JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. 1. This writ petition arises out of a suit filed on 11-4-1977 by Rang Nath son of Siya Ram Sahu against the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Chief Medical Officer (Civil Surgeon), SSPG Hospital, Varanasi. In the suit, Paras Nath and Badri Nath who were sons of Siya Ram Sahu, were also arrayed as respondents. 2. The petitioner's suit was filed in the Court of Judge Small Causes, Varanasi, and was numbered as SCC Suit No. 363 of 1977. The petitioner stated that the defendants nos. 1 and 2, namely the State of U. P. and the Chief Medical Officer, Varanasi, were tenants of two premises bearing Corporation No. K/65/85 and part of House No. K/65/86 situate in Mohalla Gola Dina Nath, Varanasi City, on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- of a joint Hindu family whose head was Siya Ram Sahu. It was the case of the petitioner that during the life time of Siya Ram Sahu a family settlement had taken place and as a result of which the petitioner became the exclusive owner of the houses in suit and became entitled to realise the rent from the government defendants. It was further the case of the petitioner that after the death of Siya Ram Sahu on 3-3-1973, he allowed Smt. Ram Kunwar Devi, the widow of Siya Ram Sahu, to realise the rent. He asserted that the defendants were in arrears of rent from 1-7-1976 but they had not paid the same despite request by the plaintiff for payment of rent. A combined notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sent by both Rang Nath and Smt. Ram Kunwar Devi. It was asserted that despite the service of the notice the defendants had not vacated the premises in suit, hence the suit for ejectment, arrears of rent and mesne profit was consequently filed. It is necessary to mention here that Smt. Ram Kunwar Devi died before the institution of the suit and hence the suit was filed by Rang Nath alone. 3. The government defendants filed a written statement. They admitted that they were tenants of the houses and that the rent was Rs. 200/- per month. It is necessary to mention here that Smt. Ram Kunwar Devi died before the institution of the suit and hence the suit was filed by Rang Nath alone. 3. The government defendants filed a written statement. They admitted that they were tenants of the houses and that the rent was Rs. 200/- per month. It was stated that the rent was being paid previously to Siya Ram Sahu and after the death of Siya Ram Sahu it was paid to his wife Smt. Ram Kunwar Devi as owner. It was then asserted that when the petitioner damanded the rent from the defendants claiming to be the exclusive owner, he was asked to produce evidence of his being the exclusive owner of the properties in suit which the plaintiff did not produce. The legality of the notice was also challenged. It was also asserted that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 4. The brothers of the petitioner, namely Paras Nath and Badri Nath filed written statements stating that they were unnecessarily impleaded as parties. They further pleaded that the houses in suit had gone to Rang Nath in the family partition, as pleaded in the plaint. The trial court took the view that since the building was a 'public building' as defined in Section 3 of the Act, the provisions of the Act were not applicable. It found that the Government defendants were in arrears of rent and that a valid notice terminating their tenancy was served. The trial court accordingly decreed the suit on 27-10-1977. 5. The government defendants filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Act. The District Judge by his order dated 15-7-1978 allowed the revision on the ground that the suit was not maintainable in the court of the Judge Small Causes. 6. The petitioner then filed a writ petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 7479 of 1979. The case was referred to a Division Bench and ultimately the Division bench allowed the writ petition and held that the suit was cognizable by a Civil Court. The decision of the Division Bench is reported in the case of Hang Nath v. District Judge, 1981 AWC 103 . The case was referred to a Division Bench and ultimately the Division bench allowed the writ petition and held that the suit was cognizable by a Civil Court. The decision of the Division Bench is reported in the case of Hang Nath v. District Judge, 1981 AWC 103 . The government defendants went upto the Supreme Court against the aforesaid decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition on 25-11-1981. 7. After the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition the revision filed by the State was taken up for disposal by the I Additional District Judge. It agreed with the trial court that the building was a public building and consequently the provisions of Act did not apply. 8. As regards the validity of the notice the Additional District Judge found that even if a composite notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act could be given, the notice was otherwise bad in law. It held that the cause of action had not been given in the notice and it further found that since the defendants had been given two months to vacate the accommodation the tenancy was not determined within 30 days and as such the notice was bad. It further found that the petitioner not having produced documentary evidence to show that he was the exclusive owner of the property, he alone was not competent to file the suit against the defendants and on this ground also the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was held to be invalid. 9. The Additional District Judge consequently allowed the revision and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 10. Aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed the present writ petition. The first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a combined notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a good notice. 11. In this connection the learned counsel has relied upon certain decisions. The first decision is in the case of State of U. P. v. Mst. Mohan Devi, 1977 ALJ 365 = 1977 AWC (J) 32 (2) wherein it has been held that a combined notice is a good notice, 12. 