ORDER B.L. Yadav, J. - The present writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India arises out of the proceedings under S. 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The facts of the case are in a very narrow compass. One Suresh Chandra, respondent 4 filed a suit on 1-10-73 for declaration of Sirdari rights and for partition in the Court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Muzaffarnagar. Initially the land in dispute was held by three persons, namely, Manga, Sunderlal and Prakash Chandra. Manga, respondent 5 has transferred his share to the petitioners and Sunderlal has transferred his share to Suresh Chandra, respondent 4. In this way the petitioners were entitled to ? share and contesting respondents were entitled to ? share in the land in dispute. 2. The aforesaid suit was decreed on 26-6- 74. The contesting respondents moved an application for preparation of final decree. But as the land in dispute was 31/2 acres since it was ordered to be auctioned in view of the rules on 16-8-74 and possession was given on the spot on 9-5-75. 3. The petitioners who were transferees to the extent of ?rd share, thereafter came to know about the aforesaid order and ex parte decree and moved two applications for setting aside the aforesaid ex parte decree dated 25-6-74 and dated 16-8-74 alleging that no notice or summons were served upon them before passing the ex parte decree and they heard a rumour in the village and came to Muzaffarnagar next day i.e. 10-6-75 and that day being Saturday and the next day being Sunday, the inspection of the record was possible only on 12-5-75 and it was found that on the basis of fictitious and fraudulent service of summons the suit had been decreed ex parte and similarly the subsequent proceedings also followed without the knowledge of the petitioners. Hence it was prayed by the petitioners that the aforesaid decree and orders have been passed behind the back of the petitioners, may be set aside and the suit may be restored to its original number and may be decided on merits. 4. Hence it was prayed by the petitioners that the aforesaid decree and orders have been passed behind the back of the petitioners, may be set aside and the suit may be restored to its original number and may be decided on merits. 4. The respondents, however, contested the application filed by the petitioner alleging that the same was beyond time and that the petitioners knew about the proceedings of the suit, but they deliberately refused to accept and a copy of the order was filed in the Court of the Commissioner and the counsel for the petitioners accepted the cost also on 24-2-75. Hence in view of this fact it cannot be assumed that the petitioners could not know about the proceedings in the aforesaid suit. Hence there was no ground for setting aside the ex parte decree. 5. The Assistant Collector, Ist Class, Muzaffarnagar by his order dated 6-8-75 held that the plaintiffs as soon as they came to know about the ex parte decree and order, against them, filed a restoration application alleging that the substituted service on the petitioners was not sufficient nor the same was made in accordance with law. It was held that sufficient cause was made out and the ex parte decree and other consequential orders be set aside. Against that order two connected revisions were filed by Suresh Chandra, respondent 4, which were dismissed by an order dated 28-11-76 holding that the findings of the trial court about the knowledge and sufficiency of service were findings of fact and no grounds for interference were made,out. 6. Thereafter a revision was filed by respondent 4 before the Board of Revenue under S. 333 of the Act and the provisions of S. 333 of the Act were similar to S. 115 of the C.P.C. The Board of Revenue, however, allowed the revision and set aside the orders of the courts below and maintained the ex parte decree by its order dated 29-7-76. It is this order against which the petitioner has come up before this court. 7. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial court has recorded a finding of fact that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay in the restoration application, which was filed as soon as the petitioner came to learn and that the service on the petitioner was not sufficient. 7. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial court has recorded a finding of fact that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay in the restoration application, which was filed as soon as the petitioner came to learn and that the service on the petitioner was not sufficient. On this finding of fact about sufficient cause being made out, the trial court set aside the ex parte decree and in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under S. 333 of the Act, which was almost similar to S. 115 of the C.P.C., no question of jurisdiction was involved. Hence the Board of Revenue exceeded his jurisdiction in allowing the revision, particularly when the Additional Commissioner has recorded a finding that no ground for interference was made out and the case was concluded by findings of fact. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent has urged on the other hand that the procedure prescribed under O. 5 R. 17 of the C.P.C. was not strictly followed and it was established that the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiffs claim and also of the date fixed. Hence the proviso to O. 9 R. 13 of the C.P.C. was attracted and the ex parte decree cannot be set aside. In this connection he placed reliance on the case of Raghubar Sahai Bhatnagar v. Bhakt Sajjan. 1977 All WC 698: ( AIR 1978 All 139 ). But in that case the facts were that the plaintiff has filed a suit against the defendant and has given local address as well as the place of his posting in service at Mathura and the plaintiff has made a prever that summons be served on the defendants at both the addresses. 