Saikia, J.:- The second respondent, Shri Dalichand Jain, has been acquitted of charge under Section 16(1) read with Sec. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, shortly, "the Act', on two grounds, namely, that the seller of the sample could not be shown to be an employee of the accused firm; and that the Food Inspector had not followed the mandatory provision by calling at least one witness at the time of taking sample. Both the findings are challenged in this appeal by the Food Inspector. 2. As regards the seller, the evidence of P. W. 1 is that when the Food Inspector, P. W. 1 entered the shop, M/s. Surajmal Amarchand, the first respondent, the second respondent Dulichand Jain, a partner of that firm, was present in the shop, and on disclosure of the former's identity and purpose of tak­ing sample of 'papad' the second respondent agreed to accept notice but instead of taking it himself, he instructed his sales­man, Umidmal Jain, to receive the notice and Umidmal accord­ingly received the same and signed the acknowledgment in presence of P. W. 1 and Babul Chandra Bezbarua, P. W. 2 Ext. 1(2) is Umidmall's signature. At that time the second respondent was sitting in the gaddi. Umidmall sold 600 grams of papad sample to P.W.I at the price of Rs. 1.20 paise, which P. W. 1 paid in cash. Umidmall also received one part of the sample as asked by the second respondent and issued signed receipt, Ext. 2. Ext. 2(1) is Umidmall's signature. In cross-examination P. W. 1 stated that he did not know Umidal earlier but only on that day on being told he knew that Umidmall was an employee of the first respondent, M/s. Surajmall Amarchand. He did not try to gather from other firms whether or not Umidmal was an employee of that firm. However, P. W. 1 clearly stated in cross-examination that the second respondent and Umidmall were sitting on the gaddi; that Ext. 2 showed Umid­mall as a vendor and did not show the second respondent or his firms as the vendor; and that he paid the price to Umidmal. P. W. 2 corroborates P. W. 1 by saying that when P. W. 1 introducing himself served the notice on the second respondent the latter instead of taking the notice, Ext. 2 showed Umid­mall as a vendor and did not show the second respondent or his firms as the vendor; and that he paid the price to Umidmal. P. W. 2 corroborates P. W. 1 by saying that when P. W. 1 introducing himself served the notice on the second respondent the latter instead of taking the notice, Ext. 1, himself asked Umidmall to receive it, he being an employee of the shop, Umidmall sold the sample, received one part of the sample and signed the acknowledgment (Ext. 2) as well as the labels on the sample. P. W. 2 also did not know the second respondent and Umidmall earlier. Both of them were sitting on the gaddi. 3. The second respondent, examining himself as D. W. 3, deposed in chief that no employee by the name of Umidmall Jain ever worked in his shop and in cross-examination he denied the suggestion that Umidmall was his employee. However, he further deposed that on 12.5.73 he was not at Gauhati. In his state­ment under S. 313 Cr. P. C. also he stated that Umidmall was not his employee and that on 12.5.73 he was at Pathsala for marketing. 4. In face of the above evidence on record, the trial court held that it was the duty of prosecution to show first that Umidmall Jain was an employee of the accused firm at that time, but that burden was not discharged. The court observed that there must be some evidence to show that this Umidmall Jain was the employee and that no attempt was made by pro­secution to prove this fact. To our mind the above finding is clearly erroneous as it has been arrived at by overlooking vital pieces of evidence on record. Apart from the statements of P. Ws 1 and 2 that both the second respondent and Umidmall were sitting on the gaddi of the shop, Umidmall received the notice, sold the sample, and received the price and one part of the sample. He signed the notice (Ext. 1), and the receipt (Ext 2) in acknowledgement of receipt of the price and sample as instructed by and in presence of the second respondent. There was, therefore, no justification for holding that prosecution failed to prove that Umidmall was an employee of the firm and for acquittal of the second respondent on that ground. 5. 1), and the receipt (Ext 2) in acknowledgement of receipt of the price and sample as instructed by and in presence of the second respondent. There was, therefore, no justification for holding that prosecution failed to prove that Umidmall was an employee of the firm and for acquittal of the second respondent on that ground. 5. Under Sec. 2(xiii) of the Act 'sale' means the sale of any article of food, whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange, for human consumption or use, or for analysis. The term 'vendor' means and includes both the persons, viz., the person from whom the sample was taken and the person who sold that article to the person from whom the same was taken, as was held in AIR 1966 SC 188. Vendor would obviously mean the person who had sold the article of food which is alleged to be adulterated. The vendor would be deprived of the defe­nce of ignorance about the nature, substance or qualities of the articles sold. Under Rule 12-C of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, shortly, 'the Rules' every vendor of an article of food shall disclose the name and address of the Director or Manager, as the case may be, nominated in Form VIII under Rule 12-B to a purchaser who informs such vendor of his