistracy and police as well as the collector and other Revenue Officers were placed under the superintendence and control of a Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit in charge of moderate tracts of the country. The Regulation entrusted the Commissioner with the powers then vested in the courts of circuit together with those vested in the Boards of Revenue to be exercised under the authority of the Nazamut Adawlut and Sudder or Chief Board of Revenue. The Sudder or the Head Board of Revenue was ordinarily to be stationed at Fort William at Calcutta but the powers of the Board were to be exercised by the Commissioners within the districts comprised in their division. Then came Regulation X of 1831 whereby the Governor General in Council was empowered to depute one or more members of the Sudder Board "to be ordinarily stationed at Allahabad and to exercise exclusive control and direction over the revenue affairs" of the areas mentioned in the Regulation, in like manner as was then exercised by the Sudder Board at Fort William. Later on, by a proclamation,' the station of the Board was shifted temporarily from Allahabad to Agra and the Board was styled as the Board of Revenue for the North Western Provinces. 8. Bengal Regulation I of 1833 talked of Sudder Board of Revenue at Allahabad though, when the Regulation was passed, the Sudder Board was stationed at Agra. Subsequently, by Act IV of 1850, the Sudder Board of Revenue at Fort William was denominated as the Board of Revenue for the lower provinces of Bengal. 9. The Board of Revenue continued to have its office at Allahabad though for a brief period the members of the Sudder Board were stationed at Agra. The Board for North Western Provinces also became Board of Revenue for Awadh territory in the year 1890, after the formal a malga mation of the territory of Oudh. 10. The Recovery of Rents (Bengal Act) 1859, the North Western Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1893, the North Western Provinces Act, 1881, the North Western Provinces and Oudh Land Revenue Act, 1901, the North Western Provinces Tenancy Act, the Agra Tenancy Act, 1936 and the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 did not describe the Board of Revenue to be one at Allahabad but during all this period it was stationed at Allahabad. The Board used to hold its courts in circuits at the headquarters of the Division of the Province during the period various tenancy legislations remained in force. The Board used to hold its courts in circuits at the headquarters of the Division of the Province during the period various tenancy legislations remained in force. In 1949, practice of holding courts in circuits was stopped and the administrative wing of the Board of Revenue was shifted to Lucknow. 11. The U. P. Board of Revenue Act, 1922, (U.P. Act XII of 1922), inter alia, provided for transfer of some non-judicial powers of the Board to the local Government and the U. P. Board of Revenue (Regulation of Procedure) Act, 1966 (U. P. Act No. 32 of 1966), which repealed the U. P. Board of Revenue (Regulation of Procedure and Validation) Act, 1953 (U. P. Act 30 of 1953), made amendment in Sections 7 and 8 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. These enactments do not, in terms, talk about any permanent seat of the Board but they do not mention any place other than Allahabad as the place where the officer of the Board was located. We may, at this stage, notice the contents of para 163 of the U. P. Revenue Court Manual which envisages an office of the Board at Allahabad and a Registrar of that office. The relevant portion of this paragraph reads thus : "163. Presentation of petitions to Board of Revenue : (a) Every appeal or application to the Board of Revenue shall, unless the Board by special order in any case otherwise direct, be presented to the Registrar of the Board's office at Allahabad or to a member at Nainital or to the District Officer of the district concerned. (b) Every appeal or application to the Board of Revenue presented to a member at Nainital or to the District Officer, of the district under Rule 153(a) shall forthwith be sent to the Registrar of the Board's office at Allahabad. (c) Every appeal or application to the Board of Revenue, presented to the Registrar of the Board's office at Allahabad or received by him under sub-rule 163(b) shall immediately be examined .................. (d) to (g) ........................." 12. We may also notice para 173 of the U. P. Revenue Court Manual which contemplates that the result of the appeal decided by the Board is to be affixed on the notice board in their office. (d) to (g) ........................." 12. We may also notice para 173 of the U. P. Revenue Court Manual which contemplates that the result of the appeal decided by the Board is to be affixed on the notice board in their office. When the appeal has been heard in any district other than Allahabad, the result is to be affixed on the notice board of the Commissioner's court if it is a headquarters of a Division or on the notice board of the Collector's court. 