JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - Petitioner, Indian Council of Agriculture Research (I.C.A.R.) is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and runs an institution known as Indian Veterinary Research Institute (I.V.R.I.). Respondent 2, Rakesh Chandra Chandra Saxena, was employed as a lower division clerk in the office of I V.R.I. and his services were terminated with effect from 5 November 1974. The State Government, in exercise of its powers under S. 4K of the Industrial Disputes Act, referred the following dispute between I. V. R. I. and its workman : " Whether action of the employer in terminating the services of its employee, Rakesh Chandra Saxena, lower division clerk, with effect from 5 December 1974, was justified and legal ? If not so, to what relief and with what particulars, is the workman entitled ?" for adjudication to the Labour Court' Bareilly. 2. Before the Labour Court the employers raised a preliminary objection and contended that inasmuch as the provisions of the Uttar Industrial Disputes Act were not attracted in the instant case, the reference made by the State Government was incompetent and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to deal with it. The Labour Court, vide its order, dated 10 April 1981, rejected the said plea raised by the employer and held that the dispute referred to it by the State Government was fully covered by the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and the reference made to it was competent. 3. Aggrieved, the I C.A.R. has approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution and prays that the reference, dated 23 May 1980, made by the State Government, as also the order, dated 10 April 1981, pawed by the Labour Court, Bareilly, be quashed. 4. Section 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act provides that where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehend, it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute to a Labour Court or to a Labour Tribunal, as the case may be. 4. Section 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act provides that where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehend, it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute to a Labour Court or to a Labour Tribunal, as the case may be. Section 2 (1) of the Act defines, for the purpose of the Act, the expression " industrial dispute" thus : " `industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person ; but does not include any industrial dispute concerning- (i) any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company, or:" It was claimed by the employer that the I.V.R.I. was managed by I.C.A.R. which a society registered under the authority of the Central Government. Accordingly, provided in S. 2 (1) (i), the present dis was not covered by the expression " industrial dispute" which under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, could be ed for adjudication by the State Government. While dealing with this Commission, the Labour Court relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in to case of Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, 1975-I L.L.N. 362, wherein it had been held that Indian Council of Scientific tad Industrial Research (I.C.S.I.R.) was not p authority as contemplated by Article 12 of situation of India. It held that in-as-as there was considerable similarity the constitution of I.C.S.I.R. and I.C.A. it., the I.C.A.R. too, on the same reasoning, could not be considered to be an authority d the Central Government. The Labour Court then went on to observe that inasmuch its the I.C.A.R. was neither authority of the Central Government nor us it being directly run by the Central Government and the dispute between I.C.S.I.R. and its employee was not excluded from the definition of the expression "industrial dispute" as provided by S. 2 (1) (i) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act. 5. 5. In the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1970 SC 82 , certain dispute 'between a company known as the Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ltd., Ranchi, incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, edits workmen was referred by the State of Bihar for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. A question that arose for consideration was whether the State of Bihar was the appropriate Government for purposes of making the reference as defined in S. 2 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act which ran thus- " Appropriate Government leaving aside the words which are not relevant for our purpose means (i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, the Central Government and (ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute the State Government." 6. It was conceded before the Supreme Court that an industry carried on by a corporation incorporated under Companies Act and not directly by Central Government or any of its departments could not be said to be an industry carried on by the Central Government notwithstanding that all the shares of the Corporation were owned by the President of India and some of its officials. It was, however, claimed that having regard to the constitution and functioning of the Corporation, the said company was being run under the authority of the Central Government and as such it was the Central Government, which was the appropriate Government for purposes of making a reference under the provisions of S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision of the case thus depended upon the construction of the words " carried on under the authority of the Central Government" used in S. 2 (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court concluded that the word " authority" in S. 2(a) of the Act must be construed according to its ordinary meaning and, therefore. must mean a legal power given by one person to another to do an act. A person is said to be authorised or to have an authority when he is in such a position that he can act in a certain manner without incurring liability, to which he would be exposed but for the authority, or so as to produce the same effect as if the person granting the authority had for himself done the act. The words " under the authority of" mean pursuant to the authority such as where an agent or servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master. On the facts of the case before it, the Supreme Court concluded that the company in question was not acting as an agent or under the authority of the Central Government and as such the appropriate Government in that case entitled to make a reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act was the State Government and not the Central Government. 7. In my opinion, the expression "any industry carried on under the authority of the Central Government" used in S. 1(i) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act carries implications similar to the expression "industry carried on under the authority of the Central Government" as used in S. 2(a) of the - Industrial Disputes Act which was the subject-matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 82 1 (vide supra). 