VASANTLAL CHHOTALAL KHANDWALA v. STATE — 1984 DIGILAW 96 (GUJ)

A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petition arises out of certain orders passed by the State Government under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The petitioner challenges the legality and validity of the order dated June 3 1983 passed by the Government. By this order the petitioner has been directed to maintain status quo in respect of the land of Athva Survey No. 3 plot No. 1 2 3 and the land of Ward No. 9 Entry No. 159 admeasuring 1691. 87 sq. mt. situated in Urban Agglomeration area of Surat. It is mentioned in the order that the Competent Authority and Addl. Collector Surat had granted permission as per order dated July 5 1980 That as per the material available on record it is contrary to law and therefore the Government has decided to take the proceedings in suo motu revision under Section 34 of the Act. Therefore. it is directed that the status quo be maintained till further orders. It is also stated in the order that the date of hearing and time shall be informed later on separately. The petitioner also challenges the legality and validity of a notice (Annexure `b to the petition) issued under the provisions of Section 8 (3) of the Act by the Competent Authority and Addl. Collector of Surat. By this notice a draft statement as per the provisions of Section 8 (1) of the Act has been sent to the petitioner and he has been informed to produce objections if any within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. ( 2 ) AS far as the notice dated December 15 1982 Annexure `b to the petition is concerned the counsel for the respondent-State has fairly conceded that the notice has been served through oversight and the same is not to be considered as a valid one. In view of the concession made by the counsel for the respondent-State the notice dated December 15 1982 (Annexure `b) is required to be treated as cancelled. Hence the challenge of the petitioner in the petition in so far as it relates to notice Annexure `b does not survive. Therefore the challenge to the order dated May/ June 3 1983 produced at Annexure `a to the petition requires to be examined. Hence the challenge of the petitioner in the petition in so far as it relates to notice Annexure `b does not survive. Therefore the challenge to the order dated May/ June 3 1983 produced at Annexure `a to the petition requires to be examined. ( 3 ) IT is the contention of the petitioner that he was not covered by the provisions of the Act inasmuch as he did not hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act. But out of abundant caution he had filled in the form under Section 6 (1) of the Act. According to the petitioner at the commencement of the Act his family comprised of himself and his wife Lataben and therefore in his statement under Section 6 (1) of the Act he declared also the vacant lands held by his wife Lataben. The details of the land held by him and his wife Lataben have been given in para 2. 1 of the petition. The wife of the petitioner Lataben had executed a will dated April 27 1979 She expired in Bombay on May 7 1979 The petitioner has stated that in view of the death of his wife he made representation dated May 21 1980 and pointed out the consequences ensuing on account of the death of his wife. Thereafter on July 5 1980 the Competent Authority under the Act came to the conclusion that the petitioner held vacant land admeasuring 1337. 85 sq. mt. which is below the ceiling limit of 1500 sq. mt. as applicable to the Urban Agglomeration area of Surat. Therefore the statement under Section 6 (1) of the Act was ordered to be filed. That order dated July 5 1980 has not been produced on record. However averments to this effect have been made in the petition. It is further contended by the petitioner that he had given a notice under Section 26 of the Act of intended transfer by way of sale of vacant lands held by him. The said notice of intended transfer was not accepted by the second respondent i. e. the Competent Authority on the ground that the land held by the petitioner was in excess of the ceiling limit. The said notice of intended transfer was not accepted by the second respondent i. e. the Competent Authority on the ground that the land held by the petitioner was in excess of the ceiling limit. As stated by the petitioner the petitioner has made certain transfers under the permission dated December 6 1982 granted by the second respondent i. e. Competent Authority and Addl. Collector Surat. Thereafter the case is sought to be taken in suo motu revision as per order dated May/june 3 1983 (Annexure `a ). This order has been challenged by the petitioner in the present petition. ( 4 ) IT is contended that the order at Annexure `a is an interim order. By this order the petitioner has been prohibited from transferring his land and he is directed to maintain status quo. It is further contended that the State Government has no jurisdiction to issue interim injunction order under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. The Government is not a court and therefore it cannot possess any inherent jurisdiction to issue interim orders. There is no express provision in the Act which empowers the Government to issue interim orders. Therefore contends the petitioner the order issued is without jurisdiction and should be treated as null and void. ( 5 ) THE contention so raised by the petitioner may be examined. Section 34 of the Act reads as follows :the State Government may on its own motion call for and examine the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under the provisions of this Act and against which no appeal has been preferred under Section 12 or Section 30 or Section 33 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such procedure and pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit;provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. FROM the reading of the Section it is abundantly clear that the Government has power to take in revision suo motu any order passed or proceeding taken under the provisions of the Act. The condition is that no appeal should have been preferred against such order under Section 12 or Section 30 or Section 33 of the Act. FROM the reading of the Section it is abundantly clear that the Government has power to take in revision suo motu any order passed or proceeding taken under the provisions of the Act. The condition is that no appeal should have been preferred against such order under Section 12 or Section 30 or Section 33 of the Act. The Government could take such order or proceeding in suo motu revision for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or