13. The U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 provided under sub-section (1) of S. 256 that the Board may sit for the disposal of cases under that Act at the headquarters of any district. R. 339 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 provides that the provisions of S. 256 have been made applicable to suits and proceedings specified in Schedule II of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as well as to the appeals, revisions and reviews arising therefrom. This rule is attributable to the powers contained in S. 344 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 14. In its meeting of March 4, 1967 all the members of the Board made distribution of their judicial work, inter alia, by providing that all the cases under the U. P. Land Revenue Act will be disposed of at Lucknow by the members on the administrative side who would have concurrent jurisdiction in respect of those cases, while cases other than these will be disposed of by the judicial members at Allahabad. THE FIRST QUESTION : (a) Location of the Board 15. From the chronology noticed above one thing is clear beyond doubt and it is this that from the time of the Bengal Regulation X of 1832, the principal office of the Board has generally been located at Allahabad and it is at Allahabad that later on its Registry has functioned. Though Regulation X of 1831 talked of one or more members of Sudder Board "to be ordinarily stationed at Allahabad" and Regulation I of 1833 talked of "the Sudder Board of Revenue at Allahabad", the Board has been exercising jurisdiction, in-respect of areas relatable to it from time to time, from an office or Registry located at Allahabad. Though Regulation X of 1831 talked of one or more members of Sudder Board "to be ordinarily stationed at Allahabad" and Regulation I of 1833 talked of "the Sudder Board of Revenue at Allahabad", the Board has been exercising jurisdiction, in-respect of areas relatable to it from time to time, from an office or Registry located at Allahabad. Historically, therefore, one cannot escape the conclusion that the location of the Board of Revenue for the State of Uttar Pradesh in the sense of its principal office is at Allahabad. (b) Distribution of business 16. The question of distribution of business need not be examined with reference to the contents of the various Bengal Regulations for in view of the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. 1901 (as amended from time to time) any inquiry about the position in the 19th Century would be of no practical importance. 17. Prior to its amendment by the U. P. Board of Revenue (Regulation of Procedure) Act, 1966 and till its amendment by U. P. Act 30 of 1975 (U. P. Land Laws Amendment Act, 1975) S. 5 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act said : "5. The control of all non-judicial matters connected with the land revenue in the United Provinces other than matters connected with settlement is vested in the (Provincial Government) and the control of all judicial matters and of all matters connected with settlement under this Act is vested in the Board." It was by U. P. Act 30 of 1975 that S. 5 came to be in the following form : "5. Controlling powers of State Government and Board respectively :- Subject to the superintendence, direction and control of the State Government the Board shall be the chief controlling authority in the matters provided under the Act, excepting matters relating to disposal of cases, appeals references and revisions." It is clear that the control of the Board till 1975 was exclusively in respect of judicial matters and matters connected with settlement under the Land Revenue Act while it was the Provincial Government which was vested with the control of all non-judicial matters connected with land revenue other than those connected with settlement. 18. 18. Section 7, dealing with the distribution of business and division of jurisdiction amongst the members, prior to the passing of the U. P. Board of Revenue (Regulation of Procedure) Act, 1966 provided that : "7. Power to distribute business- (1) Subject to such rules or orders as the (State Government) may prescribe or issue, the Board may distribute its business and make such territorial division of its jurisdiction amongst its members as to the Board may seem fit. (2) All orders made or decree passed by a member of the Board in accordance with such distribution or division shall be held to be the orders or decrees (as the case may be) of the Board." After amendment by the 1966 Act, the section assumed the following form : "7. Power to distribute business: (1) Subject to the provisions of any rules made under this Act and of section 8, the Board may so distribute its business and make such territorial division of its jurisdiction amongst its members as it thinks fit. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Board may in particular and subject as aforesaid, regulate the disposal of its judicial business by its members sitting alone or in Division Benches." 19. Section 8 provided for the mode of decision of judicial proceeding coming under the consideration of the Board on appeal or reference or in revision heard by a Division Bench composed of two or more members. 20. At present, S. 7 reads : "7. Power to distribute business :- (1) Subject to such rules or orders as the (State Government) may prescribe or, issue, the Board may distribute its business and make such territorial division of its jurisdiction amongst its members as to the Board may seem fit. (2) All orders made or decree passed by a member of the Board in accordance with such distribution or division shall be held to be the orders or decrees (as the case may be) of the Board." 21. Section 10 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act may also be read : "10. (2) All orders made or decree passed by a member of the Board in accordance with such distribution or division shall be held to be the orders or decrees (as the case may be) of the Board." 21. Section 10 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act may also be read : "10. Power to authorise member to exercise power of the Board - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the State Government may authorise any member of the Board to perform or exercise, either generally or in respect of any particular locality, all or any of the duties and powers imposed and conferred on the Board." 