JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - These two writ petitions raise common questions of law and as such are being decided together. Certain posts of Scientists were sanctioned under various All India Co-ordinated Research Projects sponsored by the Indian Council for Agricultural Research, New Delhi, in the Institute of Agricultural Sciences, Banaras Hindu University (hereinafter referred to as the University). Subsequently on the recommendation of the Academic Council of the University the Executive Council of the University created the aforesaid posts in the normal cadre of the University as Professors, Readers and Lecturers with the corresponding scales of pay by redesignating the said posts. Thereafter an advertisement dated 28-12-1983 was issued from the office of the Registrar (Admin.) (Selection Committee Section) of the University inviting applications for the aforesaid posts. Apart from mentioning essential qualifications certain desirable qualifications were also mentioned in the said advertisement. Applications seem to have been made in pursuance of the aforesaid advertisement and ultimately a Selection Committee was constituted which fixed 29-8-1984 and 30-8-1984 for interview of the candidates. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10385 of 1984 was filed by Narendra Nath Sirothia on 24-8-1984 in this Court with the prayer that the advertisement aforesaid may be quashed and the University authorities may be directed not to hold any selection for the posts advertised under the said advertisement. A copy of this advertisement has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. 2. The case of the petitioner in brief is that the Academic Council of the University had by its resolution dated 8-3-1984 made a recommendation to the Executive Council that the qualifications for the aforesaid posts be approved as per norms of the University Grants Commission and that no desirable qualifications need be shown and no experience of working in schemes be asked for and that the Executive Council approved the aforesaid resolution by its resolution dated 20/22-6-1984. According to the petitioner the Deputy Registrar (Acad) of the University conveyed the aforesaid resolution among others to the Director, Institute of Agricultural Sciences and the Dean Faculty of Agriculture, of the University by his letter dated 7-8-1984, a copy whereof is attached as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. According to the petitioner the Deputy Registrar (Acad) of the University conveyed the aforesaid resolution among others to the Director, Institute of Agricultural Sciences and the Dean Faculty of Agriculture, of the University by his letter dated 7-8-1984, a copy whereof is attached as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. According to the petitioner before the qualifications for the aforesaid posts had been determined by the Executive Council as contemplated by Statute 15 of the Statutes of the University it was not open to the Registrar to have issued the impugned advertisement on 28-12-1983. According to him the advertisement was also vitiated because it mentioned desirable qualifications which were specifically prohibited to be mentioned by the aforesaid resolution of the Executive Council. 3. Allegations of mala fide have in this connection been made against Dr. Mahatim Singh, Director of the Institute of Agricultural Sciences of the University. Subsequently in view of the fact that allegations of mala fide had been made against him an application was made to implead Dr. Mahatim Singh as a party to the writ petition a supplementary affidavit was filed along with the said application giving details about the plea of mala fide. The allegations of mala fide as stated in the writ petition, in the supplementary affidavit filed in support of the application for impleading Dr. Mahatim Singh as a party and in the rejoinder affidavit in substance are that before the afore said posts were created in the normal cadre of the University as mentioned above Dr. Mahatim Singh had provided temporary jobs in the schemes/projects to his own persons and desirable qualifications were mentioned in the advertisement so as to give weightage to those persons who included his own son Shri Jitendra Pratap Singh and his fathers sisters sons Shri Tarkeshwar Singh and Shri Radhey Shyam Singh. 4. Two counter-affidavits have been filed-one by V. K. Nagar, Assistant Registrar, Institute of Agricultural Sciences of the University and the other by Dr. Mahatim Singh. It has inter alia been asserted therein that it was wrong to suggest that the desirable qualifications were mentioned in the advertisement in a mala fide manner in order to facilitate the appointment of the aforesaid persons but had been mentioned because the Vice-Chancellor of the University, who had been authorised in this behalf by the Executive Council of the University, had approved the draft advertisement containing the desirable qualifications. In regard to the resolution of the Academic Council and the Executive Council dated 8-3-1984 and 20/22-6-1984 respectively prohibiting desirable qualifications being mentioned, it has been stated that these resolutions were passed consequent upon the proceeding of the meeting of the Faculty of Agriculture held on 17-11-1983 and that it appeared that the clause that no desirable qualifications need be shown was subsequently interpolated in the proceedings by Professor Lallan Rai, Dean, Faculty of Agriculture. It was also emphasised on behalf of the respondents that at all events the resolutions of the Academic Council and the Executive Council dated 8-3-1984 and 20/22-6-1984 respectively were not relevant as the advertisement dated 28-12-1983 had been issued by the Registrar long before on the basis of the approval granted to the draft advertisement by the Vice-Chancellor who had been authorised by the Executive Council to determine the qualifications for the aforesaid posts. 