Order The 6th accused (wife of the 2nd accused) in C.C.No.25 of 1983, on the file of the VIII Additional Special Judge, Madras, has filed this application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the proceedings against her. 2. The Special Police Establishment (C.B.I.) Madras filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner and 7 others for offences under Section 120-B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 5(2); of the Prevention of Corruption Act, alleging that all the accused entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit cheating and forgery and in pursuance of the same, made a fraudulent claim from the New India Assurance Company on a policy created in the name of the petitioner's son Bakthavatsalam who died on 29.9.1977 at the General Hospital, Madras, following an electric train accident on 28.9.1977. The 1st accused is the Development Officer of the Insurance Company. The 2nd accused is the husband of the petitioner and he was the Regional Manager of the Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation. The 8th accused is the Junior Inspector of the Insurance Company. 3. The gist of the charge is that on the death of the petitioner's son in an accident, the petitioner alongwith the other accused, created false documents and false insurance policy as the deceased had a Janatha Life Insurance Policy alive on the date of his death and made a false claim and obtained pecuniary advantage to the tune of Rs.12,000/-. Accused 3 and 4 in the case filed petitions before the Special Judge praying that they may be taken as approvers and their request was accepted and pardon was tendered under Section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. Now, the petitioner (6th accused) contends that the Special Judge cannot invoke Section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of tendering pardon to accused 3 and 4 and that taking of approvers is essentially the task of the investigating agency. In other words, the trial Court had taken the role of a prosecutor and tendered pardon and, therefore, it is without jurisdiction. Thus, the entire proceedings are vitiated and should be quashed. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor. Section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with tender of pardon to accomplices. In other words, the trial Court had taken the role of a prosecutor and tendered pardon and, therefore, it is without jurisdiction. Thus, the entire proceedings are vitiated and should be quashed. 5. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor. Section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with tender of pardon to accomplices. It says that the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, and the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence. But sub-clause (2) of Section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code, recites that ‘this section applies to any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by the Court of a Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952’. Now, the only ground on which the petitioners seek to have the proceedings quashed is that the learned Judge has granted pardon to Accused 3 and 4 without any authority, and he is not one of the authorities competent to grant pardon under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. In the first place, the regularity or otherwise of a pardon is a question of fact which must necessarily involve letting in of evidence. This stage has not yet reached. It is settled law that the act of tendering pardon cannot be interfered with by High Court. vide Chinnappa IN RE. (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 790: (1966) 2 MLJ. 445: A.I.R.1967 Mad. 351. Secondly, the Special Judge who is seized of the case is empowered to tender pardon with a view to obtaining evidence of any person directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the offence. Section 8(2); of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act has been specifically enacted to confer such a power on a Special Judge even in the course of a trial of a case before him. But, the question whether he had the necessary materials before him to decide the option to tender pardon to an accused is again one of fact which only the evidence will unfold. But, the question whether he had the necessary materials before him to decide the option to tender pardon to an accused is again one of fact which only the evidence will unfold. Section 8(2); of the said Act enables the Special Judge to tender pardon to a person with a view to obtaining evidence relevant and necessary to the offence under trial. In this case, inasmuch as the learned Judge has tendered person to two of the accused before him, it follows that the trial of the case has to be done by some other Special Judge and not by the same Judge who tendered the pardon. As such, there can be no question of the trial being vitiated by any illegality. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners commented upon the mention of Section 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the proceedings of the learned Sub-Judge. The fact that he proceeded to tender pardon to two of the accused before him clearly shows that the learned Judge has been acting only under Section 8 (2) ; of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act and not under the Criminal Procedure Code, and a mere mention of a wrong provision of law in the order or a non-mention of a proper section will not be enough to invalidate the proceedings. To reiterate, in this case, the learned Judge had only exercised the powers under Section 8 (2); of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1932 and so an order tendering pardon cannot be interfered with by the High Court. No other point has been raised in this petition, and therefore, the petition is dismissed. The stay already granted is vacated. B.S. ----- Petition dismissed.