22. These provisions indicate that the business of the Board relating to judicial matters and that connected with settlement has been the primary responsibility of the Board of which it was invested with controlling powers. The business could be distributed by the Board amongst its members for its convenient transaction. Also, that the jurisdiction which the Board was exercising could be divided by it amongst its members territory wise as well with the same object. The concept of distribution of business and the division of jurisdiction inherent in the provision of S. 7 is not that the Board was to confine the allocation of exercise of its powers amongst its members on the basis of territorial division alone as suggested by the counsel for the petitioner. If the provisions noticed by us above are to be read in that manner, we would be attributing redundancy and surplusage to some of the words used in S. 7. In legal parlance, `jurisdiction' connotes the idea of competence to deal with a matter and `business' conveys the idea of the ambit of functions to be performed. Business can be distributed amongst its members by the Board without regard to any specified part of the territory over which the Board has jurisdiction. And, likewise, any of its functions or powers can be entrusted by the Board to one or more of its members with reference to a specified part of the territory over which the Board has been given power to discharge its functions and exercise powers. That is the inevitable inference when. one reads the language used in S. 7, having regard to the accepted canons of construction of statutes. That is the inevitable inference when. one reads the language used in S. 7, having regard to the accepted canons of construction of statutes. Thus read, S. 7 would seem to provide that the Board may distribute its business amongst its members as it thinks fit and the Board may make territorial division of its jurisdiction amongst its members as it thinks fit. We are not noticing the precedents cited by the counsel for the parties for, to us, they appear not to be of much help in finding out the true import of the language used in S. 7. We would emphasise that the first principle of construction of statute's being to read the language in its normal grammatical sense, we find it difficult to accept the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the word "and" should be read as being used in a conjunctive sense so as to compel the Board to confine entrustment of exercise of its powers to its members territorially alone. 23. Section 10 of the Land Revenue Act is another pointer to the legitimacy of the view that the members of the Board may be authorised to perform or exercise-either generally or in respect of any particular locality all or any of the duties and powers imposed or conferred on the. Board. We find no justification for the view canvassed by the petitioner's counsel, that the Board cannot decide to entrust disposal of business under a particular Statute to some of its members alone or is bound to entrust the exercise of all its powers under any of the enactments with which it is concerned to some of its members only with reference to particular territories of the State. 24. We may look at the question from another angle. When the Board says that the cases under the Land Revenue Act will be heard by members sitting at Lucknow and those under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by the members sitting at Allahabad, it does not but make a distribution of that particular kind of work in respect of the entire territory of the State to some of its members. 25. That immediately brings us to the submission, emphatically made by the petitioner's counsel, that the Board cannot transact any part of its business, judicial or non-judicial, from a place other than Allahabad. 25. That immediately brings us to the submission, emphatically made by the petitioner's counsel, that the Board cannot transact any part of its business, judicial or non-judicial, from a place other than Allahabad. This submission has been made as a corollary to the plea that the principal place of the Board is at Allahabad. We find it difficult to countenance the suggestion that merely because the Board has its principal office or Registry at Allahabad, it cannot exercise its powers at any other place. The provisions of S. 256 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which are applicable to the proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by virtue of R. 339 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, in terms provide that the Board may sit at any district headquarters in Uttar Pradesh for disposal of cases. The absence of any similar provision in the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 which has provided in S. 189 for the place of sitting of other revenue courts, cannot be said to disentitle the Board from hearing cases at a place other than Allahabad for we cannot forget that unlike the Board of Revenue, the other revenue courts are established under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. The practice, though discontinued in the year 1949. of holding circuit courts was justified, apart from the earlier history, by the provisions of S. 256(1) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. In the instant case, where we are concerned with the question of the competence of the Board to hear a judicial matter at a place different than Allahabad, we are not inclined to consider the submission that it is not open to the Board of Revenue to station some of. its members at Lucknow even for performance of the Board's administrative functions. 26. When we look at S. 339(c) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and read list II of Schedule III of that Act, we find that S. 7 of the Land Revenue Act is available to the Board for distribution and division of its functions and jurisdiction in respect of the areas to which the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act applies. This enables the Board to make the kind of distribution amongst its members of the power to deal with cases arising under that Act which has been made by it. This enables the Board to make the kind of distribution amongst its members of the power to deal with cases arising under that Act which has been made by it. The second question (a) The question deserves to be considered only after we have read the four rules contained in the U.P. Revenue Court Manual on the basis whereof the Board felt that it could dismiss a revision without hearing the parties in case an objection had not been filed in writing before the Commissioner against the recommendation made by him. And, the rules are these : "186. Presentation.