8. In the case of Ramachandra Iyer (P.K.) v. Union of India, 1984-I L.L.N. 433 (vide supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to whether I.C.A. R. and its affiliate I.V.R. Lare "such other authorities" as would be comprehended in the expression "other authority" in Article 12 of the Constitution. While dealing with this question, the Supreme Court traced the history of the I.C.A. R. from the very beginning and observed that it started as a department of the Government of India having an office in the Secretariat. Even though it was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, it was wholly financed by the Government of India. Its budget was voted upon as part of the expenses incurred in the Ministry of Agriculture. Even when its status underwent a change, it was declared as an attached office of the Government of India. The control of the Government of India permeates through all its activities and it is the body to which the Government of India transferred research institute set up by it. In order to make it financially viable a case was levied, meaning thereby that the taxation power of the State was invoked, and the proceeds of the tax were to be handed over to I.C.A.R. for its use. In order to make it financially viable a case was levied, meaning thereby that the taxation power of the State was invoked, and the proceeds of the tax were to be handed over to I.C.A.R. for its use. At no stage the control of the Government of India ever flinched and since its inception it was set up to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture, and held that these circumstances by themselves were sufficient to make the I.C.A.R. an instrumentality of the State. According to the Supreme Court there could not be any doubt that I.C.A.R. was almost an inseparable adjunct of the Government of India having an outward form of being as society. It could be styled as a society set up by the State and, therefore, was an instrumentality of the State. It, therefore, follows that inasmuch as the I.C.A.R. functions as an instrumentality or adjunct of Government of India, it functions on its behalf and as its agent in the manner explained in the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 82 (vide supra), and can for purposes of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act be considered to be a society functioning under the authority of the Central Government. 9. It is significant to note that in the case of the Ramachandra lyer (P.K.) v. Union of India, 1984-I L.L.N. 433 (vide supra), the attention of the Supreme Court was also invited to the case of Sabhajit Tewary, 1975-I L.L.N. 362 (vide supra), relied upon by the Labour Court in which it had been held that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research registered under the Societies Registration Act was not an authority for purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution and it was contended that inasmuch as the constitution of I.C.A.R. was similar to Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, the I.C.A.R. should also not be treated as an authority. The Supreme Court repelled the said submission and observed as follows in Para. 12, at page 442 . . . Much water has flown down the Jamuna since the dicta in Sabhajit Tewary case (vide supra), and conceding that it is not specifically overruled in later decision, its ratio is considerably watered down to as to be a decision confined to its own facts. 12, at page 442 . . . Much water has flown down the Jamuna since the dicta in Sabhajit Tewary case (vide supra), and conceding that it is not specifically overruled in later decision, its ratio is considerably watered down to as to be a decision confined to its own facts. The case is wholly distinguishable on the facts, apart from the later indicia formulated by the Court for ascertaining whether a body is 'other authority' with it the meaning of Article 12. A mere comparison of the history of I.C.A.R. extensively set out hereinbefore and the setting up of the C.S.I.R. would clearly show that I.C.A.R. came into existence as a department of the Government of India, continued to be an attached office of the Government even though it was registered as a society and wholly financed by the Government and the taxing power of the State seas invoked to make it financially viable and to which independent research institute set up by the Government were transferred. None of these features was present in the case of C.S.I.R. and, therefore, the decision in Sabhajit Tewary case (vide supra), would render no assistance and would be clearly distinguishable. " The Supreme Court thereafter considers the tests laid down by it in other cases like Ajai Hasia case, 1981-II L.L.N. 613, Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, 1981-I L.L.N. 270, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, 1980-I L.L.N. 297 and Sukhdev Singh case, 1975-I L.L.N. 366 and came to the conclusion that there was little doubt that the I.C.A.R. was in fact an instrumentality or an agency of the State. 10. I am accordingly of opinion that the Labour Court erred in equating the I.C.A.R. with C.S.I.R. and in holding on the basis of Sabhajit Tewary case, 1975-I L.L.N. 362 (vide supra), that I.C.A.R. was not the instrumentality or agency of the State and as such a dispute between it and its workman did not fall outside the ambit of S. 2(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and that it continued to be an industrial dispute which could be referred to a Labour Court for adjudication by the State Government under S. 4K of the Act. In my opinion. In my opinion. I.C.A.R. is, as held by the Supreme Court in Ramachandra Iyer (P. K.) case, 1984-I L.L.N. 433 (vide supra), an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government. Any dispute between I.C.A.R. and its workmen, therefore, is covered by Cl. (i) of S. 2 (1) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and ceases to be a dispute which under S. 4K of the Act, can be referred for adjudication by the State Government. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the workman invited my attention to a decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Workmen of Karnataka Provident Fund Employees' Union v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore, 1983-I L.L.N. 776, wherein it was held that merely because a particular organisation is an instrumentality of the State, and, therefore, answers the definition of expression "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, it cannot be said that it is an industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government for the purposes of Industrial Disputes Act and eventually held that a dispute between the Provident Fund Organisation and its employee could be referred for adjudication by the State Government. It is not necessary for me to comment on this case as the Court was not concerned with the question as to whether or not I.C.A.R. was a body which carried on its activity under the authority of the Central Government. The controversy pertaining to I.C.A.R. in this regard, is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer case, 1983-I L.L.N. 334 (vide supra). 12. In the result, disagreeing with the Labour Court, I hold that the present dispute between the I.C.A.R. and its employee is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (1) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act and as such the reference made by the State Government, vide order, dated 23 May 1980, as also the order of the Labour Court, dated 10 April 1981, deserve to be quashed. 13. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The reference, under S. 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, made by the State Government, vide order, dated 23 May 1980, as also the proceedings in Adjudication Case No. 93 of 1980, pending in the Court of Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bareilly, are quashed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.