intention of purchasing any such article from him for analysis by a Public Analyst under Section 18 of the Act. In the instant case the second respondent instructed Umidmall to receive the notice and to sign the same. He also instructed Umidmall to sell the sample, accept the cash and one part of the sample and sign the acknowledgment receipt, Ext. 2. This would be enough to make Umidmall an employee, or agent of the second respondent. Under Section 7(1) no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any adulterated food. 2. This would be enough to make Umidmall an employee, or agent of the second respondent. Under Section 7(1) no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any adulterated food. Under section 17(1) where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company, (a)(i) the person, if any who has been nominated under sub-section (2) to be incharge of, and responsible to,, the company for the conduct of the business of the company,, or (ii) where no person has been so nominated, every person who at the time the offence was committed was incharge of and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company; (b) the company; shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly; unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that he exercised all due deligence to prevent the commission of such offence. In State ( Delhi Admn.) vs. I. K. Nagina, (1980) I S. C. C. 258 it has been ruled that the person actually effecting the sale of an adulterated article of food is directly liable under Section 7(i) of the Act. In the instant case the first respondent became liable because they were selling adulte­rated papad. The second respondent also became liable because of the words ''by any person on his behalf" which included their agents and servants. That the second respondent is a partner of the first respondent has not been denied. That the second respondent directed and instructed Umidmal to receive and sign the notice, to sell the sample, to receive the price and a part of the sample, and to sign the acknowledgement receipt, Ext. 2, have not been denied by the second respondent. His plea is that he was not there in the shop and that Umi­dmal was not an employee of the shop. In view of the evidence of P. Ws 1 and 2 and the signatures ia Exts. 1 and 2 the presence of both the second respondent and Umidmal cannot be doubted, and the second respondent cannot escape the liabi­lity under Sec. 7(i) of the Act. In view of the evidence of P. Ws 1 and 2 and the signatures ia Exts. 1 and 2 the presence of both the second respondent and Umidmal cannot be doubted, and the second respondent cannot escape the liabi­lity under Sec. 7(i) of the Act. Again, as has been held in I. K. Nagina (supra) the individual liability of the Sales Manager is distinct and separate from the corporate liability of the manufacturer. In case of a 'company prosecution' the company along with its agent, that is, the person nominated under Section 17(2) as well as the Sales Manager can both be prosecuted under Section 7(i) read with Section 16(1)(a). Notwithstanding the nomination of a person responsible under Section 17(2), there can be prosecution of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company under Section 17(4). But in such a case it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the offence has been committed 'with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of such person'. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, AIR 1983 S. C. 67 it has been held that under the Act in a case complaint against a company, its direc­tors and manager, and where there is no clear allegation against the manager and directors that they were responsible for conduct of business of disputed sample, the proceeding could be quashed against the directors but not against the manager. In the instant case the second respondent, being the partner and sitting on the gaddi, was obviously in charge of management of the shop. His acquittal on the ground that Umidmal, who acted as inst­ructed by him, could not be proved to be an employee of the firm, is therefore erroneous. 6. As regards non-compliance of Section 10(7) of the Act, under that sub-section "where the food inspector takes any ii action under clause (a) of sub-section (1), sub-section (2), sub­section (4), or sub-section (6), he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take i his or their signatures". The evidence of P. W. 1 is that besides Babul Bezbarua (P. W. 2) he had requested 2/3 outsiders to be witnesses before taking sample but as they refused to comply he had taken Babul Bezbaru.1 as witness. The evidence of P. W. 1 is that besides Babul Bezbarua (P. W. 2) he had requested 2/3 outsiders to be witnesses before taking sample but as they refused to comply he had taken Babul Bezbaru.1 as witness. In cross-examination he stated that one or two outsiders visited the shop during his stay there. He requested one or two of them, whose name he had forgotten, to be witnesses but they refused. He further stated that there were shops etc. in the neighbourhood but he did not try to call the inmates of any shop to be witnesses. He knew one or two responsible businessmen who were neighbours of the accused, namely, Ganapath Dhanuka, Devi Dhanuka, Madanial and others, but he did not try to call them because of the distance involved as their shop was located 10/12 shops away. Madan Bowri's shop was 4/5 shops away from that of the second respondent. P. W. 1 has forgotten the names of those whom he tried to call in from the road. P. W. 