R. K. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 16/12/1981 passed by the I Add. Sessions Judge, Basti whereby he has set aside the order dated 2/9/1981 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate Harraiya (Basti ). ( 2 ) BRIEF facts of the case are that on an application dated 22/6/1975 moved by Smt. Nagina to the Superintendent of Police Barar, P. S. Paikolia reported that there was a dispute between the parties over a house cum-shop situate in Babhnan Barar, P. S. Paikolia district Basti and there was apprehension of Breach of peace between the parties. This report was received by the Magistrate on 31-7-1978. On being satisfied with the report that there was apprehension of breach of peace, the Magistrate passed a preliminary order dated 31-8-1978 fixing 4-9-1978 for appearance and filing written statements by the parties. The parties filed written statements and produced evidence in support of their respective claims as required u/s 145 sub clause 4 of the Cr. P. C. Smt. Nagina produced himself as P. W. 2 and two other witnesses namely Kupil Deo P. W. 1 and Ram Ratan P. W. 3. She filed several documents including one sale deed dated 30-12-1975 executed by Babu Ram in favour of Laxmi Narain and another sale deed dated 25-4-1978 executed by Laxmi Narain in favour of Smt. Nagina, which are registered documents. She also filed 6 receipts issued by the Electricity Department showing the payment of electricity charges of the house in dispute. On the other hand Basant Lal opposite party produced two witnesses himself as D. W. 2 and Munnu Khan as D. W. 1 in support of his claim. He also summoned Police report and one F. I. R. alleged to be lodged by Panna Lal, husband of Smt. Nagina. ( 3 ) AFTER considering the entire evidence on the record, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate found that Basant Lal opposite party was not in possession over the property in dispute and the same was in the possession of Smt. Nagina. Therefore, he restrained the opposite party not to interfere with the possession of Smt. Nagina till it is decided by a competent Court. A revision was filed against the above order by Basant Lal, which was allowed by the I Addi. Sessions Judge, Basti vide his order dated 16-12-1981. Hence this revision. Therefore, he restrained the opposite party not to interfere with the possession of Smt. Nagina till it is decided by a competent Court. A revision was filed against the above order by Basant Lal, which was allowed by the I Addi. Sessions Judge, Basti vide his order dated 16-12-1981. Hence this revision. ( 4 ) RELYING on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Amar Chand Agarwala v. Shanti Bose and another and State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahil the learned counsel for the revisionist vehemently urged that the Sessions judge was not justified to interfere with the finding of possession recorded by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. He has gone out of his way to interfere with the finding of possession on the basis of evidence, which is not proved. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel representing Basant Lal vehemently contended that the admission made by Panna Lal, husband of Smt. Nagina in Ex. Kha-1 is conclusive proof to throw out the contrary evidence given by tile revisionist. In support of his contention, he relied on the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Narain v. Gopal3 and Thiru John v. Subramhamanyan and others. He further contended that First Information Report is a public document and does not require formal proof. In support of his contention he relied on Mohan Singh v. Emperor. He next contended that objection to mode of proof must be taken before the document is marked and exhibited and not in appeal. In support of his contention, he relied on the following decisions 1. Mahadeo Prasad v. Ghulam Mohammad. 2. Krishna Kumar Sinha v. The Kayastha Pathsala Prayag 3. Kuppuswami Chettiar Vs. A. S. A. Arumugam Chettiar and another ( 6 ) AFTER hearing the parties, considering their arguments at length and going through the record, I strongly feel that the Addi. Sessions Judge has gone out of his way to rely on the contents of Ex. Kha-1, which has not been proved. He has neither referred any eye-witness nor other evidence and has entirely based his finding on Ex. Kha-1 and Police report dated 6/12/1917 quoted below. . . (Vernacular Matter Ommited ). . ( 7 ) SO far as Ex. Kha-1 is concerned, only signatures of Patina Lal has been proved by Basant Lal D. W. 2. Contents of that application Ex. Kha-1 have not been proved. Therefore, to my mind, this Ex. Kha-1 and Police report dated 6/12/1917 quoted below. . . (Vernacular Matter Ommited ). . ( 7 ) SO far as Ex. Kha-1 is concerned, only signatures of Patina Lal has been proved by Basant Lal D. W. 2. Contents of that application Ex. Kha-1 have not been proved. Therefore, to my mind, this Ex. Kha-1 cannot be read in evidence to wipe out the evidence regarding possession given by the witnesses on oath. The Addi. Sessions judge has taken no care even to refer to those evidence. Therefore, finding arrived at by the Addi. Sessions Judge is entirely illegal and arbitrary, which is liable to be set aside. ( 8 ) IN the case of Amar Chand Agarwala v. Shanti Bose and another (supra), their Lordships of Supreme Court have held as under ;- Even assuming that the High Court was exercising jurisdiction under section 439 in our opinion, the present was not a case for interference by the High Court. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to be exercised normally under Section 439. Criminal Procedure Code, only in exceptional cases, when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. The High Court has not found any of these circumstances to exist in the case before us for quashing the charge and the further proceedings. ( 9 ) IN the case of State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahi (Supra) confirming the above view, the Supreme Court has held that it is now well settled that normally the jurisdiction under section 439. Cr. P. C. is to be exercised by the High Court in exceptional cases when there is glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law which is consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. ( 10 ) THE above observations of the Supreme Court are equally applicable to Sessions Judge exercising jurisdiction under section 397 Cr. P. C. Therefore, in my opinion, the present case was not a fit case for interference by the Addi. Sessions Judge without giving cogent reasons to reject the evidence on which the finding of possession of Smt. Nagina was based by the learned Magistrate. ( 11 ) AS regards the contention of the learned Counsel for Basant Lal that F. I. R. (Ex. Sessions Judge without giving cogent reasons to reject the evidence on which the finding of possession of