5. Subsequently an application was made by one Dr. Mohammad Imtiyaz for being impleaded as petitioner No. 2 in this writ petition on the ground that he too was aggrieved by the desirable qualifications being mentioned in the impugned advertisement inasmuch as he had applied for employment in response to the said advertisement but had not been called for interview. 6. The second writ petition, namely Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11814 of 1984 was filed by Dr. Inder Sen Singh on 14-9-1984 challenging the aforesaid advertisement. He asserts that he had applied for employment in response to the aforesaid advertisement, was called for interview and also appeared before the Selection Committee. He has stated that he fulfils all other qualifications but does not fulfil the desirable qualifications. He probably apprehends that he will not be selected as he does not fulfil the desirable qualifications which were illegally inserted in the impugned advertisement. The application for employment made by Dr. Mohammad Imtiaz in the writ petition filed by Narendra Nath Sirothia as well as Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11814 of 1984 has been filed by the same counsel who had filed the writ petition on behalf of Narendra Nath Sirothia. 7. As seen above Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19385 of 1984 was filed on 24-8-1984. It was filed after serving a copy thereof on the counsel for the University. It was ordered to be put up on 27-8-1984. 7. As seen above Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19385 of 1984 was filed on 24-8-1984. It was filed after serving a copy thereof on the counsel for the University. It was ordered to be put up on 27-8-1984. It appears that on that date it could not be taken up and was taken up on 29-8-1984. Counsel for the respondents were, on 29-8-1984, granted time to file counter-affidavit by 10-9-1984 and the writ petition was ordered to be listed for admission on 14-9-1984. A rejoinder-affidavit was permitted to be filed by 14-9-1984. On the application for interim reliefs which was filed along with the writ petition an order was passed on 29-8-1984 by a Division Bench of this Court to the following effect:- "Heard Counsel. The Selection Committee meeting may be held but the resolution may not be published till further orders. A certified copy of the order may be given to the parties on payment of usual charges today." It is thus apparent that the said order was passed after hearing counsel for both the parties. 8. On 14-9-1984 the writ petition was ordered to be taken up on 17-9-1984 and the petitioner was permitted to file rejoinder-affidavit in the meantime. It was further ordered on 14-9-1984 that the Executive Council which is scheduled to meet on 16th and 17th September, 1984, may meet on those dates and consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee but it shall not publish its decisions until further orders. This order too was passed after hearing counsel for both the parties. One of the learned Judges constituting the Bench which passed the order dated 14-8-1984 became subsequently indisposed and the writ petition was in pursuance of an order passed in this behalf by the Hon. Acting Chief Justice put up before us on 26-9-1984. On that date with the consent of counsel for the parties it was ordered to be put up for admission on 27-9-1984. On 27-8-1984 counsel for the parties expressed a desire that keeping in view the nature of the controversy involved therein the writ petition may be heard and finally decided at the admission stage itself. We agreed to this request and the writ petitions were thereafter argued by counsel for the parties at some length oh 27-9-1984, 8-10-1984 and 9-10-1984 (the Courts having been closed from 28-9-1984 to 7-10-1984 in connection with Deshehara holidays). We agreed to this request and the writ petitions were thereafter argued by counsel for the parties at some length oh 27-9-1984, 8-10-1984 and 9-10-1984 (the Courts having been closed from 28-9-1984 to 7-10-1984 in connection with Deshehara holidays). On the last date namely on 9-10-1984 almost at the close of the arguments counsel for the respondents pressed a technical plea also. It was submitted that since the petitioner had an alternative remedy of making a representation to the Visitor of the University, namely, the President of India, as contemplated by Section 5 (7) of the Banaras Hindu University Act, 1915 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the writ petition was not maintainable. In support of this submission reliance was placed on certain unreported decisions of this Court whereby writ petitions had been dismissed in limine on the aforesaid ground. 