- Where the decree or order sought to be revised was passed by the Commissioner the application shall be presented in the Board in the manner prescribed for the presentation of appeals, but if such decree or order has been passed by a court subordinate to the Commissioner it shall be presented to the Commissioner or with a request that it may be forwarded to the Board with his recommendation for orders. 187. Procedure in the court of the Commissioner. - If on examining the revision application the Commissioner is satisfied that (1) an appeal lies to the District Judge or the Board from the decree or order sought to be- revised, or (2) the application does not fall under any clause (a), (b) or (c) of section 275, he shall forward the case to the Board with the recommendation that the application may be summarily rejected. 188. Recommendation by the Commissioner.- (1) Where no recommendation for rejection under the last preceding rule is made the Commissioner may send for the record and hear the applicant or the parties to the case and thereafter make such recommendation to the Board as he may consider proper, Provided that no recommendation for varying the order sought to be revised shall be made unless both the parties to the case have been heard. (2) The Commissioner shall inform the .parties of the recommendation that it made to the Board and within one month of the date on which he is so informed, the aggrieved party may file objection before the Board. 189. (2) The Commissioner shall inform the .parties of the recommendation that it made to the Board and within one month of the date on which he is so informed, the aggrieved party may file objection before the Board. 189. Procedure before the Board.- On receiving an application under rule 187 or a recommendation under rule 187 or 188 and after considering the objection, if any, made under sub-rule (2) of rule 188 and hearing the parties, if necessary, the Board shall pass such orders as they may consider proper, Provided that save where an aggrieved party has failed to file objection in accordance with sub-rule (2) of rule 188 the order sought to be revised shall not be varied or reversed unless both the parties to the case have been heard. 27. The view of the Board really turns upon the proviso to R. 189 on the basis whereof it seems to have held that where a party fails to file an objection in writing to the recommendation made by the Commissioner, the revision can be disposed of without hearing that party. 28. Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provided for the power of the Board to revise an order passed by a court subordinate to it in the following terms : "333. Power of Board to call for cases.- The Board may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate court in which no appeal lies, or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, and if such subordinate court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the Board may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit." 29. Until S. 333-A was added by U.P. Land Laws Amendment Act, 1975 (U.P. Act No. XXX of 1975. Until S. 333-A was added by U.P. Land Laws Amendment Act, 1975 (U.P. Act No. XXX of 1975. The effect of the addition of S. 333-A clearly has been that where the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner felt that the order of the court subordinate deserves affiance or confirmation he can pass an order to that effect without making a reference to the Board and it is only where a variation in the order of the subordinate court was thought to be called for is a reference to be made to the Board. The second question, where it relates to a recommendation by the Commissioner to confirm the order of the subordinate Court, has become more or less academic except for some cases pertaining to the period prior to the introduction of S. 333A but the question does survive for consideration in respect of a recommendation for varying or reversing the orders sought to be revised because of the proviso to rule 189. 30. The basic question is whether it is incumbent upon the authority, entrusted with the power to revise an order, to give a hearing to parties before taking a decision or is it open, in, a situation where no objection in writing is filed by the aggrieved party against a recommendation made by the subordinate court, to do so without hearing both the parties. The Board exercises judicial power while deciding a revision. And, it is settled that judicial power cannot be delegated except when specifically permitted. S. 333 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, does not permit any delegation of this power to hear and decide a revision. Likewise, the concluding portion of S. 333-A dealing with the Board also does not envisage any delegation of the power by the Board to hear and decide the matter. S. 333-A reads thus : "333A. S. 333 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, does not permit any delegation of this power to hear and decide a revision. Likewise, the concluding portion of S. 333-A dealing with the Board also does not envisage any delegation of the power by the Board to hear and decide the matter. S. 333-A reads thus : "333A. The Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any suit or proceeding referred to in section 333 decided by any court subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceeding and if he is of opinion that such order should be varied, cancelled or reversed, he shall refer the case with his opinion thereof for the orders of the Board and the Board shall thereupon pass such orders as it thinks fit." 31. We may,. at this stage, extract the observations of the Supreme Court in G. Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpn. AIR 1959 SC 308 , contained in paragraph 31 of the report, which lays down the principle in unmistakable terms. "The second objection is that while the Act and the Rules framed thereunder impose a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing, the procedure prescribed by the Rules impose a duty on the Secretary to hear and the Chief Minister to decide. This divided responsibility is destructive of the concept of judicial hearing. Such a procedure defeats the object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by reasoned argument to accept his point of view. If one person hears and another decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. We, therefore, hold that the said procedure followed in this case also offends another basic principle of judicial procedure." 32. Smt. Maheshwari Devi v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 796 is an authority for the proposition that hearing should be afforded by the authority. which makes the decision and that hearing by another authority, which merely makes a recommendation, is not enough. Smt. Maheshwari Devi v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 796 is an authority for the proposition that hearing should be afforded by the authority. which makes the decision and that hearing by another authority, which merely makes a recommendation, is not enough. In that case, the Additional Collector had passed a final order under S. 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act anulling the settlement made in favour of Smt. Maheshwari Devi. He did not hear her. He acted upon a report made by the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms who had prepared it after hearing the parties.. The Patna High Court felt that the Deputy Collector, who had the powers of a Collector for the purpose of S. 4(h) of the Act and had made the report, having heard the parties, it was not necessary for the Additional Collector to have given further opportunity to the appellant to be heard. The Supreme Court said thus : (in paragraph 6 of the report) : "It seems to us quite clear from the reading of the orders set out above that the Deputy Collector had not purported to pass a final order at all. What he purported to do was to send a recommendation to the Addl. Collector and it was the Addl. Collector who passed a final order. The fact that the Deputy Collector had the powers of the Collector for the purposes of section 4(h) of the Act seems to us irrelevant for the purpose of this case........... and proceeded to set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand the case to the Additional Collector for disposal according to law. 33. We have extracted the above observations of the Supreme Court with a view to emphasise that the fact that the Commissioner hears the parties before making a recommendation, by itself, cannot be a substitute for a hearing by. the Board. 33. We have extracted the above observations of the Supreme Court with a view to emphasise that the fact that the Commissioner hears the parties before making a recommendation, by itself, cannot be a substitute for a hearing by. the Board. The filing of written objection by the aggrieved party to the recommendation made by the Commissioner cannot be treated to be the first stage of hearing enabling the aggrieved party to claim further hearing by the Board, which is the authority entrusted with the statutory power of deciding the application in revision, because the rule.contained in para 188(2) and the proviso to para 189 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual, inasmuch as it confines the right of hearing only to a party which has filed an objection against the recommendation made by the Commissioner, acts as a fetter upon the right of hearing due to the aggrieved party. In fact, it is in that sense that the rule has been interpreted by the Five Member Full Bench of the Board in Bahar Uddin's case. Such an interpretation cannot be upheld. 34. The rule, it is said, is attributable to the power contained in Sections 230(1) and 344(1)(b) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act read with R. 182(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules which in terms applies Part I of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual in the matter of procedure inter alia, for diposal of suits, applications and other proceedings under the Chapter pertaining to tenures. The argument is that these paragraphs of the Revenue Court Manual having statutory force cannot be ignored and no right of hearing, independent of these paragraphs, can be claimed by any party. The petitioners answered the submission by saying that R. 182(1) is ultra vires the rule making power under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act since a rule, denying hearing before the revisional authority by inter posing the procedural requirement of an objection in writing before the Commissioner, impinges upon the Board's jurisdiction to hear and decide a matter coming up before it in revision. It is said that, inasmuch as, the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the proceedings under-the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act by virtue of S. 341 thereof, the right of a party to be heard by the Revising Authority cannot be hedged in by requiring him to file an objection in writing to the recommendation made by the Commissioner. 