Smt. Nagina was based by the learned Magistrate. ( 11 ) AS regards the contention of the learned Counsel for Basant Lal that F. I. R. (Ex. Kha-1) is a public document and does not require formal proof, the facts of Mohan Singh v. Emperor (Supra) are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In that case, Officer In-charge of Police Station took down in triplicate in the check receipt books (First Information Report) as required under paragraph 90 of Chapter IX of the Police Regulations. One of these three records was brought on the record in that case. In those circumstances, their Lordships held as under; It is clear to us that it will be very difficult to exclude it from the scope of Section 35 of the Evidence Act as being an official record made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. But this report would at the very best only prove that a certain person since dead had made that statement. The contents of the report may therefore be used as a corroborative piece of evidence, to show that the implication of the appellant in the murder is not an after thought. It certainly will be relevant to establish that he was named at the very start. Beyond this it is difficult to rely on it and the probative value of this document does not go further. It certainly cannot be used as a substantive, piece of evidence. In the instant case, the application (Ex. Kha. 1) is not a document recorded in the Police record maintained by a public servant. The alleged application (Ex. Kha-1) was sent to the Superintendent of Police on which only signatures of Panna Lal is proved. There is no evidence in this case that the contents of this F. I. R. (Ex. Kha-1) on which the Add!. Sessions Judge has based his finding are public document. Therefore, the contents of the application (Ex. Kha-1) sent to the Superintendent of Police cannot be treated as a public document which does not require any proof. Thus, Mohan Lals case (Supra) does not support the above contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party. Kha-1) on which the Add!. Sessions Judge has based his finding are public document. Therefore, the contents of the application (Ex. Kha-1) sent to the Superintendent of Police cannot be treated as a public document which does not require any proof. Thus, Mohan Lals case (Supra) does not support the above contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party. ( 12 ) SO far as the argument that admission of husband is binding on wife, advanced by the learned counsel for the opposite party, is concerned, contents of the application Ex. Kha-1 have not been proved that it was written or dictated by Panna Lal. Content of the application Ex. Kha-1 and signatures on that application appear to be by different persons. Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act, requires that admission made by a party will be binding on the maker Panna Lal is neither party it this case nor the property in dispute is in his name. It is Quite clear from the statement of Smt. Nagina that she had purchased the property in dispute from on Laxmi Naraia, and she is in occupation of the whole house. Under these circumstances, what is written in Ex. Kha-1, which has been found false and final report has been filed as mentioned above, cannot be used as admission of Smt. Nagina. In this view of the matter, I find no merit in this argument of the learned counsel. ( 13 ) SO far as the proof of the application Ex. Kha-1 is concerned, only signatures has been proved, which may be admissible, but the contents arc, not proved. Therefore, the contents of the same which are not proved, cannot be used to nullify the finding of the Magistrate. As regards Police report, no doubt it is a public document because it is recorded in the Police diary. From the aforesaid Police report, it is quite clear that the First Information Report Ex. Kha-1 alleged to be sent by Panna Lal is quite false. So the use of the contents of the application dated 4-11-1977 alleged to be sent by Panqa Lal as admission by the Add ). Sessions Judge, is wholly illegal. ( 14 ) THE learned Addi. Kha-1 alleged to be sent by Panna Lal is quite false. So the use of the contents of the application dated 4-11-1977 alleged to be sent by Panqa Lal as admission by the Add ). Sessions Judge, is wholly illegal. ( 14 ) THE learned Addi. Sessions Judge is also not right in holding that Smt. Nagina has given wrong date in her application dated 22-6-1978 to the Superintendent of Police and has wrongly used it was her admission. This application is within two months next before the date 31-7-1978 on which the report of the Police was received by the Magistrate in this case, as required by proviso of Sub section 4 of Section 145. Therefore, it cannot be used as admission against Smt. Nagina. ( 15 ) AFTER going through the entire evidence carefully I find there is no other document which can be used as admission against Smt. Nagina. ( 16 ) THE cases on admission relied on by the learned counsel representing Basant Lal are distinguishable on facts. In Narain v. Gopal (Supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court that admission made by maker of the document is conclusive. In this case, there was admission of the maker and his predecessor in title regarding temple. In Thiru Johans case (Supra) there was admission of Thiru John himself. In none of the cases, admission of third party has peen used against the maker. Therefore, I find no substance in this argument and reject it. ( 17 ) IT was not proper for the learned Addi. Sessions Judge to hold that Magistrate should have proceeded u/s 107 Cr. P. C. If the Magistrate was satisfied on Police report that there was apprehension of breach of peace then Section 107 Cr. P. C. does not bar taking steps u/s 145 Cr. P. C. ( 18 ) OTHER cases cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party are also distinguish able on facts and are not relevant. Therefore, it is not necessary to discuss them here. ( 19 ) IN view of the above discussions. I have no option but to set aside the judgment of the Addi. Sessions Judge and to uphold the finding of possession recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Sub Divisional Magistrate has done right thing that he has not relied on the contents of Ex. Kha-1 which are not proved. ( 19 ) IN view of the above discussions. I have no option but to set aside the judgment of the Addi. Sessions Judge and to uphold the finding of possession recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Sub Divisional Magistrate has done right thing that he has not relied on the contents of Ex. Kha-1 which are not proved. ( 20 ) IN the result, the revision is allowed. The judgment and order dated 16/12/1981 passed by the I Addi. Sessions Judge is set aside the judgment and order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, dated 2/9/1981 is upheld S. D. M. s. Order Upheld. .