2 Babul Bezbarua, deposes that he did not call any outsiders as witnesses and that if the Food Inspector did so he did not know. During an hour or so they spent in the shop they did not go out. The second respondent, as an D. W. 3. did not depose anything to the cont­rary in this regard nor did he do so in his statement under Section 313 Cr. P. C. The learned trial court observed that P. W. 2 had not supported the statement of P. W. 1 that he called some person to witness the taking of the sample and therefore, held that the Food Inspector did not follow the mandatory provisions by calling at least one witness and hence the proceeding was held to be illegal 7. As was observed in Babulal Hargovindas vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 S. C. 1277 it is not a rule of law that the evidence of the Food Inspector cannot be accepted without corroboration. He is not an accomplice nor is it similar to the one as in the case of wills where the law makes it imperative to examine an attesting witness under Section 68 of the Evidence Act to prove the execution of the will. He is not an accomplice nor is it similar to the one as in the case of wills where the law makes it imperative to examine an attesting witness under Section 68 of the Evidence Act to prove the execution of the will. The evidence of the Food Inspector alone, if believed, can be relied on for proving that the samples were taken as required by law. At the most Courts of fact may find it difficult in any particular case to rely on the testimony of the Food Inspector alone though it cannot be said that result generally follows. The circumstances of each case will determine the extent of the weight to be given to the evidence of the Food Inspector and what in the opinion of the Court is the value of his testimony. As regards the validity of the proceeding the Court held that even other­wise there was no question of the trial being vitiated for non-compliance of sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act. The provisions of section 10(7) are akin to those under Section 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code when the premises of a citizen are searched by the Police. These provisions are enacted to safeguard against any possible allegations of excesses or resort to unfair means either by the Police Officers or by the Food Inspectors under the Act. This being the object it in the interest of the prosecuting authorities concerned to comply with the provisions of the Act, the non-compliance of which may in some cases result in their testimony being rejected. While holding so their Lordships were not to be understood as in any way minimising the need to comply with the aforesaid salutory pro­visions. In that case because the Panch witness had been called and his signatures taken which he admitted their Lordships held that there was no justification in the allegation that the provi­sions had not been complied with and that in those circumst­ances the Courts were justified on the evidence of the Food Inspector that he had complied with the requirements and that the samples ware seized in the presence of the Panch witness whose signatures were taken in the presence of the accused. In Ram Labhaya vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1974 S. C. 789 it has been ruled that the words "one or more persons" in Section 10(7) must mean one or more independent persons. The legislative history of sub-section (7) further shows that at the least, the Food Inspector ought to try and secure the presence of one or more independent persons when he takes action under any of the provisions mentioned in the sub-section. Their Lord­ships, however, were unable to agree that regardless of all circumstances, the non-presence of one or more independent persons at the relevant time would vitiate the trial or convi­ction. The obligation which section 10(7) casts on the Food Inspector is to call one or more persons to be present when he takes action. The facts in that case showed that the Food Inspector did call the neighbouring shopkeepers to witness the taking of the sample but none was willing to co-operate. He could not certainly compel their presence. In such circumst­ances, the prosecution was relieved of its obligation to cite ind­ependent witnesses. Their Lordships further observed that the Food Inspector was unable in that case to secure the presence of independent persons and was therefore driven to take the sample in the presence of the members of his staff only. It was easy enough to understand that shopkeepers may feel bound by fraternalities but no court can countenance a conspiracy to keep out independent witnesses in a bid to defeat the working of laws. The law was further crystalised in Prem Bellab vs. The State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1977 S. C. 56 ruling that there is no rule of law that conviction cannot be based on the sole testimony of a Food Inspector. It is only out of a sense of caution that the courts insist that the testimony of a food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witness. This is a necess­ary caution which has to be borne in mind because the Food Inspector may in a sense be regarded as an interested witness, but this caution is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law; if it were otherwise, it would be possible for any guilty person to escape punishment by resorting to the device of bribing panch witnesses. The conviction of the appellants in that case, it was held, could not be assailed as infirm on the ground that it rested merely on the evidence of the witnesses. 