JUDGMENT S. Saghir Ahmad, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has questioned the correctness of the judgment and order dated 3081983 passed by the IVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow by which the order dated 27982 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), Lucknow, was set aside and the disputed premises no. 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow was held to be vacant. 2. The fact giving rise to this petition are these. Premises No. 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow, was previously owned by Rani Ahmadi Begum of Salempur. It was let out to Babu Hazari Lal Mukerji, petitioner's father, about 60 years ago. The property was subsequently transferred to Pandit Ram Shanker Misra Trust (opposite party no. 3) (hereinafter referred to as the Trust) but Babu Hazari Lal Mukerji continued to occupy the premises as a tenant. On his death the tenancy right devolved upon his two sons. Dr. J. P. Mukerji and J.D. Mukerji (petitioner) who continued to live there jointly. Dr. J.P. Mukerji, who used to pay the rent to the Trust and in whose name the rent receipts were issued, died issueless on 2678. He was a bachelor. The Trust then made an application under Section 16 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act), for release of the said premises in its favour. A number of persons also applied for its allotment. A report was obtained from the Rent Control Inspector who stated that the premises in question was in the tenancy of Dr. J.P. Mukerji who died issueless. It was also staled that one S.N. Banerji, who was soninlaw of Dr. J. P. Mukerji's brother, had put a lock on the premises. The vacancy was, consequently, notified. It was at this stage that the petitioner filed objections on 18978 These objections were supported by an affidavit in which it was stated by the petitioner that he had all along been living in the premises in question since the time of his father, late Babu Hazari Lal Mukerji, who was the original tenant and on whose death the tenancy rights were inherited by the petitioner as also by his younger brother, Dr. J.P. Mukerji, It was also stated that a ration card was issued to the petitioner in November, 1975 in which the petitioner's address was shown as 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow and petitioner's brother Dr. J.P. Mukerji, was shown as member of the petitioner's family. The correctness of the Inspector's report was questioned in the said affidavit in which it was stated that the Senior Inspector had wrongly reported that the petitioner's soninlaw, Sri S.N. Banerji, had put his lock on the premises in question. It was stated that the Senior Inspector had not complied with the mandatory requirement of Rule 8 (2) of the Rules framed under the Act. The petitioner also filed affidavits of a number of persons in support of his contention that he had been living in the premises in question with his younger brother, Dr. J.P. Mukerji. He also filed a good number of documents to show that he was in occupation of the premises in question in his own rights since before the death of Dr. J.P. Mukerji. 3. Opposite party no. 3, on the other hand, asserted that the petitioner was an unauthorised occupant as he was neither the family member of Dr. J.P. Mukerji nor did he ever live with him. It was pointed out by the Trust that the petitioner earlier lived with his soninlaw at Faizabad Road and then he shifted for a short period to some house near Charbagh Railway Station. Petitioner's son, who was employed in the military, was also said to be in possession of a house in the Cantonment area of the city. The Trust also pleaded its own need for the house in question and prayed that it may be released in its favour. The Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) Rent Control, Lucknow, on a consideration of the material on record allowed the objections of the petitioner and the order dated 28878, by which the vacancy was declared in the house in question, was withdrawn. The release application as also the application for allotment were consigned to record. This order was challenged by the Trust in the revision filed under Section 18 of the Act. It was allowed by the learned IVth Additional District Judge on 30883 with the finding that the petitioner shall be treated to have impliedly surrendered his tenancy and that Dr. The release application as also the application for allotment were consigned to record. This order was challenged by the Trust in the revision filed under Section 18 of the Act. It was allowed by the learned IVth Additional District Judge on 30883 with the finding that the petitioner shall be treated to have impliedly surrendered his tenancy and that Dr. J. P. Mukerji alone was the tenant and on his death since he did not leave any heir as he was a bachelor, the house became vacant and available for release as also for allotment. The learned IVth Additional District Judge, consequently, remanded the case to the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) for further proceedings in accordance with law from the stage of vacancy. It is this judgment which has been challenged in this petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the tenancy rights had also devolved on the petitioner in his capacity as the heir of Babu Hazari Lal Mukerji, who was the original tenant of the premises in question and the petitioner being in continuous possession jointly with his brother. Dr. J P. Mukerji, the premises were not vacant. That being so, the release application filed by the Trust (opposite party no. 3) as also the applications for allotment made by certain prospective tenants were liable to be rejected and the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in remanding the case to the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) for consideration of those applications. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the learned Additional District Judge was patently in error in blindly following the decision of this Court in Sultan Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Meerut and others. (1982 (UP) RCC 302) which was not applicable to the facts of this case as the petitioner merely on the basis that the rent of the premises was all along being paid by his brother Dr. J.P. Mukerji, could not be said to have impliedly surrendered his tenancy rights. 5. 1st Additional District Judge, Meerut and others. (1982 (UP) RCC 302) which was not applicable to the facts of this case as the petitioner merely on the basis that the rent of the premises was all along being paid by his brother Dr. J.P. Mukerji, could not be said to have impliedly surrendered his tenancy rights. 5. Learned counsel for the Trust has, on the contrary, submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge were findings of fact which was based on a proper evaluation of the evidence on record and, as such, it was not open to this Court to interfere with those findings in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution and a writ of certiorari cannot be legally issued to quash the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge. It has also been submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge were correct as the petitioner, in the circumstances of the case, shall be deemed to have impliedly surrendered his tenancy rights, with the result that on the death of Dr. J. P. Mukerji, the premises in question became available for release/allotment. 6. A lease, which connotes transfer of an interest in immovable property, is a heritable right. Even a lease from month to month is a heritable interest. Thus, where a tenant dies, his rights will be inherited by his heirs. 7. It has been held by the Madras High Court in Krishna Bhatta Vs. Narayana Acharya and another (AIR 1949 Mad 618) that where there was a lease in favour of a single person as a tenant, the interest of that person in the said lease would, on his death, devolve on his heirs. The liability of the heirs to pay the rent would be a joint liability. This is in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court in BadriNarain Jha and others Vs Rameshwar Dayai Singh and others ( AIR 1951 SC 186 ) in which it was held that an interse arrangement amongst the jointtenants would not affect their liability qua the lessor for the payment of the whole rent. (See also Har Swarup Vs. Tohfa Singh and others, AIR 1928 Alld. 534 and Singaraj Venkatasu Subbaramaniam and others Vs. Velugoti Govinda Krishna, AIR 1920 Mad. 509). (See also Har Swarup Vs. Tohfa Singh and others, AIR 1928 Alld. 534 and Singaraj Venkatasu Subbaramaniam and others Vs. Velugoti Govinda Krishna, AIR 1920 Mad. 509). The liability of the heirs being joint and several, a suit against one of them for the whole of the rent was held to be maintainable vide Calcutta High Court's decision in Jogendra Nath Roy and another Vs. Nagendra Narain Nandi (11 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1026 at 1028) and Livingstone Vs. Feroz Din (AIR 1914 Lahore 500). 8. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a lease of Immovable property determines : (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) by express surrender, that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease to the lessor by mutual agreement between them. (f) by implied surrender. (g) (h) 9. Surrender is the yielding up of an interest in the immovable property which was transferred to a person under a lease. A surrender can be made only to the lessor. It can be an express surrender as provided by clause (e) and an implied surrender as provided by clause (f) of Section 111. Implied surrender is, in English Law, known as surrender by operation of law. Implied surrender occurs either by creation of a new relationship or by relinquishment of possession. 10. A Division Bench of this court in J.J. Pancholi Vs. Sridharjee and others, AIR 1984 Alld. 130 has held that Section 111 (f) of the T.P. Act provides for the determination of a lease of immovable property by implied surrender. If a lessee accepts a new contract of tenancy, it operates as surrender of old tenancy, for a lease cannot be granted unless the old tenancy is surrendered. Such a surrender takes place by operation of law.................An implied surrender can be inferred from unequivocal conduct of both the parties. 11. It is to be noted that in the above case, an altogether new lease was substituted in place of the original contract of tenancy. 12. Surrender is often a question of fact depending upon the intention of the parties, which can be inferred from their conduct. It may, however, be a question of law if their conduct necessarily implies surrender. 13. The Madras High Court in Gopal Dass Dwarka Dass Family Trust Estate & another Vs. Michaelswami Pillai & another, ILR 1964 (1) Mad. 12. Surrender is often a question of fact depending upon the intention of the parties, which can be inferred from their conduct. It may, however, be a question of law if their conduct necessarily implies surrender. 13. The Madras High Court in Gopal Dass Dwarka Dass Family Trust Estate & another Vs. Michaelswami Pillai & another, ILR 1964 (1) Mad. 443 has held that the surrender, in order to be valid must be by alt the lessees and that a surrender by one of several joint tenants would not avoid the lease. The Madras High Court, in laying down this law has followed an English decision in Leek and Moorlands Building Society Vs. Clark and others, 1952 (2) All England Law Reports 492 : (1952) 2 D.B 788. 