11. In this connection the learned counsel has relied upon certain decisions. The first decision is in the case of State of U. P. v. Mst. Mohan Devi, 1977 ALJ 365 = 1977 AWC (J) 32 (2) wherein it has been held that a combined notice is a good notice, 12. The next decision is in the case of State of U. P. v N. C. Mukerji, 1983 ALJ 1117 wherein again it was held that a combined notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a valid notice. In view of these authorities, it must be held that a combined notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with section 80 of the Code Of Civil Procedure is a good notice. 13. The decision in the case State of U. P. v. Mst. Mohan Devi (supra) is also an authority for the proposition that a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be given before the accrual of cause of action created by the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The view of the learned Additional District Judge to the contrary is clearly erroneous when he held that such a notice would be defective. 14. The other ground given by the learned Additional District Judge for holding that the notice was given for more than 30 days before his tenancy stood terminated. A notice cannot be said to be bad on this ground. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been amended in the State of U. P. and now the notice does not require to terminate the tenancy with the end of the calendar month of the tenancy but 30 days' clear notice is sufficient. An extended period is to the advantage of the tenant and cannot make the notice bad. In these circumstances it is apparent that the notice determining the tenancy as also the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure were valid and the view of the revisional court is incorrect. 15. The next question is whether Rang Nath alone was competent to institute the suit. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that he was. He relies upon certain decisions to which a reference has to be made. 15. The next question is whether Rang Nath alone was competent to institute the suit. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that he was. He relies upon certain decisions to which a reference has to be made. The first case is a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2335 . The question in that case was whether the landlord is a co-owner of the premises with others within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The plaintiff in that case who was one of the co-owners, instituted a suit for ejectment of the tenants on account of default in payment of rent and also on the ground that he required the accommodation for his own use and occupation. The trial court held that the petitioner being only a co-owner could not be said to be owner within the meaning of Section 13 (1) (f) of the Act. It was submitted that the plaintiff alone could not file the suit for eviction. This argument was negatived by the Supreme Court in para 15 of the judgment. It was observed as follows : "There are two reasons for our not being able to accept the above submission. Firstly, the plea pertains to the domain of the frame of the suit as if the suit is bad for non-joinder of other plaintiffs. Such a plea should have been raised, for what it is worth at the earliest opportunity. It was not done. Secondly, the relation between the parties being that of landlord and tenant, only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-pleading of other co-owners as such." It was further observed by the Supreme Court that : "We are of the opinion that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is." 17. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel is in the case of Smt. Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599 . This case arises out of an action under section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for ejectment of the tenant. One of the questions before the Supreme Court was that the person who had instituted the suit, was only a co-owner of the property and it was asserted on behalf of the tenant that one co-lessor could not sue for eviction even if the other co-lessors had no objection. The Supreme Court observed in paragraph 7 of the judgment as follows : "This Court in Sri Ram Pasricha, ( 1976 SCC 184 ) ; ( AIR 1976 SC 2335 ) clarified that a co-owner is as much an owner of entire property as any sole owner of the property is : "Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that a co-owner of property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property alongwith others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property.........It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises. is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13 (1) ( f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of section 13 (1) ( f ) as long as he is a co-owner of the property, being at the same time acknowledged landlord of the defendants". That case also was one for eviction under the rent control law of Bengal. It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of section 13 (1) ( f ) as long as he is a co-owner of the property, being at the same time acknowledged landlord of the defendants". That case also was one for eviction under the rent control law of Bengal. The law having been thus put beyond doubt, the contention that the absence of the other owners on record disentitled the first respondent from suing for eviction fails. We are not called upon to consider the piquant situation that might arise if some of the co-owners wanted the tenant to continue contrary to the relief claimed by the evicting co-owner." 18. The learned counsel also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Subhendu Prasad Roy Choudhury v. Kamala Bala Roy Choudhury, AIR 1978 SC 835 . In that case a notice was served by the owners of the property on the tenants terminating their tenancy. The notice was given by all the co-owners including the minors but at the foot of the notice it was not said by Raja Prosad Roy Choudhury that he was signing it on behalf of all his minor sons. The objection that it was not a valid notice because not given on behalf of the minors was upheld by the Calcutta High Court. In appeal, the Supreme Court observed that- "It was not necessary for Raja Prosad Roy Choudhury to specifically say at that foot of the notice that he was signing it on behalf of his minor son also, specially when the name of the minor had been mentioned at serial no. 9 at the top. In our judgment, therefore, the view of the appellate authority as also of the High Court that notice on behalf of Kumar Debpriya Roy Choudhury was not given is erroneous. Even assuming that notice was not given on