property of such order or as to the regularity of such proceeding. However the Government cannot exercise this power except without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person affected. ( 6 ) IT is an undisputed Act that there were proceedings under the provisions of the Act in respect of the land held by the petitioner. The proceedings have been disposed of by the Competent Authority. No appeal has been preferred in this respect. No appeal is pending. The order passed by the Government which is sought to be challenged clearly states that the sanction granted by order dated July 5 1980 is contrary to the facts disclosed on record and it is also against the provisions of law. This is the reason why the Government has thought it fit to take the same in revision under Section 34 of the Act. No final order is pssed yet. Simply the decision to take the same into revision has been taken. Thus it is clear that the Government has power to take the proceedings into revision inasmuch as the proceedings have been disposed of by the Competent Authority under the Act and no appeal against the same has been preferred or pending. In this view of the matter the contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioner that the Government has no power to take the proceedings in revision suo motu has got to be rejected. ( 7 ) ONCE it is held that the Government has the power to take the matter in suo motu revision the question to be decided is whether the Government will have power to pass interim orders in such proceedings or not. The contention is that since there is no express power to pass interim orders conferred under the provisions of the Act the Government cannot issue such interim orders. The contention is that since there is no express power to pass interim orders conferred under the provisions of the Act the Government cannot issue such interim orders. For the purpose of determination of this question it would be necessary to look at the scheme and object of the Act. The object of the Act is: (1) (a) to impose ceiling on the vacant land under urban agglomeration; (b) acquisition of such land in excess of ceiling limit; (c) regulation of construction of buildings on such land and other matters connected thereo; (2) for the prevention of: (a) Concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons and; (b) prevention of speculation and profiteering therein; (3) For the purposes of equitable distribution of land in urban agglomeration to subserve the common good in furtherance of Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Directive Principles contained in the Constitution of India. For the purpose of carrying out the functions and duties conferred under the Act the Competent Authority is conferred with the powers under Section 31 The Competent Authority has all the powers of Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil procedure in respect of the matter of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; requiring the discovery and production of any documents; receiving evidence on affidavits; requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents and any other such matter which may be prescribed. Section 32 of the Act deals with the jurisdiction of the Competent Authority and Tribunal in special cases. Section 33 provides for appeal. Section 34 provides for suo motu revision by the State Government. ( 8 ) THE authorities under the Act are required to see that the objects with which the Act has been enacted are fulfilled. If the authorities under the Act do not possess the power to direct a person to maintain status quo the very purpose and the object of the Act and the proceedings under the Act would be frustrated. A person who is holding land in excess of ceiling limit would dispose of the land in a given case. He may start construction over the land and make the vacant land un-available for the purposes of calculation in the Act. A person who is holding land in excess of ceiling limit would dispose of the land in a given case. He may start construction over the land and make the vacant land un-available for the purposes of calculation in the Act. In this respect a reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sub-Divisional Officer Sadar Faizabad v. Shambhoo Narain Singh reported in AIR 1970 SC 140 . In para 8 of the judgment it is held that where an Act confers a jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. But before implying the existence of such a power the court must be satisfied that the existence of that power is absolutely essential for the discharge of the power conferred. If the Government has no power to issue interim orders operation of the Act and functioning under the Act would become impossible. The implementation of the Act would be at the mercy of the landholders in-asmuch as before the proceedings under the Act are finally concluded they may either transfer or make construction over the land and change the entire situation to the disadvantage of the society. There-fore it has got to be held that existence of power to pass interim orders has got to be implied or read. ( 9 ) IT is sought to be contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order at Annexure `a is an advance prohibitory order. The order is passed even before the Government has taken the proceedings in suo motu revision. There-fore in his submission even assuming that the Government has power to pass interim orders such an order cannot be passed in advance that is to say even before taking the proceedings in suo motu revision. The contention is not well founded. The order is passed even before the Government has taken the proceedings in suo motu revision. There-fore in his submission even assuming that the Government has power to pass interim orders such an order cannot be passed in advance that is to say even before taking the proceedings in suo motu revision. The contention is not well founded. If the order at Annexure `a is read properly it indicates the following things:1 That order is in respect of the proceeding by the Competent Authority under the Act;2 That the order is in respect of land held by the petitioner in respect of which by an order dated July 5 1980 sanction has been granted;3 That the sanction so granted as per the order dated July 5 1980 is found to be contrary to the facts on record and against the law;4 Therefore the Government has decided to take the same in revision under Section 34 of the Act;5 Till another order is passed the petitioner is directed to main status quo; and6 It is specifically mentioned that date and time of hearing in this respect shall be informed separately. ( 