8. Applying the law as enunciated above to the facts of this case we find it difficult to hold that the Food Inspector did not at all try to procure the presence of independent witn­esses. The respectable witnesses, known to him, could not be requested because of the distance involved. The outsiders who were present in the shop and those who were called from the road refused to be witnesses. Under the circumstances, P. W.2 a member of his staff was made a witness and he corrobor­ated P. W. 1 in all material particulars. It cannot, therefore, be held that sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act was not com­plied with or that the Food Inspector himself had to be disbe­lieved and the conviction could not be based on the evidence of the two P. Ws. The trial court clearly fell into an error in. holding to the contrary. 9. Mr. Jain submits that the respondents had no opport­unity of getting the sample analysed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. Counsel, however, admits that no application was made for getting the sample so analysed. They cannot, therefore, be held to have been prejudiced by such non-examination. Counsel further submits that the first respondent firm did not at all deal with papad and the books and registers of the firm did not disclose any transaction in papad. Accep­tance of such a submission woud be possible only if the entire evidence in the case is ignored and not otherwise. The second respondent's plea that he was not in the shop on the relevant day, but was at Pathsala for marketing has been rightly disbe­lieved by the trial court. We also find it difficult to accept these submissions, 10. In this case the prosecution has been with the aid of S. 17 of the Act. The first respondent is the firm, the second its partner and the third its employee. The offence was committed on 12. 5. 73. We also find it difficult to accept these submissions, 10. In this case the prosecution has been with the aid of S. 17 of the Act. The first respondent is the firm, the second its partner and the third its employee. The offence was committed on 12. 5. 73. Under the section as then stood, (before substi­tution by Act 34 of 1976), where an offence under the Act had been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was respon­sible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, should be deemed to be guilty of the offence and should be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly, unless such person proved that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, or it was proved that the offence had not been committed with the consent or connivance of or was not attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager etc. Company included a firm and director included a partner. From the evi­dence on record we have no doubt that the offence was committed by the first respondent firm. We therefore, set aside the acquittal and hold the first respondent firm of Mis. Surajmal Ataarchand guilty under S. 16(1) read with S. 7 of the Act and sentence it to pay a sine of Rs. 1000/- (One thousand) only within one month from today. 11. There is ample evidence of the second respondent having been in management of the firm's shop sitting on its gaddi and instructing the third respondent to receive the notice, sell the sample and receive payment and sign the receipt. We, there­fore, set aside his acquittal and hold the second respondent. Dulichand Jain, guilty under S. 16(1) read with S.7 of the Act. As regards his sentence, Mr. Jain submits that the occurrence took place as far back as on 12.5.73 and the judgment of acquittal was passed on 22. 9.75. Thus more then a decade has rolled by. Under such circumstances ends of justice and crime prevention may not justify sending of the second respondent to jail but he must pay a fine of Rs. Jain submits that the occurrence took place as far back as on 12.5.73 and the judgment of acquittal was passed on 22. 9.75. Thus more then a decade has rolled by. Under such circumstances ends of justice and crime prevention may not justify sending of the second respondent to jail but he must pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- (Rupees one thousand only) within one month from to-day, in default undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and we sentence him accordingly. While imposing less than the minimum sentence we bear in mind the fact that the offence was committed more than 11 years ago as was the case in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Tek Chand, AIR 1980 S. C. 360. In State of Assam vs. Ram Nagina Prasad, S.L.P. (Criminal) 3321 of 1980 decided on 10. 2. 84 their-Lordships of the Supreme Court were of the view that the High Court should not have acquitted the accused on the ground that the cognizance of the offence was taken rather late by the Magistrate. Yet their Lordships did not set aside the acquittal under Art. 136 having regard to the fact that the acquittal was as far back as in 1979 and the offence was said to have been committed in 1972. In the case in hand we have set aside the acquittal and convicted the second respondent in 1934 while the offence was committed in 1973 and he was acquitted on 22.9.75. 12. As the third respondent only acted as instructed by the second respondent, who contended that the former was not an employee of the firm we uphold the acquittal of the third respondent and dismiss the appeal against his acquittal. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed to the extent indi­cated above.