9. We shall first dispose of the aforesaid plea that the writ petition was not maintainable inasmuch as the petitioner had an alternative remedy of making a representation to the visitor under Section 5 (7) of the Act. For dealing with this submission it will be useful to extract Section 5 (7) of the Act:- "5...................... (7) without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Section the visitor may, by order in writing, annul any proceeding of the University which is not in conformity with this Act. the Statutes or Ordinances: Provided that before making any such order, he shall call upon the University to show cause why such an order should not be made and if any cause is shown within a reasonable time shall consider the same." 10. For the petitioner it was urged by his counsel that firstly issue of an advertisement is not a proceeding within the meaning of Section 5 (7) of the Act. Secondly, the substantial relief claimed in the writ petition is for a direction not to hold any selection for the posts advertised under the impugned advertisement. It was submitted that the only power which the visitor had under Section 5 (7) of the Act was to annul any proceeding of the University and he could, not issue a mandamus directing the University not to hold selection in pursuance of an advertisement. It was submitted that the only power which the visitor had under Section 5 (7) of the Act was to annul any proceeding of the University and he could, not issue a mandamus directing the University not to hold selection in pursuance of an advertisement. Counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that since issue of an advertisement was under the Ordinances of the University a step in the process of making appointments in the University it was a "proceeding" within the meaning of Section 5 (7) of the Act. 11. Having considered the respective submissions made by counsel for the parties in this behalf we are of opinion that on the facts of the instant case the writ petition does not deserve to be dismissed at this stage on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy even if it is held that such an alternative remedy was available to the petitioner under Ses. 5 (7) of the Act. In this connection it may be pointed out that in none of the decisions of this Court cited by counsel for the respondents the petitioners of those writ petitions had approached this Court for a direction to the University not to hold selection for a post on the ground that the advertisement for the said post had been issued illegally and mala fide. In none of those cases, therefore, this Court had the occasion to consider the question as to whether even if a writ petition was filed at the stage at which it has been filed in the instant case the petitioner had an alternative remedy of making a representation to the visitor under Section 5 (7) of the Act. In none of those cases, therefore, this Court had the occasion to consider the question as to whether even if a writ petition was filed at the stage at which it has been filed in the instant case the petitioner had an alternative remedy of making a representation to the visitor under Section 5 (7) of the Act. On the facts of the instant case we do not consider it necessary to go into the question as to whether issue of an advertisement will be a proceeding within the meaning of Section 5 (7) of the Act nor into the question as to whether the visitor had the power to issue a mandamus to the Selection Committee not to hold selection inasmuch as we are of opinion that even if an alternative remedy did exist the' writ petition does not deserve to be dismissed on that ground when the plea in this behalf was pressed only after this Court had heard arguments on the merits of the case for nearly three days on a request made by counsel for the parties that the writ petition may be heard and finally decided at the stage of admission itself. As held by a Division Bench of this Court in Deep Kumar Shukla v. Allahabad University, 1984 UPLBEC 293 : (1984 Lab IC 918) in paragraph 11 of the report, the existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the facts and circumstances of that case also this Court was of opinion that that was not a fit case in which the petition should be thrown out on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. After the repeal of the Constitution (42nd Amendment). Act existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. One of the grounds on which a writ petition is not entertained because of the existence of an alternative remedy is that if the petitioner can get an equally efficacious remedy by pursuing the alternative remedy he should not be permitted to occupy the time of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. One of the grounds on which a writ petition is not entertained because of the existence of an alternative remedy is that if the petitioner can get an equally efficacious remedy by pursuing the alternative remedy he should not be permitted to occupy the time of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. When about three days time of this Court has already been occupied by arguing the writ petition on its merits it would not be a sound exercise of discretion to dismiss the writ Petition on this ground alone at this stage. 