10 ) IF there is any ambiguity with regard to the fact that the proceedings by way of revision have been initiated by the Government or not it is dispelled by the last two lines of the order wherein it is specifically mentioned that the date of hearing and time shall be informed later on. This clearly indicates that the proceedings by way of revision have already been initiated. Therefore it is not correct to say that the impugned order is an advance prohibitory order. The order has been passed after the proceedings having been taken into suo motu revision. ( 11 ) IT was next contended by the counsel for the petitioner that after the period of about three years the proceedings are sought to be revised by exercising suo motu powers of the Government under Section 34 of the Act. The contention is that the powers under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act should have been exercised within a reasonable time and the length of reasonable time should be decided by referring to the provisions of period of limitation in the Act and by resorting to the provisions of Limitation Act. The contention is that the powers under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act should have been exercised within a reasonable time and the length of reasonable time should be decided by referring to the provisions of period of limitation in the Act and by resorting to the provisions of Limitation Act. In support of this contention the counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha reported in 10 GLR 992. In that case the question that arose before the Supreme Court was under Section 65 and Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In para 12 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:the question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of case and the nature of the order which is being revised. ( 12 ) IN the case arising out of the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code this High Court has referred to the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and has followed the principle laid down therein. They are the cases of Habib Nasir Khanji v. State 11 GLR 307 and Bhagwanji Bawanji v. State 12 GLR 156 The counsel for the petitioner has also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India reported in (1976) 2 Supreme Court Cases 181. On the basis of the position of law discussed in the aforesaid cases it can be easily seen that no period of limitation is implied or it is sought to be read in the provisions of the statute concerned. The Supreme Court has in terms referred to this power meaning there-by the power under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. But the Supreme Court has not laid down any general principle of universal applicability regarding the time limit within which the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised suo motu by the authority concerned in cases where no period of limitation has been prescribed under the statute. But the Supreme Court has not laid down any general principle of universal applicability regarding the time limit within which the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised suo motu by the authority concerned in cases where no period of limitation has been prescribed under the statute. The length of reasonableness of time within which the revisional powers can be exercised suo motu has to be determined having regard to the facts of the case and the nature of the order sought to be revised. Referring to the facts of the case prima facie it does appear that the revisional authority has found that the order passed by the Competent Authority is contrary to the material on record and contrary to the provisions of law. Further investigation of facts is within the jurisdiction of the revisional authority. As far as the nature of the order sought to be revised is concerned it may be noted that the order passed under the provisions of the Act have socio-economic consequences. The nature of the proceedings under the provisions of Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and the nature of the proceedings under the Act is quite different. Both the Acts operate in different fields. The proceedings under Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and the orders that may be passed in that connection by the appropriate authority under the Bombay Land Revenue Code have essentially individual consequences pertaining to the individual property rights of the person concerned. In cases of the proceedings under the Act and the orders passed under the provisions of the Act the consequences are not likely to be confined to individual property rights. But they will have socio-economic consequences inasmuch as the very object of the Act is to impose ceiling on the vacant land and to acquire the land in excess of the ceiling limit with a view to prevent concentration of urban lands in the hands of few persons and to prevent speculation and profiteering in urban land. The Act is enacted with a view to secure equitable distribution of land in urban agglomeration so as to subserve the common good. The Act is enacted with a view to secure equitable distribution of land in urban agglomeration so as to subserve the common good. Thus having regard to the nature of the order and the consequences that flow there-from the same yardsticks with regard to the length of the reasonable time as may be applied to the cases of suo motu exercise of revisional powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code cannot be made applicable in cases where suo motu exercise of powers is resorted to by the Government under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. Moreover the facts of the case and further details with regard to the nature of the orders can be placed before the revisional authority and the revisional authority can come to its own conclusions on these aspects. At this stage it is not necessary to exercise the extraordinary powers of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in this petition. The revisional authority can always decide the question of facts as to whether there is inordinate delay as contended by the petitioner or not. Here it may be pointed out that as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of S. B. Gurbaksh Singh (supra) what is important is that the power bestowed upon an authority should be exercised in a reasonable manner and within reasonable time. The time element enters into consideration only from the limited point of view to see as to whether it is a genuine exercise of power. The exercise of power must be reasonable and the reasonableness would in its sweep include the time