29th September, 1977 was the date fixed for the defendant's appearance and hearing of the suit. On 17-8-82 the Process Server delivered the summons to the applicant, who was present in the Civil Court Compound at Allahabad, in presence of two clerks of the Advocate and plaintiffs son. The applicant, after reading the summons refused to acknoweldge it, instead he returned the same to the Process Server saying that the summons may be sent to him at his office address at Mathura. The applicant, after reading the summons refused to acknoweldge it, instead he returned the same to the Process Server saying that the summons may be sent to him at his office address at Mathura. The Process Server made a report to the trial court that the applicant had refused to accept the commons and he mentioned the names of witnesses who were present. The trial Court held the service of summons sufficient and passed an order for proceeding ex parte. On 30-9-72, the trial court passed an ex parte decree against the defendant applicant. On those facts a Division Bench of this Court held that in case the procedure under O. 5 R. 17 was not strictly followed and the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiffs claim as also the date of hearing, Proviso to O. 9 R. 13 of the C.P.C. would apply and the ex parte decree cannot be set aside. In that case the defendant himself received the summons, but he refused to accept the same on the pretext that the same may be sent at his address at Mathura, where he was posted and the Process Server also gave a report that he deliberately refused to accept the summons and the two clerks of the Advocates, also made statements and the courts below had refused to accept the contention of the defendant that the notice was not sufficiently served and failure of the Process Server to affix the same at the outer door of the defendant's place of residence or business, was not an illegality and proviso to O. 9 R. 13 of the C.P.C. was applicable. There was earlier an amendment made by Allahabad High Court in O. 9 R. 13 of the C.P.C. but now after the C.P.C. Amendment Act, 1976 (No. 104 of 1976) the said provision has been engrafted as proviso to O. 9 R. 13 by the Parliament. The statutory provision of the said proviso, so far as it is relevant for the purposes of the present case, is set out below. "Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer to plaintiffs claim." 9. "Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer to plaintiffs claim." 9. Now coming to the facts of the present case it is clear that summons for the date fixed on 5-12-73 was served by substituted service and the defendant was reported to have gone out of village. Along with the restoration application defendants also filed their affidavits including the affidavit of one Umrao, son of Mangal denying his thumb impression on the said summons in token of the substituted service and the trial court held that the substituted service was denied by the defendants and it was proved on the basis of evidence that the defendants had no knowledge about the date fixed and as soon as the defendants came to learn about the suit being decreed ex parte, they filed a restoration application and that application was treated to be within time. Hence the facts of the present case are entirely different and the case of Raghubar Sahai Bhatnagar v. Bhakt Sajjan 1977 All WC 698: ( AIR 1978 All 139 ) (supra) is not indistinguishable. 10. In Raja Ram Gupta v. Firm Jaiswal Iron and Steel Works 1980 All WC 101 :(1980 All U NOC 65) cited by the counsel for the respondent, the facts were in a very narrow compass. 10. In Raja Ram Gupta v. Firm Jaiswal Iron and Steel Works 1980 All WC 101 :(1980 All U NOC 65) cited by the counsel for the respondent, the facts were in a very narrow compass. A suit was filed and summons had been served on the defendants by publication in the newspaper `Swaraj' which had large circulation in the village and other areas of the district of Varanasi and Jaunpur as also in the village where the defendants reside and after ex parte decree was passed, the defendant had moved an application that he had no knowledge of the suit or the decree passed on 5-3-74 and when he went to the shop of the plaintiff at Golghar, Gorakhpur on 2-4-74 only then he came to know about the ex parte decree and thereafter he immediately filed an application under O. 9 R. 13 of the C.P.C. and the main feature of the case was that after filing the suit, the plaintiff in that case, had filed an application on 2-5-73, praying for attachment of movable and immovable property belonging to the defendants. The Court had appointed a Vakil Commissioner to go to the village and attach the movable and immovable property belonging to the defendant. The Commissioner had also submitted a report to the effect that he visited the spot on 26-5-73 and he met the defendant, but they refused to furnish security as required by the Court. The Commissioner attached the property belonging to the defendants which consisted of buildings, rolling mills including the godowns etc. The report made it abundantly clear that the defendant had knowledge of the proceedings on 26-5-72 and the suit having been decreed on 5-3-74. Hence the defendant had sufficient knowledge to ascertain the position in the case and to put in appearance. The affidavit sworn in support of the restoration application filed by Sri Raja Ram Gupta was also not found to be satisfactory and in spite of irregularity in the service of summons the defendants became aware of the proceedings of the suit on 26-5-73 or very soon thereafter they could have but for their wilful conduct, known about the date . of hearing in sufficient time so as to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim. of hearing in sufficient time so as to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim. On these facts it was held by this court that even though there were some irregularities in the service of summons, but in view of proviso to O. 9 R. 13, the court below could not make an order setting aside the ex parte decree. 11. The facts of the present case are entirely different. It has been found as findings of fact by the trial court that the defendants were not served nor they had knowledge about the date fixed for appearance. Consequently the trial court set aside the ex parte decree. The findings about the knowledge of defendant and the sufficient cause being made out for condonation of delay and the application for restoration having been treated within time are all findings of fact and the counsel for the respondent could not point out any error of jurisdiction nor it was pointed out that the trial court or the Addl. Commissioner acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction under S. 333 of the Act. Hence no ground was made out for the Board of Revenue to interfere with the findings of fact and to maintain the ex parte decree. 12. In view of the facts stated hereinbefore, it is crystal clear that the Board of Revenue exceeded its jurisdiction under S. 333 of the Act. 13. In view of the discussions aforesaid, the judgment and order of the Board of Revenue is manifestly erroneous and the petitioner is entitled to relief for a writ of Certiorari. 14. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the judgment and order of the Board of Revenue dated 29-7-76 is hereby quashed. However, since the case is of 1976, the ends of justice require that the suit should be decided expeditiously and I hereby direct that after the receipt of record the trial court should decide the suit as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of six months. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.