14. Mere nonpayment of rent does not constitute implied surrender (see Mazhar Rai and others Vs. Ramgat Singh and another, ILR (18) Alld. 290 (at 294). The Calcutta High Court in Rungo Lali Mundul Vs. Abdul Gaffoor and others ILR (4) Cal. 314 (at 318) was also of the same view as it held in that case that mere nonpayment of rent for many years was not sufficient to show that the relationship under the lease had ceased to exist. Patna High Court in Ramayan Prasad Vs Mt. Gulaba Kuer and another ( AIR 1967 Pat. 35 , (at 36) held that mere relinquishment of tenancy does not operate as a surrender but if it is accepted by the lessor by taking over possession, it amounts to an implied surrender. To the same effect is the view expressed in Raja Sri Amar Krishna Narain Singh Vs. Sheikh Vazir Hasan and others (AIR 1939 Oudh 257, at 267). The implication of the judgments of this court in Bundoo Vs. Akbar Ali 1978 ALJ 215 and Smt. Madhubala Vs. Smt. Budhiya, AIR 1980 Alld. 266 referred to in J.J. Pancholi's case (supra) is also not different as in both the cases the heirs of deceased tenant appeared to have surrendered the tenancy and thereafter a new contract of tenancy was created in favour of few (not all) of the heirs only. In Madhubala's case (supra) the tenant had himself admitted in crossexamination that he and her mother alone were the tenants. 15. Let me now proceed to consider the question whether the learned Addl. In Madhubala's case (supra) the tenant had himself admitted in crossexamination that he and her mother alone were the tenants. 15. Let me now proceed to consider the question whether the learned Addl. District Judge was justified in the present circumstances of the case to record a finding that the petitioner had impliedly surrendered his tenancy rights and that the case was covered by the decision of this Court in Sultan Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Meerut and others (supra) 15. A perusal of the judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge shows that he was guided by the following factors : (i) The rent in respect of the premises in question was paid for about 30 years by Dr. J. P. Mukerji alone and rent receipts were issued in his name. (ii) (a) Sri J.D. Mukerji (petitioner) has his own house in the city. He had been living in TransGomti area at 228Faizabad Road, Lucknow. (B) The Senior Inspector (Rent Control) at the time of his inspection had found the premises locked. He was informed that the lock had been placed by Sri S.N. Banerji, soninlaw of the petitioner. This clearly indicated that the petitioner was not then residing in the house. The putting of lock by Sri S.N. Banerji suggests absence of interest of Sri J.D. Mukerji. (C) Merely because address of 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow has been given as the address of the petitioner in few letters addressed to him and in his bank account and that this very address was given by the sons of the petitioner at the time of their employment, does not mean that the tenancy in the name of Dr. J.P. Mukerji also included his tenancy. The Setters sent to the petitioner on the address 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow did not constitute evidence of possession and could not have been referred to by the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies). (iii) The case is covered by the decision of this court in Sultan Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, referred to above. 17. In para 26 of his affidavit dated 17979 filed before he Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) the petitioner gave details of some of the documents which he had filed in the case. (iii) The case is covered by the decision of this court in Sultan Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, referred to above. 17. In para 26 of his affidavit dated 17979 filed before he Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) the petitioner gave details of some of the documents which he had filed in the case. They included : (1) Government Notification No. 6120/XXXVI (sic) 76690/74 dated October 1, 1977, by which the petitioner was appointed as Judge of District Juvenile Court, Lucknow. The address in the said notification was given as 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. (2) Letter dated September 4, 1978 from the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister of India addressed to the petitioner as Judge, District Juvenile Court, 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. (3) Order dated 4377 of the District Supply Officer, Lucknow, granting exemption to the petitioner from the Guest Control Order. In this order the address of the petitioner was mentioned as 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. (4) Telegram dated 17976 from Kobe (Japan) to the petitioner on his address 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. (5) Letter dated 13471 sent to the petitioner on his address 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow from Sri Kamal Nath Tewari, M.P. (6) Letter No, 2883/G5233 dated 21111974 from Captain Superintendent, Training Ship Rajendra, addressed to the petitioner at 32. Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. 