behalf of one of the co-owner landlords, the decision of this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1977) 1 SCR 395 ; AIR 1976 SC 2335 , would show that yet the notice was good and valid. Finally the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ram Charan Mower v. Ved Prakash, AIR 1980 Alld. 27. Finally the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ram Charan Mower v. Ved Prakash, AIR 1980 Alld. 27. In that case the property was owned by a number of co sharers of whom one alone found to have let out the property to the tenant. The said co-owner made an application under section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, for a permission to file a suit. The permission was eventually granted. The trial court found that the notice was served by the said co-owner and it was a valid notice and accordingly decreed the suit for ejectment which was filed. A revision was filed by the tenant under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Act. The District Judge held that since there were two co-owners, the suit at the instance of only one was not maintainable. The judgment was reversed by this Court. The learned single Judge of this Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2335 had held that one of the co-owners, namely Ram Charan Mower, who let out the property in suit, was competent to file the suit. 19. The learned Standing Counsel has relied upon two decisions of this Court. The first case is Jamir Ahmad v. Madhawanand, AIR 1979 Alld. 104. In that case it was held that notice terminating the tenancy must be on behalf of all the lessors and a notice given by a person who was a landlord within the meaning of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was of no consequence. The learned single Judge having recorded the finding that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid, set aside the decree in a suit for eviction. 20. The other decision relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel is in the case of Prayag Sonar v. Motor Singh, AIR 1914 Alld. 160. A learned single Judge of this Court had held that a notice determining the tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act could not be served by a co-owner without the others joining him and further that a suit for eviction by one co-owner could not be decreed without other co-owners joining the suit. 160. A learned single Judge of this Court had held that a notice determining the tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act could not be served by a co-owner without the others joining him and further that a suit for eviction by one co-owner could not be decreed without other co-owners joining the suit. The two decisions relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel cannot be held to be a good law in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. 21. There is a further circumstance in this case. The two brothers of the petitioner were made co-defendants in the suit. They filed a written statement admitting that the plaintiff alone was the owner of the properties in suit as a result of the family partition. The brother of the plaintiff were parties to the suit. 22. There is a reference to the petitioner having sisters in the order of the revisional court. However, there is no reference to the petitioner having sisters in the written statement or in the order of the trial court. The Additional District Judge appears to have been swayed by what was said in arguments and not by the record in recording a finding that there were sisters also who were co-heirs alongwith the petitioner. In the circumstances, I hold that the notice determining the tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a good notice. I further hold that the suit for eviction at the instance of the petitioner alone was competent and the revisional court erred in coming to a contrary conclusion. 23. The learned Standing Counsel has then urged that the suit had been wrongly entertained and decreed by the trial court. It is urged by him that under the U. P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1977 being U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, the suit must be held to have been instituted and decided by a Court without jurisdiction. He urges that a suit for eviction of a tenant can only be filed under section 21 of the Act. By section 2 of the said Ordinance, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act was amended and a new clause (a) was substituted. He urges that a suit for eviction of a tenant can only be filed under section 21 of the Act. By section 2 of the said Ordinance, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act was amended and a new clause (a) was substituted. Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act provides that nothing in this Act shall apply to the classes of buildings specified in the clauses. Clause (a) referred to any public building. 'Public Building' was defined in clause (o) of Section 3 of the Act as under ; "(o) 'public building' means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of the any local authority or any public sector corporation." 24. The argument of the learned Standing Counsel is that in view of the the said Ordinance the building in the tenancy of the Government ceased to be a public building on its enforcement and consequently the suit for eviction could not be continued in the Civil Court. The suit, as mentioned earlier, was filed on 11-4-77. The said Ordinance was promulgated on 27-4-1977. Thus, the suit cannot be said to have been wrongly instituted in the Court of the Judge Small Causes. The said Ordinance was withdrawn by the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 213 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India vide Notification No. 1165/XVII -VII-46-77 dated May 7, 1977, published in U. P. Gazette Extraordinary, dated 7-5-1977. The judgment of the trial court was delivered on 27-10-1977. The judgment also cannot be said to have been given by a court which was not competent to decide the suit. 25. There is a further circumstance that there was no provision in the said Ordinance regarding pending suits. The only effect of the said Ordinance was that if a suit came to be decided during the life time of the said Ordinance the law as amended would have to be applied. 26. There is a further circumstance that the said Ordinance came into force during the pendency of the suit. No plea on the basis of the said Ordinance was taken. The jurisdiction of the Judge Small Causes was challenged on another ground. 