12. Coming to the merits of the point urged by counsel for the petitioner that the qualifications for the posts sought to be filled in by issuing the impugned advertisement should have first been determined by the Executive Council as contemplated by Statute 15 of the University, it was urged by counsel for the respondents that the said Statutes did not confer any power on the Executive Council to determine qualification. It was submitted that the qualifications for appointments of teachers were determined by the University Grants Commission. Reliance was placed in this connection on Section 26 (1) (e) of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, Clause (e) of sub-section (l) of Section 26 of the aforesaid Act contemplates that the commission may make regulations consistent with the said Act and the rules made thereunder defining the qualifications that should ordinarily be required of a person to be appointed to the teaching staff of the University having regard to the branch of education in which he is deputed to work in the institution, in our opinion it is not possible to take the view that Statute 15 does not confer power on the Executive Council of the University to determine qualifications for the posts of teachers. Firstly, Clause (e) of subsection (l) of Section 26 of the University Grants Commission Act uses the word "ordinarily". The use of the said word contemplates that the minimum qualifications are to be laid down by the regulations framed under the aforesaid Act but it is still open to the University in view of the prevailing local conditions and other circumstances to provide for other qualifications also. The use of the said word contemplates that the minimum qualifications are to be laid down by the regulations framed under the aforesaid Act but it is still open to the University in view of the prevailing local conditions and other circumstances to provide for other qualifications also. Further it cannot be said that the Act or the Statutes and Ordinances framed thereunder did not contain any provision for determination of qualifications of the teachers and the same was done for the first time by the regulations framed under the University Grants Commission Act for the simple reason that the said Act was enacted in the year 1956 and the Banaras Hindu University Act was passed in the year 1915. 13. In order to find out the scope and import of Statute 15 of the University it would be useful to extract clauses (i) and (ii) of the said Statute on which alone reliance has been placed by counsel for the parties. They read:- "15. Subject to the provisions of the Act, these Statutes and the Ordinances, the Executive Council shall, in addition to any other powers vested in it, have the following powers, namely:- (i) to appoint, from time to time, such Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff as may be necessary, on the recommendation of the Selection Committee constituted for the purpose, and to provide for filling temporary vacancies therein; (ii) to fix the emoluments and define the duties and conditions of service of Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff: Provided that no action shall be taken by the Executive Council in respect of the number, the qualifications and the emoluments of teachers otherwise than after consideration of the recommendation of the Academic Council." 14. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, particularly the proviso to clause (ii) leaves no room for doubt that the Executive Council has been empowered to determine the qualifications of the Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff. The determination of qualifications, however, has not to be done by the Executive Council otherwise than after consideration of the recommendation of the Academic Council. In order to give effect to the aforesaid proviso the Executive Council is under an obligation to obtain the recommendation of the Academic Council. Statute 18 deals with the powers, duties and actions of the Academic Council. In order to give effect to the aforesaid proviso the Executive Council is under an obligation to obtain the recommendation of the Academic Council. Statute 18 deals with the powers, duties and actions of the Academic Council. Under Clause (i) of Statute 18 the Academic Council is under an obligation "to report on any matter referred to it by the Executive Council". 15. For the respondents it was then urged by their counsel that determination of qualification at the stage of appointments does not fall within the purview of the term "conditions of service" used in Cl. (ii) of Statute 15. According to them since the main clause (ii) does not confer on the Executive Council the power to determine qualifications the same could not be done by the proviso thereto. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. In Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina, AIR 1979 SC 52 : (1978 Lab IC 1644) it was held in paragraph 13 of the report:- "The expression "conditions of service" covers a wide range, as explained by the Privy Council in N. W. F. Province v. Suraj Narain, 75 Ind App 343 : AIR 1949 PC 112 , which was approved by this Court in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, (1961) 2 SCR 679 : ( AIR 1961 SC 751 ) These decisions and also a later decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 3 SCR 302 have made it clear that the expression `conditions of service' includes everything from the stage of appointment to the stage of termination of service and even beyond, and relates to matters pertaining to disciplinary action." The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in an earlier decision in I.N. Subba Reddy v. Andhra University, AIR 1966 SC 2049. In paragraph 12 of the report of that case it was held: "As explained by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 3 SCR 302 , the expression `conditions of service means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it, in matters like pension etc." 16. In Bhagelu v. Civil Surgeon, AIR 1960 All 353 a Division Bench of this Court held that a condition of service is some limitation or restriction or other similar obligation connected with the employment of a person. 17. The term "conditions of service" as used in Statute 15 is in our opinion of a wider import so as to include those limitations and restrictions also which qualify or disqualify a person from entering a service. That such limitations or restrictions which lay down qualifications or disqualifications for a post are connected with the employment of a person on such posts admits of no doubt. Article 309 of the Constitution uses the words "recruitment and "conditions of service" indicating that a distinction between the rules about "recruitment" and rules about "conditions of service" was sought to be maintained in the said Article. This, however, may have been done by way of abundant caution. At any rate Statute 15 of the Statutes maintains no such distinction No provision empowering any authority other than the Executive Council to prescribe the qualifications for appointment of Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff has been brought to our notice. It is not disputed that before appointment to a post can be made the qualifications of persons who seek employment on that post have to be prescribed. In this connection it may also he pointed out that the Executive Council is admittedly the appointing authority of Professors. Readers and Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff and even if there was no specific provision in this behalf the Executive Council by virtue of being the appointing authority would necessarily have the power to fix the qualifications for appointment of Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff. However, we have no doubt that statute 15 does confer such power on the Executive Council. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. If authority were needed for this proposition reference may be made to R.N. Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. Sales-Tax Commr, AIR 1955 SC 765 and I.T. Commr. v. I. M. Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713 . It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. If authority were needed for this proposition reference may be made to R.N. Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. Sales-Tax Commr, AIR 1955 SC 765 and I.T. Commr. v. I. M. Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713 . As such it is apparent that when the proviso to Clause (ii) of Statute 15 contemplates action by the Executive Council in regard to determination of qualifications of Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff, it is a particular manner it seeks to carve out an exception to the power conferred on the Executive Council by the main provision contained in clause (ii) thereof and viewed in this light there seems to be no manner of doubt that the term "conditions of service even apart from what has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the two decisions referred to above, namely, in the cases of Lilly Kurian (1978 Lab IC 1644) and I. N. Subba Reddy (AIR 1966 SC 2049) (supra) embraces within its sweep the power to lay down qualifications of Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion it is apparent that till the Executive Council had determined the qualifications for appointment on the aforesaid posts no advertisement could have been issued inviting applications for those posts. As seen above the qualifications in this behalf were determined by the Executive Council by its resolution dated 20/22-6-1984 whereby the recommendation of the Academic Council contained in its resolution dated 8-3-1984 was approved. The impugned advertisement having been issued on 28-12-1983, i.e., before the determination of the qualifications by the Executive Council was apparently invalid particularly, when it was specifically provided in the resolution of the executive Council that no desirable qualifications need be shown and no experience of working in scheme be asked for. 19. Counsel for the respondents have, however, justified the issue of the advertisement on 28-12-1983, as already pointed out, on the ground that before the issue of the aforesaid advertisement its draft containing desirable qualifications also was approved by the Vice-Chancellor who had been authorised by the Executive Council to determine the qualifications for the aforesaid posts. 