18. It was also staled by the petitioner in that affidavit that he had been living all along with Dr. J. P. Mukerji who also held a joint account with the petitioner's eldest son in the State Bank of India. The petitioner further deposed in that affidavit that he bad three fixed deposit accounts, one in the State Bank of India and two in the Central Bank of India and in all the three accounts the petitioner's address is mentioned as 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. He also stated that he had a ration card in which his address is mentioned as 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. This ration card was renewed in the year 1975 and in the said ration card Dr. J.P. Mukerji has all along been shown as a family member of the petitioner. His two sons were employed. One was in the Army and the other in the Merchant Navy and both the sons had given their address as 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. This address was also recorded in their service records. J.P. Mukerji has all along been shown as a family member of the petitioner. His two sons were employed. One was in the Army and the other in the Merchant Navy and both the sons had given their address as 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow. This address was also recorded in their service records. These documents, which consistently contained petitioner's address as 32, Aminuddaula Park, Lucknow, pertained to the period prior to the death of Dr. J.P Mukerji when there was no controversy regarding the tenancy rights of the premises in question. The authorities, the State Government and the banks in the case of the petitioner and the army authorities in the case of petitioner's sons, know that the petitioner and his sons would be available at this address. 19. The documents referred to above were extremely material documents which could not have been ignored by the learned Additional District Judge, by observing that they did not constitute evidence of possession or that the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) should not have taken those documents into consideration. 20. The observation of the learned Additional District Judge that the petitioner had his own house in the city, was wholly uncalled for as it was not supported by any evidence on record. The petitioner had stated in his affidavit dated 17979 that his daughter lived in house No. 228 Faizabad Road, Lucknow (See para 9 of the said affidavit). Even the Senior Inspector (Rent Control) in his report, which is the sheet anchor of opposite parties' case, has slated that House No. 228, Faizabad Road, Lucknow was owned by Sri S.N. Banerji. It was, therefore, not the petitioner's house and the learned Additional District Judge was in error in holding otherwise. 21. The documents referred to above, which were held by the learned Additional District Judge not lo constitute the evidence of possession clearly indicate that the petitioner had all along been living in the premises in question and that his sons also lived with him. It was, therefore, not a case where the tenancy was relinquished by surrender of possession in favour of the landlord. It was, therefore, not a case where the tenancy was relinquished by surrender of possession in favour of the landlord. The petitioner, as indicated by the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), was all along in joint possession and it was not a case where it could be said that the petitioner had not, to borrow the words of brother Mehrotra, J. in Sultan's case (supra), stirred in the matter. That decision was not applicable to the facts of the case and the learned Additional District Judge was patently in error in relying upon that decision to hold merely on the basis that the rent was paid by Dr. J. P. Mukerji, that the petitioner had impliedly surrendered his tenancy. 22. So far as the Inspector's report is concerned, it could not have been acted upon blindly by the learned Additional District Judge. Inspector's report is obtained under Rule 8 which is quoted below : 8. Ascertainment of vacancy [Sees. 12, 16 and 34 (8)] (1) The District Magistrate shall, before making any order of allotment or release in respect of any building which is alleged to be vacant under Section 12 or to be otherwise vacant or to be likely to fall vacant, obtain a report from the Rent Control Inspector. (2) The Inspector shall inspect the building, so far as possible,, in the presence of the landlord and of the tenant or any other occupant and submit his report after eliciting the facts wherever practicable by at least two respectable persons residing in the locality and the conclusion in the report of the Inspector shall be posted on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public, and an order of allotment may be passed not before the expiration of three days from the date of such posting and if in the meantime any objection is received not before the disposal of such objection. (3) Any objection under subrule (2) shall be decided after considering any evidence that the objector or any other person concerned may adduce. 23. The rule provides that before making an order of allotment or release, the District Magistrate shall get the building inspected. (3) Any objection under subrule (2) shall be decided after considering any evidence that the objector or any other person concerned may adduce. 23. The rule provides that before making an order of allotment or release, the District Magistrate shall get the building inspected. The manner in which the building is to be inspected has been set out in subrule (2) under which a building is to be inspected, so far as possible, in the presence of the landlord and the tenant or any other occupant. The use of the words so far as possible indicates that an effort has to be made to inspect the building in the presence of the landlord or tenant or any other occupant so that inspection report may not be an exparte report, Subrule (3) indicates that the correctness of the report can be questioned by the person concerned. The report per se is not of any binding value. It does not constitute conclusive evidence on the question of vacancy or occupancy. The correctness of the report has to be decided in the light of the objections filed and evidence adduced by the objector or the person concerned. It is obvious that in deciding the question whether the report is correct or not the evidence will have to be discussed and scrutinised before recording a finding on the question of vacancy. The provisions of subrule (2) of Rule 8 are mandatory and any departure from that procedure may vitiate the report. 