element also. However this does not mean that there is a period of limitation for exercise of such power. Here again it may be noted that the time within which the power can be exercised would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In this view of the matter the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner that the exercise of power by the Government after a period of three years should per se be held to be illegal cannot be accepted. This also being a question of fact is required to be examined by the appropriate authority. In this view of the matter the contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner that the exercise of power by the Government after a period of three years should per se be held to be illegal cannot be accepted. This also being a question of fact is required to be examined by the appropriate authority. ( 13 ) IT was next contended by the counsel for the petitioner that once the land is sold away by the petitioner permission cannot be revised. According to the counsel for the petitioner permission ceases to have been in existence after the land is sold. In such cases according to the learned counsel for the petitioner it would amount to setting aside the sale. The argument may be examined. No hard and fast rule can be laid down that once the sale has been effected permission cannot be revised at all. It is surely an important circumstance which may be taken into consideration by the revisional authority while deciding the revision one way or another. But it cannot be said as a general rule that once the land in respect of which permission is granted is sold away no proceedings can be taken into suo motu revision thereafter. In a given case it may even amount to setting aside the sale. In such cases at the most it would be necessary for the revisional authority to hear the person who is likely to be affected by the order that may be ultimately passed. If this constraint is to be implied or is required to be read on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction it would be easy for any party to take away the power conferred upon the revisional authority by the Legislature. In some cases same may be effected on the next day or say within a period of one or two months. Then can it be said that even if the sale has been effected next day even so only on the ground that the third party has purchased the land in question the revisional authority would be denuded of its power ? If that be the position the transferer and the transferee would become the determining the factors for deciding as to whether the revisional authority should be allowed to retain its power or should be denuded of the same. If that be the position the transferer and the transferee would become the determining the factors for deciding as to whether the revisional authority should be allowed to retain its power or should be denuded of the same. There is nothing in the provision of the Act which permits such constraint to be read on the powers of the revisional authority. ( 14 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner relied upon the following two decisions in support of the aforesaid contention:1 Jayantilal v. B. M. Gandhi 6 GLR 3372 State of Bombay v. Chhaganlal Gangaram Lavar 56 BLR 1084. On the basis of the aforesaid two decisions it was contended that once the sale is executed and the contract of sale becomes complete the revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised. The aforesaid two cases are in respect of the powers of the State Government under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In both these cases the facts clearly show that the State Government itself has entered into contract with the citizens. Once in pursuance of the order passed by the lower authority the State Government entered into a contract with the citizens and the contract of sale becomes complete the powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code cannot be invoked and the sale which has become complete cannot be set aside unilaterally. This is the principle laid down in the aforesaid two cases. In the instant case first of all the question is not of exercise of revisional power under the provisions of Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In the instant case we are concerned with the provisions of the Act the object of which is radically different than that of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Secondly the sale is not with the State Government or by the State Government. The sale is between two private individuals. Ultimately if it turns out that the sale is in contravention of the provisions of law the law must take its own course. Those who purchase the land covered by the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act must be aware of the powers of the State Government to take up the proceedings in suo motu revision. Ultimately if it turns out that the sale is in contravention of the provisions of law the law must take its own course. Those who purchase the land covered by the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act must be aware of the powers of the State Government to take up the proceedings in suo motu revision. If the exercise of power is reasonable then the party selling the land or purchasing the land can-not dispute that the Government has no power to exercise its suo motu jurisdiction simply on the ground that the sale has been effected. However this will certainly be an important circumstance to be taken into consideration by the revisional authority. The Revisional Authority is required to give hearing to the person who is likely to be affected. This is one of the requirements of the Section as laid down in the Proviso. But the existence of such circumstance would not negative the power of the Revisional Authority. Hence the contention that once the land is sold away after the grant of permission the permission granted earlier cannot be revised has got to be rejected. ( 15 ) IN above view of the matter the petition is rejected. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief granted on August 24 1983 and later on confirmed stands vacated. The counsel for the petitioner requests that the interim order granted by this Court earlier be continued for a period of 15 days to enable him to approach the superior forum as may be available to him. The request cannot be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case inasmuch as the petitioner has been directed to maintain status quo only. If the petitioner does not disturb the status quo for some time more there will be no injury whatsoever to him. Hence this prayer is rejected. Petition rejected. .