19. Counsel for the respondents have, however, justified the issue of the advertisement on 28-12-1983, as already pointed out, on the ground that before the issue of the aforesaid advertisement its draft containing desirable qualifications also was approved by the Vice-Chancellor who had been authorised by the Executive Council to determine the qualifications for the aforesaid posts. In this connection reliance was placed by counsel for the respondents on the minutes of the special meeting of the Academic Council held on 24-7-1983, a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 1 to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Mahatim Singh. The two resolutions on which reliance has been placed read as follows:- "resolved further that the appointments to those newly created posts be made in accordance with the Statutes and Ordinances of the University. Resolved still further that the Vice-Chancellor be authorised to finalise the subject, specialisation and qualification for each post after the same is reviewed by the Faculty of Agriculture." Reliance was also placed on the resolution dated 25/26-7-1983 of the Executive Council a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 2 to the aforesaid counter-affidavit whereby the aforesaid two resolutions of the Academic Counsel were accepted and approved. In the counter-affidavit of V.K. Nagar it has been staled that in pursuance of the above, the matter came up before the Faculty of Agriculture on 11-11-1983 and a committee consisting of five persons was constituted to formulate guidelines in respect of special qualifications etc. for the aforesaid posts. This Committee held its meeting on the same day and resolved that the essential qualifications for the posts in the Institute shall remain the same as prescribed by the University Grants Commission and accepted by the University. The report of the committee who thereafter placed before the Faculty in its meeting on 17-11-1983 and it is about the Proceedings of this meeting that it has been asserted on behalf of the respondents that the clause to the effect that no desirable qualifications need be shown and no experience for working in schemes be asked for was interpolated subsequently by the Dean, Faculty of Agriculture. It would, however, be pertinent to mention at this stage that it is not the case even of the respondents that the aforesaid clause in the resolution of the Academic Council dated 8-3-1984 and of the Executive Council dated 20/22-6-1984 had also been interpolated. It would, however, be pertinent to mention at this stage that it is not the case even of the respondents that the aforesaid clause in the resolution of the Academic Council dated 8-3-1984 and of the Executive Council dated 20/22-6-1984 had also been interpolated. The only submission in this behalf which was made by counsel for the respondents was that since the aforesaid clause had been interpolated in the proceedings of the meeting of the Faculty dated 17-11-1983 they came to be incorporated even in the resolutions of the Academic Council and the Executive Council. It has been urged by counsel for the respondents that since the Faculty had accepted the aforesaid report of the Committee appointed by it on 11-11-1983 including Annexure B to the said report and since the clause to the effect that no desirable qualifications need be shown and no experience of working in schemes he asked for was interpolated subsequently and since the Vice-Chancellor approved the draft advertisement after the meeting of the Faculty dated 17-11-1983 had already taken place it could be presumed that the Vice-Chancellor had approved of the desirable qualifications being mentioned in the advertisement. According to counsel for the respondents since the Vice-Chancellor had exercised the power of finalising the qualification for the aforesaid posts in pursuance of the resolution of the Executive Council dated 25/26-7-1983 the incorporation of the desirable qualifications in the advertisement could neither be termed as illegal nor mala fide. 19A. Counsel for the petitioner in this connection has urged that the plea that the clause to the effect that no desirable qualifications need be shown and no experience for working in schemes be asked for was interpolated in the proceedings of the meeting of the Faculty of Agriculture held on 17-11-1983 is an afterthought. In this connection it has been pointed out that, as already seen above, it is not the case even of the respondents that the aforesaid clause was interpolated in the resolution of the Academic Council and the Executive Council also. According to counsel for the petitioners the aforesaid clause was all along there in the proceedings of the meeting of the Faculty dated 17-11-1983 but the same was not brought to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor while obtaining his approval to the draft advertisement. According to counsel for the petitioners the aforesaid clause was all along there in the proceedings of the meeting of the Faculty dated 17-11-1983 but the same was not brought to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor while obtaining his approval to the draft advertisement. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on a letter dated 13-11-1983 of the Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, a photostat copy whereof has been filed as an annexure to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Mahatim Singh. This letter was addressed to Mr. Mukherjee, D. R. (Aca.) of the University. It reads: "Please find herewith the corrected drafts of minutes of our last two meetings of the Faculty. Since there are many corrections you may like to have a fresh draft typed, before having it cyclostyled for circulation to members. You may have to retype the annexures also since there are lot of corrections. It has been pointed out that in pursuance of the aforesaid letter the minutes of the meeting in the ordinary course of business must have been cyclostyled and circulated amongst the members but a copy of the retyped draft of the minutes has not been produced before this Court by the respondents in order to indicate that the aforesaid clause was not there in the proceedings of the meeting dated 17-11-1983 at that stage. 20. The question as to whether Professor Lallan Rai, Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture had made an interpolation in the minutes of the meeting of the Faculty of Agriculture held on 17-11-1983, is essentially a question of fact and we do not consider it safe to record a finding one way or the other on this disputed question on the meagre material on the record of the writ petition. We are, however, of the opinion that even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted that an interpolation had been made by Professor Lallan Rai as asserted on behalf of the respondents, it has no material bearing on the question of the legality of the impugned advertisement dated 28-12-1983. As is apparent from Statute 15 the relevant provisions whereof have been quoted above the Executive Council was under an obligation before determining the qualifications of Professors, Readers. Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff to obtain the recommendation of the Academic Council and consider the same. As is apparent from Statute 15 the relevant provisions whereof have been quoted above the Executive Council was under an obligation before determining the qualifications of Professors, Readers. Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff to obtain the recommendation of the Academic Council and consider the same. It is true that under clause (xviii) of Statute 15 the Executive Council was competent to delegate any of its powers to the Vice-Chancellor but the Executive Council could not make an alteration in the statutory requirements while delegating its power to the Vice-Chancellor. The resolution dated 25/26-7-1983 of the Executive Council, on which reliance has been placed by the respondents, permitted the Vice-Chancellor to finalise the qualifications for the aforesaid posts "after the same is reviewed by the faculty of Agriculture." The Executive Council did not require the Vice-Chancellor to obtain the recommendation of the Academic council and to determine the qualifications after considering the said recommendations as contemplated by the proviso to clause (ii) of Statute 15. It is well settled that the powers of the delegate cannot be in excess or in derogation of the powers of the authority which made the delegation. Consequently, in the instant case what could not be done by the Executive Council itself could certainly not be done by its delegate, namely, the Vice-Chancellor. In other words if the Executive Council could not determine the qualifications without obtaining the recommendations of the Academic Council, the Vice Chancellor could not also obviously do so. The views of the Faculty of Agriculture could by no stretch of imagination be treated as recommendation of the Academic Council. 21. Counsel for the respondents in this connection laid emphasis on the minutes of the special meeting of the Academic Council held on 24-7-1983, a copy whereof, as already pointed out, has been filed as Annexure 1 to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Mahatim Singh which contained a recommendation to the Executive Council that the Vice-Chancellor be authorised to finalise the qualifications for the posts "after the same is reviewed by the Faculty of Agriculture". In this connection it may be pointed out that where as clause (xviii) of Statute 15 permits the Executive Council to delegate its powers to the Vice-Chancellor, statute 18, which deals with the powers, duties and actions of the Academic Council does not contain a similar provision. In this connection it may be pointed out that where as clause (xviii) of Statute 15 permits the Executive Council to delegate its powers to the Vice-Chancellor, statute 18, which deals with the powers, duties and actions of the Academic Council does not contain a similar provision. Statutes 15 and 18 are the parts of the same Statutes. It can, from the circumstance that even though power of delegation was specifically conferred on the Executive Council no such power was conferred on the Academic Council, be legitimately inferred that no power of delegation was intended to be conferred on the Academic Council and the reason in not doing so is obvious. The Academic Council is a body of experts in the matter of academic qualifications etc. and it was for this reason that the Executive Council, even though an authority higher than the Academic Council and even though it is the appointing authority of the Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other members of the teaching staff, was required to determine the qualifications for the aforesaid posts on the recommendation of the Academic Council. The Academic Council is under clause (v) of Statute 18 empowered "to consider proposals submitted by the Faculties". It is only after the proposals of the Faculties have been considered and approved by the Academic Council that they can be treated as recommendations of the Academic Council. 