JUDGMENT M. WAHAJUDDIN, J. 1. THE landlord applied for eviction of the tenant under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 urging his personal needs. THE Prescribed Authority found the needs of the landlord genuine, but further held that his purpose would be served if the first floor and the second floor is given to the landlord, while the ground floor is left with the tenant. 2. AS regards the release of first floor and second floor an appeal directed against such order was dismissed and the tenant then preferred a writ petition which was also dismissed by this Court. I have referred these facts simply to lay down hat the finding that the landlord's need is genuine has become final and conclusive. The only matter in dispute, therefore, would be whether his needs will be satisfied by giving him the first and second floor or that he should have been allowed to evict the tenant from the ground floor as well. As regards the Prescribed Authority's order that the ground floor should remain with the tenant, there was an appeal and initially that appeal was also dismissed; but the matter came in writ petition before Hon'ble R. M. Sahai, J. who remanded the matter observing that the appellate court should consider the report of the Commissioner, which is already on record, as to then decide the matter. The matter again went before the appellate court and the appellate court after considering the Commissioner's report, as directed by this Court, allowed the appeal and granted landlord's prayer concerning the ground floor as well. The tenant feeling aggrieved has preferred this writ petition against such order. I may at this stage also observe that so far as the ground floor is concerned the matter was not in the other writ petition before Hon'ble N.D. OJha, J. when His Lordship disposed of the writ petition concerning the first and second floor. In fact, the appeal was not even decided by that time. 3. AS I am now concerned only with the ground floor, it will be needless to refer to the judgment in the writ petition decided by Hon'ble N.D. Ojha, J. which related to only first and second floor. In fact, the appeal was not even decided by that time. 3. AS I am now concerned only with the ground floor, it will be needless to refer to the judgment in the writ petition decided by Hon'ble N.D. Ojha, J. which related to only first and second floor. However, that judgment is still relevant from one angle, namely, that finding that the landlord has a genuine need for the accommodation is final and the only matter which remained for consideration was whether landlord's need will be satisfied by the first and second floor or the ground floor should also be given to the landlord. 4. WHILE opposing the writ petition at the stage of admission, it is being urged on behalf of the landlord that actually there is an admission of the tenant himself as per affidavit preferred by him in the court below laying down that the accommodation can be utilized only by one person and the occupation of the accommodation by two families would neither be possible nor practical. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner here that this affidavit was given in the background and context that the tenant should have the entire accommodation and the court has to make a margin and allowance for the same while considering such admission. I would not decide the matter simply on that admission while of course it may be one relevant piece of evidence by way of admission on record. I may now refer to the report of the commissioner. The position that has transpired is that it would be found that in the ground floor there are two rooms, though smaller in size in comparison to the size of the room in the first floor, and there is a latrine and courtyard and the stair is in the courtyard. On the first floor there is one big room with balcony projection and there is one small room described as kitchen. If it is taken a small residential or store room, then there will be no kitchen. Actually, it can serve as kitchen. On the second floor there is no room or such bounded structure except a shea and there is open roof. If it is taken a small residential or store room, then there will be no kitchen. Actually, it can serve as kitchen. On the second floor there is no room or such bounded structure except a shea and there is open roof. The appellate court has come to the conclusion that the existing accommodation on the first floor and the roof and shed on the second floor would not suffice for the landlord and for his genuine needs the ground floor is a must for him. This is what has been observed by the appellate court as a fact. 5. THE law is well settled that this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not function as a court of fact and no interference is possible with any finding of fact of subordinate court in exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There are very large number of pronouncements of the Supreme Court laying down such principles of law. It will be needless to quote all of them and it will suffice to cite the latest pronouncement of Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori, 1984 AWC 375 . There is another pronouncement of the Supreme Court referred to in the judgment of the earlier writ petit ion (Annexure 5-A'), i.e. Munni Lal v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 SC 29 and M/S. India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakhruddin, AIR 1978 SC 45 . THE learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the case of Munshi Lal Varma v. Additional District Judge, Dehradun, 1980 ARC 515 in which it was held that casual visits cannot be equated with the requirement for the residential purpose. This observation has been made in a context of the individual facts of that case. Actually the landlord himself was in that case residing permanently elsewhere and his visit is to Dehradun, where the accommodation was situated, were only casual. 6. IT was urged that the appellate court had wrongly considered that the landlord's daughter, who is married, and his son-in-law may also come and stay occasionally. IT was further urged that the sons are residing elsewhere and the appellate court omitted to consider these factors. I am unable to agree with the submissions. 6. IT was urged that the appellate court had wrongly considered that the landlord's daughter, who is married, and his son-in-law may also come and stay occasionally. IT was further urged that the sons are residing elsewhere and the appellate court omitted to consider these factors. I am unable to agree with the submissions. IT is not only frequent, but very common and usual practice that the sons and daughters, daughter-in-laws and son-in-laws come to stay with the head of the family and the head of the family cannot turn them out. Of course, if the accommodation is such that with the slightest sense of privacy and without rigour they can be accommodated, the position may be different; but according to conception and tradition of our society it will be wrong to assume or say that the daughter with her husband would sleep in the same room in which her parent sleep or reside. This will be equally true for the daughter-in-law. This is one angle of approach. The law is very clear, as has been laid down in the Supreme Court case of Raj Rani Mehrotra, 1980 ARC 311 and in the cases reported in AIR 1959 Alld. 675 and AIR 1958 Alld. 154 that in every case and even in the absence of any plea the court has to consider whether a part of the premises if vacated would serve the needs of the landlord. Obviously, the Commissioner's report concerning the extent of the accommodation in each floor and location etc is most vital. Even with shightest decency it will be impossible in any case impracticable, for two families to share a latrine, while in the entire accommodation there is a single latrine. Again there is also one kitchen, i. e. in the first storey and no other kitchen. In the first and second stories one will have to approach the stair cases from the court yard. When all these factors are taken into consideration, the view taken by the first appellate court can neither be considered perverse, nor against the basic facts and evidence; and that being the position, no interference can be made in this petition by exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. THE writ petition is, therefore, dismissed but the parties shall bear their own costs. 7. THE writ petition is, therefore, dismissed but the parties shall bear their own costs. As the tenant has been living in the ground floor and he has also a family, to avoid hardship to the tenant I allow four months time to vacate that premises. This order is subject to the condition that within two months he shall deposit the full arrears of rent up to the period when the tenant was in possession of the entire premises, and from the date when the possession of first and second floor was delivered, he will deposit by way of tentative a portioned rent calculated at the rate of Rs. 20/- (Rupees twenty) per month. Petition dismissed.