JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This writ petition has been preferred by the State of U.P. against the judgment of the District Judge, Gorakhpur, allowing the appeal of Respondent 2 which had been filed against the order of the Competent Authority declaring 868.26 square metres as surplus. 2. The area held by Respondent 2, was found by the District Judge, was 3164.23 square metres. Out of this area, 763.68 square metres was covered by constructions. To this construction, 532.29 square metres was the land appurtenant. After excluding 1295.97 square metres, the learned District Judge held that 1868.26 square metres was vacant land left with Respondent 2. The learned District Judge held that as this area was below 2000 square metres which was the prescribed ceiling limit for Gorakhpur, nothing was liable to be declaied as surplus. Aggrieved, the State has filed the present writ. 3. The first submission made by the learned Counsel for the State as that in calculating the vacant land, the area constructed upon as well as the land appurtenant and additional appurtenant is to be takes into account. This submission of the learned State Counsel is borne out from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. L.J. Johnson and Others, AIR 1983 SC 1303 . In this case, the Supreme Court has laid down: Section 4(9) contemplates that if a person holds vacant land as also other portion of land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit, the extent of land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall be taken into account in calculating the extent of the vacant land. 4. Sri S.P. Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent 2, referred to Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court and urged that the Supreme Court bad totally excluded the area covered by constructions and the land left out as appurtenant land while calculating the excess vacant land. I do not find any merit in this argument. In paragraph 25, the Supreme Court has taken an illustration where A has 4000 square metres of land out of which 2000 square metres is covered by building. To this construction 1000 square metres was added, to which be was entitled to as land appurtenant and additional appurtenant. Taken together, the total was 3000 square metres. In paragraph 25, the Supreme Court has taken an illustration where A has 4000 square metres of land out of which 2000 square metres is covered by building. To this construction 1000 square metres was added, to which be was entitled to as land appurtenant and additional appurtenant. Taken together, the total was 3000 square metres. After leaving out this 3000 square metres, the Supreme Court held that 1000 square metres of land was liable to be declared as surplus. In this paragraph, the Supreme Court emphasised that if there is a constructed building with a dwelling unit, the land covered by construction cannot be treated as open land for the purpose of declaring it as excess vacant land beyond the ceiling limit. Section 4(11) of the Act also has laid down: For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing in Sub-sections (5), (6), (7), (9) and (10) shall be construed as empowering the competent authority to declare any land referred to in Sub-clause 00 or Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (q) of Section 2 as excess vacant land under this Chapter. 5. It is thus dear that the land constructed upon and the land appurtenant to which a person may be, entitled to can not be declared and treated as open land for the purpose of declaring surplus. It can, of course, be taken into account, as said by the Supreme Court in other paragraphs, for the purpose of calculating the extent of vacant land. 6. In paragraph 29, the Supreme Court has taken an illustration of this kind. In the case before the Supreme Court, the total land possessed by the land holder was 2530 square metres. After considering the land constructed upon, which was 464 square metres, and 1000 square metres as appurtenant and additional appurtenant the Supreme Court found that 530 square metres would be in excess of the ceiling limit of 2000 square metres, which was prescribed for Dehra Dun in respect of which the case was being dealt with. 7. The two Illustrations, one mentioned in paragraph 25 and the other in paragraph 29 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, are in respect of different contingencies. Confusion should not be created by the mere fact of 2000 square metres, which was wholly covered being left out from consideration. 7. The two Illustrations, one mentioned in paragraph 25 and the other in paragraph 29 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, are in respect of different contingencies. Confusion should not be created by the mere fact of 2000 square metres, which was wholly covered being left out from consideration. This area having been fully built up, could not be treated as open land for the purpose of declaring excess. To the built up area, 1000 square metres was allowable u/s 2(g). Thus, the vacant land in the illustration given in paragraph 25 was 1000 square metres. This was, therefore, declared as excess vacant land. Paragraph 25 provides that the land constructed upon and the land appurtenant would be excluded from the consideration of ceiling limit, whereas paragraph 29 deals with the determination of vacant land. 8. In the instant case, the land constructed upon and the land appurtenant thereto has to be taken into account, which the District Judge wrong-dully omitted. This interpretation of the District Judge is against the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson (supra). 9. I do not agree with the argument of the Respondents counsel that each individual plot must have been shown in the master plan for the purpose other than agriculture and unless that was done, Section 2(o)(c) would not apply. In a master plan, it is the area which is earmarked and if evidence is brought to show that a particular area where the disputed plots are situate has been earmarked for a purpose which is not agriculture, Section 2(o)(c) will apply. The purpose of mentioning extractive industries is apparently a purpose other than agriculture. However, since the matter is going back, the District Judge will look into it and decide the same in accordance with law. 10. For what I have said above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the District Judge, Gorakhpur, dated 14-7-1982 is quashed, and he is directed to decide the appeal of Respondent 2 afresh in the fight of observations made in this judgment. No. order as to costs.