35. It is not really necessary for us to consider the' argument relating to the validity of the rule contained in para 188(2) and the proviso to para 189 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual for we feel that the controversy can be resolved by looking at it a little differently. By now, it is settled beyond doubt that even where the Statute does not, in terms, confer a right of hearing upon a party, an order adverse to him should not be passed without hearing him as it could be contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice which is applicable not only to authorities 'exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers but also those exercising administrative powers. For example, we find that in M.N. Sastri v. S.S. Satyanarayan AIR 1981 SC 1156 , the Supreme Court said that even while hearing an application in revision under S. 435/438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, where a party is not entitled to be heard as of right, hearing should be given to it else it would be contrary to the aforesaid rule of natural justice. Similarly, we find in Menaka Gandlri.v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , a Seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court saying that "although there are no positive words in the Statute, requiring that the party shall be heard, yet, the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the Legislature. The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of natural justice......... and that "Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of natural justice......... and that "Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. The inquiry must, always be, does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected." These observations would be applicable to the case of the present petitioners too for notwithstanding the fact that the rule of procedure required them to have filed an objection, in terms of the aforesaid paragraphs of the Revenue Court Manual, yet, fairness damanded that before the revision was disposed of by the Board, it should have given a hearing to them. We cannot forget that rules of procedure are handmaidens in the cause of justice and should not be allowed to become barriers to it. 36. We are purposely avoiding to go into the question of the validity of the rule of procedural requirement enshrined in these paragraphs of the Revenue Court Manual because we feel that cases where a recommendation of dismissal of the revision has been made by the Commissioner, would be very few for, after the insertion of S. 333-A in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, a Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner would no longer be required to make such a recommendation. He can refuse to interfere with the order of the subordinate Court and a party aggrieved by the refusal would be free to approach the Board directly-. As far as cases where a recommendation to vary or reverse the order is made, we would read down the contents of para 188(2) and the proviso to para 189 of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual to the effect that irrespective of the failure of an aggrieved party to file an objection in writing before the Board, the order sought to be revised shall not be varied or reversed unless the parties to the case have been heard. We would do so with a view to keep intact the amplitude of the powers conferred upon the Board both under S. 333 and S. 333-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and to avoid abridgment of the content of that power by the intended procedural requirement of filing of an objection in writing for we cannot overlook that these paragraphs of the Revenue Court Manual were framed at a time when Sections 333 and 333-A were not in existence. We have proceeded to do so on the principle accepted by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor of Bihar University AIR 1968 SC 353 in respect of S. 4 of the Bihar State Universities (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Act (No. 14) of 1960. The same interpretation will enure to the benefit of the surviving cases, like those of the petitioners relating to pre-S. 333-A period, where the recommendation to dismiss the revision has been accepted by the Board without hearing the aggrieved party. 37. Before parting with the discussion we feel inclined to observe that the provisions of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual, which were framed long ago, require a second look to bring them in conformity with the provisions of the various Statutes under which the revenue courts, including the Board of Revenue, have been entrusted with the powers and functions and of the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court and this Court. We may add that Sri B. P. Paul, who appeared for the petitioners, and Sri B.K. Singh, who appeared for the respondents, have argued the matter before us with ability and have rendered valuable assistance to us. THE CONCLUSION 38. The inevitable consequence of the above discussion is that the dismissal of the revisions by the Board in both these cases, without affording hearing to the petitioners, cannot be sustained. The order passed by it refusing to review the dismissal order can also not be upheld. THE CONCLUSION 38. The inevitable consequence of the above discussion is that the dismissal of the revisions by the Board in both these cases, without affording hearing to the petitioners, cannot be sustained. The order passed by it refusing to review the dismissal order can also not be upheld. The orders dated June 2, 1971 and November 12, 1971 by which the revision petitions filed by petitioners Mansoor Ali and Bahar Uddin have been rejected as well as those dated May 31, 1975 and January 2, 1976 disposing of the review petitions, in so far as they uphold the view that it was open to the Board to dispose of the revision petitions without hearing the petitioner for his failure to file objection to the recommendation made by the Additional Commissioner, are quashed. The Board is directed to hear and dispose of the revisions afresh in accordance with law. 39. The petitions succeed to this extent and are allowed. The petitioners shall be entitled to costs.