24. It is obvious that in the instant case the inspection was made in the absence of the petitioner. The premises in question was reported to be locked. The report does not say that the Inspector made any other attempt to inspect the premises in the presence of the petitioner. In any case, the Inspector had come to know at the spot that one Sri S.N. Banerji had put a lock on the premises in question. The Inspector had also come to know that Sri Banerji lived at 228, Faizabad Road, Lucknow, which was his own house and that he was soninlaw of the petitioner. The learned Additional District Judge should not, therefore, have relied upon this report without looking into the objections raised by the petitioner against the said report. The Inspector had also come to know that Sri Banerji lived at 228, Faizabad Road, Lucknow, which was his own house and that he was soninlaw of the petitioner. The learned Additional District Judge should not, therefore, have relied upon this report without looking into the objections raised by the petitioner against the said report. It will be worthwhile to mention that the petitioner in his affidavit dated 17979 filed before the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) had seriously questioned the correctness of the report. It was stated in para 4 of the affidavit that the Senior Inspector had not contacted the petitioner who was the tenant of the building and was living therein for the last 60 years since the time of his father, Babu Hazari Lal Mukerji, who was the original tenant. In para 19 of the affidavit it was stated that the report was a table report and had not been prepared in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8 (2). The petitioner also stated in para 24 of the aforesaid affidavit as under : 24. That in the Senior Inspector's report 3 witnesses have been cited. Sri Ashok Kumar Shukla, who chose subsequently to become the allottee applicant himself was a friend of Lain Mohan and was the son of Smt. Sunder Devi Shukla, who was beguiled to call herself the owner of the premises and to give her consent in favour of Lalit Mohan for the allotment of premises in question, allegedly died in the recent liquor tragedy. The other person is Ramesh Kumar Gupta, whose photo studio is situated on main busy thoroughfare and far removed from the locality. And Sri B.K. Saxena says that he was given to understand by Ashok and Lalit that the deponent intended to give up the residence after the death of Dr. Mukerji and therefore he told the Inspector that the house had fallen vacant. 25. These objections were not taken into consideration by the Additional District Judge who could not have blindly acted upon the said report. 26. Learned counsel for the Trust has contended, on the basis of the Supreme Court decisions in Raman and Raman Ltd Vs State of Madras and another ( AIR 1956 S.C. 463 ), Zora Singh Vs. J.M. Tandon and others ( AIR 1971 SC 1537 ), M/s Parry and Co. Ltd. Vs. P.C. Pal Standard Oil Co. 26. Learned counsel for the Trust has contended, on the basis of the Supreme Court decisions in Raman and Raman Ltd Vs State of Madras and another ( AIR 1956 S.C. 463 ), Zora Singh Vs. J.M. Tandon and others ( AIR 1971 SC 1537 ), M/s Parry and Co. Ltd. Vs. P.C. Pal Standard Oil Co. and others ( AIR 1965 SC 111 ), that there could not be a reappraisal of the evidence in deciding a writ petition and that a writ of certiorari cannot be issued merely on the ground that the appreciation of evidence by the Lower Court was not proper. A perusal of the above Supreme Court decisions would indicate that the findings which are based on no evidence or which are perverse are not immune from judicial scrutiny. 27. In the instant case the findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge that the petitioner had his own house in the city was based on no evidence. His further finding that the documents, which were filed by the petitioner before the learned Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies) did not constitute evidence of possession or could not have been taken into consideration, was an erroneous decision on a question of law. The learned Additional District Judge also committed manifest error of law in blindly relying upon the report of the Rent Control Inspector. In any case, the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge that the petitioner had impliedly surrendered his tenancy, was based on total misappreciation of the true legal position and misapplication of a decision of this Court in Sultan's case (supra) which was not applicable to the present case. The findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge hurt the judicial conscience. They cannot, therefore, be sustained. 28. In view of the above the writ petition is allowed. The judgment and order dated 27982 passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), Lucknow is upheld and the judgment and order dated 3081983 passed by the learned IVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow is hereby quashed. Let a writ of certiorari issue accordingly. The petitioner shall be entitled costs. (Petition allowed)