26. There is a further circumstance that the said Ordinance came into force during the pendency of the suit. No plea on the basis of the said Ordinance was taken. The jurisdiction of the Judge Small Causes was challenged on another ground. That challenge was accepted by the District Judge initially. The High Court overruled the challenge and the order of the High Court was upheld because the Special Leave Petition filed by the State against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed. Sri Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar is right in urging that the respondent is precluded from raising the question now sought to be a raised on the basis of the said Ordinance because this challenge could have been raised at the earlier stage of the litigation which went right upto the Supreme Court but the respondents did not do so. He has based his objection on Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that no Court shall try any suit in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties. The Explanation IV to the Section provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. 27. The question of jurisdiction having been raised in a different form cannot be allowed to be raised in its present form as sought to be raised by the learned Standing Counsel. 28. I next come to another ground of defence as urged by the learned Standing Counsel. The learned Standing Counsel has urged that by Section 2 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983') which came into force on 18-5-1983, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act was substituted. Clause (a) under the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 runs as follows :- "(a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector Corporation is the landlord; or" 29. Clause (a) under the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 runs as follows :- "(a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector Corporation is the landlord; or" 29. The argument is that now the building under the tenancy of the Government under the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 came to be covered by the Act. He then points out that the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 was replaced by the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) (Second) Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983') and it came into force on 12-10-1983 and is still in force. By the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983, the amendment made in clause (a) of the Act by the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983, has been continued. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 provides that it shall be deemed to have come into force on May 18, 1983. Under the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983, a building which is in the tenancy of the government will be now covered by the provisions of the Act and the proceedings for eviction can only be instituted under Section 21 of the Act. 30. However, there is no provision in either of the two Ordinances dealing with pending cases. It is well settled that an amendment of law is presumed to be prospective and not retrospective. In the case of Punjab Tin Supply Company Chandigarh v. Central Government, AIR 1984 SC 87 the Supreme Court in Paragraph 17 of the judgment has observed that- "All laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor. Hence the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the Court has to decide whether in the light of the surrounding circumstances retrospective effect should be given to it or not. " Both the Ordinances have no provisions dealing with the pending suits. Normally the rights of the parties are to be determined on the basis of law as it stood on the date of the suit. Further the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 has, by Section 1 (2), provided that it shall come into force on 18-5-1983. Thus, retrospectivity has been given to the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 but it does not go beyond 18-5-83. In the circumstances, the amendment of clause (a) of sub-section (i) of Section 2 of the Act by the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 dates back only to 18-5-1983. Consequently the provisions of Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act as it stood on the date of the suit have to be applied on the facts of the present case and under Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act when the suit was instituted, the building under the tenancy of the government defendants were a public buildings within the meaning of Section 3 (o) of the Act. 31. The learned Standing Counsel then urges that in view of the provisions of Section 6 (2) of the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983, the government defendants would be protected from eviction. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 runs as follows :- "(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by the Ordinance referred to in sub-section (1), shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Ordinance, as if the provisions of this Ordinance were in force at all material times." 32. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 refers to the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 which has been repealed. In this case, nothing was done in pursuance of the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 refers to the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 which has been repealed. In this case, nothing was done in pursuance of the Ordinance No. 28 of 1983. The suit was instituted under the general law. The revisional court acted under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Act and, therefore, sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Ordinance No. 43 of 1983 will not come into play. 33. In this view of the matter, the government respondents cannot get any advantage from either of the two Ordinances. 34. In the circumstances, I find that the order of revisional authority cannot be sustained. In the result, the writ petition succeeds, the impugned order of the revisional authority (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) dated 16-2-1982 is quashed and the order of the trial court is restored. The petitioner is entitled to his costs from the respondent no. 1. Petition allowed.