JUDGMENT Umesh Chandra, J. - This is a defendants second appeal directed against judgment and decree, dated 26-8-1972, passed by the Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Deoria, partly allowing the appeal and dismissing the plaintiff-respondents suit for declaration and cancellation of the sale deed so far as it relates to one half share of the minor plaintiff nos. 2 and 3 in the and in dispute, but confirming the decree passed by the trial court so far as it relates to th share of plaintiff no. 1 in the land in dispute. The facts giving rise to this appeal in brief are as under : The plaintiffs relied on the following pedigree : 2. The Branch of Ram Autar Pathak became extinct, Ramanand Pathak and Surajman Pathak were left as co-tenure holders of the land in dispute. At the time of vesting, both Suraj Man, and Janakraj, grand sons of Ramanand Pathak, were recorded as tenure holders and they continued to be so recorded upto 1362-F. Suraj Man died leaving two sons Bachchan Pathak respondent no. 4 and Swaminath Pathak respondent no. 1, but only the name of Bachhan Pathak was recorded over and land in dispute along with Janakraj from 1363-F to 1369-F. On 27-5-1960 Bachhan Pathak and Smt. Kunwara, mother of minor plaintiffs 2 and 3 for self and in her capacity as guardian of these minors sold the entire land to defendant no. 1 for Rs. 1000/- by sale deed (Paper no. 67-A1). Plaintiffs Swaminath Pathak, Parmatma Pathak and Kedar Nath Pathak, thereafter filed a suit for cancellation of the sale deed and also for a declaration that they were Bhumidhars in possession of the land in question to the extent of th share. In the alternative a relief for possession was also claimed. Swaminath Pathak claimed th share in the land in dispute and alleged that the same could not be transferred to defendant no. 1 and, therefore, the sale deed was void. The minor plaintiffs asserted that the entire sale deed was voidable for want of consideration and because undue influence was exercised on Smt. Kunwara, and that she could not transfer their share in the property in dispute. 3. Both the defendants resisted the suit and supported the sale deed which, according to them, was executed by Smt. Kunwara for valuable consideration and the same was binding on the plaintiffs. 4. 3. Both the defendants resisted the suit and supported the sale deed which, according to them, was executed by Smt. Kunwara for valuable consideration and the same was binding on the plaintiffs. 4. The trial court overruled the plaintiffs case that Smt. Kunwara was subjected to undue influence or fraud and held that the sale deed was for consideration. However, the sale deed was held to be invalid as regards the minors share because permission of the District Judge was not obtained for transfer of the minors share. The claim of Swaminath that he has th share in the property in dispute was upheld and consequently the plaintiffs suit for cancellation of the sale deed to the extent of th share in the property in dispute and for declaration was decreed. 5. In appeal the findings of the lower court as regards execution of the sale deed and as to the share of plaintiff no. 1 were confirmed. The appellate court held that the suit was cognisable by the civil court as on the pleaded cause of action they could not get relief from the revenue court by means of a suit under Section 229-B of Act No. I of 1951. The appellate court further found that the vendors under the challenged sale deed did not have a transferable right to the extent, of th share belonging to plaintiff no. 1 and the sale deed to that extent was void. As regards the shares of the minor plaintiffs, the appellate court was of the view that the sale deed could not be cancelled merely because permission of the District Judge had not been obtained, as this plea was not taken as a ground in the plaint for assailing the sale deed. The appeal was partly allowed leading to this second appeal by Chandra Deo Pathak defendant no. 1. No appeal or cross-objection has been filed by plaintiff nos. 2 and 3. None of the respondents has put in appearance at the time of hearing of the appeal. 6. Both the courts below have found (1) that the sale deed was executed by Smt. Kunwara for consideration, and she was not subjected to any undue influence or fraud, and (2) that the share of plaintiff no. 1 in the property in dispute is th and that the vendors did not have any transferable right to the extent of his share. 1 in the property in dispute is th and that the vendors did not have any transferable right to the extent of his share. The sale deed to that extent was void. Plaintiff no. 1 came to know of the sale deed in 1964 when he returned from his service and the suit by him was within time. These findings are based on evidence and need no interference. 7. The point for consideration is whether under such circumstances, the suit by plaintiff no. 1 was cognisable by the civil court. 8. In Dr. Ajodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prasad, 1981 AWC page 469, the plaintiff was the son of the deceased landholder and the widow of the landholder had executed a sale deed. The son being a preferential heir, the transfer made by the widow was void ab initio. It was held that it would not require cancellation through a decree by the civil court. In this case a reference was made to the case of Gorakh Nath Dube v. H.N. Singh, AIR 1973 Supreme Court page 2451, in which it was held : "We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would he to the extent or the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interest in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would he to the extent or the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interest in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed and therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. In the case before us, the plaintiffs claim is that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inoperative and void, such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation court." A similar view was taken in Ram Roop and others v. Smt. Budhiya, 1979 ALJ 800. In Mewa v. Baldeo, 1966 AWR 597 , it was held : "It may be noted here that position would have been very different if the document which was sought to be cancelled was a document void ab inito, for instance, if it had been executed by the plaintiff while he was minor then the document being completely void it would not have been necessary to avoid it and in that case he could, merely by proving that it was a void document, get a declaration of his title to the property or even possession without cancellation, of the sale deed. It was possible for the revenue court in those circumstances to look into the facts and after coming to the conclusion that the sale deed was completely void and ineffectual to pass title to the transferee could have given a declaration or could have also decreed possession in favour of the plaintiff. But in cases where avoidance of a document is necessary the position is different." 9. But in cases where avoidance of a document is necessary the position is different." 9. Applying these principles, the sale deed to the extent of the share of plaintiff no. 1 was void as the vendors had no transferable right as regards his share. The deed to that extent is void. Plaintiff no. 1, therefore, could not file a suit for declaration and cancellation of the sale deed in the civil court. 10. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 have not filed an appeal or cross-objection and therefore, no decision is given as to their rights to the reliefs claimed. 11. The result is that the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree, dated 26-8-1972, passed by the lower appellate court is modified and the suit of plaintiff no. 1 is also dismissed with costs.