22. Counsel for the respondents in this connection urged that even if the Academic Council was not authorised to delegate its powers to the Vice-Chancellor it could have appointed the Vice-Chancellor as a committee to consider the qualifications for the aforesaid posts. Firstly, the minutes of the meeting of the academic council do not indicate that the Vice-Chancellor was sought to be appointed as a committee. Secondly, even if it may be accepted for the sake of argument that the Vice-Chancellor was sought to be appointed as a committee by the Academic Council to consider the qualifications for the aforesaid posts it would be of no assistance to the respondents inasmuch as it is well settled that the report of a committee has no force of its own and becomes enforceable only if it is approved by the authority who had appointed the committee. In this view of the matter after the Vice-Chancellor had determined the qualifications for the aforesaid posts as a committee he should have placed the same before the Academic council and it was only after the Academic council had approved of the same that it could become the recommendation of the Academic Council. In this view of the matter the mere fact that the Vice-Chancellor may have approved the draft advertisement containing the desirable qualifications cannot be treated at par to determination of qualifications for the aforesaid posts by the Executive Council as contemplated by the proviso to clause (ii) of Statute 15. 23. In Ramchandra v. Govind, AIR 1975 SC 915 it was held in paragraph 25 of the report;- "A century ago, in Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch D 426, Jessel MR adopted the rule that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. This rule has stood the test of time. It was applied by the Privy Council, in Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor, 63 Ind App 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) and later by this Court in several cases, Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. 1954 SCR 1098 : AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 Cri LJ 910 : Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1962 SCR 662 : AIR 1961 SC 1527 : 1961 (2) Cri LJ 705 to a Mafeistrate making a record under Sections 164 and 364 of the Cr P. C. 1898. This rule squarely applies "where, indeed, the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did no imply a prohibition to do it in any other. "Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. pp. 362-363". The rule will be attracted with full force in the present case, because non verification of the surrender in the requisite manner would frustrate the very purpose of this provision. Intention of the legislature to prohibit the verification of the surrender in a manner other than the one prescribed, is implied in these provisions. Failure to comply with these mandatory provisions, therefore, had vitiated the surrender and rendered it non est for the purpose of S. 5 (3) (b)". 24. Intention of the legislature to prohibit the verification of the surrender in a manner other than the one prescribed, is implied in these provisions. Failure to comply with these mandatory provisions, therefore, had vitiated the surrender and rendered it non est for the purpose of S. 5 (3) (b)". 24. In this view of the matter the advertisement issued on 28-12-1983 was illegal not being in conformity with the requirements of the proviso to clause (ii) of Statute 15 of the Statutes of the University. 25. Since the impugned advertisement has been held to be illegal on the aforesaid grounds, we do not consider it necessary to go into the question of mala fide imputed to Dr. Mahatim Singh. 26. It is true that Dr. Indra Sen Singh, the petitioner in writ petition No. 11814 of 1984, came to this Court after the Selection Committee had already interviewed the candidates and he had himself appeared before the Selection Committee and on that Count he may not have been entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, we are of opinion that it will serve no useful purpose in dismissing the said writ petition when the relief claimed therein is already being granted in the other writ petition filed by Narendra Nath Sirothia. 27. In the result each of these two writ petitions succeeds and is allowed and the respondents are restrained from making any appointment on the basis of the impugned advertisement dated 28-12-1983 and the deliberations of the Selection Committee and the Executive referred to above consequent upon the said advertisement. In the circumstances of the case, however the parties shall bear their own costs.